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“Risk society is a catastrophic society.” 
Ulrich Beck, 1992
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
_______________________________________ 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
It seems that disasters and large-scale ones in particular, are becoming an inevitable part 
of modern societies. Such calamities as typhoons, vast earthquakes and strong tsunamis 
are taking place all over the world, endangering the lives of people and their 
possessions. Indeed, a disaster can be considered a disaster if a natural or manmade 
hazard is coming in touch with, and is devastating human, cultural and economic assets. 
As an example of a large-scale event shaking the world we may mention the recent 
earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 in Asia, the hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
in the United States (Autumn 2005) and the vast earthquake in Pakistan (October 2005). 
But let us take a look at the following:  
• The Chernobyl accident occurred on April 26, 1986 in Ukraine (then part of the 
Soviet Union), when the unit 4 reactor of the Chernobyl power plant suffered a 
catastrophic steam explosion that resulted in a fire, a series of additional 
explosions, and a nuclear meltdown. It is regarded as the worst accident in the 
history of nuclear power. Because there was no containment building, a plume of 
radioactive fallout drifted over parts of the western Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and the Eastern United States. Large areas of 
Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia were badly contaminated, resulting in the 
evacuation and resettlement of roughly 200.000 people. 
• The September 11th 2001 attacks are among the most significant events to have 
occurred so far in the 21st century in terms of the profound political, 
psychological, and economic effects that followed in the United States and many 
other parts of the world. Then, a series of coordinated attacks upon the United 
States was performed, in which a total of nineteen hijackers simultaneously took 
control of four U.S. domestic commercial airliners, crashing airplanes into the 
World Trade Centre in Manhattan, New York City — both of which collapsed, 
and the U.S. Department of Defence headquarters, the Pentagon, in Arlington 
County, Virginia. The official count records 2.986 deaths in the attacks.  
• In August of 2002 a 100-year flood caused by over a week of continuous heavy 
rains ravaged Europe, killing dozens, dispossessing thousands, and causing 
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damages of billions of euros in the Czech Republic, Austria, Germany, Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, Romania and Croatia.1 
• The 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake, which seismic moment magnitude was valued 
at least 9,0 on the scale of Richter, killed following various sources up to 285.000 
people (Lay, et al., 2005), making it one of the deadliest disasters in modern 
history.  
• The Kashmir earthquake 2005 was a major seismological disturbance, registered 
7,6 on the moment magnitude scale of Richter. The Pakistani government's 
official death toll was 87.350. Some, however, estimate that the death toll could 
reach over 100.000. 
• The official death toll of hurricane Katrina (2005) is estimated at 1.325 and over a 
million people displaced. Devastating the city of New Orleans, the damage is 
estimated to be from $70 to $130 billion, making Katrina the most expensive 
natural disaster in U.S. history. Hurricane Rita was the seventeenth named tropical 
storm, ninth hurricane, fifth major hurricane, and second Category 5 hurricane of 
the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season.  
The size of the event is the distinguishing feature that unites all these adversities, 
characterised by vast devastation to physical property as well as often stunningly high 
human losses. The unprecedented rage of these events makes them appear on the top of 
the agenda of both public and academic debate. A number of questions arise in this 
respect, however. Some of the most obvious are: Are these devastating events to happen 
again in the future? How vulnerable are we to such events if they hit us again? Can we 
prevent such calamities from happening in the future? And: can we prepare ourselves to 
these events? 
These questions, although they may seem simple, raise fundamental issues of 
attitude towards disasters in contemporary societies. We may notice that risk, and 
especially very low risk (of a very big event) is treated differently by individuals than, 
say, prospects for benefits or the chance of good luck. This phenomenon was first 
observed by Kahneman and Tversky as a duality of decision making (see Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). The so-called ‘certainty effect’ (described as giving less weight to 
outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to outcomes that are realized with 
certainty), following the authors, contributes to risk aversion in situations involving 
certain gains, and to risk seeking in situations involving certain losses. According to 
prospect theory, people tend to underestimate the risk of losses (in our case, an unlikely 
but still possible disaster). Even more (ibid, p.286) “small probabilities of disaster are 
sometimes entirely ignored.” The consequence of this is that individuals (who, after all, 
are society’s constituents) do not properly prepare for an adversity, and are completely 
taken by surprise when it strikes; a phenomenon that was directly observed in the recent 
case of hurricane Katrina (2005) devastating the city of New Orleans. This drama has 
taught us that the awareness of disasters as small chance-high consequence events 
should be raised in order to help avoid future failures. Actions to be taken should in the 
first instance include gaining insight into the processes behind a disaster in an 
established complex system, followed by a priori scanning of potential directions in 
which the economy may develop after a shock. However, it is not possible to think 
                                               
1
 A 100-year flood means that a flood of this intensity may be expected to occur, on average, once every 
100 years. 
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about steering socio-economic adjustments and recovery without intimate knowledge of 
the nature of a disaster. This particular issue has become the pivotal point for the 
commencement of our inquiry. We shall start with that. 
 
1.2. DISASTERS AS A ‘THEME’ 
A study of the impact of natural disasters as a multidisciplinary effort requires 
knowledge of the laws of nature, the engineering properties of physical structures, the 
working of economic systems, the sociology and psychology of individuals, the 
institutional settings and the political processes behind the planning and implementation 
of precautionary measures, recovery, and reconstruction – in short, a multitude of 
disciplines and sub-disciplines. In this thesis, we shall concentrate on only one such 
dimension, namely the economic side of the ‘narrative’ behind a disaster. However, we 
should be aware that influences from all these other fields make themselves felt in the 
economic sphere. Occasionally we shall encounter them.   
We shall proceed this Chapter with the justification and the problem statement for 
our research, followed by the description of the general research design formulating the 
scope, aim, research questions and our ‘philosophy’ behind disaster modelling. We shall 
conclude with a general outline of the thesis. 
 
1.2.1. Why the Need for Such a Study? 
The current study covers the modelling of major disasters, i.e. events of a scale that 
have rarely taken place before. One of the questions that may come up with respect to 
the chosen domain of research is: why care about such peculiar, uncommon, almost 
abnormal events if these are unlikely to happen? Or: why should we bother about the 
methodology for loss estimation if most probably we shall never experience a disaster in 
real? This is a fair question, to which US National Research Council (1999, p.39) 
provides a clear answer: 
“…ex post measurement by itself does not directly address the […] primary 
purposes […] for quantifying indirect effects. Determining appropriate amounts 
of resources for victims of disasters cannot wait until after a disaster […] 
Valuing mitigation requires estimation of expected loss savings over time. 
Measurement of actual losses from one particular event contributes only limited 
information for that purpose. Finally, planning emergency response necessarily 
must precede a disaster.” 
Provided this, we may justify our choice of subject on the grounds that exploration 
of major disaster consequences is a vitally important task for contemporary societies in 
view of their sustainable development2 objectives (see Brundtland Report (UN, 1987), 
as well as UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, UN\ISDR 2001). However 
                                               
2
 Here we interpret the term ‘sustainability’ in the way it is generally understood today, i.e. as meeting the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, here 
following the UN Brundtland Report (1987), p.54. Sustainability is a helpful concept to be employed in 
thinking about major disasters, especially if linked to the concepts of mitigation, adaptation and 
resilience, which will be discusses later in this thesis. 
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unusual a catastrophe may seem to be, its arrival cannot be completely excluded and we 
cannot afford ignoring that. In this context, we also should refer to the precautionary 
principle (see World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology, COMEST, 2005). According to this principle, an activity should not be 
undertaken if one may expect that it will bring substantial or irreversible negative 
effects. In the case of disasters, one can also interpret it in a slightly different manner, 
i.e. in terms of activities or policies that have to be implemented, because idleness 
(‘doing nothing’) may lead to an incident, the consequences of which cannot be 
precisely estimated in advance, but may be expected to have serious negative or even 
irreversible effects on the entire economy or society. At the moment that it does happen, 
it will be too late to think of how it could have been prevented or how we could have 
prepared for it. In order not to play blind, we have to be aware of the scenarios with the 
worst expected outcomes. Indeed, therefore we need an in-depth study about the 
expected effects and consequences of major calamities. 
Another question to ask is whether we do need a different kind of analysis of 
large-scale disturbances; that is, when compared with the number of studies on 
perturbations of a more conventional (‘marginal’) scale. For this, we shall again consult 
the US National Research Council (1999, p.40):  
“The abruptness, impermanence, and often unprecedented intensity of a natural 
disaster does not fit the (usual) event pattern upon which most regional 
economic models are based”.  
We may take this to suggest that we need new ways of thinking about disastrous 
events on a grand-scale. The nature of a disaster presumes substantial harm being 
brought to a socio-economic system, thereby propagating an uncommon disturbance 
throughout the entire system. This feature of an aggravating force is shared by almost 
all major calamities. In fact, as we shall show, it forces us to adopt a different kind of 
models in order to analyse the essence of these occurrences.  
Finally, one may wonder, however, whether the field of disaster analysis exists at 
all. The point here is that because economic ‘catastrophe theory’ is a compound of 
studies carried out by scholars of many backgrounds, the existence of a field itself can 
be questioned. To this end, Alexander (1997, p.297) claims that so far one may observe 
that: 
“Disaster studies involve a distinctive amalgam of academic and practical 
considerations, theoretical and applied concepts, social and physical sciences, 
natural and technological phenomena, and structural and non-structural 
mitigation methods. The field has benefited from the tension of opposites created 
by these dualities, but development has been held back by the contradictions that 
they imply.” 
This observation about the fragmentation within disaster studies into sub-fields 
and specialisation has a number of implications according to Alexander (ibid, p.298). 
Among others, he mentions first that due to a lack of adequate cross-disciplinary 
training, what he calls ‘the wheel of disasterology’ is constantly being reinvented by 
specialised practitioners and academics who are unaware of previous work outside their 
own field. Next, there are few agreed standards and there is no consensus on the body of 
general knowledge on disasters. Finally, failure to appreciate developments in the fields 
other than one’s own means that attitudes are not steadily re-calibrated and innovations 
in theory are not easily propagated.  
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Views like the above have strengthened our opinion that the field of disaster 
analysis is not a coherent one, yet is emerging and will need time to maturate into a full-
fledged academic field. In the meanwhile, however, the lack of consistency and 
communication between researchers has in fact caused a number of problems. 
Alexander (ibid) points to the following ones: in the modern world, death tolls have not 
fallen dramatically in response to improved mitigation; large-scale transfer of 
technology has not occurred, and more generally, disaster relief has not been adequately 
combined with mitigation and economic development. This is in particular true with 
respect to developing countries rather than developed ones, where these findings should 
receive a more nuanced interpretation. However, the threat of high victim tolls is still 
present in modern economies, where advanced defence measures often have created a 
feeling of false security, thereby stimulating the inflow of economic assets as well as 
inhabitants to the hazard prone areas. Examples are the inhabitants of New Orleans, 
‘unexpectedly’ hit by hurricane Katrina; and the high damage potential (both human and 
economic) in the Western parts of the Netherlands, where polders reach a depth of 5 to 
6 meter below the sea level, and flood standards are, in some places, set to as high as 
once in 10.000 years. These issues, in particular connected to the case of the 
Netherlands, will be addressed in detail in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis. We may see 
from the above that both theoretical and practical dimensions of disaster management 
have suffered because of a lack of development in the field. This thesis is an attempt to 
provide an integrated analysis and augment to the body of knowledge in disaster 
research, and in particular the studies of the economic consequences of major 
adversities, thereby focusing on those circumstances where economic structure and size 
or scale of the disaster meet.  
 
1.2.2. What is the Problem? 
There are at least three reasons, as we have just mentioned, to initiate research in the 
field of disaster analysis. However, there are many paths to follow, and one needs a 
certain lead to select a particular direction for an inquiry. For us, this lead was provided 
by the realisation that there was a fundamental problem at hand. This awareness was 
triggered by a project in which we were involved in the early stages of our work.   
This research originated from a case study of the economic consequences of 
natural disasters in the framework of the Delft Cluster Project3 “Consequences of 
Flooding”, under the research theme “Risk due to flooding” that was finished by July 
2003 (see Delft Cluster Reports: Van der Veen et al., 2003b; Roos and Roos et al., 
2003; Gautam and Van der Hoek, 2003; Reinders and Ham, 2003; Stuyt et al., 2003; 
Asselman and Jonkman, 2003; Jonkman, 2003; Asselman and Heynert, 2003; Krom and 
Goovaerts, 2003; Galanti, 2003; Calle, Knoeff and Verheij, 2003; Van Mierlo et al., 
2003).4 The project team, next to ourselves, included colleagues from the Public Works 
                                               
3
 Delft Cluster (DC) is a research cluster that includes six beta-institutes (Delft Technical University, 
TNO, Delft Hydraulics, Geo Delft, KIWA and UNESCO-IHE) advancing the knowledge and offering 
expertise in the issues that are found on the crux of nature, culture and infrastructure. The Cluster has six 
core research themes, namely, Soil and structure; Risk due to flooding; Urban infrastructure; Subsurface 
management; Integrated water resource management; and Technical knowledge management. More 
information can be found on the website of Delft Cluster, www.delftcluster.nl. 
4
 These reports are also available online from http://www.library.tudelft.nl/delftcluster/. 
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Department, Ministry of Transport, Public Work and Water Management 
(Rijkswaterstaat), TU Delft, TNO Bouw, WL Delft Hydraulics, GeoDelft, Alterra, 
Delphiro and CSO. Various aspects of disaster consequences were studied; inter alia, 
the hydrological, environmental and geophysical ones, human loss, construction failure, 
and others. The task of the Twente group, in which the present author took part, was to 
outline a methodology for economic damage estimation and to provide a calculation of 
expected loss based on the hydraulic simulation of a hypothetical flood in the province 
of South Holland (we shall return to this study in Chapter 7). This meant, that already 
from the very beginning of the trajectory, alongside with getting acquainted with the 
literature in the field, we had to deal with empirics-related inquiries.   
The assessment of expected damage figures on this hypothetical case was most 
revealing. The study illuminated that there was a lack of common methodological 
ground for economic damage assessment, which meant that a generally accepted 
interpretation of the disaster situation was not (yet) available. Being confronted with 
this, we decided to direct our efforts at the exploration of the issues in depth after the 
Delft Cluster Project was over. We started to look for ways to develop an integrated 
theoretical framework5 capable of a consistent reflection of possible events and 
respective choices to be made at each stage of the disaster drama. This goal has 
determined the course of our further research.  
The exploration of literature concerning economic consequences of natural 
disasters provided the definitive orientation of this research towards further 
methodological inquiry into economic damage estimation. This revealed a wide 
diversity of research in terms of models used, damage definitions applied, and purposes 
served. The existence of these differences across the studies certainly undermined the 
comparability, and in some cases, also the validity of results. Another point was the 
identification of ‘weak spots’ at which contemporary models fall short behind the 
research needs. The connection between the theoretical framework and empirical work 
was not always clear, especially in the representation of the spatial dimension of 
catastrophic events. The interpretation and application of theoretical concepts in 
empirical assessment varied greatly among various scholars (where a particularly severe 
situation appeared to have emerged around the conceptualisation of the concepts of 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ loss), as well as transparency in model formulation was 
sometimes missing. 
Simultaneously, we discovered that the need for in-depth research in the field of 
severe unscheduled events grows, fuelled by the rising awareness of societies about 
climate change and its possible implications. For example, Boorsma (2005), providing a 
reflection on the evolution of the modern welfare state under the conditions of climate 
change, greying of population and terrorism threats, warns about the unprecedented 
scale and pace at which those risks are developing. In fact, the search for answers seems 
to have resulted in a growing gap between the needs to solve the problem of major 
disasters and their consequences, and the insufficient capacity to tackle it.  
                                               
5
 A number of authors plea for integrative approaches in hazard management. For example, Hoekstra, 
(2005) claims that water management in the context of globalisation, climate change and increasing 
uncertainties cannot be considered as a subject of engineering solutions apart from the broader framework 
of sustainable development.  
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1.2.3. Our Vision 
We decided to take a fresh look at the issues at hand, thereby necessarily abstracting 
from many specific aspects (to avoid too big scope at this level). We shall start from an 
interpretation of the pre-disaster situation in terms of the well-known economic circular 
flow concept. This, we believe, should provide the necessary benchmark position for 
further analysis. The need for analysis on the larger scale, like a region or a country, has 
dictated us the choice of the scope of our study with a focus on the meso-macro level of 
industrial activity. For this, the circular flow concept will be employed as a ‘platform’ 
through its notion of uninterrupted (circular) flow, which provides the backbone for 
studying the destruction brought about by a big disaster.   
Subsequently, we interpret the economic impact of a catastrophe in terms of the 
disruptions of the pre-disaster circular flow.6 These disruptions have a multitude of 
consequences. They mean, e.g., that expected final (consumption) demand will not be 
available. Other consequences are that those hoping for a job will not find employment, 
and, hence, will not receive a regular wage. So, parts of final consumer demand that 
have been produced will not find their hoped for buyers. Simultaneously, many of those 
who suffered a loss, will look for solutions to improve their situations. Finally, all these 
effects again have a momentum of their own, thereby laying claims on still available or 
accessible resources at an unprecedented scale (more about that later).  
Thus, we shall look at the disaster’s impact in terms of disruptions of the pre-
disaster circular flow of goods and services. Therefore, we need to find a way of 
looking at the economy that can capture this notion satisfactorily. To this end, and 
perhaps surprisingly, we shall employ a model that stresses interactions; that is, 
circularity. This leads us to a search for frameworks that would be able to express the 
myriads of interconnections in a modern industrialized society including the 
‘translation’ of these interconnections into ‘products’ like economic surplus and net 
output. This again leads us to a so-called inter-industry or input-output type of models 
where industries or sectors form the productive core. To be more precise, we arrive at a 
multi-sector type of model based on the technological properties of industries. That is, 
we will be looking at industries in terms of their production functions, and, more 
concretely, the way these production functions interlock. The technology ‘in place’ 
therefore provides much of the necessary structure to trace the pattern of physical 
disturbances that are at the hart of our exploration.    
At the same time, we also shall look at what may be called social or institutional 
rigidities. These have not (yet) found a solid place within today’s catastrophe literature. 
Yet, we feel that these are most important in interpreting the effects of a disaster. The 
term shall be used by us to distinguish specific regularities that play a dominant role in 
modern economies. One such rigidity concerns our level of consumption. In our modern 
societies, this level plays the role of a kind of anchor, in the sense that large 
fluctuations, possibly due to external circumstances, are to be avoided, even at large 
efforts. A similar role is played by the ‘imperative’ of employment. Keeping and 
restoring employment opportunities belongs to the most important tasks for nearly any 
government in a disaster’s aftermath. In our modelling efforts, in the later Chapters, we 
shall repeatedly come back to this.   
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 Clearly, this approach presupposes the existence of a well-established accounting system, that provides 
a good reflection of the actual economic activity. 
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We are facing other issues. As said, actually we shall be looking at disruptions, so 
at a lack of interrelations caused by the disaster. Here technology (thus) provides the 
core, and losses can be described in real terms. However, we also should be able to 
express ‘costs’ in a money terms. That is, we should be able to analyse the disruptions 
in terms of monetary flows. But then, how to think about ‘disruptions’? Actually, we are 
entering an area that is thus far a partial terra incognita.   
We shall also discuss economic models. These will be models of the meso-level, 
focusing on interactions at the industry and inter-industry levels. This choice is 
deliberate because both the macro-level, with its focus on the national aggregates, and 
the micro-level, with its focus in the individual person or agent, are not entirely 
appropriate to address questions of preparation for, and dealing with the risks of really 
big disasters. To that end, one most urgently needs a model type that enables the 
researcher to focus on what may be its most characteristic property, i.e. the disruption of 
existing interactions. To that end, a most important candidate family of models is 
provided by the now available input-output models. However, these models also have 
certain drawbacks. In fact, they are, despite their ‘level’, somewhat unlikely candidates.  
The problem is that much of modern input-output analysis deals with impact 
studies in so-called open input-output models. This type of model is an excellent vehicle 
for determining the ultimate effects of changes in consumer demand on employment, 
imports, and other affected categories. The ‘bridge’ is provided by reasonably stable 
patterns in inter-sector or interindustry trade. So, in the standard approach we rather are 
looking at ‘interaction’, not ‘disruption’. As we shall show, to study disruptions in the 
industrial networks, we shall have to go back to the basic building block, the sector’s 
production function. As we shall see, this will provide a means to analyse the changes in 
inter-sectoral trade as a consequence of the catastrophe. Interestingly, to study 
disruptions, we shall go back to very early input-output forms introduced by Wassily 
Leontief in the 1930s, the so-called closed ones (Leontief, 1936, 1937). The closed 
models in particular stress man’s dependence on the entire economy in producing his 
consumption basket and, most importantly, in providing the desired jobs. In our view, 
closed models are better in bringing to the fore the many dependencies that exist in 
modern economies. Unfortunately, the now available theoretical apparatus is not very 
developed. This is the reason why we devote much attention to this issue building up 
our model in Chapter 6. In fact, we start from the open model, but for the adapted input-
output disequilibrium transformation that we offer, we essentially ‘close’ the system. 
Disruptions or imbalances, when interpreted in terms of stable proportions, may be 
seen in way that some goods are overproduced while others are underproduced. There 
literally is no balance anymore in the economy in the sense that quantities demanded 
equal quantities supplied. We even may have to ask if previously existing productive 
activities are still there. This actually points at a different problem to address, and to a 
different model tradition. (We recall that the Leontief input-output model informs us 
about the outputs needed to produce a specific ‘surplus’, i.e. final demand. It does not 
have the possibility to inform us about disproportions in the light of a specific societal 
goal). Actually, there is an alternative approach, going back to Von Neumann (1945/46) 
that has a different philosophy, although the basic ideas were put forward already in the 
1920s and ‘30s. Von Neumann was the first to deal with growth problems in a multi-
sector setting. He thereby focused on one very special type of growth, i.e. balanced or 
proportional growth throughout the economy, that is, a case where all industries grow at 
the same rate. Von Neumann showed that normally there exists one particular uniform 
growth rate. What makes his approach interesting for us is that he, concentrating on 
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finding the right inter-sectoral proportions for balanced growth, also showed that, in the 
light of this particular goal, some industries become superfluous in the sense that their 
products are not needed in the produced amounts. This implies that these industries may 
oversupply, and that their products, now redundant past a certain quantity, will receive a 
price zero. Stated somewhat differently, most importantly, we can also derive that 
certain industries are the real bottlenecks to growth, which is the other side of the 
‘overproduction’ coin. That is, the overall growth rate could be higher if their output 
could be increased.  
There is an interesting methodological background underlying Von Neumann 
approach. This goes back to a view put forward by Schlesinger at the mathematical 
Seminar conducted in Vienna in the early 1930s. Koopmans (1951, pp1-2) mentions 
that Schlesinger formulated a suggestion, also made by Zeuthen, that economic theory 
should not only explain nonnegative prices and quantities, but should also explain 
which goods are scarce and which are free (many earlier had concentrated on systems of 
equations which should produce the desired nonnegative outcomes for quantities and 
prices). Von Neumann accomplished a quite different task. He introduced alternative 
methods of producing a specific good, and allowed for joint production. He obtained 
statements on goods (which are free and which are not), but also on the available 
technologies (which are used and which are not used). Also, he firmly established the 
notion of a circular flow as a situation where commodities are simultaneously inputs 
and outputs in an interconnected system of production relation. Because no outside 
inputs or resources were required for, the model became a closed one. In this sense, Von 
Neumann’s model is quite different from Leontief’s. Von Neumann’s model has always 
been used to study expanding economies. Most interestingly, as we shall see, it can also 
be used for studying contracting economies, as in the case of economies that have 
experienced a severe blow, see also Kemeny, Morgenstern and Thompson (1956) and 
Morgenstern and Thompson (1976).7 
Later on, in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the balanced growth model provided 
benchmark scenarios for growth studies employing the turnpike idea.8 In those models, 
labour is treated just the same as all the other productive resources; i.e., it may either be 
oversupplied resulting in unemployment, or be undersupplied acting as a bottleneck. 
This aspect seems to be of particular use for us in economic disaster analysis, where 
people, treated here as a production factor, and (distorted) employment opportunities in 
the immediate calamity aftermath may not match. This means that human resources are 
not used to their utmost because of unavailability of jobs, in turn implying that those 
without jobs do not have the means to sustain themselves; both are a problem and need 
a solution. 
The multi-sector models we shall discuss are known for their ‘rigidity’. That is, 
the production functions are of the so-called limitational type. One property of such 
functions is that price changes do not induce substitutions between input categories; the 
technology is fixed, unlike technology in neo-classical production functions. (So, if an 
industry wants to react on price changes, it has to adopt an alternative technology, 
which then –hopefully- is available).  
                                               
7
 Seed also Chacko (1976) for additional detail on the historical background of Von Neumann’s model.   
8
 The turnpike theories of the 1960s and 1970s discussed so-called fastest routes towards goals such as 
reaching full employment, increasing consumption per head or a better distribution of incomes; see e.g. 
Tsukui and Murakami (1979)  
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However, next to technological rigidities, there also are what we shall call 
‘institutional rigidities’. We shall give these an interpretation somewhat different from 
the well-known organizational or governance rigidities such as analyzed in the New 
Institutional Economics (see e.g. Williamson, 2000; Menard and Shirley, 2005, and 
many others). In fact, we shall stay rather close to the models at hand. The background 
of our decision to introduce this wider type of rigidities is given by motivation that if we 
think about disaster and recovery, we must take into account that labour and industries 
are quite different in terms of their pre- and post-disaster characteristics. Labour is, in a 
sense, much more mobile than most industries can be. In cases where sufficient warning 
time is available, labour often has survived to an amazing extent. However, we shall 
focus below on two aspects that are dominant factors in any economy. The first one is 
that households’ consumption demand remains remarkably constant over the years. 
Following neo-classical economic theory reasoning, this can be seen as consumers, 
having chosen a basket of goods that maximises their utility, keep consuming it. 
Keeping this in mind shall be a determining factor in our research. The other factor 
concerns the ‘dogma’ of full employment. Whichever vicissitudes an economy may 
suffer, full employment always is at the top of its priorities. Later on in this thesis, these 
two factors will be the determining elements for the post-disaster recovery trajectory. 
(In this sense, it replaces Von Neumann’s proportional growth objective). In model 
terms, this leads us to a model that is ‘intermediate’ between Leontief and Von 
Neumann. With its help, we arrive at the novel concept of the Basic Equation in 
Chapter 6, which brings together the post-disaster bottlenecks. 
There is one more important methodological point that we should mention at this 
point. As observed by several authors in the disaster community, input-output modelling 
makes it possible to look at the ‘inside’ of the complex inter-industry linkages within an 
economic system.9 In this thesis, we shall expand this notion in, what we perceive, is a 
novel direction. We should recall that the information in an input-output table is based 
on localised production and consumption activities. That is, the flow and stock data are 
aggregation totals based on the compilation of individual establishments. We shall 
employ this property to describe the impact of a disaster. To this end, we introduce 
certain adjustments to the basic model to capture the complex disaster and 
reconstruction scenarios, thereby taking account of changes in the internal structure of 
the economy and its external links. In fact, we shall put forth a modified input-output 
framework which is, as we shall explain, specifically suited for disaster analysis and 
what may be called ‘disequilibrium accounting’. Furthermore, it can be used as a 
starting point for projections in recovery scenarios and the modelling of precautionary 
measures and policies. 
Many issues will be dealt with ‘along the way’. As seen, we stress physical 
disruptions. But what about economic costs?10 We shall emphasise that it is important to 
define clearly what is meant by ‘economic costs’ and how they are measured. 
Essentially, two types of costs are met in the literature, direct and indirect losses. 
Broadly defined, direct losses refer to physical damages to property and assets, and 
associated losses of circular flow, stemming directly from the ‘interaction’ with hazard. 
                                               
9See, for example, Cole, Pantoja and Razak (1993), Jones (1997), Shinozuka, Rose and Eguchi (1998), 
Okuyama, Hewings and Sonis (2002). 
10
 In the scope of this thesis, we choose to focus on the economic side of disasters, and especially on the 
economic costs in terms of interruptions of economic flow. We explicitly abstain from addressing other 
dimensions of disasters connected, inter alia, to the loss of human lives, the valuation of assets that have 
cultural or historical value, or other non-market assets. 
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Indirect losses are, in turn, often connected to interruptions of business operations 
throughout the economy. This implies also, that while direct calamity consequences are 
often a matter of measurement, indirect losses require more than that; namely, some 
inference into the processes of disruption and recovery. In addition, a number of other 
essential elements comes to the fore in the discussion of disaster losses, which are 
connected to the choice of perspective, be it financial or economic; and the choice of the 
valuation method. To keep the appraisal of losses associated with a disaster consistent, 
one should also exercise caution with regard to what is in the literature referred to as 
‘double-counting’ (we shall extensively discuss these issues in Chapters 2 and 3). 
Effectively, this concerns the awareness of the fact that assets, involved in production 
activities, can be measured either as stock, or as flow. Essentially, with the exploitation 
of stocks, flows are produced. For example, machinery and equipment are stocks; at the 
same time, when used in production processes, they give rise to the flow of new goods. 
If such capital assets are accounted as lost based on their stock value (e.g., replacement 
value), then the flow of goods that will not be produced by them are already taken 
account of. This implies, that counting both the stock and the flow values of the same 
asset means counting it twice. Finally, time aspect of costs should be considered 
explicitly. While in the immediate disaster aftermath only direct physical losses are 
observed, in the medium run indirect losses from business interruption surface. Because 
we select to have the pre-disaster development path as a threshold to which the losses 
should be related, we shall propose that costs of a calamity may be defined depending 
on the trajectory the economy will (or wishes to) follow after the catastrophe. This, 
evidently, makes planning in the form of contingent scenarios essential. Other issues 
concern the time aspect, and the role of typical dynamic modelling. Finally, we should 
stress that we make a distinction between types of emergency assistance such as 
personal aid and assistance, clearing debris, et cetera; and the systematic recovery 
efforts. We basically shall only look at the latter.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.3.1. The Scope 
A number of choices had to be made when we were setting the agenda for our research.  
First of all, in this thesis we are focusing on the exploration of the effects of major 
disasters. These are significantly less studied than smaller or ‘marginal’ shocks. The key 
difference between the two is that, under normal circumstances, impact analysis is the 
usual instrument to discuss ‘minor changes’, i.e. disruptions that do not endanger the 
stability of the system. Large-scale adversities, on the other hand, impose disequilibrium 
and structural change and affect an economy in its entirety, where ceteris paribus 
assumptions are almost impossible. This means that major disaster analysis requires a 
new kind of models to investigate the nature of the processes behind efforts to achieve a 
new equilibrium. We shall concentrate on such approaches. 
The next choice that had to be made is the context in which disasters and their 
consequences can be studied. Clearly, many aspects can be considered and many paths 
can be followed. Among these are the economic, political, social, sociological, 
environmental, ecological, cultural or psychological aspects of calamities. Because 
these problems have many aspects, it is impossible to cover all of them in detail within 
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the scope of one manuscript. For this reason, we choose to narrow our research to the 
study of one particular dimension of disasters, namely, their economic consequences.  
Third, it appeared that disasters have very different economic consequences in 
developed and developing countries (which we will address in more detail in Chapter 
3). This may imply that different modelling frameworks have to be employed for each 
particular type of analysis. Considering this difference, we have opted for the 
exploration of impacts in the modern, heavily industrialised societies rather than in the 
less developed economies. Considering the complexity of modern industrialised 
networks, we decided to focus on the effects that an adverse outside shock may bring, 
disturbing the established balances and links within those networks. 
Fourth, disaster analysis may serve different purposes, ranging from implications 
for national policy-making to raising the awareness of individual risk perception. 
However, it appeared that many studies are to a high degree ad hoc made with different 
conceptualisations of the term ‘damage’. A conceptually generalised methodology 
seemed to be the missing link between the empirical examination of consequences of 
real disasters and policy advice. Filling this gap, with a very diverse literature at hand, 
turned into a challenge at large. However, we decided to direct our efforts at the quest 
for a better, more coherent and more general methodology, putting it at the core of our 
research. Therefore, this study has obtained a theoretical-methodological focus.  
Fifth, the study of the literature on disaster analysis has shown a great variety of 
research at several levels. Often studies are looking into the effects of an adversity on 
the micro level, i.e. the economic consequences for particular businesses or groups of 
people. We should not underestimate the value of these inferences; notwithstanding 
that, it was found that studies of the effects on the economy-wide level are substantially 
underrepresented. This means that little is known of the loss of interconnections and 
links between the economic agents at large, which is in particular essential for getting 
insight into the consequences of major calamities. With this in mind, we have decided to 
direct our inquiry on the analysis of the linkages and relationships within the economy 
at the national level. 
Finally, the origin and nature of disasters, be they man-made or natural, are 
essentially of little difference for our investigation. In the current inquiry we opt for 
inquiries into the substantial disruptions brought into an economic system by a hazard 
without particular reference to causality. We should point out, of course, that the nature 
of a calamity determines the character of disturbance to a great extent (like damage 
caused by flash floods would be different from an earthquake, a drought, an outbreak of 
a pandemics or a nuclear explosion). However, in the context of this study we shall not 
pay specific attention to the origin of a disaster. Nevertheless, because our case study is 
situated in the Netherlands and deals with large-scale flooding, for convenience sake we 
shall make reference to natural disasters11, though our findings and methodology have 
broader applicability. 
                                               
11
 For more insight into man-made or ‘manufactured’ risks in the context of modern societies as opposed 
to external risks (natural hazards), one may consult the works on risk society, for example, by Ulrich 
Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990, 1999).   
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1.3.2. The Approach 
The goal of the current inquiry is thus: 
 
The goal as it is formulated above contains three elements that are at the core of 
our investigation: the reflection of actual processes in the wake of an adversity; 
modelling the consequences of an adversity, and the policy dimension. In order to 
achieve this goal, research questions were formulated providing structure to the 
inquiry. The following questions and sub-questions were identified: 
1. What is the essence of a disaster in a contemporary economy?  
(Chapters 2 and 3) 
a. How can we define a disaster? 
b. Which concepts are essential to describe a disaster phenomenon? 
c. What kinds of economic effects of disasters can be identified? 
2. In how far is it possible to model the impact of a disaster in an economy as a 
complex interrelated system in a consistent way?  
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
3. How can meso-level economic modelling help understand the way modern 
economies may deal with disasters?  
(Chapters 6 and 7) 
4. How can this methodology contribute to the formulation of the role of policy 
in addressing disaster consequences and preparedness to those in modern 
industrialised economies?  
(Chapter 8) 
a. To what degree can disasters in contemporary societies be prevented?  
b. In how far can contemporary societies prepare to a disaster and how? 
The above questions raise an array of fundamental issues not yet well covered in 
the respective literature. Another set of issues concerns methodological aspects of 
modelling economic consequences of a calamity. Here, structure and transparency are 
sometimes missing. Lastly, we are also touching upon the issues connected to economic 
policy-making. From an economic perspective, we are mostly interested in the analysis 
of actions and measures, their suitability with respect to the purposes served, and the 
identification of such economically grounded purposes. 
To develop a methodologically consistent framework with a good grasp 
of the complexity of connections within an industrialised economic 
network; suitable for the reflection and analysis of the economic 
consequences of a severe disaster; and which may also be used as a tool 
for policy analysis of both pre-disaster precautionary measures and 
post-disaster actions directed at targeted reconstruction and recovery. 
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To address the research questions, we need to establish a suitable framework, a 
model, in order to be able to incorporate various elements of disaster analysis we would 
like to study. 
We are of the opinion that disasters are complex phenomena that in fact consist of 
multiple processes. This implies that we may analytically divide those processes into a 
number of stages. Applied to modelling, essentially, such an approach based on a multi-
step procedure should make an analysis of economic system performance after a shock 
more transparent and controllable. We suggest one of the ways one may think about 
major catastrophes and their consequences (see inter alia Steenge and Bočkarjova, 
2007). These can be considered the building blocks of what can be deemed as a novel 
approach in economic disaster analysis. Ultimately, a three-stage procedure is proposed. 
The first step is to get a proper perspective on the nature of the economic disruptions 
brought about by a hazard. Here it is important to pay attention to the emerging market 
disequilibrium and mismatches in the disrupted economic network. The second stage 
consists of addressing the post-disaster imbalances and a systematic investigation of the 
options open to an economy when entering the post-disaster period. Multiple paths can 
be followed; the challenge is to identify and model those of them that are most likely to 
happen or are most preferred. During the third stage, a special type of cost-benefit 
analysis of various ex-ante policy measures is suggested, based on the geographical 
dimension of the catastrophe. We envisage that precautionary measures, if taken, 
impose costs; at the same time expectedly they should offer better protection or reduced 
losses as a gain. On basis of respective costs and benefits of various measures, their 
feasibility can be analysed. 
For the projections in the future development possibilities and processes with the 
prevalence of uncertainty12, scenario analysis becomes a way out to analyse at least a 
number of selected trajectories. The essence and usefulness of scenario approach in 
disaster analysis is apparent: by formulating scenarios, those variables that are 
essentially exogenous can be endogenised, thus generating valuable inferences in the 
possible aftermath processes. The art of formulating scenarios is hidden in two boxes: 
first (following Duchin, 2006), formulate fruitful hypotheses leading to meaningful and 
ingenious inferences; and second (following Fontela and Rueda-Cantouche, 2004), 
translate the narrative of a scenario into the appropriate variables or parameters 
comprising a particular model. If the researcher is successful in applying this approach, 
it adds to the development and testing of a theory the additional dimension of 
exploration of future option and their systematic interpretation, being a noteworthy tool 
for policy advice and action planning. With this, the circle of theoretical analysis, future 
simulation and decision-making support is complete. 
So, recapitulating: we have observed a great variety in approaches at disaster-
related studies. In our view, there is a need for common ground and integration to bring 
the existing notions and concepts under one unifying roof. Particularly urgent is the 
situation where a very big catastrophe, natural or manmade, hits a highly developed 
                                               
12
 Here, we might find a parallel with the famous distinction that Frank Knight, made between ‘risk’ 
(which refers to situations where the probability of an outcome can be quantified by means of known 
probabilities) on the one hand, and ‘uncertainty’ (where the outcome cannot be quantified via a known 
probability) on the other hand (Knight, 1921). In line with that, we would propose that, strictly speaking, 
major disasters, as we discuss them in this thesis, are better described by uncertainty than by risk. Yet, in 
the later chapters (see Chapter 8), we shall present an approach that attempts at quantifying those 
uncertainties in terms of probability. 
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industrial nation. It appeared that many, often divergent, opinions exist. This is a 
situation that should not be accepted and should be addressed as soon as possible.  
We shall advocate the need for a general methodological ‘platform’. In this study 
that is provided by the notion of the circular flow. The catastrophe’s impact then is 
modelled in terms of disruptions of this circular flow, which causes imbalances in 
production and consumption. Given an objective in terms of where the economy should 
after the disaster, recovery and reconstruction programs can start. We shall present a 
novel type of inter-industry model that focuses on the imbalances and disproportions.  
We would like to stress that we are not aiming at providing a totally new 
foundation for the construction of the disaster analysis field. Rather, we will make an 
attempt to contribute to improving conceptual coherence in the emerging field. We thus 
are not aiming at providing an all-inclusive analysis of a disaster outbreak; instead, we 
have chosen to study one of the elements pertaining disaster analysis, placing it in the 
more general context of disaster policy and management. From a methodological point 
of view, we also are not aiming at presenting the ‘best’ model to analyse disaster 
consequences; rather, we wish to suggest a general framework as one of the ways for 
transparent and consistent analysis of disaster economic impacts within a complex 
modern industrialised economy. 
 
1.3.3. Outline of the Thesis 
Part I, Concepts, starts with two conceptual Chapters. Chapter 2 describes the core 
concepts in disaster analysis. We attempt to settle the definitions that describe the 
disaster phenomena in the economic context of our research. These are followed by the 
notions connected to the coping capacity of a system in response to a calamity. These 
terms are central to the analysis of system’s vulnerability and resilience. They are 
indispensable in the new type of thinking about major tribulations in modern 
economies, as they specifically describe the attributes of the disturbed system. We also 
clarify the use and applicability in disaster analysis of related concepts of susceptibility, 
resistance, robustness, redundancy and sustainability. Policy-related notions of 
adaptability and mitigation are described in this Chapter as well, with the focus on the 
difference between the two, namely the system-oriented adaptability, and hazard-
oriented mitigation.  
Chapter 3 follows this discussion with the debate around another set of concepts 
connected to the analysis of the consequences of major adversities. Attention here is 
drawn to the differential impact of disasters. First, in terms of scale, it is important to 
distinguish between minor shocks, and major shocks to which disasters belong. The 
character of the impact of these two types of shocks determines the scale, and thereby 
also the approach to be taken to analyse these impacts. In the case of a major calamity 
we have to do with severe displacements in the established economic network. The 
second difference is determined in terms of the type of economy affected. It is proposed 
that developing and industrialised countries bear different kinds of burden as a result of 
a major hazard. We complete the Chapter discussing the concept of economic damage. 
We argue that the precise definition of damage hinges on a number of considerations, 
where choices have to be made. The first concerns the purpose, which damage 
assessment is intended to serve; the economic and financial appraisals being the major 
issue of choice. Second, the spatial and temporal dimensions of damage have to be 
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considered before the analysis is launched. Finally, to avoid confusion in the application 
of damage concepts in empirical studies, one has to be aware of the measure of asset 
value used in the study. Thinking in terms of stocks and flows proves to be an excellent 
guide. We conclude with providing the definitions for direct and indirect economic 
damage. 
 
Three Chapters comprising Part II, Building a disaster model, focus on the 
discussion of models and modelling in and for disaster analysis. In Chapter 4 we 
provide a review of selected literature dealing with modelling of economic effects of 
major calamities. Here we concentrate on the difference between measurement and 
inference. The former, in terms of direct physical damage, can be observed and 
measured directly; the latter – in the form of indirect economic damage – is much more 
difficult to grasp, though. This means, that modelling is needed to get insight into the 
interruption of production and consumption activities within an established economic 
network. In the light of this distinction, we review Dutch modelling schools, as well as 
internationally known approaches. We conclude with a discussion of the choice of the 
model, putting forward that input-output approach should prove especially useful in the 
analysis of economic structure on a grand scale, but should be adjusted for the 
modelling of major disruptions brought about by a hazard. 
Chapter 5 contains the outline of the standard Input-Output model describing the 
interrelationships within an economic system with a short historical retrospect and basic 
model formulation. Given the particular ends our inquiry is serving, the analysis of 
major shocks, we provide a critical review of the characteristics the model possesses to 
be adjusted paving the way to our adapted analysis. 
Chapter 6 forms the core of our investigation. We start with the outline of three 
issues central to the theme of disaster modelling intertwined in input-output approaches: 
the size or scale, the presence of rigidities, and policy issues present in disaster 
management. All of these have to be incorporated in ‘disequilibrium’ modelling of 
disasters. We continue with the brief literature overview on the existing models in input-
output circles preceding our efforts on the construction of a framework viable of 
reflecting major disturbance. In particular, the so-called Event Matrix attracted our 
attention attempting to structure thinking around a shock and its aftermath. After 
presenting our assumptions, we set off for the modelling journey in the disaster-adjusted 
input-output world. From the very outset, we decide to split the analysis into three 
stages: immediate post-disaster situation, recovery stage and analysis of prevention 
strategies. For the first stage, we derive what we call the ‘Basic equation’ as a reflection 
of imbalances within an economy immediately after a shock. This is also the starting 
point for stage two, when recovery paths are modelled bringing the system to a new 
equilibrium. Multiple paths are possible; therefore scenario analysis is chosen as a tool 
to deal with the uncertainty. Finally, the building blocks of a sort of cost-benefit 
analysis of preventive or precautionary measures are presented. The elements of 
vulnerability, resilience, adaptation and mitigation are incorporated in the modelling as 
it is presented in this Chapter. The built up scheme is accompanied by small examples. 
 
The Analysis part, Part III of this thesis, consists of three Chapters, two of which 
are devoted to case studies, and the conclusion Chapter. We begin with an illustrative 
calculation of industrial loss due to flooding in the Central Holland in Chapter 7. This 
case is based on the hypothetical (yet possible) simulation of a dike breach near 
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Rotterdam resulting in a major flooding. Essentially, this is the data from Delft Cluster 
project (see Section 1.2.2), the case we have started building our preliminary model 
from, and with which we would like to compare the estimates made with the improved 
methodology. 
In Chapter 8, we continue the analysis, now drawing an explicit link between the 
economic analysis of disaster consequences in general and our proposed model in 
particular, and policy-making. Effectively, we argue that the economic component is 
indispensable for decision-making about such a complex issue as water management 
and flood protection in the Netherlands. Fortunately, this seems to become more and 
more common practice, though the transition from dominantly engineering solutions to 
a more integrated decision-making involving multiple parties is yet in process. We 
stress that this is an important development, especially provided the shifting attention in 
flood protection philosophy from probability management to risk management, where 
the latter is a product of probability and effect. 
In Chapter 9 we conclude the thesis with a summary, main findings and 
contributions, and further research agenda. We provide a general reflection on the 
model we have developed, placing it in the broad perspective. We point at the role that 
our proposed model may play in the light of developments taking place in disaster 
analysis and policy practice. We also provide some closing remarks on the limitations 
and issues that may become potential topics for future inquiries or a follow up of this 
thesis. One of those is found in gaining additional insight in theories emphasising the 
prominent role of space, like the New Economic Geography theory; another possibility 
accompany theories explaining policy change, like political economy. Many other 
aspects connected to disaster phenomenon were outside the scope of the current study. 
However, we suggest that the road to more integrative, including inter-disciplinary, 
approaches should be followed also in future work. We conclude with suggestions for 
further research. 
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Part One 
Conceptual Issues 
_______________________________________ 
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Chapter 2 
Core Concepts in Disaster Analysis 
_______________________________________ 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we intend to contribute to the debate on the fundamental concepts in the 
field of disaster analysis is an open one. We shall attempt to clarify selected issues and 
work towards consensus on basic concepts such as disaster and catastrophe, as well as 
related concepts of vulnerability, resilience and adaptability. What is the essence of a 
disaster? Do we mean an economic or natural disaster? Is there a difference between a 
disaster and a catastrophe? What are economic vulnerability and resilience? Are all 
these mere ‘buzz’ words, or are they meaningful terms? In the coming Sections we shall 
address these questions. 
The purpose of identifying and providing a shape for the core concepts in 
economic disaster analysis can be found in the need to gain more insight into the nature 
of a disaster in modern economies, to deepen the understanding of the processes behind 
it, improve explicability by modelling; and ultimately being able to articulate the results 
and findings to the broad audiences inside and outside the scientific community. A well-
defined conceptual base will be the initial step in building our integrative approach to 
disaster modelling. 
 
2.2. WHAT IS A DISASTER? 
It is considered to be true that natural disasters mostly erupt spontaneously or at very 
short notice. Therefore people are often caught by surprise when a calamity occurs. 
Usually little can be done to prevent or reduce the magnitude of a natural phenomenon. 
Nature and the extent of the impact of natural disasters on human society (number of 
deaths, structural damage, insurance costs, et cetera) do not depend solely on the 
characteristics of the event itself, e.g. a storm path or strength of an earthquake. Other 
factors can prove to be equally significant: for example, the proximity of populated 
areas, disaster-proof constructions and infrastructure, the ability of individuals and 
businesses to respond and adjust to a calamity. Following Cole (1998) earthquakes and 
flash floods, mass movements, mud and snow avalanches, cold- and heat waves, tidal 
waves, droughts, volcanic eruptions, storms and tornadoes “are natural occurrences. In 
contrast, damage caused […] can always be traced back to human activities. By setting 
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in flood valleys man has put himself – consciously or unconsciously – at the mercy of 
flood risks.” Therefore, it is more the interaction between the natural occurrence and 
human induced systems, which leads to a disaster. 
Tsunamis, floods, droughts, hurricanes and earthquakes seem to have become a 
constant threat to contemporary societies. In the past decades we have seen a growing 
awareness of the devastating effects of these natural disasters on the economies of 
developing and developed countries. The World Bank, the United Nations and the 
European Union have published a number of reports on this problem, inter alia ECLAC 
(1991, 2003), UN/ISDR (2002), Colombo and Vetere Arellano (2002), Freeman et al. 
(2004), Arnold (2006). Parallel to this awareness we note a strong increase in the 
interest in the methodology of estimating economic consequences of disasters on 
current and future welfare of modern societies. 
Calamities appear to be of a dimension we hardly experience regularly; yet, more 
and more frequently, the terms ‘disasters’ or ‘catastrophes’ are used. However, these 
concepts are rarely defined precisely. This means that, on the one hand, contemporary 
societies more often face exceptional events of unusual strength and consequence, and 
have to find ways of dealing with them. This implies that a new problem is now facing 
the world, which needs to be solved urgently. On the other hand, there is yet no enough 
insight into the nature of these calamities and their potential impacts. Some ten years 
ago Alexander (1997, p.298) remarked: “there has been a general lack of holistic 
analyses that treat hazard, risk and disaster as integrated phenomena. Many links 
between the various aspects of them remain poorly understood.” This is still largely so; 
at present there is not enough adequate scientific knowledge on the issues of disaster 
vulnerability, response and preparedness. We shall start by identifying the essence of 
disasters in the context of our research. 
We will recall that disaster analysis, and especially its economic dimension, is a 
relatively new field of study. Alexander (ibid, p.289) makes the following observation 
on this: “as befits a field in which the social is combined with the physical, and in which 
some 30 different academic disciplines have a hand, most concepts associated with 
natural disaster lack fixed definitions, as they are used by practitioners with very diverse 
objectives and perceptions.” Quarantelli (1995) follows this argument by stating that the 
field cannot develop properly as a research enterprise unless there is more clarity and 
consensus on the central concepts in the field. That is why, in approaching the issue of 
major disturbances we shall first try, for clarity’s sake, to establish the definition of a 
disaster to be used within the scope of this thesis. Alongside the concept of disaster, we 
shall come across a number of other terms often used in calamity analysis, concerning 
the nature and scale of the event, the coping capacity of the system in response to it, and 
the ability of a system to adjust to a future possible calamity. In the course of this 
Chapter, we shall cover them as well. 
 
2.2.1. The Concept of Disaster 
In general terms, catastrophes that may have disastrous effects, can be usually 
categorised as being of natural or man-made origin (UN/ISDR, 2002). Natural 
phenomena that can pose threats to humans can be extreme weather events, earthquakes, 
floods, droughts, storms, tropical cyclones and hurricanes, wildfire, tsunami, volcanic 
eruptions and avalanches, as well as epidemic diseases, plant or animal contagion and 
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intensive infestations. Man-made calamities can range from technological disasters, 
such as industrial pollution, nuclear power station failure and radioactivity, toxic waste 
and dam failure; to terrorist attacks. Nowadays, it seems both categories of calamities 
are increasing. First, the climate change research (International Panel on Climate 
Change, IPCC, 2001 and 2007; and World Wildlife Foundation, WWF, 2004) proclaims 
substantial shifts in the global climate, increasing sea levels and average temperatures, 
leading to unpredicted changes in weather and the increase in number of extreme 
events. Furthermore, in the past decades, man-made disasters and the threat of terrorism 
in particular, are experienced all over the world. This has posed a new, until now 
unknown danger, where the coping capacity of nations in response to these challenges 
has become of critical importance. 
Let us first of all consider the terms ’catastrophe’ and ’disaster’. Although 
’catastrophe’ is frequently used alongside ’disaster’, it is not a well-defined term, being 
simply referred to as ‘unusually severe disaster’ (Wikipedia). For this purpose, 
‘disaster’ is a more familiar concept, referring in the first place to “the impact of a 
natural or man-made event that negatively affects life, property, livelihood or industry 
often resulting in permanent changes to human societies, ecosystems and environment”. 
UN/ISDR (2002, p.338) provides a similar definition, adding that “It results from the 
combination of hazard, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures 
to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk.” It is important to note that the 
impact or consequences are mentioned, not the event itself, which is called a disaster. In 
line with this, natural hazard, the term more commonly used in American literature, is 
the manifestation of disaster, exacerbating vulnerable conditions and exceeding 
individuals' and communities' means to survive and thrive. Quarantelli (2001, p.332) 
points out that it is not the natural phenomena alone, which lead to a disastrous impact, 
it is a combination of the extreme phenomena emerging in the nature and socio-
economic system that, when enmeshed, can produce a destructive outcome. Alexander 
(1997, p.289) has a similar interpretation: “every natural disaster involves a unique 
pattern of physical energy expenditure and human reaction”. Furthermore, he adds 
(ibid): “there has been an increasing tendency to regard disasters as caused more by the 
social conditions they affect than by the geophysical agents that precipitate them”. In 
other words, hazard represents only the potential for causing damage (Benson and 
Twigg, 2004), following these authors, or the expectation of the effects of a natural 
phenomenon (FEMA, 1991). It is the interaction between a hazardous event and human-
induced systems that makes this potential turn into a disaster. Moreover, Horlick-Jones 
(1995), Bankoff (2001) and Schipper and Pelling (2006) claim that, contrary to 
widespread views, disasters in modern societies are not natural, but rather social 
phenomena. Morrow (1999, p.1) from the sociological perspective, adds that “disaster 
vulnerability is socially constructed, i.e., it arises out of the social and economic 
circumstances of everyday living”. In other words, it can be said that disaster event only 
triggers those inherent vulnerabilities to surface and intensifies them in the face of 
survival. Dombrowsky (1995, p.241), who developed a sociological approach to 
disasters, is even more explicit in defining “disaster as an empirical falsification of 
human action, as proof of the incorrectness of human insight into both nature and 
culture”. Therefore, it takes two, the outside agent and the human-induced system, to 
make a disaster. 
The abovementioned disaster definitions make a clear point that for the concept to 
gain its scientific contents, it has to be polished. Porfiriev (1995, p.285) discussing the 
methodological issues of definition and delineation of disaster, notes: “It is argued that 
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there are two principle orientations or approaches to research, namely an 
applied/pragmatic one and a theoretical/conceptual one. These are based on ontological 
and epistemological grounds, respectively, which serve as the main factors determining 
the existing differences and variations in the studying and understanding of disasters.” 
This may serve as a guiding principle for discussing the theme of disasters, explicitly 
marking the differences between applied and theoretical research. In his study of 
disasters, Gilbert (1995) summarises the theoretical approaches in literature. He 
crystallizes three broad paradigms: Firstly, disasters are seen as a duplication of war, 
where human communities are reacting globally against outside aggression. This partly 
contradicts Quarantelli (2001, p.335), who explicitly excludes social conflicts (such as 
wars, ethnic genocides, riots or civil strife, revolutions, terrorist attacks, acts of 
sabotage, et cetera) from the scope of disaster concept. Secondly, disasters are an 
expression of social vulnerabilities, inherent problems, which a society has to deal with. 
This presumption supports the point of view of Morrow (1999) to which we referred 
above. Thirdly, disasters are described as an entrance into a state of uncertainty, where 
the danger is difficult to define; it is apparent that it exists, yet its shape is elusive13. To 
some extent, in our opinion, disasters possess all three characteristics. Very often, it is 
an event stipulated by an external agent, which steers the society’s practices away from 
their usual path. At the same time, the state of emergency can trigger the failure of the 
system’s elements to perform because of their inherent faults. Finally, in the 
contemporary worlds of climate change, threats of terrorist attacks and technological 
advancement, we are dependent on the environment we live in. If this experiences a 
serious breach, whether natural, technological or human-induced, a disaster may deem 
unavoidable. Yet, the exact source and timing of an actual hazard remains uncertain.  
Furthermore, we want to pay attention to the literature dealing with the economic 
aspects of disaster definition. Rose (2003) is one of the few authors attempting to 
provide an explicit economic dimension to the definition of a natural disaster. Rose is 
trying to ascertain whether, in economic terms, calamities should be seen as a separate 
unique event, as a representative of a type of events, or whether it depends on the event 
as soon as it adversely affects the economic performance of a country. Rose develops a 
typology, based on three groups of characteristics, i.e.: 
“First, are the ordinary physical characteristics of the natural, technological or 
political-economic stimulus (causal agent, areal extent, rate of onset, 
predictability and duration). Second, is the economic magnitude, or “effect”, 
which really defines the disruption rather than the event that triggers it. Third, 
is “manageability”, which is the buffer between physical characteristics and 
the effects in terms of society’s ability to modify the disruption.” (ibid, p.5) 
The author concludes that research on economic disruptions based solely on causal 
agent, although it provides a substantial explanation, is too limited to explore the 
consequences of calamities in contemporary economies. Rose’s insights have added the 
revealing categorisation of what he called urban disruptions, transitional disruptions and 
water-related disruptions. 
                                               
13
 Here, we may again refer to the well-known distinction of Knight between risk and uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921). In his view, risk refers to a situation where the probability of an outcome can be 
calculated. The reliability of the estimate depends on theoretical insight and stable empirical conditions. If 
the reliability is sufficiently high, this implies that one can insure oneself against the particular event. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the probability of an event cannot be 
determined, and where the outcome cannot be insured against. 
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Besides, an interesting question is: What is the threshold in economic terms at 
which a natural hazard becomes a disaster? Various measuring scales for economic 
disasters can be found. For example, one of them is an operational tolerance level of 2% 
or greater output reduction in the economy affected (Rose, 2003). This might imply that 
hazardous events curtailing over 2% of production of the US would in economic terms 
be considered a major calamity. In this sense, hurricane Katrina does not apply to the 
US, but it definitely applies to the level of the state of Louisiana. Similarly, Katrina 
would be a national disaster, had it occurred in the Netherlands. According to Rose, due 
to the varying size of the economy in question and the time horizon chosen, the 
definition of a (economic) disaster becomes a relative concept. This interpretation 
immediately addresses the important issue of spatial dimension, which has to be 
included in disaster definition. Thus, when speaking of a disastrous event, one has to be 
explicit about the geographical area that is referred to when describing the effects of a 
calamity.  
Apart from the relativity of the spatial dimension of the concept, the suggested 
output loss threshold can also be argued. In fact, Alexander (1997, p.290) summarises 
that elements that have been used to define disaster include the following four: number 
of deaths; value of damage and losses; impact upon the social system; and a geophysical 
definition (the latter, however, is discredited by some authors who consider disasters to 
be a pure social construct). Among authors who attempted to quantify a threshold for 
disaster, Smith (1996) offers an alternative measure, namely economic damage in 
excess of 1% GNP. Albala-Bertrand (2002) suggests that “a disaster impact is generally 
defined as major if estimated direct losses approach or exceed the average GDP growth 
rate of an affected country and/or damage seriously affects economic activity even if 
direct losses from the event are not a significant portion of GDP”. Bureau of Transport 
and Regional Economics (BTRE, 2001), Australia, however, offers an absolute total 
cost threshold of 10 million dollars to define a disaster. These last three quantifying 
definitions of a disaster are essentially based on the concept of losses, where economic 
damage, direct, indirect and total losses are mentioned. The explanation of these terms 
needs a special Chapter in itself, as various authors offer also varying definitions of the 
underlying concepts. We shall devote Chapter 3 to the discussion of damage and related 
concepts in disaster analysis, which our reader is also advised to consult. 
The situation as above, where multiple points of reference exist, gives too wide 
space to interpretation of what a catastrophe or a disaster might be, leaving the concept 
vaguely defined. Bram, Haughwout and Orr (2004), conducting a study of economic 
effects of 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, claim that “measuring the scale of a 
disaster is never easy”. Therefore, it would be wise to narrow the definition, and in 
doing so, we shall return to the foundations of the basic definition of a calamity. In the 
available descriptions, often ‘permanent changes’ in the affected systems, ‘change of an 
outstanding radical and rapid character’ or ‘serious disruption of the functioning of the 
community’, are referred to. All these expressions point to an extraordinary sort of 
negative impact that a system is experiencing. From that, one can derive two main 
features of a disaster: the shock is sudden or unexpected, and it is exceptionally strong. 
Gunderson (2003, p.35) in his studies of ecosystems is talking about “surprise – 
unexpected discrete events, [that cause] discontinuity in long-term trend”. At the same 
time, we recall that socio-economic scholars like Folke, Colding and Berkes (2003, 
p.359l) call crisis a special type of surprise. This sort of ‘surprise’ factor makes the 
systems enduring a disaster particularly vulnerable; the strength that the hazard hits with 
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makes it almost unbearable. So, the definition of a disaster to be used within limits of 
this thesis is as follows: 
 
The definition of disaster as stated above implies a clear scale distinction on three 
levels: spatial, temporal and the strength of impact. Whereas the first two dimensions 
may essentially be left for determination within the framework of a particular study, the 
issue of disaster impact requires additional elaboration. In the following Section, we 
shall devote attention to this factor. 
 
2.2.2. Disaster and Catastrophe: A Matter of Scale 
We have pointed out in the previous Section that a catastrophe is “an unusually severe 
disaster”. Although Rose (2006, p.28) would “offer no specific definition of the 
threshold at which a disaster becomes a catastrophe”, he refers to the examples of the 
recent calamities, such as Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) 
and the attacks on the World Trade Centre (2001). However, the following question 
arises when discussing the scale of a catastrophic event, namely: What exactly 
distinguishes a ‘catastrophe’ from a ‘disaster’, or any other sort of adverse shock?  
Concerning disaster as a major external disturbance to an economy, we have to 
address developments that take place in the system in the disaster aftermath. In our 
investigation, we highlight the exploration of disaster effects in developed countries 
with well-established industrialised networks in contrast to those in developing 
countries (as also do Morrow, 1999; Shook, 1997). We shall return to this discussion in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 of this thesis. Following this line, we are thinking in the first 
instance in terms of interconnectedness on various levels between production sectors, 
markets, as well as individual agents, such as producers, consumers and government. 
Under normal conditions, markets for goods are driven by scarcity-abundance 
mechanisms, which determine prices. Some markets are connected through product 
substitutability and complimentarity, thus influencing prices. As we know from 
economic theory, prices are superior mechanisms triggering incentives – both to 
produce and to consume. This means that final product markets and intermediate 
product markets (via production processes) are interconnected in a circular flow. 
Individual consumers and governments, that make decisions to consume final products 
following their preferences, dictated by utility maximisation, affect prices and 
quantities, determining how much output should be produced. This, in turn, affects the 
demand for intermediate goods, and therefore also supply, and consequently the markets 
for intermediate goods, and so on. This is a simple representation of a circular flow of 
activity. Taking into account international trade as a part of economic modelling 
exercise will impose another layer of complexity and interconnectedness. Clearly, a real 
economic network reveales even a greater level of intricacy, from which it becomes 
A disaster is a discontinuity resulting from interaction between a natural 
phenomenon or a manmade failure, and a human-induced system, where 
the system becomes adversely affected beyond the scale of minor 
changes, implying loss of connectivity within the established system, with 
well-specified spatial and temporal dimensions. 
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apparent that a shock, brought about by a devastating natural phenomenon, may have 
serious consequences for almost each element comprising a system. Moreover, in a 
regulated economy, where market forces are not present on all markets, impact of a 
disturbance can be even more substantial, as not all markets can clear through the price 
mechanism. 
In Chapter 1, we mentioned the difference between a marginal impact and a major 
shock, and made a choice in favour of analysis of severe disturbances, to which disasters 
belong. The essential point of difference is that under minor impulses, a robust 
economic system remains stable, as it is relatively quickly able to adjust and restore 
equilibrium. However, in the situation when a system undergoes a significant 
fluctuation affecting a complex economic network in the urbanised high-tech society, 
the effects are expected to be much more severe (Alexander, 1997). Also, the presence 
of the so-called rigidities plays a role here (we touch upon them in Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.4). When a major shock is in place, a system cannot be described as robust, in a 
sense that it can instantaneously deal with a shock, and needs time to find its new 
destination again. This means, that we need other concepts that would be able to 
describe this situation. Besides, a major shock cannot be analysed as a sum of marginal 
ones, because the dislocation occurring to a system by severe tribulation is of a much 
higher order and has by far more reaching repercussions throughout an economy (Van 
der Veen, Vetere Arellano and Nordvik, 2003). The ‘bigness’ of the event plays a major 
role, which is also pointed out by the investigators in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina 
(see, for example US House of Representatives, 2006), who observe (ibid, p.1): “a 
catastrophic disaster like Katrina can and did overwhelm most aspects of the system for 
an initial period of time.” To further elaborate this point, it is the severity of a shock 
which plays the crucial role. When a calamity occurs, there is a point when established 
balances within the system become so disturbed, that its basic structure no longer 
resembles its features and returning to the pre-calamity state requires enormous 
resources not to be found within the system itself. Following Carpenter et al. (2001, 
p.778), who focus on resilience issues in ecosystems, “in this case, we think of 
perturbations as displacing the system from a particular configuration and the 
underlying structure as determining how the system will evolve after the displacement”. 
This lends itself as a suitable point to draw the line between a ‘disaster’ and a 
‘catastrophe’. A disaster is a substantial adverse shock to an economy which is however 
found before the collapse point, while the system is still able to maintain its basic 
structure and its operation, though partially hampered. A catastrophe, on the other hand, 
can be characterised, in its extreme, by evidence of system failure on its various levels. 
This means that we are dealing with some threshold level of persistence that a 
system can endure before it collapses under an impact, and this point marks the 
boundary between an ‘ordinary’ disaster and a catastrophe. This brings us to the next 
question of where this boundary is, which separates the system being able to recover its 
operation, and the system experiencing a failure, which is not able to resume operation 
without attracting outside resources. Carpenter et al. (2001) provide the answer to such 
a question, framing it in terms of resilience and resistance. They give an example, “two 
systems […] may have the same resilience, but differ in their resistance, as measured in 
terms of how much they are displaced (or disturbed) by a given physical force or 
pressure”. So, according to Carpenter and colleagues, resilience is a system 
characteristic; whereas resistance is shock-dependent (our definitions of resilience and 
resistance are offered, respectively, in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.4). The interaction of the 
two determines the level of persistence of the system after a particular shock (ibid, 
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p.779). This means, that the shock that jeopardises both the level of resilience and 
resistance (to which we shall return in the next Section), dooms the system to collapse. 
That’s when we suppose it should be called a catastrophe. 
For clarity’s sake, a disaster can be referred to as a ’big shock’, conceptually 
distinguished from a marginal impact (Okuyama, 2003a, argues for development of the 
theory of economic disasters). At the same time, a catastrophe can be described as 
follows: 
 
In this connection, disaster literature seems to deal with ’disasters’ as shocks that 
go beyond the conventional marginal analysis. The US National Research Council has 
similar findings (1999, p.40): “the abruptness, impermanence, and often unprecedented 
intensity of a natural disaster do not fit the (usual) event pattern upon which most 
regional economic models are based.” Provided the specific nature of major 
disturbances in particular in terms of the consequences of which remain as sources of 
potentially high threat to modern societies, we shall consider, in the scope of this thesis, 
both disaster and catastrophe events. For a while, we shall not look at the differences 
between the two; rather, we shall attempt at providing insight into the processes brought 
about by these severe calamities as an alternative to the conventional analyses of minor 
shocks. We refer to the latter, again, as such shocks, to which a system is robust in the 
sense that it can deal with them with ease and relatively fast, without incurring drastic 
changes in its structure. 
 
2.3. DEFINING COPING CAPACITY IN RESPONSE TO A DISASTER 
As we have seen above, in the analysis of economic system response to a major 
catastrophe, an entire collection of concepts such as vulnerability, resilience, adaptation, 
mitigation, as well as related notions come up to the surface. Definitely, we need more 
elaboration and clarity on these concepts. Recently, an observation was made among the 
economists active in disaster research (Bočkarjova, 2006) that there should be more 
consistency in using resilience, based on the fact that both the processes before, as well 
as after the outbreak of a disaster are described as resilience without mentioning the 
term; or the notion is widely used as a popular ‘buzz’ word, becoming effectively 
empty.  
Alexander points out the importance of taking into account these new, emerging 
concepts in disaster analysis (Alexander, 1997, p.291): “Many influential writers have 
seen vulnerability as one of the keys to understanding disaster, because it is correlated 
with underprivilege, with past losses and with susceptibility to future losses”. The 
problem is, however, that neither multidisciplinary literature covering disaster 
modelling, nor economic literature in general, have developed widely accepted 
definitions of these concepts. In this Section we shall try to contribute to the debate on 
A catastrophe is an extremely severe adverse shock, which causes a 
substantial disruption of the system, with well-specified spatial and 
temporal dimensions, to the extent that it fails to perform its vital 
functions for a considerable period of time, or forever. 
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these important concepts, by attempting to clarify these matters. As outlined above, 
defining the scope of the concepts, on the one hand predetermines the borders of the 
analysis to be performed, requiring more specificity from the researcher; and on the 
other hand provides more insight for drawing inferences for policy directions. 
 
2.3.1. Resilience and Adaptability in Disaster Analysis 
Let us start with the concept of resilience, central to our analysis. It often surfaces in 
disaster studies, though not often its precise definition is provided, and its meaning 
varies depending on the context. The reason we chose to pay special attention to this 
concept is connected to the topic of our inquiry, namely, large-scale disturbances and 
their economic consequences. Indeed, specific nature of shocks we study, i.e. disasters 
or catastrophes, as defined in previous Sections, is fundamentally different from major 
studies that focus on what is often referred to as incremental or marginal impacts. The 
scale of major shocks, alternatively, triggers the occurrence of a different set of effects 
within an analysed system, and consequently requires a new mode of analysis. This, in 
turn, demands a new set of concepts characterising and describing the phenomena and 
the system undergoing major changes, necessary to uncover the processes behind a 
calamity. In this respect, resilience is the concept linking the event of a disaster and 
displacements in an economic network to the achievement of a new equilibrium state 
(as well as recovery to follow), the process often omitted in incremental or impact 
studies, as it is assumed to take place almost instantaneously through the working of 
economic (market) forces. Here, on the contrary, a system found out of balance 
occupies an important place in disaster analysis. The processes taking place at recovery 
stage, are not straightforward, and thus need closer exploration. Resilience, in our view, 
is a reliable guide in this inquiry. 
It is of interest to observe the evolution of the resilience notion. Technically, the 
term ‘resilience’ originated in the field of ecology (Carpenter et al., 2001, p.765). Green 
(2003, p.21) notes, however, that “as a concept, it has been translated from the material 
science […] into ecology [… where] the term has been shifted into systems theory and 
significantly widened to take account of multiple stability domains”. During this 
evolution, the original application of the notion of resilience to characterise individual 
features has also expanded into the analysis of system attributes. Besides, Denhardt 
(2005) mentions that the concept is more frequently used in medical, psychological and 
ecological studies, rather than in studies of organisations. We shall proceed with the 
discussion on this theme. 
Starting, we shall provide a selection of views on resilience among the 
environmental scientists and (socio-)ecologists. We believe this would allow for a 
substantially deeper and richer exploration of backgrounds and ideas, which can 
ultimately be borrowed for concept definition in our disaster analysis. Gunderson and 
Holling (2001), the distinguished scholars in the field, define resilience as the capacity 
of a system to undergo disturbance and maintain its functions and controls. 
Alternatively, the key criterion of resistance, in their view, is persistence of the system, 
and therefore it is necessary to consider resistance (which is essentially a flexibility 
parameter) as the complimentary attribute of resilience (which the authors consider as 
an absolute measure). Carpenter et al. (2001, p.765), in turn, defines resistance in terms 
of magnitude of disturbance, which can be tolerated before a socio-ecological system 
moves to a different region of state controlled by a different set of processes. In contrast 
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to Gunderson and Holling, Carpenter et al. place the concept of resilience as very 
similar to persistence. Also, they view resilience as a multidimensional concept, namely  
“…we must begin by clearly defining resilience in terms of what to what. These 
aspects change, depending on the temporal, social, and spatial scale at which the 
measurement is made. […] Just as resilience can be achieved in one time period 
at the expense of resilience in a succeeding period, resilience at one spatial 
extent can be subsidized from a broader scale. For example, it is common for a 
regional crisis—drought, say—to be relieved by the importation of resources 
from the state. The region persists, but only through external subsidy.” 
(Carpenter et al., 2001, p.767) 
This interpretation of resilience explicitly requires clarity on the choice of 
temporal and spatial scales, which is a conventionally difficult task, leading to the issue 
of boundaries, which we already came across when discussing the concept of disaster in 
the previous Sections. The solution to these puzzles is the art of being consistent in 
defining various dimensions of the concepts used in the same study.  
Another attempt for an elegant solution is provided by Allenby and Fink (2005, 
p.1034), where “resiliency is defined as the capability of a system to maintain its 
functions and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade 
gracefully when it must.” However, the term ‘degrade gracefully’ remains vague, 
leaving broad room for interpretation. In this sense, the definition provided by the 
Resilience Alliance (2005), assembling efforts in the research on resilience in social-
ecological systems, seems to provide a clear guidance encompassing a wide range of 
basic characteristics:  
“Resilience as applied to ecosystems, or to integrated systems of people and the 
natural environment, has three defining characteristics:  
1) The amount of change the system can undergo and still retain the same 
controls on function and structure;  
2) The degree to which the system is capable of self-organization;  
3) The ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation.” 
This Resilience Alliance definition is also broad enough and can easily be applied in 
social sciences, in particular to the study of the survival of economic systems under the 
impact of an extreme negative shock. 
The internet-based Wikipedia gives an adjusted definition of business resilience: 
“In business terms, resilience is the ability of an organization, resource, or structure to 
sustain the impact of a business interruption and recover and resume its operations to 
continue to provide minimum services”. This definition, however, does not encompass 
the frequently incorporated element of learning and adapting often seen in the (socio-
)ecological literature. We would nevertheless agree with the latter. In this connection, 
we once again refer to Gunderson (2003): “Adaptive capacity is a component of 
resilience that reflects the learning aspect of system behaviour in response to 
disturbance.” Thus, talking about the resilience of a system, one should discuss its 
adaptability as well. In terms of disaster analysis this means that adaptability of a socio-
economic system is an essential part of the whole process of ‘living with the threat’ of a 
disaster. The process of adaptation in advance to an unknown possible calamity includes 
building up resilience, meaning resilience as a process of learning and adjustments, 
rather than a state, adding to it a flavour of dynamics. 
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One other aspect of the resilience is whether it is a normative or an absolute 
notion. Carpenter et al. (2001) argue, “unlike sustainability, resilience can be desirable 
or undesirable […] In contrast, sustainability is an overarching goal that includes 
assumptions or preferences about which system states are desirable.” This is an 
interesting statement as, indeed, a system under stress can have inner resilience and 
bounce back responding to a shock; however, this may not necessarily result in a 
response which is desirable from the point of view of society. Instead, there are 
numerous ways how an (economic) system can cushion a disaster in any other way than 
expected by planners. Taking into account the notion of adaptability, which is included 
in the concept of resilience by Gunderson (2003), making it an ever-evolving process, it 
is important to consider resilience of a system in conjunction with sustainability goals. 
Provided the resilience is built up in line with the sustainable development trajectories, 
there is an increased chance that the system shall respond in a crisis situation in a way, 
which is most preferable. 
 
2.3.2. The Economic Dimension of Coping Capacity 
Among social science researchers, recently there is a growing urge to pay more 
attention to the concept of resilience. The increased frequency in using the term 
‘resilience’, especially in disaster modelling and analysis, and the fact that this term in 
the past was unjustly disregarded, formulated the need for a more coordinated effort, 
also in the economics world. Rose (2004b) touches upon the issue of resilience, which is 
repeatedly coming to the surface in disaster literature. Taking into account a wider 
temporal span in disaster analysis, i.e. time necessary for recovery in the disaster 
aftermath, often taken as a part of impact analysis, resilience becomes an essential 
matter, as it has a direct bearing on the total damage sustained by an economic system. 
In relation to this, it can be assumed that a higher resilience level can make the economy 
recover faster and with fewer costs. We shall outline the trend in thinking about 
resilience among economists. 
If we follow Parker, Green and Thompson (1987) three notions describe the 
coping capacity against major (economic) shocks: susceptibility, vulnerability or 
resilience, and adaptability. A number of inferences can be drawn from this 
classification. First, we note that the authors place a reciprocal link between resilience 
and vulnerability. However, we can argue that one does not exclude the other, and a 
system can be vulnerable to hazards, but at the same time also resilient in its response to 
a major disruption. This means that we would opt for vulnerability as a static, inherent 
feature of the system under attack, while viewing resilience as a dynamic characteristic 
of the system in action, responding to the shock. Secondly, the concept of resilience is 
clearly separated from ‘adaptability’, which is different from what we observe in 
ecological literature. 
On the other hand, Green (2003, p.25) states that “the resilience of a system is: 
‘the dynamic response of vulnerability over time to the perturbations to which the 
system is subjected.’” With this, Green points to the static character of vulnerability and 
the dynamic character of resilience, as we suggested above. Furthermore, Green (ibid) 
proposes that “a resilient system is then one which bends under stress but does not 
break, and which returns to a desirable state after the perturbation has passed”. This 
statement on the one hand clearly suggests that resilience is a post-disaster category; 
and on the other hand assigns the positive character to resilience, assuming that its 
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resemblance should result in a system coming back to a desirable state. Rose (2006) 
also complies with the latter. We disagree with Green and Rose in this respect, but 
would rather take the position of Carpenter et al., that resilience without being coupled 
to the concept of sustainability is context-free, and targeting resilience alone can lead to 
an outcome which may be different from the desirable state of recovery. 
Rose (2004a, 2006) provides an analysis of resilience covered in economic 
literature on disaster analysis and opposes the view that resilience encompasses a 
portion of pre-disaster adaptive capacity. He claims that resilience is purely a post-
catastrophe feature, characterising the “inherent and adaptive responses14 to hazards that 
enable individuals and communities to avoid some potential losses”. Rose clarifies, “in 
contrast to pre-event character of mitigation, economic resilience emphasises ingenuity 
and resourcefulness applied during and after the event”. The author makes an apparent 
distinction between the pre-disaster mitigation activities directed at decreasing the 
probability of the catastrophic event to occur, and the post-disaster adjustment of an 
economy, characterised by resilience. It is important to mention that in American 
literature, mitigation is usually referred to any pre-disaster preparedness measures; 
while we would suggest distinguishing between two types of ex-ante measures, 
mitigative and adaptive, both of which can be important in terms of decision-making. 
First, we define mitigation as: 
 
At the same time, in our view, adaptation is directed at preparing the system to perform 
in a superior way in response to a negative impact. By adaptation in the context of 
disaster preparedness, we mean:  
 
An example of mitigation would be activities directed a the reduction of CO2 
emissions, which are intended to decrease the effects of global warming; alternatively, 
practicing evacuation in case flood alarm is issued, building flood defenses, reallocation 
of economic activities to the areas less prone to hazards would belong to adaptive 
measures. A similar definition can be found in one of the project descriptions of 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO, 2004). Interpreting adaptation 
in such a manner is similar to medical preventive measures taken in anticipation of an 
epidemic aimed at strengthening the individual immune system. In this manner, we 
argue, resilience is closely connected to adaptation, which can also be found in the 
                                               
14
 While we would say ‘inherent and adjusting responses’; see our definition of adaptability below. 
Mitigation is a set of pre-disaster activities directed at addressing the 
source of hazard, thus aiming at decreasing the threat posed by a 
potential hazard. 
Adaptation is a set of pre-disaster adjustment activities directed at 
creating conditions within the human-induced system that enhance this 
system’s resistance to an outside shock, as well as its response capacity 
to cushion a negative impact, thereby improving its resilience. 
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socio-ecological literature reviewed at the beginning of this Chapter. Mileti (1999, p.5) 
supports this view, regarding resilient systems as those that “can withstand en extreme 
event with a tolerable level of losses” and “take mitigation actions consistent with the 
achieving that level of protection”. Note that Mileti uses ‘mitigation’, which we would 
substitute with ‘mitigation and adaptation’ as discussed. 
A number of authors have introduced concepts that have a wide reach in disaster 
analysis. For example, Benson and Twigg (2004, p.21), in the context of research 
dedicated to increasing the safety of vulnerable communities and to reducing the 
impacts of disasters in developing countries, define mitigation as an all-inclusive 
concept, being “any action taken before, during or after a disaster to minimize its 
impact, including structural (physical) and non-structural measures”, including post-
disaster activities. The Board on Natural Disasters (1999, p.944), the US, shares this 
view on mitigation. At the same time, this concept seems to overlap with the term 
preparedness, which refers to the period in time shortly before a disaster and marks 
(ibid) “any specific measure taken before disaster strikes, usually to forecast or warn 
against it, take precautions when one threatens and arrange for the appropriate 
response”. Preparedness, thus, can be considered, in our lexicon, as part of adaptation. 
Freeman, for example, uses preparedness in the meaning of contingency planning (see 
Freeman, 2006). Parker, Green and Thompson (1987), however, consider adaptation as 
an all-inclusive concept. German scientists (see for example, Messner and Meyer, 
2006), in their turn, consider vulnerability a broad concept, including exposure 
indicators, elements at risk and susceptibility. The authors diverge in defining all these 
concepts, as discussed above. Resilience is viewed in a narrow sense, which makes in 
their analysis a part of susceptibility of ecological units. Susceptibility within the 
context of flood damage research, according to them (ibid, p.5), “in a broader meaning 
relates to system characteristics and include social context of flood damage formation, 
especially awareness and preparedness of affected people regarding risk they live with 
(before the flood), their capability to cope with the hazard (during the flood), and to 
withstand its consequences and to recuperate (after the flood event).” 
To avoid confusion, however, we abide by making a distinction between pre-
disaster measures as mitigation (directed at the reduction and control of hazard) and 
adaptation (directed at the improvement of characteristics of a human-induced system to 
respond to an adversity); and post-disaster resilience reflected in response and recovery 
activities. The definitions of concepts related to resilience in disaster analysis are 
discussed in the following Sections. 
 
2.3.3. Our Definition of Resilience 
At this point, it is clear that interpretation of resilience among economists often limits 
the application of the concept to the post-disaster situation alone. However, it is difficult 
to imagine that the inherent capacity of a system to respond to an outside shock should 
be seen as such an ultimately rigid category. Instead, similarly to immunity, it can be 
built up in advance to prepare the system for the outside threat. So, we state: 
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This implies that, in our view, adaptation is naturally following the concept of 
resilience. Essentially, the two are closely connected; when the resilience stage in the 
immediate disaster aftermath, with its emergency recovery and restoration activities, is 
over, and some daily routine has returned, adaptation takes over to prepare the system 
for future threats. Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003, p.41), as a part of disaster analysis 
community, state that “resilience […] suggests an ability to sustain a shock without 
completely deteriorating; that is, most conceptions of resilience involve some idea of 
adapting to and ‘bouncing back’ from a disruption.” Supporting this view, we note, 
furthermore, that adaptation can come from the stimulus within the system, but it can 
also be triggered from outside, like public policy. Therefore, within the scope of this 
thesis we shall consider the concept of resilience together with the adaptive capacity of 
the system, as ‘resilience’ emerges from continuous adaptation process, as well as 
adaptation is often enforced by the experience of a calamity. In Day (1987, p.252)15, we 
find supporting evidence: “The economy may then be thought of as being made up of a 
set of interacting adaptive processes, i.e., as a complex, adapting system.” This means 
that adaptability is inherent to the economic system, and thus naturally presupposes 
adjustments in the face of expected adverse events. 
We can summarise here that the concept of resilience is an important element in 
disaster analysis, which describes the processes of adjustments and survival in an 
economic system under attack. Essentially, because under ‘normal circumstances’ an 
economy can be described by the notions of stability and robustness, resilience is 
unnecessary in the standard impulse analysis. Yet, in the studies of major disturbances, 
resilience provides content to the time dimension of the disaster concept: including 
adaptability element, it points to the need for preparedness in the ex ante situation, and 
can be seen as a key indicator for policy goal when considered together with 
sustainability. The latter is because enhancing resilience should be considered a policy-
oriented cost-effective tool to manage catastrophic risk (Parker, Green and Thompson, 
1987; Rose, 2006). Also, reflecting the ability of a system to cushion a major shock, the 
notion of resilience suggests that a certain time span after a calamity has to be taken on 
board of disaster analysis, lying at the core of establishing disaster consequences (with 
which we continue in the next Chapter).  
The link between the application of resilience and policy action can be explored in 
the example of flood defence policy in the Netherlands. Eventually, one can note the 
straightforward connection between the use of the concept of resilience in damage 
assessment as a post-disaster policy instrument and its application for the purposes of 
building up the pre-disaster protection policies. Investing in improving the inherent 
resiliency of the whole economic system in advance can stimulate a better response to 
potential disaster, meaning lower losses, as well as a healthier reaction of the entire 
                                               
15
 We should add that Day’s evolutionary approach to economic change offers perspectives that may be 
worthwhile to consider in the perspective of the risk society (see also Day, 1993, 2004). 
Resilience is the ability of a human-induced system to: 1. cushion a 
shock, responding to it by adjustment; 2. safeguard continuity, 
maintaining its main characteristics; 3. exhibit learning capacity to 
improve its protective mechanisms in the face of future perturbations. 
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economy to any adverse outside impulse. We shall discuss this issue in more detail in 
Chapter 8. 
 
2.3.4. Concepts Related to Resilience  
When discussing resilience, a number of other concepts come to the surface. In the 
previous Section we elaborated on resilience, mitigation and adaptation. However, some 
other terms need to be touched on briefly to avoid unnecessary confusion. In doing this, 
we do not pretend to establish unanimously accepted definitions, but rather to clarify the 
meaning of those concepts, with the aim of having some sort of ‘operational definition’ 
used in terms of this thesis. 
As mentioned, Parker, Green and Thompson (1987) refers to susceptibility, 
vulnerability and resilience. Susceptibility seems to be a good place to start. According 
to the authors, susceptibility refers to the physical exposition to hazard, location of an 
object in the vicinity of potentially dangerous area. The EU project FLOODsite16 
defines it as the propensity of a particular receptor to experience harm (Gouldby and 
Samuels, 2005, p.26). For example, the location of a production site in the flood plane 
of a river makes it highly susceptible to a flood. Vulnerability, in our view, is static, and 
reflects sensitivity of the system to a disturbance, its potential to be harmed. In other 
words, vulnerability is the propensity of a system to incur damage. Therefore, clearly, a 
system can be susceptible to hazard, but not necessarily vulnerable. Next, resilience, as 
established in the previous Section, is a dynamic concept resembling the coping 
capacity of a system to deal with a shock (as well as the learning abilities to adapt in 
advance to potential dangers). As seen, Parker, Green and Thompson (1987) define 
resilience as a reciprocal of vulnerability; this, in our view, is not exactly the case. Also 
Adger (2000, p.348), from the environmental economist’s point of view, states that the 
former is only a ‘loose antonym’ of the latter. Provided the dynamic connotation 
assigned to the definition of resilience, we can say that a system can be vulnerable to a 
shock, but this does not necessarily imply that it is not resilient anymore. Though 
vulnerable to a disturbance, the system may react to this in a resilient way, adjusting in 
the face of a calamity and neutralising its negative impacts. 
The concept of resistance comes close to resilience. Resistance is the ability of the 
system to bear a shock and withhold damage; resilience is the ability to react. The subtle 
difference with resilience can be explained when thinking of resistance as a static 
concept. Then, it can be noted that resistance is the reciprocal of vulnerability, which 
expresses the exposure of the system to a shock and its potential to incur damage, and 
which can be seen analogous to Rose’s concept of static resilience (see Rose, 2006; his 
concept of dynamic resilience would be analogous to our concept of resilience). 
However, whereas a system has a given (or developed) level of resilience, its resistance 
can be different depending on the outside shock (as much as the system is vulnerable to 
a different extent depending on the impact, see also Green, 2004).17 
                                               
16
 FLOODsite project for integrated flood risk analysis and management methodologies covers the 
physical, environmental, ecological and socio-economic aspects of floods from rivers, estuaries and the 
sea. For more information, consult also the website www.floodsite.net. 
17
 Following Green (2004, p.323) “vulnerability can be defined as the relationship between a purposive 
system and its environment, where that environment varies over time”, which directly points at the 
variability of vulnerability depending on the outside conditions. 
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Robustness is also sometimes discussed in the debate on resilience. A robust 
system is the one that is “healthy, strong, durable”. With respect to disaster events, Rose 
(2006) defines it as avoidance of direct and indirect losses. The definition of robustness 
by Bruneau et al. (2003) coincides with our definition of resistance. Green (2003) 
suggests that a robust response, as opposed to a resilient one, is not flexible but rather 
makes system remain unaffected by shock. We may observe, thus, that robustness is 
often seen to be very close to resistance; yet the latter being applied from natural and 
social sciences; the former stemming from the economists’ vocabulary. However, we 
shall notice that it is important to note that, in fact, the concept of robustness is 
conventionally used in marginal analysis of incremental change analysis in economics. 
Alternatively, a system facing a major calamity, as discussed in this thesis, cannot 
reveal robustness anymore, as it is severely damaged and is forced out of its 
equilibrium. Resistance and its reciprocal, vulnerability, in this respect seem to capture 
a broader connotation, also applicable to the analysis of events on a grand scale, which 
are in the focus of our enquiry. 
Redundancy, as the measure of excess capacity (also found in Rose, 2006; and 
Bruneau et al., 2003; together with the concept of resourcefulness18), can be seen as part 
of resilience, particularly in the sense of “duplication for preventing failure of an entire 
system” (Wikipedia). This interpretation of redundancy in the ex-ante situation fits the 
proactive character of resilience as we describe it – being a process and revealing 
adaptive features. 
Finally, sustainability, which we already mentioned in the context of the ongoing 
discussion in this Chapter, is the ability of the system to maintain into perpetuity. The 
Brundtland Report (UN, 1987) defines sustainable development as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (also found in the documentation on the EU FLOODsite project, 
Gouldby and Samuels (2005, p.26). As mentioned before, this is the reflection of the 
desirable state of the system in the view of long-term development and in conjunction 
with a wider spectrum of variables, describing the environment in which the system is 
operating. This positive character of the term distinguishes it from resilience, which has 
no value judgement. So, the system can appear resilient in response to a calamity, 
although this does not make it necessarily return to the desired sustainable path. 
Legitimately, Tobin (1999) considers “sustainable and resilient communities” within the 
context of hazard mitigation. 
We can conclude at this stage that the underlying differences we noted between 
the concept of resilience and the related terms are often very delicate. Disaster scientists 
and those working in the related field of analysis should be more aware of this. To avoid 
confusion, within the framework of this thesis we shall stick to the definitions as 
outlined above. 
                                               
18
 Also, Bruneau et al. (2003), alongside robustness, redundancy and resourcefulness, include rapidity as 
a constituent of resilience. Yet, in our view, the definition of rapidity as the capacity to meet priorities and 
achieve goals in a timely manner in order to contain losses and avoid future disruption, overlaps with our 
definition of adaptability in terms of avoiding future losses; and also has some positive judgment of 
achieving a prescribed goal, which we would rather assign to sustainability. 
 37 
2.3.5. Core Concepts Shaping Disaster Analysis 
The new concepts for disaster studies as we have defined them in this Chapter are not 
only necessary for describing the specificity of calamity situations, but also for gaining 
more insight into the processes behind economic disaster phenomena. For example, 
these new concepts may be used as tools to organise our thinking about precautionary 
policies preparing for a potential hazard, as well as thinking about action in the 
immediate disaster aftermath. Without identifying those elements involved in working 
of an economic system under extreme conditions, which we can understand and 
structure by introducing and clearly defining the essential concepts in the new field of 
disaster analysis, modelling cannot be realised. Now we can take a step further and look 
at how far the identified concepts can be useful in understanding and modelling disaster 
impacts. 
We can imagine that when a country, hosting important production facilities, is hit 
by a major hazard, a part of the established economic network is gone, the system 
misses its constituent parts and thus cannot keep on working properly. The asymmetry 
of shock would then mean for a number of producers surrounding the economy that they 
lose their customers; others lose suppliers. Those producers experiencing difficulties 
will not be able to perform their obligations to third parties, causing an avalanche effect 
throughout the economy. Imbalances in relative proportions between the various sectors 
within the economy then become commonplace, leading to excess supplies and 
demands on various markets, neither of which is desirable. Ultimately, this would 
translate into shortages for consumers, who will not be able to obtain all the necessary 
goods to satisfy their needs. The described processes in the immediate disaster 
aftermath are a reflection of economy’s vulnerability, the degree to which it incurs 
losses as a result of a hazard. 
Practice has shown that negative consequences experienced throughout the 
economic network cannot be automatically restored (in particular on regulated markets) 
because of disproportionalities and rigidities that impede the return to balance (see 
Chapter 3 for further discussion on rigidities), emerging on a large scale. The system 
appears to be severely out of equilibrium, and needs to reorganise itself to return to a 
balance. This means that a whole range of adjustments, stemming from the resilience 
potential of an economy, is required; but how to think about that? On the one hand, the 
comeback to a (new) equilibrium can be entirely entrusted to the market forces. On the 
other hand, is the market capable of providing a solution to such a complicated 
problem? We should clarify: is the outcome of the market solution desirable, efficient, 
fair? Is it impossible that market failures and rigidities sabotage the whole recovery 
process? Probably, in some cases another party – the regulating hand of the government 
– is necessary to restore the balance at the lowest cost. At least in regulated economies, 
for example, the Netherlands, the mix of market self-forces and government 
intervention seems inevitable. However, as soon as the government steps into the 
matter, it should have some guidelines which options are available and which policies 
are best to help gain control of the situation. Economic modelling of potential disruption 
and the options open for recovery should guide the decision-making process in the 
important post-disaster phase of development. 
Also, a proactive approach to disaster preparedness can be analysed from the point 
of view of risk-averse policymakers, where the precautionary principle can play a role 
(see COMEST, 2005). This principle first emerged in the context of ecological debates, 
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and is also applied in the studies of risk society19 (see Giddens, 1999, as well as Beck, 
1992). According to the precautionary principle, an activity should not be undertaken if 
one can expect that it will bring substantial or irreversible negative effects. Applying the 
precautionary principle to disaster preparedness, this can be interpreted in terms of 
activities that should be undertaken if it is to be expected that idleness (‘doing nothing’ 
and hoping that a disaster does not happen) can bring about substantial or irreversible 
negative effects. Indeed, the possible irreversibility of the effects of a disaster (where 
system and/or group risks may play a significant role) should be considered seriously 
and brought to the awareness of both the broad public and the decision-makers. In 
essence, the analysis of the robustness and resilience of an economic system, and its 
adaptability to a changing physical environment can help identify those elements of an 
economic network, which can endanger the stability of the entire system if they are 
displaced. This can involve both the elements of physical infrastructure, and essential 
nodes in the socio-economic network.  
The forms that adaptability and resilience can then take in the framework of 
policy-making can be an interesting research topic. With the background definition 
established, one can investigate what those terms mean in reality, and which 
measurements should be used (see Rose, Oladosu and Liao, 2007). For example, 
according to some sources (e.g., NWO, 2004), adaptation can be regarded as 
autonomous (i.e., as we have suggested above, led by market forces), or it can be driven 
by public policy in the anticipation of a threat. The latter can be seen, in turn, as the 
planning of adaptations as a reactive process, like steering the recovery in the aftermath 
of a calamity; or as an anticipatory action, building up response capacity in advance (a 
clear revelation of resilience potential). It can be expected, according to the source 
(ibid), that in the long run adaptability may take on extreme forms, such as changing 
spatial patterns of residence, work, agriculture, infrastructure and nature. 
We can distinguish here a range of scientific efforts to make adaptability more 
tangible. Essentially, these are aimed at defining critical system characteristics, which 
should be able to guarantee the continuity of operation in the face of calamity. Kendra 
and Wachtendorf (2003, p.44) state that researchers for the New York State Department 
of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) and the Multidisciplinary Centre for Earthquake 
Engineering Research (MCEER) in the US identified the dimensions along which 
resilience can be measured. They claim that these contain robustness, resourcefulness, 
redundancy and rapidity (similarly to Bruneau et al. 2003). Kendra and Wachtendorf 
add (2003, p.45): “resilience should be seen not merely as the application of scientific 
knowledge and techniques, but also as an art.” This argument stems from the finding 
that all disasters are ‘same, yet different’ (supported by Denhardt, 2005), which 
presumes that we have to be prepared for their consequences in advance, yet be able to 
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 Following Giddens (1999, p.3), “A risk society is a society where we increasingly live on a high 
technological frontier which absolutely no one completely understands and which generates a diversity of 
possible futures”. Further, Giddens remarks (ibid, p.4): “A world which lives after nature and after the 
end of tradition is one marked by a transition from external to what I call manufactured risk. 
Manufactured risk is risk created by the very progression of human development, especially by the 
progression of science and technology.” Because modern risk societies, to a certain extent, are 
disconnected from nature, the growing importance of man-made risks is stressed, while risks connected to 
natural hazards as a threat to modern societies are somewhat disregarded. We shall agree on the former 
point, yet would draw the attention of the reader to the danger of underestimating the importance of the 
latter point, which we shall follow with the discussion concerning vulnerability of modern industrialized 
societies to natural hazards in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. We shall also come back to the risk society in 
Chapter 9. 
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improvise on the spot in each particular calamity case. What the authors offer as a 
system to achieve resilience is that it should possess, firstly, a high degree of 
organisational craftsmanship; secondly, the ability to respond to the singularities; and 
thirdly, a sense for what is the same and what is different from prior experience in every 
new experience. This suggests that a resilient society or a system should have some sort 
of built-in philosophy about the manner in which it should respond to a shock when 
occurs in reality, as well as the capacity to adjust immediately when facing an unknown 
danger. 
On the more operational, however still aggregate, level Tobin (1999, p.16) 
suggests that the following characteristics should apply to sustainable and resilient 
communities, which can be addressed in advance: 
• Lowered levels of risk to all members through reduced exposure to the 
geophysical event. 
• Reduced levels of vulnerability for all members of society. 
• Planning for sustainability and resilience must be ongoing. 
• High level of support from responsible agencies and political leaders.  
• Incorporation of partnerships and cooperation at different governmental levels.  
• Strengthened networks for independent and interdependent segments of society.  
• Planning at the appropriate scale. 
We may also draw from Pingali, Alinovi and Sutton (2005), who offer the 
following strategies to augment the food system’s resilience, which can readily be 
applied to more general cases: strengthening diversity; rebuilding local institutions and 
traditional support networks; reinforcing local knowledge; and building on economic 
agents’ ability to adapt and reorganise.  
Other examples are the works of Cole (2004a,b), where, in a series of studies on 
the economic effects of hurricanes on the Caribbean island of Aruba, he distinguished 
several ‘survival strategies’ for a small island economy (however, without mentioning 
the concepts of resilience or adaptation explicitly). This would typically include a 
duplication of crucial lifeline systems such as the food and drink systems, particularly 
around international hotels (where reliance on tourism sector is critical for this island 
economy). In case a disaster hits the primary lifeline supply system (i.e., water, 
electricity and gas supply, transport and communication systems), excess capacity 
should be available to ensure the continuity of the usual activities. This, however, comes 
at a price of a priori investments, which cannot be spent on alternative purposes, be it 
consumption or investments in capital. All benefits and costs of such precautionary 
measures should be considered and carefully weighed when a particular decision has to 
be taken. 
What we are especially interested in, within the context of our research, is the 
application of the principles outlined above to differentiation between ways the 
economy can react in response to a disturbance, neutralising the negative consequences 
in production interruptions. Built on the reviewed methods and strategies to make 
resilience and adaptation operational, we suggest that the following schedule can be 
applied: 
1. ensure business operation continuity outside the impacted area (supply side) 
by means of: 
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a. having a back-up lifeline system, including electricity, water and gas 
supplies, telecommunications, alternative transportation routes, et cetera; 
b. maintaining extra stock (both for raw materials and final products); 
c. ability to switch in a flexible way to new procurement and consumption 
markets; 
2. ensure the availability, distribution and exchange of information as a crucial 
asset in immediate decision-making for economic agents and government 
institutions;20 
3. substitution of lost domestic output by increased production of goods and 
services by businesses at home, utilising spare production capacities – on the 
supply side; 
4. adjustments in the consumption pattern via product substitutability on the 
demand side; 
5. diversification of the economic system – both on the production and 
consumption markets to reduce dependency on the outside resources. 
It can be noted that the classification that we offer is directed at the micro- and meso-
levels of individual producers and sectors of an economy. At the same time, ensuring 
the building up of resilient individual elements of the whole system will expectedly 
have an aggregated effect on the economy level. Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003, p. 48) 
draw a connection between links at various levels. They assert that, on the one hand, 
resilient communities provide the context in which organisations themselves become 
more resilient. On the other hand, however, organisations provide the infrastructure for 
a community’s resilience, in that organisational resources, networks and overall 
capacity are what make coordinated community-wide response possible. They conclude, 
“the relationship is iterative and telescoping, played out across multiple scales within 
organisations, between organisations and between organisations and the community.” 
The outlined classification of resilience embodiment in practical activities, as we 
propose, provides another possibility to demonstrate that adaptability and resilience are 
seamlessly connected. Some of the elements (also found in Rose, 2006, though 
structured into the inherent and adaptive resilience) evidently belong to the post-disaster 
performance, such as the ability to find new business partners, adjustments in 
consumption patterns and provision of information. The rest of the constituents depict 
adaptation variables, building up resilient capacity, which cannot emerge at the moment 
when a disaster hits, without being ‘prepared’ in advance. This includes back-up 
systems, additional stocks, economic diversification, and the existence of spare 
capacities for production, which will appear to be essential to our discussion of rigidities 
in the next Chapter. Unless present in advance, these options cannot be used as the 
calamity strikes. Therefore, the economic agents have to take a priori action to ensure 
the presence of resilient capacity. Yet, in the longer run, resilient response in the 
immediate disaster aftermath, also possessing a learning element, gradually becomes an 
adaptative process, shaping preparedness to the potential hazard in the future. 
                                               
20
 The utter importance of information as a decisive factor in immediate reaction and planning was 
substantially emphasized by the US Bipartisan Committee reporting on the consequences of hurricane 
Katrina (see US House of Representatives, 2006) 
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2.4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter we addressed conceptual issues connected to the definitions of a number 
of important concepts in disaster analysis. Firstly, we focused the concepts of disaster 
and catastrophe, often alternated in use. We established that there is not much 
convention on the definition of the very subject of disaster studies, which essentially 
underlies the lack of order in the field, let alone the existence of the field itself. 
However, we attempted to bring more clarity and define a disaster, resulting from the 
interaction between natural and human-induced systems, as a shock going beyond the 
scale of what can be referred to as a minor or marginal impact, affecting the established 
balance throughout the economic system with explicit spatial and temporal dimensions. 
Catastrophe, in turn, is a ’severe disaster’, causing acute displacements of a system, in 
its extreme leading to overall failure. In fact, drawing a line between the two sorts of 
calamities is not easy, but we state that is it a matter of scale and severity, which 
distinguishes the two. 
In the debate about long-term effects of flooding and society’s capability to 
recover, a number of concepts are gaining increasing attention in disaster analysis, 
among others, resilience and adaptation. A problem is that neither the multidisciplinary 
literature covering disaster modelling, nor the economic literature, have developed 
generally accepted definitions. Yet, some trends can be observed. They certainly 
deserve more elaboration.  
Taking into account a wider temporal span in disaster analysis, resilience becomes 
an essential matter as it has direct implications on the total damage sustained. We need 
this concept in the study of major calamities, which imply severe disturbances, as a twin 
brother of robustness that is used in the minor shock analyses. Resilience, in our view, 
reflects a system’s capacity to adjust in the face of tribulation and respond to it in a way, 
which could cushion the immediate negative impact, maintaining its main 
characteristics (Gunderson and Holling, 2001; Allenby and Fink, 2005). Some authors, 
especially from the (socio-) ecological field, attribute learning and adaptive capacity to 
resilience as well (see, for example, Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003; Resilience 
Alliance, 2005), with which we agree, too. In connection to this, it is assumed that a 
higher resilience level can make an economy recover faster and at lower cost (Rose, 
2004a). Recently, in disaster consequence studies, resilience plays a more prominent 
role: re-organizing the system so that it responds rapidly in a flexible way to a shock, 
becoming a goal in itself. In her study on water management system, De Bruijn (2004) 
points to the superiority of resilience strategies. Besides, a prudent policy-maker would 
couple this goal with the sustainability principle, providing resilience with normative 
contents (Tobin, 1999). 
To enhance resilience of a system, one has to think in terms of disaster 
preparedness. As immunity, resilience can be improved in advance. In this sense, it is 
connected to the concept of adaptability. Adaptation, thus, is directed at the preparation 
of the system to the expected adversity, and can cover local, national and even global 
aspects. Adaptation is intended to reduce inherent vulnerability of a system to a 
calamity, as well as to improve its response capacity, i.e. resilience. The difference with 
the widely used mitigation strategies is that, contrary to adaptation (which is aimed at 
the system under attack), mitigation is seen as the entirety of strategies, aimed at 
preventing or limiting the adversity. 
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The debate on the concepts in disaster analysis, described in this Chapter, is 
completely open and asks for ongoing contributions. We hope to have provided a 
consistent examination on a number of issues from the economic point of view. Because 
we have started from the fundamental questions guiding disaster analysis, it was 
necessary to provide the definitions of core concepts offering a basic structure for an 
integrated thinking about the processes in complex economic systems provoked by an 
event of a major disaster. In the following two Chapters of Part II, we shall continue 
with discussing economic concepts in, approaches and frameworks for modelling 
disaster consequences. 
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Chapter 3 
Consequences of Disasters 
_______________________________________ 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
We would like to recall two aspects of disasters that we established in the previous 
Chapter: the term ’disaster‘ does not refer to the hazardous event itself, but rather to its 
consequences, and is defined as the interaction between natural or manmade hazards 
and human-induced systems. Shinozuka, Rose and Eguchi (1998, p.1) make a 
compelling observation:  
“…earthquakes are much like the old philosophical conundrum: if a tree falls in 
the forest and there’s no one around, is there a noise? Similarly, in an area with a 
small population and little economic activity, an earthquake is not very 
meaningful.” 
This brings us to the point that when talking about catastrophes, we are clearly 
dealing with situations where human settlements, activities and lives are destroyed, 
whereas otherwise it is just a rage of nature. A wide range of effects can occur, such as 
loss of life; psychological trauma’s; devastation of property and assets, both residential 
and business-related causing deterioration of welfare; curtailment of human activities 
caused by failure of public services; interruption of business and production activities; 
damage to historical and cultural heritage; decay to pastures and arable land; destruction 
of environmental conditions, ecological imbalances, and so forth. The multidimensional 
character of consequences results in the analysis of disaster impacts involving a variety 
of disciplines, including, among others, economics, sociology, ecology, engineering and 
environmental sciences. As pointed out in this thesis we limit the scope of exploration 
of disaster consequences to the study of economic effects of a major adverse shock (we 
tackled the issue of scale in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2).  
Besides, it is important to realise that, as a disaster is compounded of all the 
impacts it brings with it, it should therefore be considered improper to regard one effect 
as superior to the other21. What we are attempting to achieve is, concentrating on the 
economic side of calamity consequences, to contribute to the understanding of the 
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 For example, we shall not evaluate the non-monetary impacts on households, which is becoming 
traditional in flooding literature. We refer to MAFF (1999), Alterra (2003), and Van Ast, Bouma and 
Francois (2004). 
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nature of devastations and the means to deal with them, preparing contemporary society 
for potential disturbances. This makes us realize that the stakes are high. In this Chapter, 
we shall closely study the effects disasters may have in modern societies. We shall try to 
distinguish between various types of impacts, and prepare the stage for economic 
impact modelling, which will follow in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
3.2. CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS 
A first task is to distinguish essential aspects of disaster consequences. First, we want to 
pay more attention to the scale of the event that is studied. In the previous Chapter, we 
have found that it is the scale of the distress in particular, which makes a disaster a 
specific topic for research. On the one hand, studies of disasters are different from the 
conventional studies of marginal or step-wise changes, like incremental change in tax 
policy, trade tariffs or government expenditures. Impacts brought by a calamity are 
conceptually different, due to the very scale of the event. This stems in particular from 
the observation that a sum of a number of marginal changes would not produce the 
same outcome as one major shock (Van der Veen, Vetere Arellano and Nordvik, 2003). 
This means that we have to open a new chapter in the studies of impact analysis, with 
special attention for disasters. Needless to say that catastrophes, as extremely severe 
disasters, should occupy a separate niche exploring system failures. 
There are a number of aspects that are essential in determining the magnitude of a 
calamity. First of all, on the global scale, climate change is often recognised as a factor 
contributing on the one hand to the increasing climatic variability and changing 
exposure to hazards; and on the other hand to uncertainty regarding its effects in 
specific localities. Next, there exists a differentiation of disaster effects in the literature 
between developed and developing countries, as the character of damages sustained 
depends on the economic (infra-)structure of the society. In the following subsection, 
we shall cover these topics and concentrate on the discussion of disaster consequences 
in developed countries, present rigidities and challenges during response and recovery 
stage. Because many issues in disaster and extreme event analysis are considered to be 
connected to the ongoing climate change processes, we shall first start with that. 
 
3.2.1. Climate Change: a New Challenge 
Disasters are particularly dangerous because they are difficult to predict. Currently, a 
number of challenges can be identified that may be expected to contribute to the (more 
frequent) emergence of calamities (MunichRe, 2006). The scale of a disaster depends, 
first of all, on the nature of the hazard and secondly on consequences resulting from 
this. However, the two are connected: the stronger the natural downturn, the more 
severe the consequences. If the hazard becomes increasingly likely, and the 
consequences of this are not known precisely, but are expected to be momentous, the 
situation deserves special treatment. One of the broadly recognised dangers at the 
moment is climate change, posing additional pressure on the development of the entire 
globe. We shall examine what this could mean for industrialised societies in particular. 
The last decades have shown growing awareness on the increasing concentrations 
of ‘greenhouse’ gases in the atmosphere, which are believed to cause climate change. 
 45 
This is currently identified as global average warming (as pointed out by some experts, 
see the report of the International Panel for Climate Change, IPCC, 2001, p.72), and is 
identified by the increase in the number and severity of extreme weather events, 
increased precipitation and the sea level rise (Van Aalst, 2006). Following US National 
Research Council (2002, p.1) “Abrupt climate changes were especially common when 
the climate system was being forced to change most rapidly. Thus, greenhouse warming 
and other human alterations of the earth system may increase the possibility of large, 
abrupt, and unwelcome regional or global climatic events.” This means that nowadays, 
when global environment is changing rapidly, it may be the reason why the world more 
frequently experiences extreme disasters, such as tsunamis, earthquakes, floods and 
hurricanes. As apparent from different sources (IPCC, 2001; World Wildlife 
Foundation, WWF, 2004; US National Academy of Sciences, 2005, et cetera) this trend 
is increasing. The consequences of this are virtually unpredictable. Although we can 
assume that man can hardly influence the probability of a hazard, it is becoming widely 
acknowledged that unscheduled extreme natural events will form part of our future. For 
example, following Penning–Rowsell and Peerbolte (1994, p.9), and indirectly also Van 
Aalst (2006, p.12), the potential for large-scale flooding exists all over Europe (see also 
other recent publications supporting these developments, like Van Dorland and Jansen, 
2006; Stern 2006 and IPCC, 2007). Therefore, we have to take the unexpected into 
account when thinking about development trajectories (the argument is also supported 
by Benson and Twigg, 2004, and Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2004). Identifying 
climate change and its effects as potential part of catastrophe emergence mechanism 
necessitates admitting that we are in fact forced to adapt to living in the world where 
disasters have high potential. Schipper and Pelling (2006, p.30) point out that “the 
scholarly realms of disaster risk and climate change are also starting to merge”.  
In an attempt to gain some measure of control over the climate change 
developments and their consequences at large, Helmer and Hilhorst (2006, p.3) plead 
for what we would interpret as an integrated approach (we shall return to the discussion 
of this issue in Chapter 8, in the context of Dutch water and flood management), which 
could include 
• better coordination among the climate change, disasters and development 
communities; 
• an even-handed attention to the reduction of greenhouse gases and the risks 
associated with climate change, including through enhanced disaster management; 
and 
• improved conceptual and methodological approaches to understand and respond 
to local manifestations of disasters while simultaneously addressing underlying 
complex and partially global processes. 
This statement provides a wide platform for debate, which aims at bringing together 
climate change challenges, and couples them to disaster analysis and development 
trajectory planning. O’Brien et al. (2006, p.64), however, make a step further and 
connect the climate change problem with disaster management and resilience-building:  
“Disaster policy response to climate change is dependent on a number of factors, 
such as readiness to accept the reality of climate change, institutions and 
capacity, as well as willingness to embed climate change risk assessment and 
management in development strategies. These conditions do not yet exist 
universally. A focus that neglects to enhance capacity-building and resilience as a 
prerequisite for managing climate change risks will, in all likelihood, do little to 
reduce vulnerability to those risks”. 
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To achieve those goals, Van Aalst (2006, p.5) points out that challenges posed by 
climate change can not be managed separately from a broader context of development: 
“…the additional risks due to climate change should not be analysed or treated in 
isolation, but instead integrated into broader efforts to reduce the risk of natural 
disasters.” Besides, Thomalla et al. (2006, p.47) suggest what they call the following 
experiments: 1. Enhancement of resilience/vulnerability dialogue; 2. Identifying regions 
of large-scale vulnerability; 3. Execution of vulnerability analysis using a formal 
methodology. We notice that both O’Brien et al. (2006) and Thomalla et al. (2006) 
point out the methodological underpinning behind disaster vulnerability analysis. To 
this end, the conclusion can be drawn that not only evaluations of disaster consequences 
themselves, but also a wider range of goals, such as studying resilience, contingency 
planning as well as designing development trajectories connected to climate change 
depend on the theoretical grounds of disaster analysis. Therefore, we shall continue 
elaborating how economic damage can be identified and modelled. 
 
3.2.2. Disaster Impacts in Developed and Developing Countries 
Another important consideration in studying disaster consequences in economic terms is 
that it matters which type of economy is affected (on hazard vulnerability of small cities 
versus big agglomerations, see Cross, 2001; and MunichRe, 2005). One example is the 
distinction between developing and developed economic systems. Some authors claim 
that disasters in developing countries result in much more severe devastation than in 
developed countries due to the vulnerability of the former triggered by a high degree of 
susceptibility22 (see in particular Mechler, 2004; but also Christoplos, Mitchell and 
Liljelund, 2001; Murlidharan and Shah, 2003; Pingali, Alinovi and Sutton, 2005); at the 
same time, other authors consider the study of disruptions in industrialised countries as 
a priority because of increased complexity (like Morrow, 1999; Steenge and 
Bočkarjova, 2007). In this subsection, we shall address the differences stipulating the 
emergence of this division. In the Section 3.2.3 we shall deepen the discussion of 
disaster impacts in developed economies. 
Let us look at the core of the differences. The reason why developing countries 
suffer severely from a disaster is that they are highly susceptible to natural hazards – 
with generally lower protection standards, stemming from the inability of these 
countries to finance advanced protection measures. Also, the high level of vulnerability 
of these economies to a calamity is often stipulated by increasing sensitivity to climatic 
variability due to dependency on agriculture and basic industry. These are also 
inadequately developed to satisfy the needs of growing population. Also, problems of 
conflicts, governance and weak public financial management further impede 
development (see Benson and Clay, 2003). The question whether such societies are 
becoming more or less resilient remains open. In these terms, high vulnerability of 
developing countries to natural hazards combined with low level of resilience, inability 
to cushion the adverse impact can turn a hazard into a devastating disaster.  
Alternatively, we have to be particularly aware of the consequences of these 
natural tribulations on modern societies, as, traditionally, people found it attractive to 
establish their settlements in places such as river banks, river mouths, coastal areas, et 
cetera, because this was advantageous in terms of trade, as well as for recreational 
                                               
22
 See the discussion of these concepts in Chapter 2. 
 47 
purposes. Settlements in these areas are naturally prone to forces of nature, and need 
additional protection. The reason that contemporary economies are significantly 
sensitive to potential calamity and why it is becoming increasingly challenging to cope 
with them lies in the increasing accumulation of economic assets and economic activity 
at a speed, which has never been witnessed before. UN/ISDR (2002) make the 
following general note: “Population density and growth, unplanned urbanisation, 
inappropriate land use, environmental mismanagement and loss of biodiversity, social 
injustice, poverty and short-term economic vision are important determinants of 
vulnerability.” The issue is also recognised by the EU Commission (2006), which, in 
drafting a directive on the assessment and management of floods, points to two trends in 
the development of flood risk, namely, increase in scale and frequency of floods, and 
marked increase in vulnerability. Developed countries are in general less susceptible, as 
they are able to invest continuously in advanced protective measures. However, the 
level of vulnerability of industrialised economies is not easy to determine, as at least 
two factors contribute to it. On the one hand, these systems do not rely on agriculture 
anymore, which implies higher resistance. On the other hand, a developed economy 
consists of a complex system of inter-industrial network. Rose and Guha (2004, p.120) 
note in this respect: “Greater interdependence causes these direct losses to ripple 
through the economy to a greater extent via many rounds of cost increases and lost 
purchases and sales. Greater self-sufficiency means an economy is more vulnerable to a 
disaster within its borders because of reduced trade with the outside world.” This 
suggests that the sensitivity (or, rather, vulnerability) of a modern economic network to 
outside shocks, however, remains difficult to establish, as interaction effects are 
involved throughout the entire system, and the loss of a part of this system should be 
considered in the context of the entire economy. Therefore, we propose that it is 
essential to study complex economic systems as they become affected by major adverse 
shocks.  
Besides vulnerability, we also need to determine the level of resilience of modern 
systems to major outside shocks. During recovery, use of excess production capacities 
in the non-affected areas, resulting in production substitution; adjustments in economic 
behaviour of firms and households; as well as other ways of resilient response of an 
economic system to a shock can take place. The magnitude of these cushioning effects 
depends on the availability of alternative sources of supply and demand in the economy; 
the duration of the physical disruption; and the possibility to extend production. In 
general, assessing in advance whether alternative sources are available and whether 
production elsewhere can be relied upon, remains an extremely difficult task. However, 
this should be an essential part of disaster analysis. Also, although modern economies 
have undergone substantial change during the last century towards information societies 
based on knowledge (on information technology developments in connection to hazard 
perception see Mitchell, 1997), high-tech production and services, it is not apparent 
whether their ability to respond to an adverse impulse has deteriorated or improved. 
What can be stated with a high level of certainty is that modern economies have 
acquired new qualities, which need to be studied. Pelling (2003) asserts: “Urbanization 
affects disasters just as profoundly as disasters can affect urbanization”. At present, only 
a few studies exist which perform in-depth explorations of resilient response in 
industrialised economic networks. Nevertheless, more attention is now being paid to 
this topic, among which also our current study.  
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3.2.3. An Industrialised Economy as a Complex Circular Flow System 
Further in this Section, we shall focus on the description of the impacts of a disaster in 
an economy with a highly developed industrial structure. Essentially, because of the 
complexity of modern economic systems, their elements are tightly interconnected 
through a diversified multi-level system of links. With this in mind, we shall focus on 
the analysis of linkages and dependencies within those systems. In this context, the 
concept of circular flow becomes a useful tool of analysis. 
The circular flow as a framework in which we shall further discuss disasters can 
essentially be borrowed from macroeconomic theory (introduced by Quesnay, and later 
became a part of macroeconomic textbooks, see for example Mankiw, 1994; 
Chamberlin and Yueh, 2006). The concept of production as a circular flow dates back to 
early writers such as William Petty in England and Richard Cantillon in France. 
However, the Frenchman François Quesnay is generally credited with developing the 
first real model of the circulation of commodities between interconnected sectors of an 
economy. His Tableau économique, published in various versions between 1758 and 
1766, is a representation of the production, expenditure and distribution of commodities 
in a two sector economy (agriculture and manufacturing). To express his views, 
Quesnay employed a very special device, the so-called zigzags. The first effort to 
transcribe the zigzags into a modern input-output format was made by Phillips (1955), 
after which many efforts followed (see Steenge, 2000). Leontief, in his early work on 
input-output tables for the USA, saw his (own) work as an effort to build a modern 
Tableau économique for the United States (Leontief, 1936,1941). 
The idea of a circular flow is central to the understanding of how an economy 
works. An economic system can be thus viewed as a network where there are actions 
and interactions between households, firms, the government, financial institutions and 
the foreign sector. This has come to be known as the circular flow of income.  
The basic scheme of flows in an economy can be observed between firms and 
households (found in Figure 3.1). We may notice that there are two loops: the blue 
arrows illustrate the flows of goods and services; maroon arrows stand for money 
circulation. This means, that between firms and households, there is a clock-wise 
exchange of labour as a factor of production to the firms, and of final goods from the 
firms to the households. Money streams go in the opposite direction to goods and 
services in the form of consumption expenditures of households for those goods and 
services, which are also revenues for the firms; and factor payments from the firms to 
households, which are essentially earned income for the supplied labour (i.e., wages). If 
we consider only the small inner circle of streams of money and goods between 
households and firms, we will observe that households are supplying labour and 
consuming final goods; and firms are producing goods in the economy. Also, a flow of 
intermediate goods can be observed from the market for goods and services to the 
market for factors of production. Intermediate goods are those goods that will be further 
used in the production of other final goods and services; these transactions can be 
traced, for example, within the input-output intermediate transactions matrix, to be 
discussed in more details in Chapter 5. It can also be visualised as a scheme of inter- 
and intra-industry flows as shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.1. The economy as a circular flow. 
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If we extend our scheme and include government, financial markets and foreign 
countries, we shall obtain a more complicated chart of flows (Figure 3.1). Here, in 
addition to the above-mentioned streams of goods, services and money, we may observe 
also the transactions that are added due to the presence of the third actor, the 
government. Both firms and households have to pay taxes, in exchange for which they 
receive government services (that can be homeland security, defence, et cetera); and 
receive, respectively, subsidies and transfer payments. Government is also spending 
money (government purchases) for some goods and services on the market for goods 
and services; as well as borrowing and lending money in the financial market. 
Households and firms are participating in the financial market, too, by means of 
borrowing, lending, saving and investing, respectively receiving or paying dividends or 
interest. 
The circle is completed by the leakages to and injections from foreign markets. 
Namely, some of goods and services that are produced in abundance are exported (for 
which payments are received); alternatively, those goods and services that are not 
produced domestically, or not in the required amounts, are imported (for which 
payments are made). Finally, financial markets in an open economy witness the inflows 
and outflows of foreign investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Scheme of input-output inter- and intra-industry flows. 
 
Above, we referred to the circular flow as represented in terms of an input-output 
system. An input-output system provides a stylised representation of the complex 
circularity discussed above (see also Leontief, 1991; and Samuelson, 1991). In that 
system, each industry (denoted as A, B and C in Figure 3.2) is producing some amount 
of output. Part of this output will be used by the same sector (say, sector A) for its own 
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needs. For example, part of equipment and machinery produced by heavy industry will 
be used in production (e.g., will go from A to A). Another part of sectoral outputs will 
be traded between other industries for their production needs. Thus, the flows of 
intermediate goods between all sectors can be observed (from A to B, from A to C, from 
B to C, and so on). It is also possible that intermediate goods stream in both ways 
between two sectors (like on the diagram above). This can be the case, for example, 
when agricultural sector is selling its outputs to the service sector, as well as buying 
some services from it for the purposes of production. The final part of output produced 
by each sector is allocated to the final demand categories, such as private or public 
consumption, investments or exports. Also, final demand categories are supplying 
labour and capital depreciation back to the productive sectors, which closes this input-
output circle of flows. 
It may be useful to introduce briefly the basic, static input-output model already at 
this place. (We shall come back to this model more extensively in Chapters 5 and 6). 
The model describes, in a-priori specified detail, the production of goods and services 
in an economy. The model is based on the notion of interlocking production processes. 
Two types of inputs into these processes are distinguished, i.e. commodities, the 
production of which is described in the required detail, and commodities, the 
production process of which is not described. Examples of the first type are the various 
kinds of agricultural products, the products of light and heavy industry and services. 
Examples of the second type are labour, imports, capital investments and government 
services in the form of taxes and subsidies. The latter category is known as the primary 
resources or factors. The production processes are modelled as so-called limitational 
production functions, also known as Leontief production functions. The term 
‘limitational’ here means that the proportions in which the inputs have to be combined 
in production is fixed, basically on technological grounds. That is, the model (at least in 
its basic structure) does not allow substitution between inputs based on price 
movements, as in ‘smooth’ neo-classical production functions.23 Standard, we have:  
fAxx +=
 [3.1] 
where the (n x n) matrix A stands for the technologically determined matrix of input 
coefficients, f for the (n x 1) vector of exogenously determined final demand, and x for 
the vector (n x 1) of total output required to produce f, where we shall assume f>0. The 
dimension of matrix A informs us that the production of n goods and services is 
considered. The columns of the matrix stand for the inputs of the ‘produced’ or 
‘intermediate’ inputs into each production function. (In Chapters 5 and 6 we shall 
discuss the way the input coefficients in A –and in the row-vector l, below- are 
obtained). For us, at the moment, it will be sufficient to notice that the coefficients aij of 
A represent standardised value flows from industry i to industry j. Matrix A, together 
with the information in f and l in [3.2] represent the circular flow in a very concise 
form.     
To complete the model, we also need to introduce the ‘non-produced’ or primary 
factors or inputs. For the moment we shall only distinguish one such input, labour. We 
have:  
                                               
23
 The literature distinguishes several types of ‘mixed’ models, in which price effects do have an 
influence on  input proportions. We shall only occasionally refer to those forms.  
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lx=L
 [3.2] 
where l represents the vector of labour input coefficients into each production function, 
and the scalar L total labour income or employment. The elements of l are known as the 
direct input coefficients.24 Important is that the elements of l also are technologically 
determined. (One reason that the production of the primary factors is not considered is 
the fact that these processes are of a quite different nature, often involving long-term 
activities such as teaching and education in the case of labour. Sometimes also they are 
not sufficiently known as in the case of imports). Equilibrium prices p are given by the 
equation: 
lpAp w+=  [3.3] 
where w is the wage rate, such as euros per hour earned. (The row-vector lw  also is 
known as the vector of value-added coefficients). We note that built-in is the property 
that labour can buy the economy’s net output, the commodity bundle f. In fact, we have 
the following balance between income and expenditure, another instance of the model’s 
built-in circularity:  
fpxl =w  [3.4] 
The model enables us to calculate the effects of a change in final demand. 
Suppose exogenously determined final demand changes to ∆f)(f + . From [3.1] we then 
obtain straightforwardly: 
∆f)A(f∆x)(x +=+ , [3.5] 
which gives us the new total output vector.  
The above model essentially has only one scarce or limited factor, i.e. labour. 
That is, any limits to production are caused by a possible shortage of labour. (In models 
distinguishing additional primary factors, analogously, several of these production 
bottlenecks are distinguished). Suppose labour is only available in the amount L. In that 
case, the economy faces a labour shortage if L<L  as given by [3.2]. This means that the 
consumption bundle f is not feasible, and must be changed.25 We should remark that the 
model does not address issues of unemployment, or, more general, of ‘resources’ that 
are oversupplied. So, if a situation where L>L is interpreted as a situation of 
unemployment, there are no mechanism that, e.g. would drive the economy towards a 
fuller use of labour as a productive factor. Such issues need to be addressed in more 
elaborate versions of the model.    
The model usually is compounded on the basis of transaction reviewed for a 
specified period of time, which normally is one year. Finally, the model is static 
                                               
24
 The so-called indirect or total input coefficients are the elements of the multiplier or Leontief matrix of 
this model. This matrix also will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
25
 More elaborate models put limits also on the availability of the produced goods, but for the moment we 
shall abstract from those possibilities.    
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because an analysis of the effects of investments is not part of the model. That is, 
investments are accounted for as one of the categories of final demand, but their effects 
on the economy’s dynamics are not analyzed.    
The equations [3.1],[3.2],[3.3],[3.4] represent the initial situation, i.e. before the 
shock. All entries are in money values. This is done because the empirical data needed 
to implement the model often are available only in money terms. Thus, we work with 
physical units expressed in monetary terms; see Miller and Blair (1985, Ch.2). An 
additional advantage is that money value representations enhance comparability 
between sectors, regions, and over time.   
The static model, however, has a second form, the closed model. The standard 
form here is: 
xM x =  [3.6] 
The elements of the columns of M again are interpreted in terms of production 
functions. In this model, the distinction between ‘produced’ and ‘non-produced’ (i.e. 
primary) goods and services is not made; all commodities are equal in this sense. Total 
inputs are given by the vector Mx, total outputs by vector x. The model thus tells us 
that the solution, x, is the dominant right-hand eigenvector of matrix M. As we see, this 
matrix has dominant or Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue equal to unity, with x the 
corresponding eigenvector which gives the output proportions for this economy.26  
The model [3.6] thus does not address questions involving the consequences of 
changes in final consumption demand. It only answers the question: which proportions 
are needed - in terms of inputs and outputs – so that the economy can reproduce itself in 
one period? This implies another difference with the open model [3.1] above. We may 
wish to interpret one of the columns of M in terms of the (proportions of a) 
consumption bundle for households. These households in turn provide the necessary 
labour inputs for the industrial processes. The coefficients in the row of M, which 
corresponds to the ‘consumption inputs’ column, then are comparable to the direct 
labour inputs in vector l of the open model. If the consumption vector is reasonably 
stable in proportions, this interpretation seems acceptable.27 The price model 
corresponding to [3.6] is: 
Mp  p =  [3.7] 
That is, the equilibrium price vector p is the left-hand Perron-Frobenius 
eigenvector of M.   
Suppose now that an economy is described by [3.6]. That is, we have a perfect 
fine-tuning in the sense that inputs and outputs are precisely matched. Suppose also that 
this includes labour and that this implies a situation of full employment. Suppose 
                                               
26
 In Chapter 6, we shall encounter a closed Leontief model where the coefficients matrix M is the sum of 
two input coefficient matrices, one standing for the technologies in use (A), and another for the real wage 
(H). 
27
 Nonetheless, several authors object to this view because man would be introduced as a ‘machine’ 
requiring certain inputs to produce its product (i.e. labour force).  
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furthermore that for some reason the input vector changes to My where xy ξ≠ , ξ > 0. 
In that case, we have 
yM  z =   [3.8] 
where z is not equal to y (because y is not an eigenvector of M). In that case, the perfect 
circular flow as depicted by equation [3.6] is lost. In fact, compared to the circular flow 
in [3.6], now (relative) over- and undersupply can be observed in [3.8]. If the situation 
persists for some time, entirely new efforts will be undertaken to restore some kind of 
equilibrium. The question then is if such a situation is advisable. The alternative is that 
the government prepares the country for the situation by preparing itself and by 
preparing various scenarios. That is the line we shall pursue later on, especially in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
3.2.4. Disaster Impacts in an Industrialised Economy; the Role of ‘Rigidities’ 
The circular flow representation of an economy as above shows that all agents and all 
markets within a system are interconnected on several levels. Unexpected severe 
adverse shocks to an economic system cause interruptions in the circular flow and as a 
result, chain reaction eventuating in the paralysation of the entire economic network. 
One of the factors which can aggravate these effects are so-called rigidities, which can 
emerge due to what we would call technological factors (rather connected to the 
existence of the so-called ‘critical’ sectors that may cause the emergence of bottlenecks 
in production cycle); and institutional factors, (connected to contractual obligations, 
time lags or lack of information, et cetera). The latter fall outside the direct scope of this 
study, although they have an implicit influence on the former. At the same time, so-
called technological factors guiding the emergence of rigidities are discussed further in 
this Chapter, as part of the exploration of production breaks and changes in economic 
structure, that at the core of our grand inquiry (as we shall see, the discussion of 
rigidities plays an important role building our model in Chapter 6). The other two issues 
that we are going to illuminate in this Section are the ability of an economic system to 
respond to a shock and the role of government as an important actor in steering disaster 
aftermath. In the modern economies, where private and public domains interact and 
form the economic landscape of the country, also the issue of responsibility, disaster 
prevention and preparedness come up to the surface. Specific to the thematic of 
disasters is the problem of insurance, which will also be covered below. First, we shall 
discuss rigidities. 
‘Rigidities’ 
For any economy, a set of rigidities can be determined which are inherent to a system. 
Delimiting the possibilities of the functioning system, these are important to consider in 
business-as-usual times; more than that, they become crucial in times of extreme 
situations as disasters. Here, we shall attempt to look at the processes behind a disaster 
in an industrialised economy, to identify those rigidities connected to technological 
factors, and their role shaping disaster aftermath.  
Focusing on gaining a better insight into the nature of disasters and their economic 
consequences in contemporary industrialised economies, we in fact have to pay 
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particular attention to the production and consumption activities, and disturbances 
thereof, the role of government and response of the private actors on its incentives. 
Essentially, an economy is a network consisting of multiple production establishments 
producing goods and services for different branches of industry and with different sizes 
and production capacities. When industrial units belonging to different industries within 
a locality suffer a different level of output failure, we talk about an asymmetric or 
heterogeneous shock. Heterogeneous character of damage induced by these shocks 
contributes to the specificity of disasters. Some experts (Cochrane, 1997a) note, in this 
respect, that should an economy experience a homogeneous shock, i.e., each sector 
would be damaged to the same extent, the total loss figures would be limited to ‘direct 
damage’ (often referred, but not limited) to physical damage; (we shall discuss concepts 
of damage in more detail later on in this Chapter, see Sections 3.3.4 to 3.3.6). This is 
because every sector within an economic network will shrink proportionally, and 
production activity can still go on, however, on a smaller scale. Yet, with a 
heterogeneous shock, so called ‘indirect damages’ appear (which are effectively 
connected to the disruptions in the economic circular flow; to be followed in discussions 
in the subsequent Sections 3.3.4 to 3.3.6), and may in fact even exceed the magnitude of 
the direct losses. Indirect losses thus seem more difficult to control, and following 
Cochrane (ibid), these are less sensitive to economic structure (be it industry vs. service 
dominated economy), than to damage pattern, size of the economy, preexisting 
conditions, and the manner in which recovery is financed. This means, that the relative 
magnitude of the economic system, system’s vitality (which is directly connected to the 
concepts of adaptability and resilience discussed in Chapter 2), asymmetry of the shock, 
and recovery planning are central to the understanding of processes behind the disaster 
event in modern economies. In this Section, we shall concentrate on the latter two 
aspects. 
As a result of the asymmetry in effects, one of the types of limitations experienced 
in an economic network is production bottlenecks. A ‘production bottleneck’ in an 
economy can be broadly defined as a situation in which overall production is 
jeopardised by one of the affected sectors, which can no longer supply the vital inputs to 
the rest of the economy. Several causal factors are at work here. One of them is a 
structural or technological factor, which is the existence of so-called ‘critical industries’ 
in an economy28. When, as a result of a natural disaster, an uneven loss of production 
throughout the sectors in the region is observed, these sectors become especially crucial. 
The size of such an industry is not significant; big or small, a critical sector is a highly 
important (perhaps, the only) source of input for other industries without close 
substitutes. If it becomes destroyed by a hazard, and no substitutes to it can easily be 
found (either in imports, inventories or excess capacity), many sectors depending on this 
critical sector will not be able to continue production, affecting other sectors in turn, 
thus jeopardizing the operation of the entire system. In such a situation, it is possible 
that total economic loss figures throughout the economy may substantially increase due 
to the indirect effects (see also Cochrane, 2004). Given these circumstances, 
disturbances in the critical sector will predominantly trigger over-proportional losses 
among the industries depending on the critical sector as purchasers, i.e., relying on it as 
the supplier.  
                                               
28Critical sectors, as we discuss them here, impose rigidities of different nature than those that are 
conventionally referred to as ‘key sectors’ in regional science and are often identified by means of 
significant backward and forward linkages obtained from the input-output analysis (for more background 
information on this issue, see, for example Hazari, 1970; Beyers, 1976). 
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A second type of rigidities, of an institutional nature, can worsen the picture. We 
shall mention some of them; these can be, for example, import limitations, payment 
lags, contractual obligations, lack of information, time necessary for finding new 
business partners or markets, as well as for re-contracting, et cetera. As the literature 
suggests (Cochrane, 1997b), the existence of such bottlenecks can substantially raise 
economic loss expectations. Furthermore, provided the existence of institutional 
rigidities, the technological factors become even more affected. As we mentioned in the 
paragraph above, critical sectors may get affected, limiting the capacity of the entire 
system to operate. With severe institutional limitations, in the immediate disaster 
aftermath each disturbed sector may in fact become critical, as in the initial time period 
resources are fixed, and cannot be substituted. This means that system is found out of 
balance and, what is more important, out of proportions. In such a situation, essentially, 
the sector suffering highest disturbance becomes the limiting factor, a ‘bottleneck’, for 
the entire economy until adjustments and/or substitution possibilities emerge. Also, it 
has been noticed that some certain proportions exist, in which households consume final 
products. In this sense, short-term resource rigidity (be it labour or raw materials) and 
stability of consumption bundle (the elements of the vector f in equation [3.1] above) fit 
in the input-output framework where technology is seen fixed. We shall return to the 
issues of rigidities and proportions in Chapters 4 and 6. Beyond that, there are some 
employment issues to be considered. 
Another limiting factor in recovery efforts can be recognised, which are claims 
regarding ‘full employment’. In fact, we have to discuss it in terms of excess production 
capacities. For example, if in the rest of the country, where producers outside the 
devastated area are not fully employed, they can take over part of the lost output. 
However, if domestic substitution is not possible due to full employment of resources, 
the economy will hardly be able to adjust and expand its production activities elsewhere 
in the country, which can make the total loss figures for the entire country increase. 
Under the circumstances of full-employment and consequent limitations to growth, 
domestic producers (as well as consumers), if possible, may start looking for suppliers 
abroad, and, by importing the missing goods, ensure continuity of production. This, in 
effect, means that domestically produced goods are substituted for ones produced 
abroad. On the one hand, this helps companies outside the affected area maintain 
production in the short run. Yet, in the medium and long run, output that is imported, 
economically speaking, is considered lost. Effectively, the reason is that the goods 
produced domestically before the shock, and imported after a calamity, in the longer run 
become crowded out of the in-home market. With imports continually increasing, 
broader welfare effects can be expected in terms of employment, income distribution 
and price stability. We shall leave these issues for further elaboration outside the scope 
of this thesis; rather, we shall continue with other fundamental aspects governing 
recovery. 
One of the broadly recognised critical sectors is lifelines, broadly defined as 
sector(s) providing infrastructure facilities (roads, railroads, and air transport), utilities 
(electricity, gas, water supply, sewage system) and communication services. If out of 
order, lifelines are a bottleneck for a whole area. Many authors emphasized their 
prominent role in contributing to losses (see, e.g. in Cole 1998, and Shinozuka, Rose 
and Eguchi, 1998). This is due to the fact that productive sectors are highly dependent 
on the supply of utility sectors, as well as infrastructure and communication in the 
contemporary world (see for example the studies of Rose and Benavides, 1998; Rose, 
2004b). Many economic transactions depend directly on physical lifeline systems – for 
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example, purchase of power and water by businesses and households, the trucking of 
goods between the industrial areas and to the final markets, the flow of information 
within and beyond the region. Dysfunctional lifelines may be responsible for paralysing 
the whole productive system. Even in cases when a disaster has a limited direct 
(physical) impact on the area, the indirect medium-term impacts due to physical 
infrastructure failures might be much more devastating, the effects of which may stretch 
far beyond the borders of regional or local economies. 
The observation is important that (even) partial disruption of lifelines results in 
larger negative effects than can be seen, for example, directly from an input-output 
table. As indicated by Tierney and Nigg (1995), “data on the business impacts of the 
[Mississippi] 1993 floods indicate that lifeline service interruptions were widespread, 
were perceived by business owners as very disruptive, and were a much more 
significant source of business closure than actual physical flooding”. Other research 
outcomes support this finding. Based on the approach suggested by Chang (1998, p.82) 
and Rose and Benavides (1998, p.96) ‘lifeline disruption effect functions’ can be 
estimated for each branch of industry. Detected high sectoral dependence on lifeline 
supplies is central to the approach. From business survey, electricity dependence 
coefficients are deduced and employed to determine the deterioration of sectoral output 
as a result of physical lifeline disruptions. Alternatively, Okuyama, Hewings and Sonis 
(2002) offer to model lifeline collapses through the imposition of final demand impulse 
due to the interruption in lifeline services on the post-disaster input-output table with 
adjusted coefficients.  
Modelling the effects of lifeline network failure on the rest of the country can be 
complicated further by their mutual interdependence. It should also be taken into 
consideration that lifeline networks make up a complex system, interconnected with 
each other. The Report of the Centre of Advanced Engineering (CAE), New Zealand 
(1997, p.12) states: “But, most importantly, in most cases there is a high level of 
interdependency between lifeline services. Each lifeline generally needs the others in 
some way”. Furthermore, Rose and Benavides (1998) note that modelling the cases 
involving several lifeline element disruptions is not a straightforward task. The reason 
for that is the presence of non-linearity of these interdependency effects. The CAE 
Report takes a step further, exploring lifeline interconnectedness. It distinguishes 
between the interdependence of lifeline networks in operation (if A fails, B fails), and in 
response (need to fix A to get to B). Essentially, lifelines deserve a separate study, 
tracing their effects on the performance of the rest of economic infrastructure, as well as 
their interdependences, which are crucial for economic disaster consequence analysis. In 
this thesis, our model will not include an explicit account of lifeline failure, although we 
acknowledge the importance of this factor for disaster analysis. We believe that this 
should be added as a specific dimension to the fully-fledged model, which we leave to 
further investigation. At the moment, we shall concentrate on the fundamental issues of 
interconnectedness. Further in this Chapter, we shall turn to the concept of damage and 
continue with the discussion of specific models in the next Chapter. Before that, we 
shall touch upon issues such as response and recovery and the role of governments in 
the modern economies. 
To summarise, we should note that the various types and kinds of rigidities, as we 
have outlined them in this subsection, are connected to the concepts we have discussed 
in Chapter 2. In fact, we should see the emergence of rigidities and resilience as two 
sides of the same coin. If the economy is not prepared to a calamity, and has not built in 
advance some essential elements (consult in particular Section 2.3.5 of Chapter 2) 
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improving its potential to bounce back in the face of a disaster, it will have to face 
extreme rigidities during the recovery period. This means, that to decrease the 
(potential) effects of those rigidities, the system has to direct its efforts on improving 
resilience before a disaster takes place. Yet, because, unfortunately, this is not always 
the path that is taken by the societies (the case of New Orleans provides a noteworthy 
example of that, as reported, among others, by Ink 2006; Menzel 2006; Kok et al., 2006, 
and the Brookings Institute), we shall seriously consider the existence of rigidities in the 
aftermath of a catastrophe in the rest of the thesis. Clearly, government should play an 
important role in determining the milestones it aims at reaching. We shall continue with 
that. 
The Role of Government 
Government usually plays an important role in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. 
One of the typical observations one can make immediately after an outbreak of a 
calamity is that government is normally expected by the public to take the initiative and 
responsibility to provide basic human and financial resources to ensure the spin-off of 
recovery and disaster relief operations. The government can help improve the situation, 
providing both physical resources as well as incentives to the public and industry 
steering the revival of the economic activities. A number of possibilities exist, which 
have to be considered. On the one hand, this can include such activities as organised 
evacuation, provision of temporary dwellings, debris cleaning, et cetera. These rather 
belong to what we refer to as ‘emergency aid’, and fall out of the scope of the current 
inquiry (to what we also pointed in Chapter 1). What we are more interested in, is the 
role of the government that offers structural recovery aid29 in the form of extra financial 
resources to cover, for example, individual losses which were not insured, provide 
subsidies or tax relieves to the companies hit by a calamity, et cetera. However, it is a 
matter of knowledge, as well as political and economic intuition, to choose the right 
measure and instruments for recovery, providing the incentives, which should ultimately 
result in the desired effects. At the same time, lack of initiative and insight on the part of 
the government may lead to severe consequences, such as delayed response, 
unnecessary human and physical losses.30 
From emergency experience in disaster situations it has become apparent that 
substantial inference into the essence of catastrophic events and their consequences is 
necessary before decisions are made. Probably one of the ways to model recovery is to 
employ scenario work, choosing various incentives that a government can implement, 
which should result in a variety of reactions of an economic system, leading to a 
spectrum of outcomes. We do not directly estimate the volumes of these investments to 
include them in the model, though indirectly we shall take this aspect of recovery into 
account.31 It is an important aspect of disaster consequence modelling, as steering of an 
                                               
29
 This statement would require, strictly speaking, an assumption concerning the ability of the government 
to continue operation in the times of major adversity. To avoid complications at this stage of research, we 
shall stick to this very assumption. 
30
 See the report of the US House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee investigating 
preparedness and response to Hurricane Katrina (The US House of Representatives 2006), emphasizing 
these aspects. 
31
 As an apart, we should note here the relation of government expenditure to disaster loss and benefit 
accounting. It is important to bear in mind that some public expenditures connected to relief management 
are attributed to losses, while others to positive effects. Some of expenses are just transfers, such as taxes 
not received, due to a production standstill, unemployment benefits paid out, and the like. These transfers 
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economic recovery can have a substantial influence on the further development 
direction that the country takes, in turn determining the total loss figure. We recall that 
we interpret total disaster losses as a difference between the actual post-calamity path 
and the potential path that an economy would have followed without a disturbance. 
Disaster Insurance 
Also, often when discussing calamities in the junction of the private-public domain, the 
issue of insurance comes to the surface. Increasingly, this occupies more space in the 
debate among the issues on the public agenda, connected to the sharing of 
responsibility. A common argument is: if damage can be insured privately, those losses 
should no longer be a burden for the government. However, is it that easy? When 
addressing the issue of insurance, one should bear in mind that we are considering 
large-scale adversities, such as major flooding in the Netherlands (to which we shall 
return in Chapters 7 and 8), which are a special case in connection to insurance. Let us 
first explain the insurance principle. As a rule, insurance companies collect insurance 
premiums that (should) cover the payments of claims in a fixed period. Premiums are 
calculated on the basis of the average expected replacement value of the insured asset 
and the probability of the event against which the asset is insured. This means that 
incurred costs in a calamity are spread among the policyholders on a periodical basis, 
where premiums reflect average expected loss and include a mark-up. This principle is 
applicable to the cases where events have a certain predictable frequency. If this 
frequency (probability) is known, as well as the value of the insured assets, the 
insurance policy can be determined. However, once there is uncertainty with respect to 
the probability of an event (again, analogously to Knight), the average expected loss is 
more difficult to assess. Also, the difficulty to differentiate in time, space and among 
individual policy holders, makes insurance of ‘low probability-high consequence’ 
events more problematic. 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2005), in their study of terrorism insurance, point 
out several aspects, which make extreme events different from the usual insurance 
arrangement. Following them, we can apply three of these to disaster insurance, namely, 
catastrophic losses, interdependences and ambiguity. The latter means that a disaster 
event is typically characterized by a low, yet uncertain frequency, which complicates 
assessing and pricing the disaster risk for insurance companies (see also OECD, 2004). 
Catastrophic losses, basically, mean that large numbers of people as well as property 
can be affected, leading to substantial claims. Interdependence is stipulated by the chain 
of events where not necessarily the insured object or individual are liable for the 
occurring losses. This is in particular true for indirect losses (which we shall address 
later in this Chapter), when businesses or individuals suffer damage due to failures in 
other parts of the network, such as contemporary economies. Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan (2005, p.48) summarise: “Failures of a weak link in an interdependent system 
can have devastating impacts on all parts of the system.” 
As we see, a disaster is often an event bringing about high group risk and system 
risk. The former is a type of risk that not an individual, but a whole group of individuals 
incur damages; the latter concerns the critical shock which can result in failure of the 
                                                                                                                                          
reflect the redistribution of welfare, which, however, does not reflect the change in the total welfare of the 
society (see MAFF, 1999, p.25). At the same time, other expenditures, such as investments and increased 
public demand, should contribute to stimulating economic activity and can be seen as benefits. 
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whole system, be it economic, social, environmental or political.32 This means that 
when a catastrophe takes place, a large group of individuals become affected at once, 
possibly covering a relatively large territory (to be referred to as affected area). 
Covering claims associated with such a disaster requires access to substantial amount of 
capital. This leaves basically two options: either insurance premiums for ‘low frequency 
- high consequence’ events may explode (making it virtually inaccessible for 
consumers), or insurance companies should have access to supplementary ‘emergency’ 
capital sources in case a major calamity happens. To this end, Jaffee and Russel (2006) 
point to the possibility of a government providing insurance companies with loans to 
guarantee smoothness of accounting and prevent bankruptcy within a specified risk-
sharing arrangement. However, the authors also point out that even this may not be 
enough. Because the residual risk is high and hard to measure, re-insurers covering 
insurance company losses may be reluctant to provide this type of financial service, and 
the available ones may be expensive. Some authors (e.g., Cole, 1998) point to the 
disaster risk as uninsurable, a type of event that is sometimes described as an Act of 
God. Clearly, the above points to how future developments can evolve in rebalancing 
the public-private domain mixture in modern economies. In Chapter 8, we shall follow 
up on this topic. 
 
3.3. THE CONCEPT OF DAMAGE 
Among a variety of consequences a disaster may have, damage in general is a 
measurable category, a quantification of society’s vulnerability. Economic damage in 
particular occupies a special place in disaster consequence assessments. The purpose of 
an a-priori assessment of economic damage is gaining insight in the damage potential 
that a hazard may bring. In this respect, the level of societal vulnerability to a disaster, 
the organisation of mitigation and recovery programmes, as well as evaluation of the 
need for investments in proactive protection measures, depend essentially on the 
expected extent of damage. However, much is as yet uncertain in this area. ’Damage‘ is 
one of the most controversial and multifaceted terms in disaster analysis; one rarely 
finds the same definition of damage in publications from different sources, such as 
authors, research institutes, or government agencies. The National Research Council, 
the US, provides a striking example (1999, p.5): 
“Somewhat surprisingly, however, the total economic losses that natural disasters 
cause the nation are not consistently calculated. Following a natural disaster, 
different agencies and organizations provide damage estimates, but these 
estimates usually vary widely, cover a range of costs, and change (usually 
increasing) through time. There is no widely accepted framework or formula for 
estimating the losses of natural disasters to the nation.” 
With little consensus on this key concept in disaster analysis, advancement of the 
disaster community can only be achieved by promoting an integrated approach where 
generally agreed concept definitions would form a basis. Here we quote Mitchell (2000) 
who notes, “Terminology that is confusing or contested can lead to misunderstandings, 
unwanted actions or protracted episodes of intellectual wheel-spinning”. So, there is a 
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 Cochrane (2003) uses systemic risk in a different context, which is related to the financial stance. Yet, 
both concepts are similar in nature. 
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need for a common set of concepts to achieve progress. Yet, in general terms, recently a 
convergence seems to emerge among scholarly authors in distinguishing two main 
elements of damage, direct and indirect effects (or higher-order effects, like suggested 
by Rose, 2004b), forming the core of the debate. However, many discrepancies still 
appear on the operationalisation and application levels. The difficulties experienced 
usually are threefold. Firstly, there is often no agreement on the common reference 
point. Here, such terms as public costs, private costs, insurance companies’ paid 
compensations, and total economic costs – are in fact incompatible in a single 
comparison. Next, there is often no agreement on the scale of studies, be it temporal or 
spatial. Finally, sometimes no distinction is made between the stock and flow 
measures/dimensions of damage, which induces possible confusion between the 
concepts of direct and indirect damage. This, in turn, may lead to double counting, 
imposing a methodological bias on the estimations. We shall touch on these and a 
number of other issues concerning damage definition in this Chapter, outlining the 
multiple dimensions of the concept and challenges in addressing them.33  
 
3.3.1. Who Are the Stakeholders? 
The multifaceted character of damage clearly stems from the various purposes it is 
meant to serve. Who is in the end interested in damage and damage estimations in the 
context of a calamity? Evidently, there are multiple interested parties. First of all, 
governments are concerned with the actual and expected damage figures – for budget 
planning, investment arrangements, et cetera. This results from the fact that the task of 
providing public goods (also including their protection) is delegated to the government. 
Policymakers and planners should have precise damage data to be able to steer public 
policy in the desired direction. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport (the 
Netherlands), the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food, MAFF (the UK), the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA (the US), and the Bureau of Transport 
and Regional Economics (Australia) are examples of such government organizations. 
ProVention Consortium, The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UN/ISDR) and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) are examples of international (intergovernmental) organisations, which carry 
out research on the natural disaster-related analysis for the purpose of policy 
implications. 
Next, insurers, their associations, re-insurers and government insurance regulators 
have a high stake in information connected to damage estimation. Whether actual or 
expected, knowledge about damage is a factor of substantial importance to establish 
insurance premiums (which in some countries are regulated), which in turn have crucial 
influence on (the stability of) the insurance and re-insurance markets (see previous 
Section where we have outlined briefly the problems and specificity of disaster 
insurance, as well as discussion of insurance in Chapter 8). 
Some industries are among the dominant stakeholders in disaster organisation 
systems. For example, the electricity industry will be interested in achieving continuity 
of its supply also during calamity periods. Some research in this direction has been done 
in Japan (Shumuta et al., 2002; Yamano, Kajitani and Shumuta, 2004). Another 
                                               
33
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example is the analysis of high-tech industry damages incurred after the Northridge 
earthquake in the US (Suarez-Villa and Walrod, 1999).  
Clearly, individuals and businesses are another group of stakeholders in damage 
assessments. With this knowledge, decisions about private insurance and mitigation can 
be taken. Finally, academic researchers and experts in disaster analysis are the ones who 
are capable of providing this data, as well analysing it and, if necessary, supplying 
policy advice to governments. Here, the fundamental interest in the damage estimation 
and modelling stands to the fore of the development drive. 
The parties which have a stake in damage estimation are each interested in a 
specific aspect. Governments are concerned with macro-finance issues, i.e., budget 
expenditures, which are affected by expected disaster damage figures. In this sense, 
government interest involves a broad spectrum, such as recovery expenditures, losses of 
taxes due to business interruption, increased number of benefits to be paid due to rising 
unemployment, and so on. Thus, ’state accounting‘ may be concerned, as expected 
increase in budget expenditures have to be balanced by new sources of income, such as 
for example, higher taxes. Alternatively, other state budget recipients, who would have 
otherwise been a priority, may become deprived because of government expenditures 
being adjusted in favour of disaster mitigation and recovery.  
Private actors, such as insurers have a commercial interest, reflected in the value 
of claims to be paid under their policies. This covers direct damage to property and 
assets, as well as human lives (as mentioned before, the latter category falls outside the 
scope of this thesis). In addition, businesses will be interested to know whether they 
might be confronted with production disturbances. However, whereas the insurer’s 
insight into the possibility of a disaster is based on a probability calculation, that of 
businesses and especially individuals are based on individual risk perception (see, for 
example, Heems and Kothuis, 2006; Tatano, Yamaguchi and Okada 2004, and others 
discussing this issue).34 Naturally, industry representatives are mostly interested in the 
performance of their particular branch. Finally, academic research in disaster analysis is 
formalised on the broad range of damage assessment. The additional aspect of damage 
which they are interested in is in particular economic damage, based on the concept of 
opportunity costs. We shall return to it in Section 3.3.3. 
Summarising, each of the abovementioned parties will have a different perception 
about what damage means. Secondly, depending on the end user, various aspects of 
damage may be considered. Finally, the estimation of damage suiting the purposes of a 
particular stakeholder group could demand a special sort of methodology (for example, 
based on financial appraisal or economic damage estimation principles). We shall 
elaborate on this further in the following Sections. 
 
3.3.2. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions of Damage 
Just as the definition of disaster must be rooted in temporal and spatial scales, this also 
holds true for the definition of damage. In this Section we shall focus on two important 
dimensions of the concept of damage. In terms of space, depending on the area 
considered in the analysis, the amount of damage can vary, which is true both in an 
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 This aspect will not be covered in our inquiry, where we focus on the insight into sustained damages in 
an economic system rather than on perceived damages. 
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absolute and a relative sense. For example, whether one limits the study of the 
consequences of hurricane Katrina to the city of New Orleans or the state of Louisiana, 
or even the federal level, the amount of damage will be different (because many areas 
outside the city were affected as well). Concurrently, this also applies to relative 
numbers, which are usually expressed by the loss of gross regional or domestic product, 
GRP or GDP. Whether we refer to the damage caused by Katrina in terms of regional or 
national products makes a substantial difference. The issue of the spatial dimension of 
damage hinges on the definition of spatial dimension of the economic system chosen for 
analysis of disaster, as we have outlined in Chapter 2. Whereas an ’economy‘ acquires 
its borders for the purpose of a particular study, this dimension can be readily applied to 
the determination of damage. The larger the area covered by an analysis, the larger the 
absolute losses, because in the contemporary globalised, interconnected world 
consequences of disturbances in localities may have far-reaching repercussions on the 
grand scale. 
Another aspect of damage assessment is its temporal magnitude. Often, the effects 
of a disaster stretch out over a time span after the physical event took place. For 
example, buildings may collapse months after a flood or an earthquake, because their 
construction was undermined by the direct contact with water or due to ground 
movements. This means that attributing damage estimation to the point of time directly 
in the aftermath of a calamity is inappropriate. This only provides an estimate of direct 
vulnerability of a system to the hazard without considering the ability of the system to 
adjust in the face of a calamity. The relevant question becomes then: How long should 
the time span be to be taken into the analysis of disaster consequences? For example, 
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2003 
p.12) suggests “convention calls for the maximum of five-year time frame although 
most losses occur during the first two. In any case, the estimate of these effects must be 
extended throughout the period required to achieve the partial or total recovery of the 
affected production capacity”.  
The choice in favour of a broader time dimension is supported by the resilience 
argument presented in Chapter 2. We put forward that resilience is the response of an 
economic system to a perturbation in a way that it cushions the initial adverse effect of 
the shock and strives to achieve new balance, adjusting to the new conditions and 
disequilibria. During this process, a number of things can take place. For example, in 
the disturbed production network, where a part of firms temporary appear to be out of 
business as a result of a calamity, firms outside the affected area with spare production 
capacity can decide to increase their production, employing new opportunities and 
thereby acquiring a larger share of the market. Companies, which are able to switch 
quickly to new suppliers and customers, are able to resume production, keeping the 
overall production cycle running. This means that a so-called substitution effect is in 
place, which can be seen as one of the elements of a resilient economic system. In this 
way, domestic production substitution deflates the initial damage figures, contributing 
to the recovery of overall output. Yet, these processes are conditional upon the 
emergence of rigidities in the disaster aftermath, that we have discussed earlier in this 
Chapter (see Section 3.2.4), and to which we shall come back in Chapter 6 developing 
our model. 
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3.3.3. Economic versus Financial Damage Appraisal 
As pointed out above, damage estimation serves various purposes, and it is therefore 
important to decide which particular purpose a particular study has. This will, in turn, 
affect the selection of aspects of damage one is going to evaluate. In this Section, we 
would like to stress again that there is a major difference between financial and 
economic appraisal. Below, we shall briefly discuss both. 
Financial assessment is based, in the first instance, on the business balance sheet, 
which consists of two parts: Assets and Liabilities. Assets represent the value of all 
assets and resources at the disposal of the company in the given period of time; and 
liabilities reflect their sources. Assets include real estate, machinery and equipment, raw 
materials, stocks, as well as monetary assets like cash, money deposited on a bank 
account, and investments. Liabilities consist of capital (shares and reserves), and 
financial obligations such as bonds, and other debts. The main accounting equality 
holds: the total value of Assets is equal to the total value of Liabilities. This means that 
the costs of a disaster to a company would then represent a change in the value of a 
business as a whole, which then can be traced through a change in the total Assets and 
in the change of total Liabilities, which would show the same result. So, interpretation 
of one of those changes is enough to determine accounting loss. 
The valuation in accounting terms as described in the previous paragraph is rooted 
in the depreciated value of lost assets (the so-called ’book value‘), which is obtained 
when the purchase value of an asset is decreased by the amount of depreciation. This 
allows for the gradual writing-off of assets and resources, spreading the costs over 
several periods of time. The costs of lost assets are then expressed in terms of 
depreciated value (for machinery, equipment, et cetera), which is the remaining value of 
an asset after depreciation at a particular point in time, and equals the balance-sheet 
value. This virtually implies that for example, a three-year-old machine should be 
replaced by the same old machine. It is important to keep in mind in this respect that the 
replacement principle for assets does not presume the purchase of new equipment. If it 
does happen, than the difference between the depreciated value of an asset and the price 
of a new asset that comes in its place is considered as an investment, not a loss. 
An alternative approach to accounting is economic appraisal, which is based on 
the economic (opportunity) cost principle. Standard, alternative costs represent anything 
that has to be sacrificed to obtain some specific commodity or service. In this, economic 
assessment differs fundamentally from the financial approach. For example, a 
government may have to decide between two options of flood preparedness, like dike 
strengthening and a public campaign on raising flood risk awareness. The alternative 
cost of investing in dike strengthening in this case would be foregone investment in 
public campaigning.  
Unfortunately, the concept of alternative costs is a complex one, and its 
application in disaster damage assessment brings many conceptual problems. Because 
assets are lost as a result of the hazard, we obviously have to do with the loss of 
resources. Losses due to a hazard are not a choice; i.e., there is no trade-off between 
various ends on which money could be spent (opportunity costs); it appears only in 
making reconstruction and recovery choices. This is a problem in itself: it is not 
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straightforward how to define disaster losses in terms of alternative costs.35 Because of 
this difficulty, the methodological underpinnings of the damage concept, and 
consequently damage estimation remain disputable. Yet, for existing markets, market 
prices are used in the valuation of goods and services.36 We suggest that the same 
principle should be applied for the valuation of lost assets. By this we mean that the 
value of a lost asset is the market price of an asset with which the lost one is replaced. In 
fact, it is possible that a market for used equipment and machinery exists; which means 
that estimates of capital goods based on the replacement principle are very data-
intensive (requiring an extensive knowledge of the state of lost assets at the time of a 
calamity). Yet, to simplify the estimations, we may also assume that only primary 
markets exist where new products are traded. This would imply that both a brand-new 
piece of equipment that is lost, and the one that is five years old, are replaced by a new 
machine at its current market price. Also, the lost real property is counted by the market 
value of the replacement property (either rebuilt or purchased instead of the lost one).  
The analysis of damage as a consequence of a disaster should be based on either of 
the methods described above. A number of authors warn about the danger of mistaking 
the two principles (inter alia, Benson, 1997; Van der Veen et al., 2003a). Researchers 
carrying out damage assessment should watch carefully that there is a consistent use of 
concepts in the appraisal, to ensure the reliability of their results. In this thesis we shall 
focus on the economic damage estimation, and therefore we shall continue with the 
techniques and methods describing it. 
 
3.3.4. Economic Damage Assessment: Stocks and Flows 
When conducting an economic appraisal of damage incurred within an economic 
system, it is important to make the essential distinction between two measures of asset 
value: stocks and flows. While stocks reflect quantity measured at a given point in time, 
flows reflect quantity per unit of time. Usually, stocks and flows are related. That is, 
stock is often considered as an accumulation of flows, and flows represent the change in 
stock (in a given period of time). Because stocks are often generated by flows, in 
economic theory it is generally accepted that a stock value of an asset equals the 
discounted value of future flows, generated by this asset. This has direct implications 
for the accounting of business interruption as a result of property loss. Economically 
speaking, one of the manners of thinking about the value of machinery or equipment 
used in the production of goods is actually considering the present value of all the goods 
the machine will expectedly produce during its lifetime. In terms of assessing disaster-
imposed damage, this means that one can include either the market value of lost 
equipment, or evaluate the expected flow of output that will not be produced because the 
machine is lost. Consequently, including both measures can not be done, because they 
both represent the same value of a single asset. If stocks are counted together with flows 
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 Only a few authors make it explicit, for example, Bram and Rappaport (2002) compare the 
development trend in the aftermath of 9-11 disaster with the projected trend without a disaster; while 
others (Rose and Lim, 2002) abstain from such an approach. Yet, in our view, it cannot be seen as an 
alternative cost, but rather as a threshold scenario. 
36
 We abstain for a moment from considering damages to assets of exceptional cultural value (what is 
sometimes referred to as irreplaceable objects of art) or damages to nature. For non-market valuation 
methods, see inter alia
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(for the same asset), one should guard against double counting (MAFF, 1999; Messner 
et al., 2007). Thus, stock and flow values are only measures of the same category, not 
categories to be measured separately.  
More than twenty years ago, Ellson, Milliman and Roberts (1984, p.559) 
concluded on the basis of their literature survey that “most of the economic impact 
literature fails to make proper distinctions between the measurement of loss and the 
measurement of long run patterns of personal income, employment, and population 
growth. Much of the research has confused stock and flow concepts in the estimation of 
loss. Double counting is often involved, and the losses are not estimated in present value 
term”. This confirms that the issue of stock and flow measurement is at the core of 
proper damage assessment, and one has to pay a great deal of attention to this important 
issue. 
However, if stocks and flows measure the same, which one of them should be 
preferred in damage assessment? We can look at the analysis of this issue done by Rose 
and Lim (2002). The stock of capital and machinery results in a flow of production and 
income in future, which means that business interruptions and capital stock affected 
measure the same thing. Rose and Lim (2002, p.2) state that, for several reasons, an 
estimate based on flows can result in a better estimate than estimating damage based on 
stocks, or property damage. Their reasons are the following: Firstly, an estimate based 
on flows makes up a better proxy of lost value, since it accounts for damage due to 
business disruptions. To this end, disturbances in business operations are not always 
attributed to the loss of stock (for example, industrial activities can be paralysed because 
of the failure in electricity supply), and thus flow measure takes consistently into 
account all business interruption that have effect in the economy. Secondly, flow 
measures are more compatible with macro-economic parameters, such as GDP, value 
added, and employment. Also, Rose and Lim (ibid) state that a stock based concept can 
result in an over-exaggeration of damage since only a portion of the property value may 
translate into service flows in any time. Thirdly, estimates based on a flow concept are 
more compatible and more consistent with the distinction between direct and indirect 
damage (we will address this later in this Chapter). Finally, flow measures require an 
explicit time dimension. This means, that economic modelling of losses should have 
well-defined borders. This becomes an important point of departure in the literature for 
the discussion of time dimension of damage, to which we shall also return in the 
following Sections. 
 
3.3.5. Damage in the Literature 
In this Section, we shall address the definitions of damage which are currently used in 
assessing the possible losses due to a natural disaster opening the debate on 
methodology developments for damage estimation. A number of studies estimating the 
consequences of a severe natural phenomenon, occurring in an industrialised economy, 
are now available. These studies, however, use different methodologies, partly 
involving different sets of concepts and definitions. Differences exist, e.g., in the 
treatment of direct and indirect costs (to be addressed later), the role attributed to 
substitution effects, and the statistical database. In addition, sometimes, concepts from 
the financial domain are used interchangeably with economic ones, often resulting in 
inaccurate assessments. 
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So far we have discussed various aspects of damage and damage estimation. 
However, we have not as yet defined what damage in economic terms precisely means. 
Let us first go through a number of terms that are used interchangeably with ‘damage’ 
to get to the essence of the matter. The report of National Research Council (1999) 
attempts to portray those most frequently used, mentioning apart from damage, such 
terms as impacts, losses and costs. In this thesis, we are talking about impacts and 
consequences that encompass a broad spectrum of effects. We shall use damage 
alongside the terms losses and costs when talking about negative economic impacts 
while exploring the literature on disaster analysis. In the literature we find a multitude 
of damage classifications: direct, indirect, primary and secondary, induced, second- and 
higher-order effects are mentioned. Moreover, the terms used do not always have the 
same meaning. With such variation, it is not an easy task to compare different studies 
consistently.  
Cochrane (2004) offers a straightforward classification of damage in direct and 
indirect losses. He suggests (ibid, p.37) “Terminologically, indirect loss is any loss 
other than direct loss. Direct loss is a loss linked directly to disaster. It includes all 
damages, plus employment losses due directly to the closure of damaged facilities. 
Indirect losses are anything else.” This is a simplified view on the indirect costs that can 
be applied in the instances when total loss figure is obtained, and direct (physical) 
damages are known. Further, Cochrane offers more explanation on indirect losses (ibid, 
p.39): “Indirect losses are a result of dislocations suffered by economic sectors not 
sustaining direct damage. Activities that are either forward-linked (rely on regional 
markets for their output) or backward-linked (rely on regional source of supply) could 
experience interruptions in their operations.” Cochrane thus defines direct loss as the 
sum of physical loss resulting from the direct interaction of the forces of nature with 
human-induced environment, and the losses due to business interruption as those 
incurred by companies in the affected area37. Indirect loss, subsequently, can in fact best 
be described by the ripple effects throughout the economy, taking into account all 
production losses incurred outside the affected area. A number of American authors 
performing disaster analysis support this point of view, among others, Cole, Pantoja and 
Razak (1993), Cochrane (1997b), Chang (1998), and Rose and Lim (2002). We note 
that Chang (1998) follows Cochrane (1997b) defining economic losses, marking a 
convergence in opinion.  
Another group of researchers, however, maintain a somewhat different view on 
the interpretation of direct and indirect losses. Thus, direct losses may sometimes 
include only physical damages; all losses caused by business interruption, both inside 
and outside the affected area, are considered indirect. Among others, Booysen, Viljoen 
and de Villiers (1999), BTRE (2001), Murlidharan and Shah (2003), and Messner and 
Meyer (2006) refer to such demarcation between losses. Parker, Green and Thompson 
(1987) agree, however they suggest a distinction between direct costs and primary and 
secondary indirect costs along this differentiation: Direct costs relate to loss of land, 
capital and machinery, therefore to stocks, and primary indirect costs to business 
interruption, a flow. Moreover, secondary indirect effects relate to multipliers in the 
economy. In view of the discussion between the measures of stocks and flows, the 
authors warn us that one can not add the first two categories (i.e. direct and primary 
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 Cochrane (1997b) extends the definition of direct costs by not only including the physical damage to 
land, plants and houses, but also induced physical effects, which are the consequence of the disaster, and 
often referred to the disruption of lifeline system (discussed earlier in this Chapter) that causes additional 
business interruption (see also Tierney, 1997). 
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indirect costs) unless production is lost to foreign countries. This means that, in current 
terminology, for those assets that are involved in production processes, primary indirect 
and secondary indirect losses can be added to account for interruptions in the production 
circle; the loss of other assets can be accounted through direct damages. 
For completeness’ sake, another type of damage should be noted. Sometimes this 
is offered to analyse the macroeconomic effects of disasters (see for example ECLAC, 
2003; Murlidharan and Shah, 2003; Freeman et al., 2004; Mechler, 2004 and 2006; 
Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler and Pflug, 2005). These often include stochastic modelling, 
macro-financing models and budgeting approaches. The ECLAC report notes however, 
that macroeconomic analysis acts as ‘complementary statistics’ reflecting the impacts of 
a catastrophe in terms of macro-variables, which should not be added to the estimates of 
direct and indirect damage.  
A final remark about various types of damage can be attributed to Rose (2004b), 
i.e. the linguistic differences between the names of the concepts themselves used in 
disaster damage analysis. The main distinction is between the direct and the rest of the 
losses. As mentioned, these exist in a vast variety, such as, indirect, induced, primary, 
second-order or higher-order effects. Rose advances a proposal that, in order to avoid 
confusion between the disaster loss modellers, two terms should be used to distinguish 
between the major sources of damage, – direct and higher-order effects. This, according 
to Rose, overcomes possible misuse of input-output terminology and also is general 
enough to cover the effects illuminated by various models used in disaster analysis. 
 
3.3.6. Weak Links in Damage Assessment 
So far in this Chapter we discussed a variety of concepts connected to damage 
definition. At this point, we may summarise, that no widely accepted definition of 
damage can be found in the literature. This conclusion is based to the fact that, firstly, 
there is no agreement on the economic points of departure; financial appraisals are 
mixed with economic cost-benefit analyses (CBA). Where a financial appraisal is often 
the basis for investigating the sum of money to be recovered from insurance companies, 
CBA is a helpful means to weigh alternative measures against disasters. When the two 
are used simultaneously, methodologically inconsistent results are a consequence.  
Secondly, there is confusion on the temporal and spatial scales. While financial 
appraisal limits itself to a single organisation, like a company or sometimes a state; 
economic analysis can be carried out at multiple spatial scales, ranging from local to 
regional, national or global. Here, choices have to be made. A similar argument can be 
made about the temporal dimension, where financial evaluations are tied to specified 
timeframes (like months, quarters or years). Alternatively, economic appraisals can be 
implemented for an arbitrary time frame, where it varies for the estimation of direct and 
indirect effects of a calamity. Each of these effects demands a specified time scale, 
which should be internally consistent within a single study.  
Thirdly, there is the issue of double counting. This is often due to the confusion 
between stock concepts and flow concepts. We will give a further explanation, although 
this issue was already addressed in the previous Sections. The point is that the alternate 
use of stock and flow measures in one study is a common phenomenon, which has 
crucial consequences for the entire damage estimation. However, Rose (2004b) notes 
that the issue is not simple. According to him, “this is a controversial subject. I am in 
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agreement with analysts who suggest it is appropriate to include both the stock and flow 
measures in the case of damaged property, where the latter represents the opportunity 
costs of delays in restoring production.” We can argue that, on the one hand, lost 
property can not have an opportunity cost because of the very fact that it is lost. It can 
be seen as loss of resources, which has to be accounted for based on the market value. 
On the other hand, one of the arguments supporting the assumption of a broader look on 
the post-disaster recovery can be found in Cole (1998, p.126) claiming that, in fact, 
disasters can also be viewed as part of the development process, providing 
opportunities, alongside with tragedy. In other words, a post-disaster situation may 
represent an entirely new state of affairs. It is characterised by new challenges, 
conditions and incentives for all economic agents facing the consequences of an 
adversity. This means that the post-disaster situation to some extent resembles more 
flexibility, as entrepreneurs, who lost assets as a result of a calamity, have to take new 
decisions, whether to resume production activities (in some cases, start everything 
anew), or not to do so. In this sense, lost asset can also be seen as a sunk cost because it 
can not be reimbursed in any way (except for insurance claims, which simplifies further 
argumentation), and therefore can not be taken into account in future decision-making. 
Based on these two arguments, we can say that there is no need to account for stocks 
and flows twice: lost assets are accounted for on the grounds of loss of resources. 
Delays should not be added to losses, as the new situation in the aftermath of a disaster 
brings also new opportunities offering a choice of resuming or opting for a new type of 
activity. 
The other possible source of double counting is accounting for both loss of income 
and expenditure. Although this aspect does not come up often in the studies, we find it 
important to address this possibility as well. Cochrane (found in National Research 
Council, 1992, p.101, also cited by Chang, 1998), provides a thorough explanation on 
this account: 
“…the level of economic activity can be measured by counting expenditures, or 
incomes, but not both. Income […] must be equivalent to value of the products 
produced. This is because the price of a product reflects all the costs incurred in 
its creation, which in this case is the sum of wages, interest, and profits. This 
simple result provides an important loss-accounting guide: damage assessment 
should focus on incomes lost or spending lost, but not both. Either should yield 
the same result.” 
This statement should be borne in mind by researchers performing financial, as 
well as economic appraisals. Similarly, as we have stated in Section 3.1.3, financial 
appraisal should be based either on accounting for assets or on liabilities. This implies 
that from the point of view of financial loss assessment of lost stocks and profits are to 
be counted, while output loss should not. This means that one should either take a 
producer or consumer stand. Whereas producers are incurring spending for their inputs, 
wages, taxes, as well as foregone profits, all the consumers are loosing is the end 
product (which indeed serves a source of income for producers). Thus, accounting for 
final output loss is enough, and adding any other loss categories should be tested for 
double counting. 
Next, loss definition suffers from the fact that in various studies the delimitation of 
the various categories of loss is unclear. As discussed, various studies use notions such 
as direct, indirect, primary, secondary, induced damage. Although lately, we also notice 
a trend towards the convergence to the direct-indirect loss division. Here, two main 
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approaches can be distinguished. As we have demonstrated, some authors support the 
division of costs based on the spatial criterion (i.e., all losses attributable to the affected 
area are direct, losses incurred elsewhere are indirect), or based on the stock-flow 
differential (all physical damage is stock, and considered direct; all losses associated 
with production curtailment, whether within or outside the affected area, measured as 
flow, are indirect). In this, however, each scientist is free to choose; yet, provided that 
double-counting is avoided.  
Finally, various purposes and destinations, as outlined in Section 3.1.1, that 
damage assessment serves are an obstruction to the wide cross-study comparisons. This 
means that we have to get things straight and establish a consistent economic loss 
definition to be used within the scope of this thesis. 
We shall bear in mind the points of attention outlined above, while establishing a 
definition of economic damage to be used further in this thesis. 
 
3.3.7. Our Definition of Damage: Direct and Indirect Loss 
To avoid the ambiguities found in the literature,38 we start by adopting the general 
framework of economic loss appraisal (which implies that the used key concept is 
economic costs as discussed above). We build upon the classification of economic loss 
by Cochrane (2004, p.37): “Direct loss is a loss linked directly to disaster. It includes all 
damages, plus employment losses due directly to the closure of damaged facilities. 
Indirect losses are anything else.” Rose (2004b, p.17), in his discussion of direct versus 
higher-order effects, makes a similar proposition to use “the term ‘higher-order effects’ 
to cover all flow losses beyond those associated with the curtailment of output as a 
result of hazard-induced property damage in the producing facility itself.” Based on 
these statements, we define:39 
 
Based on the MAFF (1999, p.15) views on double-counting, we relate direct 
losses to: physical damage to capital assets, including buildings, infrastructure, 
industrial plants, and inventories of finished, intermediate and raw materials destroyed 
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 Inter alia the World Bank, the UN, IIASA and Swiss Re. See also for reference ECLAC (1991 and 
2003), Benson and Clay (2000 and 2004), Freeman et al. (2004). 
39
 We notice that in our definition, we distinguish between direct and indirect losses; yet, it is directly 
compatible with Rose’s distinction between direct and higher-order effects. In our connotation, while 
direct physical losses are more ‘visible’; indirect damages, like businesses impeding their operation and 
thus interrupting the circularity of an established economic flow, ironically enough, are not that apparent, 
while forming a substantial part of total losses throughout the economy. It is due to the ‘latent’ nature of 
indirect losses that inference about the working of the economic system is needed to bring them up to the 
surface. 
Direct losses are those damages, which are hazard-induced; indirect 
losses are incurred in the economy as a result of loss of 
interconnectedness and interdependence between agents within the 
predefined economic network. 
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or damaged by the actual impact of a disaster.40 Business flows, which are interrupted 
directly as a result of physical disruptions, are also a part of direct losses. It is important 
to notice that the losses of assets in the disaster area involved in production activities 
give rise to what is known as business interruption, and, together with losses incurred 
by businesses elsewhere, which are in turn referred to as indirect losses, should be 
estimated in terms of disturbances of circular flow (which we described in Section 
3.2.3). Formulating disaster damage assessment in terms of emerging concepts of 
vulnerability (or, alternatively, resistance as discussed in Section 2.3.4) and resilience, 
we have to take recovery into our appraisal framework as a part of medium-term effects; 
and adaptation as a part of long-term effects.  
Besides, with respect to the MAFF definition, only that loss of output is 
considered which is not taken over by domestic producers. This means that MAFF takes 
the substitution effect on the (national) macro level directly into the definition of 
damage. However, because of the difficulty of accounting for the substitution effect as 
well as the multiplicity of other resilient actions at once, we prefer to distinguish 
between what we would call gross and net business interruption. Gross production loss 
in this context can be seen as the accounting of all losses in the immediate disaster 
aftermath (the extent of vulnarability). The net result for damage estimation is obtained 
when resilient response takes place and we can account for it. In the end, we define that: 
 
In other words, the proposition above suggests that, on the national level, any economic 
activity within the system that contributes to the decrease of lost output (e.g., using the 
spare capacities, or expanding the capacities reacting fast on the unsatisfied demand), 
should be seen as ‘neutralising’ initial loss. This would essentially mean that on the 
micro-level, there would be losers and winners; the former are those who were hit by 
the hazard, the latter are those who could take the advantage of new opportunities; on 
the macro level, those effects are added. 
In this enquiry, we are most interested in the effects of disasters connected to the 
loss of connectivity within a complex industrialised economic system. This brings us to 
the type of damage attributed to the disruptions of flows of goods and services in such a 
system. In terms of defined damage, we shall concentrate on the business interruption as 
indirect effect in the entire economy. As already indicated, evaluation of such damage 
requires more than a survey of physical losses; rather, modelling of interconnections 
and interdependencies within an economic network is necessary. This means, that we 
have to pave the way to building a model that provides us with insight into these 
processes in the disaster aftermath.  
                                               
40
 We acknowledge the existence of non-monetary impacts, but we shall not provide an appraisal of those 
impacts within the scope of this thesis. 
On the macro level, only that part of non-produced output is lost (net), 
which is not taken over by domestic producers, and which is substituted 
by the goods produced abroad. 
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3.4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter, we have gone into the discussion on the consequences of major 
disasters in industrialised societies. In contrast to developing countries, modern complex 
economic networks seem less predictable, in terms of both their vulnerability and 
resilience to a major hazard. In-depth studies of such systems are needed to gain insight 
into the processes behind a disaster. 
In fact, modern societies with high concentration of wealth are faced with an 
additional challenge, which will expectedly trigger amplification of disasters in the 
future, i.e. the ongoing climate change. Extreme weather events, which seem to 
intensify through the time, are the biggest danger, and this has to be dealt within the 
broader context of development. We paid attention to the account of the consequences 
of a disaster in the modern economy. We identified three categories to be considered: 
scale, rigidities and the role of government. 
We postulate that two types of rigidities can be in place that characterise an 
economy, namely, institutional and technological, which appear to become intensified 
in times of adversity. We focused on the description of structural rigidities pertaining to 
an economic system of production and consumption activities. Such rigidities can also 
be referred to as ‘bottlenecks’, a more familiar term in disaster analysis. Literature 
identifies failure of the lifeline systems (including infrastructure, transport and 
communications), full employment (in terms of lack of spare production capacities in an 
economy) and the emergence of the so-called ‘critical sectors’ as factors contributing to 
the creation of major bottlenecks for the reconstruction and recovery in the disaster 
aftermath. Clearly, institutional aspects of limited information, contract obligations, 
uncertainty, and so on, impose more challenges on the system and may also intensify 
technological rigidities. 
Furthermore, we addressed the role of government in steering the post-disaster 
recovery and the issue of disaster insurance. Essentially, governments are expected, if 
not demanded, to provide at least some basic aid for disaster victims, as well as to 
provide a spin-off for reconstruction and recovery activities. This means, that for this 
underpinning modelling is necessary to suggest the directions to be followed, and 
measures to be chosen for launching recovery programmes. At the same time, the topic 
of insurance tends to reappear on the public debate agenda, while governments are 
increasingly willing to share the responsibility of risk management. However, disasters 
and major calamities are not common for the private insurance industry, as they are 
characterised by the presence of catastrophic losses, interdependence and ambiguity, all 
of which makes it troublesome for private insurers to define the amount of premiums, as 
well as to ensure the presence of capital to satisfy all disaster-related claims 
simultaneously. Here, a smart mix of private and public solutions should be sought.  
In the final part of this Chapter we addressed the concept of damage, its purposes 
and definitions. The lack of consensus in the disaster community, which we noted in the 
previous Chapter, has direct implications for the conceptualisation of the damage 
notion. Essentially, we found that depending on the purpose served and stakeholders 
concerned, damage can have different contents. This has a reflection in the multiplicity 
of existing models and methodologies to assess damage. Because of the scope of current 
study, we concentrated on the issue of economic damage, which should have explicitly 
defined temporal and spatial dimensions. Moreover, we pointed out the clear distinction 
that has to be made between the economic and financial approaches, and the respective 
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sets of concepts belonging to each of the categories. Finally, we also drew attention to 
the division of loss measures into stock and flow. This is in fact a crucial point to mark 
the so-called double counting of losses. We submit that caution should be exercised in 
accounting for interruptions in production processes (essentially interruptions of flows 
of goods and services in an economic network) that are characterised by losses 
associated with production still-stands. 
To summarise, we propose, in the framework of this study, to use the division of 
damage into direct and indirect loss, – whether loss takes place directly on the site of 
the disaster outbreak, or outside of it. We also mentioned that losses connected to 
interruption of business flows in the affected area triggering production standstills 
elsewhere require a different way of accounting, compared to direct damages to the 
physical environment. For the latter, a type of statistical method can be used to assess 
the costs of lost properties, land and machinery (which is a stock measure). However, 
because of the complex interconnections within modern economic networks, which 
characterises contemporary industrialised societies, one needs an advanced model to 
trace the changes within these complicated systems and establish the value of indirect 
losses (which is also a flow measure). This means that we have to have a model to 
account for interruptions in the circular flow.  
We have also tackled briefly the issue of scale of a disturbance and the relation 
between direct and indirect losses. As discussed in this Chapter, disaster consequences 
and therefore damage in the industrialised society are directly connected to the 
complexity of the economic system under attack. This means that we can assume at this 
point that because of the close interconnectedness of various elements within a system, 
any direct damage would most probably imply a relatively high extent of indirect 
damage. Because in the contemporary world system constituents depend on the array of 
conditions and the state of other constituents, major disasters are likely to push a system 
out of balance (and thus out of proportions), and thus to resonate far beyond the borders 
of their direct impact through a complex chain of avalanche effects. This means, that 
under these conditions we can expect that a major disaster in the developed economy 
would be characterised in particular by the intensity of the ripple or indirect production 
effects relative to the direct loss. The role of resilience in this situation is to neutralise 
indirect losses, adjusting in the face of a disaster; and through a-priori adaptation, to 
minimise direct losses, decreasing economic system’s vulnerability. 
In the following Chapter 4 we shall discuss the possibilities for such modelling 
and make a selection of literature on economic analysis of disaster consequences before 
proceeding to the development of our own model (Chapters 5 and 6). 
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Part Two  
Modelling 
_______________________________________ 
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Chapter 4 
Literature and Modelling 
_______________________________________ 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous Chapters we outlined the general framework for our research, i.e. the 
issue of large-scale disasters, which break out in an industrialised society, and their 
consequences. We aim at finding a way to describe in terms of modelling the economic 
effects of a disaster on society at large, as well as establish working definitions for a 
number of concepts frequently used in these analyses.  
Chapter 3 mostly dealt with the debate on the effects of a calamity in a modern 
industrialised economy with a complex network of economic interconnectedness, and 
the definition of damage. We established that economic damage consists of two 
components, direct and indirect, and that it is defined on the basis of a distinction 
between stocks and flows. We found that we can recognize the difference between 
measurement and inference. Whereas direct damage estimation requires collecting data 
(which can be observed and measured to a certain extent) on physical disruptions, such 
as damage to buildings, equipment, and other physical assets, caused by the hazard 
itself, it is much more difficult to observe or measure the consequences of this loss - 
indirect economic damage, requiring more inference for an assessment. By indirect 
damage we mean the disruption of the circular flow of goods and services in an 
economic system, leading to the more complicated cascade effects in production and 
consumption markets. A temporary or persistent ‘disappearance’ of suppliers and/or 
consumers from an established system can resonate with significant effects on the 
welfare of society at large. To get a handle on these flow disruptions, we need a vision, 
a philosophy, and finally, a model, which could lead to the analysis of the processes in a 
contemporary economy, which evolve in the face of disaster threats. In this Chapter we 
hope to get closer to the core of our investigation, i.e. the literature covering economic 
loss modelling.  
We already observed a number of problems in the field of disaster studies (tackled 
in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis). First of all, these are connected to the very existence 
of the field; there is a community of researchers, academics, experts and practitioners, 
basically in its early stages of formation. At the moment, this is characterised by a wide 
array of topics covered; concepts used and definitions applied, which in itself –perhaps– 
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may reveal a lack of a common methodological basis. In any case, all these factors 
make it difficult to compare, analyse and capitalise on the existing valuable knowledge; 
yet our goal is, within the scope of the current research, to provide an overview of 
studies dealing with economic modelling of disaster consequences. Highlighting the 
failures and advantages of each approach, we shall try to illuminate the features 
valuable to our fundamental inquiry, where we go back to the primary questions and 
basic principles underlying disaster analyses.  
Yet, a number of features are shared by many scholars. Among these, we find the 
notion of the meso-level’ as a most promising level. The typical macro-level of the 
national aggregates usually often is too abstract or too aggregated to be able to deliver 
the information sought for. At the same, the typical micro-level of the individual 
persons or agents may be too prone to accidental vicissitudes, which leaves the meso-
level of investigation. One of the tasks then, to distinguish disaster modelling from other 
approaches and methods, is the representation of disorder and disequilibrium at a grand 
scale within an economic system in the immediate disaster aftermath.  
Another feature is reflected in the choice of ‘rigidities’ that any model maker is 
confronted with. In our work, we shall focus on two types of such rigidities. The first 
one concerns technological rigidities as reflected in certain proportions between inputs 
and outputs in the technologies employed. This issue is also connected to the 
employment in terms of labour requirement, and the proportions in which final products 
are consumed by labour (that effectively comes from households). In particular, we 
shall consider here such ‘fixed’ or ‘invariable’ proportions regarding our consumption 
behaviour and our employment objectives. The second is of an institutional nature and 
concerns time lags, uncertainty, and so on. At the end of this Chapter, we shall put forth 
a proposal for a general framework to be used as a basis for extending disaster analysis 
in our study. 
 
4.2. THE BODY OF LITERATURE ON NATURAL DISASTERS 
In this thesis we have chosen to focus on the methodological issues of studying the 
economic consequences of major shocks in industrialised economies. This, in principle, 
implies that we are interested in the literature, which explores disaster impacts through a 
wide range of natural phenomena. For this purpose, we decided to be open to the studies 
of research conducted in various domains of natural disaster types, such as floods, 
hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis (see for example Parker, 2000; Kunreuther and 
Rose, 2004). The selection of works below features perturbations that natural hazards 
bring to the economy, and the way the system responds to them. 
In this Chapter, we offer only a selection of authors dealing with the analysis of 
consequences of natural disasters disturbing the interconnectivity within an economic 
network. We have to note from the outset that, due to the natural origin of the calamities 
we are studying, authors covering one or another aspect of disasters are split 
geographically. For example, British and Dutch researchers are more concerned with 
the issue of major floods, American authors cover mostly the effects of major 
earthquakes (although floods, hurricanes and other natural phenomena are studied, the 
scale of the events is not of the dimension we are looking for), Japanese scholars are 
exploring the impacts of earthquakes and floods caused by tsunamis. The scale of the 
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event played an essential role in our selection. We are looking for analyses of a major 
hazard resulting in a vast disruption within a chosen economic system. 
Not only the nature of a disaster, but also the purpose of the study make us 
distinguish various schools. We mentioned this in our discussion on the concept of 
damage. For example, studies concerned with practical issues, such as problem solving 
for a specific sector, are more ad-hoc oriented than studies focusing on the overall 
damage estimation within a specified economy. We aim at presenting an overview of 
the different approaches, picking up elements, where possible, that could be used in 
building our own model. As we shall see, these methodologies differ significantly in 
background philosophy, objective and scope. Eventually, some main lines will emerge, 
but by and large, the debate is just beginning. 
 
4.2.1. Dutch Modelling Schools 
We shall start with a discussion of recent modelling efforts in flood damage assessment 
in the Netherlands, reflecting the social science position in damage assessment. For a 
long time this aspect was continuously overlooked, in attempts to find engineering and 
structural solutions. However, it was discovered that little knowledge had been collected 
about the broader impacts, like economic and financial losses, loss of human life, 
environmental effects, and so on. This means that the quest for exploration of these 
aspects has just begun, and as yet is far from being laid down in a unique methodology; 
rather, depending on the kind of questions one wishes to address, different types of 
models are employed. Often, models in economic impact analysis focus on the micro 
and meso levels, without looking at the general picture of a calamity. In the framework 
of this thesis we are mostly interested in new research lines in the macro sphere, which 
pay attention to the issues of interdependency and interaction at the national level. As 
mentioned, we shall consider what happens at the macro level as a resultant of events at 
the meso and, sometimes, even at the micro levels. 
A first model (or perhaps, ‘method’), which attempts to provide a methodological 
insight into the array of impacts, is the so-called ‘standard method’, developed by HKV 
Lijn in Water, a consultancy company, in a study for the Dutch Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works, and Water Management, MTP (Vrisou van Eck, Kok and 
Vrouwenvelder, 1999). This method is based on specific standardisations and is also 
used in the High Water Information System, HIS 41 (Meulepas and De Klerk, 2004; 
MTP 2005a), which provides information about high water developments in the primary 
dike 42 system to professionals and policy-makers. The method addresses various types 
of direct physical damage, as well as loss of life. It uses extensive data from the today 
available geographic information systems (see Appendix 5A for a description and 
applicability of GIS data), and detailed unit loss (or damage) functions for direct 
                                               
41
 The High-water Information System in the Netherlands is designed to monitor flood defences, to 
present inundation and loss calculations. Several stakeholder organisations are involved, with a central 
role for the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (MTP).  
42
 A few words of clarification are needed. Primary dikes protect the area against the ‘outside’ water, like 
the sea, the rivers or the lakes. At the same time, secondary dikes are found within the primary dike areas, 
which take care of the so-called compartimentalisation of the primary dike ring with the aim to limit the 
flooded area; under normal circumstances, however, they do not directly protect the area from flooding 
(see also Chapter 8 for more information on the Dutch water and flood management).  
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damage estimation. Each loss function includes three elements, namely estimated 
maximum damage per unit in construction category or productive sector; number of 
units in a category or sector, and damage factor for the particular category or sector. The 
maximum estimated damage value is determined by the replacement value of assets, 
which is effectively ’book value‘ (as we discussed in Chapter 3). The number of units 
per category or sector represents the number of buildings per respective construction 
category or number of establishments per productive sector. The damage factors are 
sector- or category-specific and vary according to the flood depth (e.g., the higher the 
level of flood, the higher the damage factor, and thus, the higher the damage incurred by 
the object). Damage factors in these functions are derived from simulations by means of 
hydrodynamic calculations and GIS maps based on a number of scenarios, taking into 
account the presence and strength of intermediate defences, differences in elevation and 
water levels, and building types. The method allows distinguishing damage factors for 
the following activity sectors: agriculture and recreation, pumping stations, means of 
transport, infrastructure, companies, and housing. Although providing a detailed 
account of direct physical damages, the method pays relatively little attention to indirect 
losses throughout the economy. In a recent version (see MTP, 2005b) the original 
classification of losses into primary direct losses, primary indirect losses, and secondary 
losses (Vrisou van Eck, Kok and Vrouwenvelder, 1999) has been replaced by a 
classification into two classes only: direct and indirect losses. Currently, in the standard 
method, direct material damage (substituting for primary direct losses) is defined as 
damage caused to objects, capital goods and movable goods as a result of direct contact 
with water. In the new version, direct damage due to business interruption (which 
replaces primary indirect losses) refers to losses due to interrupted production of 
businesses in the flooded area. Finally, indirect damage (replacing secondary losses in 
the previous version) is viewed as damage to business suppliers and customers outside 
the flooded area and travel time losses due to inoperability of roads and railways in the 
flooded area. 
The method is not ‘problem-free’: “all the financial and/or economic 
consequences of a flood” (ibid, p. A-1) are assessed, which suggests that the separate 
notions of financial and economic damage are not strictly in contrast (see Chapter 3 for 
the discussion of theis issue). Also, double counting (also discussed in Chapter 3) may 
be a problem. According to the method, when direct and indirect losses are added, then 
both the costs of replacement of lost capital, and the loss of goods and services which 
are not produced as a result of production interruption at the production site are 
included. Following our earlier discussion, UK Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries (MAFF, 1999) suggests that including both categories can mean counting the 
same costs twice, as the first one (the costs of capital goods used in production) is a 
stock measure, and the other (the non-produced goods) is a flow measure of the same 
damage category. In addition, Eijgenraam (2005) points at another source of double 
counting resulting from the overlapping summation of direct and indirect losses when 
calculations are done for each dike ring separately.43 If a summation of total losses in a 
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 The part of the Netherlands vulnerable to flooding from sea or rivers is subdivided into a number of so-
called dike-ring areas. Each dike-ring area is surrounded by a ring of natural or man-made water 
defences, such as dikes, dunes, concrete structures or high grounds. There are 99 such dike-ring areas in 
the country, including the ones along the Meuse (MTP, 2005c, p.13). A dike-ring area consists of one or 
more polders. One of the largest dike ring areas comprises the densely populated Western part of the 
Netherlands and covers important parts of the provinces of North Holland, South Holland, and Utrecht, 
and includes several major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leiden, Haarlem, Gouda). We 
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number of regions (dike rings in this case) is done, then it may occur that some of the 
costs that are direct in one region may be an indirect loss for another region, and vice 
versa, which means that a portion of costs is added repeatedly. 
The Netherlands Economic Institute, NEI, (Briene et al., 2003) presents a method 
to assess the maximum damage brought by a flood in a dike ring, including explicitly 
the calculations of indirect effects of production loss throughout the country. NEI 
follows the classification of damage in the standard method. Noteworthy is the manner 
in which indirect losses are estimated. In this, the NEI report refers to the underpinning 
study by the Tebodin consultancy group (Van den Berg et al., 2000), which determines 
the maximum value of damage for various productive sectors. This, in turn, is obtained 
via the summation of the maximum values of buildings, installations and final products. 
NEI, based on the study of Tebodin, suggest that the inter-industry effects of shutting 
down part of a productive sector in the country are estimated in a way, which avoids the 
rigidity of the standard input-output multiplier. The authors argue that substitution 
effects, that take place outside the region (dike ring in this case) as well as the presence 
of suppliers within the region that are ready to take over lost production during the 
reconstruction period, are unaccounted for in the input-output national multiplier, and 
thus applying it would exaggerate the effects of business interruption. Therefore, only 
25% of the indirect standard input-output multiplier effect is included in the business 
interruption losses. Furthermore, both Briene et al. and Van den Berg et al. do not 
account for the market value of the lost assets, but take the replacement value (after 
accounting for depreciation) as a threshold for estimating maximum damage (which is 
basically a financial concept).  
The Dutch Central Planning Bureau recently published several studies on water 
management and policy assessment. In a recent study it presented a cost-benefit analysis 
rooted in economic welfare theory; an example is the analysis for infrastructural 
alterations of river courses: “Giving Space for Water” (CPB, 2000), with only limited 
attention to typical indirect effects. In two other studies (Ebregt, Eijgenraam and 
Stolwijk, 2005; Eijgenraam, 2005), the CPB presents a further developed methodology 
based on a cost-benefit analysis, focusing on the macro-economic level rather than 
standard damage calculations for a particular dike ring. This attempts to present a more 
complete picture of the overall effects between the constituent parts of the entire 
economic system. Eijgenraam (2005) discusses optimal safety standards for dike-ring 
areas. This study also contains a correction of Van Dantzig’s 50-year old contribution to 
solve the economic decision problem regarding the optimal height of dikes (Van 
Dantzig, 1956). Within the context of economic growth, the expected annual loss by 
flooding is the key variable. The Eijgenraam study provides the formulas for optimal 
investment in the heightening of dikes. The optimisation problem results in the 
minimisation of expected damage (which is based on the damage functions) and 
covered by the investments in the strengthening of flood protection defences to prevent 
damage. This optimalisation provides the economically optimal investment strategy. 
Software based on Eijgeraam’s approach, OptimaliseRing (Duits, 2006), provides the 
calculations for the moments in time when the investments have to be made, and what 
the amount of the investment should be. Furthermore, the software determines optimal 
flooding standards per dike ring as a function of time (in connection to this, see also the 
                                                                                                                                          
shall return to this issue and pay more attention to the discussion on the Dutch example of water and flood 
management in detail in Chapter 8. 
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discussion of current developments in Dutch water and flood management policy in 
Chapter 8). 
We have seen that a number of studies are now available which focus, broadly 
speaking, on the micro- and meso-level. So far, macro-economic studies are relatively 
underrepresented. However, new research lines are pursued in several directions. An 
overview of damage evaluation methods as a result of a flooding is provided in the 
study of the Centre for Sustainable Development and Management team at the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (Van Ast, Bouma and Francois, 2004). The report outlines ample 
possibilities for establishing the value of assets, and includes indirect monetary 
assessment strategies for non-market goods (like hedonic pricing, contingent valuation, 
contingent ranking and cost avoidance methods). Ultimately, the authors develop a so-
called risk assessment approach, based on a discounted CBA framework, 
acknowledging the non-monetary damage aspects (e.g., damage to the nature and 
environment, emotional damage as well as uncertainty), and the risk perception of 
policy-makers. 
The special point of attention for the Netherlands is the event of large scale 
flooding (either from the sea or the rivers).44 A rising sea level and an increased 
probability of flooding of polders along the Dutch rivers and the coast demand a quick 
and permanent solution. We note, however, that there are relatively few reports on the 
consequences for Dutch society of a large scale flooding. Until recently, there have been 
several publications on small-scale inundations, but there was practically no experience 
with the societal and economic effects of major floods (Van der Veen et al., 2001). In 
the broader international literature it can also be noted that the vast majority of scholarly 
work dealing with floods focuses on relatively small-scale events. This means that the 
authors are basically concentrating on the micro-effects of the events, producing cost – 
benefit analyses for the regional level. Large-scale floods analysed on a national level 
thus remain an issue, which is not covered.  
Some recent Dutch work in the meso- and macro-sphere (Bočkarjova, Steenge and 
Van der Veen, 2004a,b; Van der Veen and Logtmeijer, 2005) concentrates on the effects 
of large-scale calamities in highly industrialized economic systems. Here, the case study 
of a hypothetical dike breach near Rotterdam (Krimpen) was studied, evaluating the 
effects of such an event for the entire Dutch economy. Van der Veen and Logtmeijer 
(2005) have tried to illuminate the so-called economic hotspots as a result of this 
hypothetical calamity, mapping those spots in terms of economic activity in the flooded 
area which would cause most of the (indirect) losses elsewhere in the country. 
Bočkarjova, Steenge and Van der Veen (2004b) offer building blocks for a three-stage 
procedure using an Input-Output based framework, employing a geography component 
for modelling economic impacts of major disturbances within an economy. An extended 
version of this approach is further developed and discussed in this thesis. The first stage, 
as the novel element in the approach, is to account for the immediate post-disaster 
situation, ‘disequilibrium’. When an essential part of a socio-economic network is 
suddenly ‘not available anymore’, this substantially undermines the ability of the entire 
economic system to function properly. The second stage follows, where looking for new 
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 To illustrate the urgency of the situation, a single dike breach is enough to flood the Prince Alexander 
polder with the city of Rotterdam to an extent similar to that of the flooding of New Orleans after 
hurricane Katrina, where about 30 dike breaches took place (for more information, see Kok et al., 2006). 
These findings also support the consequences of an imaginary Katrina in the Netherlands, see Dykstra 
(2005). 
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equilibria and design of recovery scenarios takes place. Basically, such a setting implies 
that one has to look at a complex system suffering a disruption as a whole, while it is 
trying to establish a new balance. This is accompanied by often extremely complex 
adjustments within the system itself, as well as the involvement of government in the 
recovery processes. With this in mind, it is important, not only to evaluate the possible 
damage that an economy can incur, but also to look at the possibilities for steering 
recovery. Clearly, a number of options exist and these should be studied as well. For 
example, the country may wish to re-establish the ‘status quo ante’ as soon as possible. 
On the other hand, it may also wish to use the occasion to renew selected parts of its 
physical infrastructure. Finally, the model can be used as a basis for a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) platform for the evaluation of various policy options when the outcomes 
of multiple preventive measures and recovery paths can be compared. 
The above-discussed methods present a picture of models and methods for damage 
estimation currently used in the Netherlands, their interpretation and justification. One 
characteristic to be noted is that the methodologies on economic cost assessment are 
still developing and are rarely described in detail. This is one of the factors which can 
explain the difficulty in comparing the various methodologies, also because the 
underlying concepts often vary in dimension. This means that it is not an easy task to 
compare the relative merits of the assessments provided by the different methods. At the 
moment, a multiplicity of partial studies are available, which, however, do not easily 
add up to a single picture. In future work, convergence to clear and possibly uniform 
definitions of the concepts, as well as an explicit choice of the modelling framework, is 
considered desirable. 
 
4.2.2. International Modelling Expertise 
On the international arena, often researchers tend to analyse natural disasters in the 
broader sense, taking into account the geographical, geo-technical, engineering, 
economic and even political aspects. This is due to the fact that initially studies of 
disaster consequences were dominated by the civil engineering field which focused on 
exploring the physical impacts of geological and hydrological hazards (which has also 
been the case in the Netherlands). Economic analysis started gaining importance later 
and therefore had to ‘stream in’ the established field of study, when it became apparent 
that broader perspective on disaster analysis and understanding of the processes and 
their consequences behind this phenomenon in modern societies are of great 
importance. One of the most vivid examples can be found in Scawthorn, Lashkari and 
Naseer (1997).  
The study of Scawthorn, Lashkari and Naseer (1997) is an integrated approach, 
which, however, overlooks some economic insights, evidently an important element of 
disaster consequence analysis. In this research, a general outline of the disaster is drawn 
up, presenting the timing and scheduling of events. A study of hazard mitigation 
activities45 is outlined on the basis of cost–benefit analysis derived from simulations of 
past disasters in the designated area. It is interesting to observe how the issue of supply 
and demand for structural protection measures against natural disasters is tackled. This 
involves not only financial considerations to provide additional safety, but also, and not 
                                               
45
 We recall that hazard mitigation, as defined by American scholars, contains actions directed at the 
reduction or elimination of risk, and includes both probability and consequence.  
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less importantly, sociological and psychological reasons for decision-making. For 
instance, Scawthorn, Lashkari and Naseer (1997) concluded that public demand for the 
civil protection and implementation of mitigation measures against earthquakes depends 
on the personal perception rate of such indicators as seismicity, seismic hazard and 
seismic risk.46 This has led to the identification of a specific area in which public 
awareness has to be raised on the issue of natural disasters. Here, inquiries into the 
inferences alongside the measurement and their communication to the public prove to 
be an indispensable tool in a democratic policy-making.47 
We note that the Scawthorn, Lashkari and Naseer (1997) study covers a wide 
range of physical impacts of disasters and mitigation strategies, without, however, 
explicitly engaging in modelling indirect economic effects of business interruption. This 
is evidence of the need of a special study into the modelling of broad economic 
consequences of major disruptions. Here, a number of approaches are available on the 
international arena, when one tries to gain insight into the post-disaster surviving 
capacity, thereby focusing on direct and indirect effects. These, as we defined in the 
previous Chapter, come about as a result of disruptions in sectoral purchases and inter-
industry supply and demand imbalances. 
First, let us note the efforts to determine the effects on businesses and economy 
in general on the part of national and international institutions and organisations (for the 
Dutch experience, please consult the previous sub-section). In this field, there are a 
number of studies. The report from the BTRE (2001) with the objective to establish the 
costs of natural disasters in Australia over time, to examine the trends in these costs, and 
to develop a model for the costs of future disasters, uses economic costs at the national 
level as a threshold for estimating losses. The Report notably refers to the fact that 
business interruption costs are deemed insignificant, provided there is production 
transfer between the producers. This is possibly true if a high level of resilience in terms 
of business substitution is present within an economic system (as we discussed in the 
previous Chapter); otherwise exclusion of this cost item from the total cost picture is not 
legitimate. The report however concurs with including losses associated with the 
increases of imports or decreases of exports. However, because the authors assume a 
high level of resilience in the system, no account of indirect business interruption losses 
is made. 
Next, we refer to Benson and Clay (2004) with their report for the World Bank 
on the economic and financial impacts of natural disasters. In this study, the authors 
investigate the fiscal constraints to and implications for economic growth, development, 
and poverty reduction, with particular focus on developing countries. The study adopts 
what is called an eclectic approach that is based on the construction of a historical 
narrative of disasters for the country or region of the case study. According to Benson 
and Clay, disasters are not treated as a ’black box‘, i.e. external negative economic 
shocks,. A mixture of formal quantitative and qualitative analysis is employed to 
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 An array of literature can be found dealing with the issue of individual risk perception, which is one of 
the critical issues for policy-makers (see, for example, Plough and Krimsky, 1987; Baker, 1990; Eiser, 
2004; Kaiser and Witzki, 2004; Tatano, Yamaguchi and Okada, 2004; Heems and Kothuis, 2006; 
Messner and Meyer, 2006). 
47
 See, for example, the Report of the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
(RIVM 2003, p.14), which suggests that in cases where the risk of some events is characterised by 
complexity and high consequences, the choices concerning acceptable levels of risk should be discussed 
in an open public debate. 
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examine the economic impacts of natural hazards at an economy-wide level, where 
quantitative investigations are partial, involving a combination of regression analysis, 
the use of charts to examine movement around trends, and ’before-and-after‘ 
comparisons of disaster impacts, such as the forecasted and actual economic 
performance. Interestingly, the authors use a null hypothesis, which implies that there is 
no direct link between disaster shocks and economic performance. A qualitative 
political-economic analysis is complementary to place quantitative results within the 
specific economic and social policy context of each country in the case study. By 
disconnecting the disaster event from overall economic performance, the authors are, 
however, obliged to explicitly reject their null hypothesis before alienating the effects of 
a calamity - which can be a justifiable approach to study developing countries where 
adversities occur frequently, and virtually are part of the development trend.  
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC 
(2003), and the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food reports (MAFF, 
1999, 2000) offer broad and rather detailed frameworks for disaster consequence 
appraisal, but provide no unified model. The former covers in its analysis such aspects 
as social sectors, infrastructure, economic sectors (like agriculture, manufacturing and 
tourism), and other factors (including environmental and macroeconomic effects). The 
latter is in effect a cost-benefit framework for the appraisal of flood and coastal defence 
projects, including damages to property, infrastructure, indirect business losses, non-
monetary losses to households, as well as recreational and environmental values, 
comparing costs and benefits of specific measures to the so-called ‘do-nothing’ option. 
Macro-models, however, are available, for example from the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, IIASA, Austria (see Freeman et al., 2004; 
Mechler, 2004; Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler and Pflug, 2005). The model, as outlined by 
Mechler (2004), consists of three elements, and analyses the macroeconomic trade-offs 
in natural disaster risk management, assessing the macroeconomic costs and benefits 
and cost-efficiency of management measures. The model integrates probabilistic natural 
hazard losses into macroeconomic planning models. In its first step, the model translates 
the direct losses into macro-impacts in terms of flows. Secondly, the insurance module 
analyses different (re-)insurance strategies for the insurance of infrastructure by the 
public sector. Finally, risk management is assessed by means of a CBA. However, little 
attention is paid to the economic and production-related structure of a system under 
analysis with impacts on the meso-level. 
The models and approaches outlined above are all having the macro-scale as the 
focus of their studies. Alternatively, if we adopt an approach based on the sectoral level, 
a number of other methodologies are available. Input-Output Analysis (I-O) and 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) are well-known approaches. Both types, 
however, traditionally have their typical advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
because standard input-output theory is often seen as rigid in terms of its technological 
ties and thus less appropriate in situations where substitution possibilities present 
themselves, input-output based methods have been viewed as being the less evident 
choice if market-based mechanisms play (or should play) an important role in the 
processes under study. On the other side of the spectrum, CGE methods, allowing 
instantaneous price adjustments, have been characterized as being overly optimistic 
regarding market flexibility and overall substitution tendencies when confronted with 
real world adaptive (in)capabilities (Rose, 1995, 2004b), often restricted in the 
immediate disaster aftermath and later recovery (we pointed out at these issues in 
Section 3.2.4, Chapter 3).  
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Rose made a significant contribution to the development of disaster-related 
modelling in I-O, as well as in CGE paradigms. With his conceptual works (see Rose 
and Lim, 2002; Rose, 2004b) and particular the discussion on resilience (Rose, 2006) 
which we introduced in the two previous Chapters), he continued his work in modelling 
economic consequences of adversities. The focus of a number of Rose’s modelling 
effort contributed to the understanding of the influence of lifeline disruptions caused by 
a hazard on the interrupted economic flows and their repercussions throughout an entire 
system (see Rose and Benavides, 1998, on electricity lifeline disruption analysis, and 
Rose and Liao, 2005, on water service disruptions). With the help of specified impact 
coefficients, disturbances in other productive sectors were modelled within an input-
output framework as a result of electricity system breakdowns. However, the 
investigation was carried out at the county scale, which does not correspond to the 
magnitude of events we are looking for. This means that for our inquiry, we can use the 
elements of his approach, although we would have to adjust them for the larger scale of 
an event in our study.  
In a number of studies, Rose (Rose, 2004a; Rose et al., 2006) paid attention to the 
analysis of resilience and mitigation. In Rose and Liao (2005) and subsequently in Rose 
(2006), a CGE approach is used to study resilience and its quantification for cases of 
major disruptions, viewing the economic system’s capacity to react to adversity. 
However, the authors acknowledge that without further refinement, CGE models, as 
well as nearly all other economic models, reflect only ‘business-as-usual’ conditions; 
while disasters and other extreme major disorders are discontinuities, and therefore may 
make a system reshaped in a different sort of pattern. Rose and Liao developed 
modeling improvements advancing the CGE analysis of major supply disruptions of 
critical inputs by specifying operational definitions of macroeconomic resilience (which 
include water and other input conservation, increased substitutability of other inputs for 
water as a critical resource, back-up supplies, time-of-day usage and change in 
technology), linking production function parameters to various types of producer 
adaptations in emergencies, developing algorithms for recalibrating production 
functions to empirical or simulation data, and decomposing partial and general 
equilibrium responses. 
In their research, Rose and colleagues came across the issue, and justifiably raise 
this in their work, that in effect any model used for an analysis of changes in ‘normal’ 
circumstances has to be adjusted for an analysis of events of major disturbances. This is 
very important for disaster studies, as it points to a serious gap in existing modelling 
practices and the need for methodological advancement. The lack of development of 
methods for economic disaster consequence analysis evidences the need for our current 
study. The fact that Rose and colleagues raise this fundamental issue only substantiates 
our attempt to find an adjusted, well-structured and transparent methodological 
framework for major calamity description, analysis and exploration of recovery and 
preparedness actions and policy. 
Persistently, Rose (1995, p.296) reveals: “My own use of CGE models has 
increased my appreciation of input-output economics rather than diminished it.” This 
statement is a witness to the usefulness and importance of the input-output approach in 
contemporary modelling, despite its, sometimes misperceived, drawbacks (for more 
discussion of this issue, see further Rose, 1995). In the following, we shall concentrate 
on input-output analysis. One reason for doing so is that the model remains attractive 
for the assessment of costs incurred by a disaster as it offers a simple way of accounting 
for a complex economic system. Another reason is that it seems a better tool for 
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analysing situations of severe disruptions because it allows us to concentrate 
specifically on the physical side of the problem at hand. This means that, on the one 
hand, as a complete and internally consistent accounting system, it should be able to 
make the connection between the physical disruptions in the immediate calamity 
aftermath, and map them into the input-output ‘accounting’ tables. Our main point, 
however, is that input-output is underutilised or underdeveloped as a methodology in 
dealing with disruptions and imbalances of the type we are discussing. Input-output 
methodology, as it stands now, does not offer a very flexible set of tools to deal with 
such situations. The problem here is (partially shared with CGE methodology) that it 
stresses interaction and equilibrium, while the post-disaster situation, as we discuss it, is 
characterized by severe disruption, often chaos, and consequently, disequilibrium. In 
situations where the economy is suddenly confronted with an entirely new set of 
circumstances, with hazard-imputed consequences, where it has to act quickly, and has 
to make decisions in a non-standard way in the light of suddenly restricted or 
unavailable resources, input-output, as it stands, is essentially inadequate. Our approach 
proposes that a return to basic principles is needed to give it its due place and scope, 
and to extend to major shock analysis. 
 
4.2.3. Input-Output Modelling in International Disaster Literature 
Many authors have chosen inter-industry input-output models for analysis because of 
their ability to reflect the structure of a regional economy in detail and to trace 
economic interdependence between the regions by calculating indirect effects of 
disruptions, as if one was ‘localising’ the disastrous event. The use of these models to 
estimate the regional impact of natural hazards dates back to work by Cochrane (1974). 
Later, in his study of the economic impact of an earthquake in the American Midwest, 
Cochrane (1997a) suggested an inter-industry model as a means of measuring indirect 
loss. The approach used by Cochrane (ibid) relied on both the existence of regional 
input-output tables and several assumptions on inventory management, importability of 
shortages, exportability of surpluses and the amount of excess capacity in each sector, 
the output of each sector consisting of a fixed proportion of other sector outputs. 
Cochrane provided an analysis of the relation between direct and indirect losses, 
focusing in particular on the dependence of the relative magnitude of indirect losses. As 
a result of a number of simulations with varied user inputs and damage patterns, an 
emerging pattern was observed, about which Cochrane (2004, pp42-43) concludes: 
“Indirect loss […] is less sensitive to economic structure (manufacturing dominated or 
service dominated economy) than to damage pattern, degree of integration (size), 
preexisting conditions, and who is financing the recovery.” This means, that the relative 
magnitude of the economic system, the system’s vitality (which is directly connected to 
the concepts of adaptability and resilience discussed in Chapter 2), asymmetry of the 
shock, and recovery planning are central to the understanding of processes behind the 
disaster event in modern economies. The study of Cochrane is a valuable contribution to 
the understanding of the consequences of major disturbances on the generalised level. 
However, there is no additional insight into the structure of an economic system and an 
analysis of changes thereof. This means that the analysis performed does not provide a 
more detailed perspective on disaster phenomenon within a complex industrialised 
network, which we are studying. 
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Continuing with the literature overview, we should note the HAZUS software, a 
multi-hazard loss estimation methodology, developed by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and the National Institute of Building Sciences (for detailed 
description of the software, see (FEMA, 2001), where both Rose and Cochrane were 
among the contributors). This is based on the data from a geographic information 
system and is intended to simulate the direct and indirect economic effects of a specific 
natural hazard, like an earthquake, flood or wind storm. The HAZUS algorithm is 
essentially I-O based, though it is neither a linear program, nor a CGE model. Let us 
clarify: within the HAZUS setting, it is assumed that household spending is 
endogenous, thus favouring type II input-output multipliers. With the specification that 
households behave according to the Life-cycle model of consumption (assuming 
constant average consumption through the years based on the total income earned), the 
pattern of consumption is disconnected from regional income at a particular point in 
time, and thus remains constant. Although the algorithm does adjust trading patterns, it 
does not allow for product and input substitutions driven by relative price changes, thus 
keeping the model more transparent, and the results easier to interpret relative to CGE. 
The Indirect Economic Loss Model (IELM) component of HAZUS uses the post-
disaster surviving capacity in terms of a part of surviving production as a starting point 
for recalculating inter-industry supplies and demands. This is done as follows. The 
algorithm determines the impacts on the inter-industry sales and purchases by means of 
row- and column-wise multiplications of the transactions table with the factor of 
survived capacity. Following this procedure, first inter-industry inputs are multiplied 
(input-output transactions matrix columns) by the respective percentage of the sector’s 
post disaster capacity; then shipments (input-output transactions matrix rows) are 
multiplied by the surviving capacity. Finally, the algorithm adds the pre-disaster final 
demands (household, government, and exports) to arrive at a complete measure of 
excess supply and demand by sector. The algorithm of the module then identifies and 
balances the shortages and excesses. If excess demand is detected, the algorithm 
searches for a way to adjust sectoral capacity to account for unemployed resources in 
the region, and by importing from other regions, which are user-defined. If excess 
supplies are detected, the algorithm searches for alternative means of disposing those 
supplies, specifically through export. The model adjusts potential outputs iteratively, 
depending upon the unique characteristics of the economy under study, until all net 
excesses are eliminated. 
The strength of the software is that it represents one of the most complete methods 
to model ex-ante and ex-post disaster consequences in an integrated manner, with an 
explicit geographical component. However, the model hinges on a number of specific 
assumptions. Unusual for an input-output analysis is the treatment of rows as columns 
of transactions matrix according to the surviving production capacity, while resulting 
coefficients and multipliers are interpreted in the conventional input-output sense. The 
reason is the assumed stability of technological coefficients (see also Rose and Chen, 
1991), i.e. column-wise proportions within each sector; that’s why, if the input-output 
transactions matrix is also multiplied row-wise, vertical proportions become altered and 
need new interpretation or modification.  
Cole contributed a great deal to the development of input-output techniques 
applied in relation to earthquake analysis. Cole, Pantoja and Razak, (1993) used 
economic models based on social accounting matrices (SAMs), which are effectively 
extensions of conventional input-output tables and often cover additional income and 
expenditure flows between institutions, such as households, government and the rest of 
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the world,48 to measure the consequences of planned and unplanned economic events in 
small island economies. These models were constructed on the basis of past disasters, 
and simulative models were produced for the specific areas most prone to the impact of 
natural hazards. The approach offered by Cole, Pantoja and Razak uses a so-called 
Event Accounting Matrix (EAM), whose elements correspond to the entries of the 
SAM. Such a matrix is constructed so that it enables the mapping of the direct impact of 
the disaster onto the SAM. Following Cole (1998, p.135), the EAM records the intensity 
of the impacts on each activity and transaction in the first instance, and the response (or 
recovery rate) of each activity or transaction after a disaster in the second instance. With 
the help of an EAM, a system’s vulnerability and adjustments can be modelled, and the 
results can be used to design strategies for regions prone to natural disasters (we shall 
return to the EAM idea in Section 4.3). The authors suggest that such a technique can be 
developed further into a full-fledged expert system for use in post-disaster economic 
recovery efforts, which could in turn provide a framework for the integration of a 
sector-specific expert system in transport and water supply systems and other activities 
in the public and private sectors. The discussion on the use of expert systems versus 
decision-support systems in policy-making was continued in Cole (1998). 
In his following studies, Cole (2004a,b) proposes a model to analyse how disasters 
and their consequences affect social actors and propagate throughout society. The focus 
of these works of Cole is the preparedness for disasters and survival strategies, which 
should improve societies’ capacity to face adversities and recover from them (found 
also in Cole, 1995). Essentially, the suggested model hinges on investments in 
protection as a ‘buffer’ saved for the case of calamity. Purchase of formal insurance, 
maintenance of stocks, provision of a duplicate water supply system or even 
maintenance of social networks can be seen as investments; at the same time, these 
precautionary measures come at a cost. The opportunity cost of the resources used for 
investments in the ‘buffer’ cannot be put into production, increasing welfare in 
business-as-usual times. In more technical terms, ex-ante preparations and spending on 
protection are ‘leaking out’ of an input-output table, and in effect remain idle (as they 
cannot be used for other purposes) before disaster strikes. This means, that investments 
in preparedness can be accounted for in a special added row (as costs) and column (as 
sources) of a SAM matrix.49 With this additional account, a SAM becomes what is 
called an insurance accounting matrix. When modelling the post-disaster situation, the 
benefits of precautionary investments in terms of lower costs and faster recovery can be 
identified. Then, these benefits can also be weighed against the costs incurred, but also 
against the ripple effects which are not realised because part of resources were taken out 
of the system for the sake of protection. The suggested approach allows a demonstration 
of how contingencies and protection in one sector or in one segment of society can 
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 The SAM provides an insight into the link between input-output tables and the so-called sector 
accounts, which include factors and institutions. The SAM particularly focuses on the representation of 
consumption and factor remuneration. Also, the activity part of a SAM is identical to the input-output 
table, although the level of aggregation is usually much greater. Differences between the other parts of a 
SAM are substantial, however. This reflects the diversity in purpose among users of the SAM. 
49
 In his works, Cole widely makes use of SAMs, Social Accounting Matrices, which are an extension of 
a standard input-output table, constructed based on the same double-entry principle, and include a variety 
of additional information. For example, Cole builds his studies of small island economies around SAMs, 
accounting for the segmentation present in the society, like the division between the rich and the poor, 
modern and traditional sectors, public and private sectors. Adding the new information to the standard 
input-output table, one can see the specific pattern of income and expenditure per group, and thus analyse 
which effects calamities can have on each group. This can be a very useful exercise for cases where 
differences between social strata and sectors comprising economic network are substantial. 
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affect vulnerability of another, as well as to examine the optimal level of protection 
investments to be made. 
Another input-output based model on the international arena is one presented by 
Santos and Haimes (2004). Santos and Haimes offer what they call the inoperability 
input-output model for studying the disturbances due to a terrorist attack. Within an 
input-output framework, the authors use decomposition analysis to arrive at the 
description of how terrorism-induced perturbations can propagate throughout an entire 
economic network resulting from system interconnectedness. In essence, inoperability, 
as defined by Santos and Haimes, refers to normalised production loss, where decreased 
production due to a disturbance is related to the ‘as-planned’ production level. 
Ultimately, an input-output type equation is obtained, which is an alternative 
representation of conventional output-final demand modelling. The model uses a 
Ghosh-type coefficient matrix, which is, essentially, the supply-side input-output model 
(see Chapter 5 for a more detailed description of the standard input-output model, as 
well as Ghosh, 1958; Miller and Blair, 1985). It relates the (normalised) inoperability 
output to the demand-side perturbation that is also normalised according to the ‘as 
planned’ output level. The model is an example of an input-output modification for 
calamity modelling, although does not include a discussion of the essence of 
perturbations. Although the model is meant to shed light on the processes in an 
economic system in the wake of a calamity, the model operates as a usual equilibrium 
artefact, not accounting for the mismatches and imbalances in the economic network 
brought about by the major shocks. 
Finally, we would like to outline the joint works of Okuyama, Hewings and Sonis 
(2002 and 2004), built around extending an input-output model with a time dimension. 
In addition, the dynamic character of the introduced Sequential Interindustry Model 
(SIM) allows the adoption of production chronology of various production sectors 
(divided between anticipatory, responsive and just-in-time modes) to model the impact 
of the unscheduled events, as well as recovery and reconstruction thereafter. The model 
is developed for both single-region and the bi-regional settings (using input-output table 
for two regions). The just-in-time sectors (mostly, services) are characterised by the 
conventional input-output equation, whereas input-output equations for anticipatory and 
responsive sectors are modified. The anticipatory mode (represented by agriculture and 
most of the manufacturing industries) provides the dependence of current period output 
on future (anticipated) output and current final demand. The production of a sector in 
the responsive mode (construction industry) depends on past output and current 
demand. Providing the implications of this analysis for recovery and reconstruction, the 
authors conclude that inventories and the availability of perfect information play a 
significant role in analysing the surprise aspect of an adversity on output fluctuations in 
the disaster aftermath. One cannot prepare for an unexpected, unanticipated shock, 
which means that high losses may follow. As a result, the model shows that mismatches 
between demand and supply as a result of fundamental perturbations within an 
economic system in a short period of time are unavoidable. Essentially, the model 
proves to be valuable for disaster analysis and subsequent recovery over time. On the 
one hand it is capable of providing insight into the recovery phase-wise planning to 
avoid bottlenecks; on the other hand, it may also be used to identify those temporal key 
sectors, crucial to the economy-wide recovery. However, the model does not pay a great 
deal of attention to the infusion of the shock itself, which is done through the decrease 
of final demand. 
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Looking at the methodology used by researchers on the international arena for 
economic disaster analysis, we can conclude that the methods, which incorporate input-
output and SAM techniques vary among authors and provide us with a vast range of 
information for consideration in our studies. Experiences with manipulation of the 
input-output model and its extensions in the attempt to model post-disaster recovery 
show that existing approaches are as yet incomplete, and that improvements are 
certainly called for. 
 
4.3. ANALYSIS AND CHOICES 
In the introduction to this Chapter we stated that disaster analysis as a community of 
researchers, practitioners and academics is still taking shape, and that therefore 
generally accepted theoretical and methodological bases are still missing, in contrast to 
more established fields of study. This is one of the underlying reasons why research 
efforts carried out all around the world in the scientific community are spread so widely, 
both in method and purpose, which complicates the detection of a common 
denominator. The evolution of the disaster research community indirectly triggered the 
emergence of multiple approaches and schools. We have attempted to make a selection 
from these, which we present in this Chapter.  
In the remainder of this Chapter, we shall elaborate on those elements in disaster 
consequence analysis that seem promising to use in our own modelling. After this, there 
will be a discussion on the choice of a basic modelling framework. We shall conclude 
this Chapter with a summary. 
 
4.3.1. Literature on Methods and Models 
Needless to say, much valuable work has been done in the field of disaster impact 
modelling. However, much of it has been devoted to the study of particular empirical 
needs or cases (Shinozuka, Rose and Eguchi, 1998), where the electricity system 
blackout consequences after an earthquake are analysed; or serves specific practical 
purposes (Tierney and Nigg, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004). Tierney and Nigg (1995) 
emphasise that lifeline service interruptions after the 1993 Midwest floods were 
perceived by businesses as very disruptive, and were a much more significant source of 
business closure than actual physical flooding. Freeman et al. address risk management 
in terms of macroeconomic planning, i.e. the incorporation of potential future natural 
disaster losses into current budgeting activities. The nature of the problem at hand often 
forces the researcher to develop specific methods for case-oriented problems, while 
wider theoretical and methodological aspects had to remain invisible. For example, in 
her study, Chang (2003) develops a methodology for cost-benefit analysis of disaster 
mitigation measures for urban infrastructure systems with the emphasis on evaluating 
societal impacts. This should be seen as an important contribution to the field of disaster 
studies, as Wisner and Luce (1993) point out that very often the emphasis of analyses is 
on the physical hazards, not human vulnerability, which Chang successfully fills in. In 
the current analysis we shall take a conceptual standpoint, returning to the main 
concepts behind economic disaster modelling, yet taking into account the ‘human side’ 
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of a catastrophe. This can, we hope, connect applied studies and methodological 
advancement in the field. 
The literature suggests that it is essential that, as soon as possible, it becomes clear 
what exactly has happened, and how the situation has changed immediately after the 
disaster. Evidently, a disaster, by definition, brings about a shock to an economy of an 
unprecedented scale, and thus marks a break in the established development path. The 
severity of an event, together with a lack of familiarity with similar events in the past, 
gives little room for experience for both economic agents and decision-makers to react 
quickly and appropriately to an adversity. This is one of the reasons for the failure to 
perform and respond effectively to the tragedy in New Orleans after the devastating 
hurricane Katrina in 2005 (see US House of Representatives, 2006; as well as Ink, 2006; 
and Menzel, 2006). Among others, Penner (2006, p.1) explicitly states: “Katrina 
spectacularly exposed widespread weaknesses in the public policy response to 
catastrophes, weaknesses that afflicted everything from the humanitarian response to the 
operation of the food insurance programme.” The studies on the effects of Katrina 
witness an agreement on the fact that the calamity came unexpectedly; no one seemed to 
have anticipated neither the event, nor its scale and strength of impact. This means that 
such (perhaps, virtual) experience should be built up in advance by modelling, 
simulating and analysing possible disaster events as well as drawing up scenarios of 
expected damage with potential recovery possibilities. This is essential in putting 
recovery programmes into place and in reviving prime activities after the factual 
systemic shock. We can draw from this that disaster preparedness aspect is essential, 
and it is important that disaster modelling frameworks are able of providing good ex-
ante analysis to support policy and action.  
However, modelling and analysing an economy under stress is not an easy task. 
The literature (Okuyama, 2003b; Van der Veen et al., 2003a; Cochrane, 2004; Rose, 
2004b) seems to agree that a precise starting point for disaster research is often missing. 
Even where it is assumed ‘obvious’, the basic issues of disaster implications always 
require additional attention. For example, there is no accepted formula for the 
representation of disrupted ties within an economic network as a result of a disaster. 
There is also little clarity about the recovery goals, and in many cases returning to the 
pre-disaster state (what is referred to as ’normalcy‘, see for example McEntire (2006) 
becomes a common strategy, while other options are often left unconsidered. It becomes 
clear that in the first instance there is a need for proper understanding of the post-
disaster situation. Okuyama (2003b, p.12), e.g., notes the uncertainty that appears as a 
result of a disaster:  
“Uncertainty arises after a disaster because first, the extent and range of direct 
damages are unknown right after the event; second, the trends of economic 
activities, especially the fluctuation of demand, become unclear in the short run; 
and third, the influx of demand injections for recovery and reconstruction 
activities makes the long-run forecast of economic growth in the region difficult.” 
In our approach, we want to stress the importance of starting from the basic need 
of an adequate reflection of post-disaster survived production capacity in an economy. 
There is a range of attempts at pointing the way for economic modelling of the disaster 
aftermath. A set of three factors can be distinguished which basically stipulate the track 
of post-shock development: the level and severity of the damage incurred, the 
economy’s resilience potential, and the external factors (for a discussion of resilience, 
vulnerability and related notions, see Chapter 3). Cochrane (1997b, pp243-244) points 
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out that combinations of similarly defined factors trigger the recovery direction of each 
particular economy to a (new) equilibrium, and stipulate the ratio of gains and losses of 
a shock brought about by a disaster.  
Other authors, e.g. Rose and Lim, (2002, p.12) discuss a similar issue whereby 
preconditions can pave the way for an economy’s survival capacity after a calamity and 
point out that “More sectorally diverse economies are better able to withstand the 
shocks of business interruption losses”. Adger (2000, p.352) contributes to this 
discussion, adding that promotion of specialisation in economic activities has negative 
consequences in terms of risk to individuals and for communities. We can interpret the 
argument behind such reasoning to mean that specialised economies are less resilient to 
major shocks, as they rely on few areas of specialisation and are thus less flexible in risk 
distribution. Specialised economic systems can exhibit a greater risk of failure in case 
the resource or industry(ies) it relies on are gone. Furthermore, Adger et al. (2005, 
p.1037) suggest “in social systems, governance and management frameworks can 
spread risk by diversifying patterns of resource use and by encouraging alternate 
activities and lifestyles.” However, before studying prevention, one has to understand 
the mechanisms of a disaster in a modern economy. 
Here, we start with Cole, Pantoja and Razak (1993), who, recapitulating the 
situation in an economic network immediately after a calamity, introduce what they call 
an event accounting matrix, EAM (see also the previous subsection). This is one of the 
comprehensive efforts to try to realise and manage the recovery of an economy in a 
disaster aftermath in a systematic manner.50 The aim of establishing an EAM is to bring 
structure and transparency in thinking about the disorder induced by a calamity, and to 
provide a direction for recovery planning, for which the authors confirm its importance 
in economic disaster analysis.  
The specific focus of Cole and colleagues on relatively small (island) economies 
like Aruba and their preparedness for destructive natural phenomena can be deemed to 
be related to the character of the problem at hand. Essentially, the relative dimension of 
disturbance at the core of Cole’s attention is crucial and therefore an analogy can easily 
be drawn to our study of a large-scale calamity in an industrialised economy. Due to the 
location of the island in the Caribbean basin, it is quite susceptible to a natural hazard; 
due to the relatively small size of the country, Aruba is also relatively vulnerable to 
hazards. For example, the island is completely dependent on tourism, which in turn is 
sensitive to natural hazard events. This means that even a moderate natural adversity 
can cause significant harm to the functioning and endurance of the entire society. In 
their modelling effort, Cole, Pantoja and Razak attempt in the first instance to provide 
insight into the post-disaster destructions, as well as outlining the recovery, with the aim 
of ensuring the sustainability of the small economy in view of future challenges.  
The explicit choice of Cole, Pantoja and Razak (1993) to describe the nature of 
economic processes in the immediate disaster aftermath and to simulate economic 
restructuring thereafter, led the authors to adopt the notion of an EAM, which is unique 
in the disaster community. The stage of structuring of chaos and disorder, basically 
                                               
50
 A somewhat similar approach, although referred to as a ‘parameter matrix’ approach in the extension of 
the so-called Indirect Loss module, can be found in HAZUS (FEMA, 2001, p.16-34). The HAZUS 
algorithm uses these matrices as a tool to make supply, demand and value added adjustments in the 
disaster aftermath sector-dependent. However, the particular construction of the matrix is not elaborated 
upon. 
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before recovery starts, is often overlooked by many authors. Only with accurate 
knowledge of the survived capacity and available resources in the disaster aftermath, 
can further recovery and reconstruction activities be planned and implemented. Cole, 
Pantoja and Razak (1993, p.B-8) attempt to find a solution for the disequilibrium stage 
via an ‘event matrix’. They state: 
the intensity of an event E may be represented by changes in the coefficient 
matrix, say, E*A, and in the exogenous demand Y. This vector is related directly 
to the “event matrix” […] and simply measures the extent to which a particular 
activity has been disrupted. Hence, the total impact now may be written as:51 
{ } YP(T)  A *E(T)I   X(T) 1−−=  
Note, that an ‘event matrix’ may be a matrix or a vector, but should be compatible 
with the corresponding SAM (see also our description of the method in the previous 
Section). Also note that X, E and P (respectively, total output, changes in the production 
coefficients and cumulative impact) are functions of time. Time is an important 
parameter according to Cole, Pantoja and Razak, and has to be explicitly included in the 
analysis. Further on the same page, Cole, Pantoja and Razak (ibid) further clarify the 
meaning of an event matrix:  
In general, then, the “events matrix” is E(wij, cij, tij, rij). The parameter wij is the 
characteristic lag associated with the transaction […] The remaining parameters 
define the impact of the disaster and recovery – c, t and r respectively represent 
the initial impact, the time-scale for recovery, and the expected impact of 
reconstruction.  
Apparently, the philosophy behind structuring the various steps in disaster 
analysis, like initial disruption and recovery activities through time, by means of an 
‘event matrix’ is, irrefutably, an important methodological contribution to disaster 
modelling. Cole, Pantoja and Razak (1993, p.4-7) continue: 
In the most general case, the event matrix will be a set of tables corresponding to 
entries in the original input-output table which specifies i) the extent of damage 
to internal and external components, ii) the goal for recovery and iii) the time 
scale for recovery. The details [of how an event matrix is specified] will depend 
on the situation under investigation 
However, the development of the matrices comprising the ‘event matrix’ received 
little further advancement in disaster studies. In particular, the precise mathematical 
definition and derivation of an EAM are missing, especially the connection between the 
E and A matrices. At the same time, Cole, Pantoja and Razak (ibid, p.3-16) themselves 
are proponents of the so-called ‘expert system approach’, which implies that, following 
the authors, matrices defining the initial distortion, as well as recovery are to be defined 
independently by outside experts in the field of economic recovery.  
In our opinion, the definition of an ‘event matrix’, as stipulated above, offers 
another lead. We would like to distinguish two main stages here. Stage one 
encompasses element i), i.e. reflection on the real situation immediately after the 
disaster -primarily a listing of production and consumption imbalances- while stage two 
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 We recognize here a variant of the Leontief or multiplier matrix to be discussed in Section 5.2. Here A 
is the matrix of input coefficients as appearing in equation [3.1].   
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consists of the elements ii) and iii), the direct recovery planning with implications for 
the long-run development trajectory. Moreover, in our view, the circle of disaster 
analysis as presented so far is not complete, as it is missing the proactive element, such 
as the analysis of prevention measures, the ex ante adaptation of an economy to the 
potential adversity, building up resilience and reducing vulnerability. For this purpose 
we suggest that a third stage has to be added to the proposed modelling activities, i.e. an 
evaluation of (policy) options that exist with respect to disaster preparedness. We shall 
return to this proposition in Chapter 6 when we introduce our own model. Before that, 
we have to discuss the arguments behind the choice of a basic modelling framework 
(next Section) and its construction (Chapter 5). 
 
4.3.2. Choice of Modelling Framework 
Models that we highlighted in this short review above, while each have their strong 
sides, seem to suffer from malfunction in some respect. Here, we summarise briefly the 
main points of limitation in current disaster effect modelling and make a choice of 
model for our own inference. 
In our view, one of the features that disaster modelling has to reflect is that clarity 
and insight should be provided with respect to the immediate post-disaster situation. 
This is important because disaster studies, as we discuss them in this thesis, are 
considering a specific situation in which an economic system suddenly appears, which 
is a major calamity. This is in turn characterised by vast physical disruption, loss of 
lives and resources which consequently results in the loss of connectivity within the 
economic circular flow and a (possibly, enduring) imbalance situation, where the scale 
of the initial shock plays a leading role, as we discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Modelling disaster repercussions in this way is becoming methodologically different 
from conventional marginal or step-wise impulse analyses, and should not omit the 
disequilibrium stage of disruption before proceeding to recovery exercises. This is 
probably one of the most widespread flaws, because modellers are ‘trapped’ within the 
merits of most existing models, based on the notion of equilibrium, which is in turn 
difficult to neglect. This implies essentially that care should be taken in choosing 
modelling tools for analysing disaster consequences and their appropriateness, while 
equilibrium models seldom appear to be adjusted to the specific purposes of disaster 
problem.  
Further, some minor points should be addressed. Another problem is that other 
models lack a convincing geographical dimension or sometimes miss a connection to 
the spatial factor. Few models have explicit temporal boundaries, not always taking a 
wide range of economic effects present during the recovery phase into the analysis 
(which can also be positive alongside the negative repercussions of a disaster; for 
example, driven by the resilience potential). Next, some research efforts are directed at 
the scale of events, which is unusual, but not as grand as we define in this thesis. For 
example, very few works concerned a disaster such as Katrina, which points at the need 
for carrying out ex-ante large-scale analyses. Here, the problem is that we tend to draw 
inferences about future events based on previous occurrences; unfortunately, extremes 
sometimes do occur, and we need to be ahead of time and think about unlikely, though 
not impossible, events to prevent devastating catastrophes. Finally, some models are 
developed to suit particular (ad-hoc) needs, and therefore miss generality.  
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Nevertheless, by and large the methodological debate is still open, depending on 
what the country or region views as its biggest problem. One of the additional issues to 
be explored concerns policy in countries differing in political and economic structure, 
which also influences the choice of the model. In a pure market economy decisions 
made can be expected to differ from those made in a more regulated country. Here, we 
have to look for novel solutions which address the entire range of (pre)conditions. First 
of all we should decide on the choice of the level of analysis: at the moment, there is a 
need for a macro-oriented framework, which at the same time provides insight into the 
disturbance of structure and operation of the entire socio-economic system under the 
conditions of a calamity (Van der Veen, 2004). Next, modelling efforts should be 
oriented at providing a wide range of economic effects inflicted by a disaster, in 
particular covering the extent of direct and indirect economic losses throughout the 
system. Finally, it is essential that models are capable of covering available policy 
options. Whether proactive or recovery-oriented, policy measures should be modelled 
and analysed with regards to the possible response that these might cause throughout the 
economy. Being able to assess relative costs and benefits of various measures, such 
models would offer indispensable means to support decision-making. 
After the review of literature on the existing models and discussion of their pros 
and cons, we may say that for the analysis of disaster consequences, we are looking for 
a model, which possesses three important features. Firstly, it is the ability to model a 
complex economic system, where numerous actors are interdependent on each other, 
producing high-order interconnectedness. Secondly, it is the capability to model a 
system which is (temporarily) out of equilibrium and tends to return to a (new) balance. 
Thirdly, the model should include a module to treat the analysis of policy options 
anticipating and preparing for a calamity. The combination of these three conditions for 
a model is a truly challenging task.  
Which model should be chosen to analyse a complex disrupted economic system? 
What limitation and opportunities, both available at present, as well as still unexplored, 
do models offer for disaster analysis? These questions are not easy to answer; there 
basically are just too many unknowns. We addressed this issue in Chapter 3, where we 
stated that, depending on the kind of questions we wish to address, different models are 
used for economic analysis of major catastrophes. Certain preferences seem to exist, 
depending on country and type of catastrophe we wish to study. In the United States, for 
example, a number of market-based approaches have been presented recently focusing 
on short and medium run disequilibria (see, for example, Cole, Pantoja and Razak, 
1993; Cochrane, 1997a,b; Rose and Lim, 2002; Cole, 2003; Okuyama, 2004; Okuyama 
and Chang 2004; Okuyama, Hewings and Sonis, 2004). Yet, not many authors have 
considered economies, where government exercises relatively significant influence on 
the markets, where modelling would require more attention to the (proactive) policy 
side (we shall return to the discussion of the role of government in water management 
and flood policy in the Netherlands in Chapter 8). 
Other existing analytical frameworks circulating internationally contain 
Computable General Equilibrium and Input-Output models, including their Linear 
Programming variants, and social accounting matrices. All have their strong and weak 
points. Input-Output models offer a transparent structure of an economy by sector, allow 
concentrating specifically on the physical side of the problem at hand, and are 
temptingly simple. And although input-output is widely used as a methodology for 
dealing with large-scale disruptions we are discussing, it still needs methodological 
fine-tuning for the maturity required for this type of analysis. In fact, standard Input-
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Output methodology, stressing interaction and equilibrium, does not offer a very 
flexible set of tools to deal with post-disaster situations characterised by persistent 
disruption and disequilibrium. This problem is partially shared with the CGE 
methodology, which is often seen as a superior alternative to input-output approaches.52 
In a sense it can be argued that standard Input-Output, being limited by the fixed 
production functions (essentially, proportions between the inputs used, which are 
technologically determined), is an antipode of the CGE models deemed to be intricate, 
involving multiple actors and markets, and flexible, allowing markets to adjust 
elastically through the price mechanism to the new circumstances. Rose (1995, p.296) 
holds an opinion, which can bridge the gap in the methodological debate between CGE 
and I-O proponents:  
“…economists using CGE models often see them as clear improvements over I-
O. They point to an enhanced emphasis on institutions and a broader set of 
interactions, or to non-linearities and substitution possibilities in response to 
market signals. At the same time, they often fail to acknowledge that their models 
are based on more restrictive assumptions than I-O models, in that they typically 
assume optimizing behavior and that the economy is in equilibrium. Most 
important is the fact that these more recent multisector formulations would be of 
limited value without an I-O model of sectoral interdependency as part of their 
theoretical core and without an empirical I-O table to make them operational.” 
Also, while acknowledging the value of CGE and its merits, it is not exactly what 
it seems, in the light of calamity analysis. Although CGE models can be exceptionally 
suitable for the analysis of impacts in terms of price-quantity adjustments, this often 
used framework should be applied with due care to the analysis of disaster 
consequences. We shall briefly address this in conjunction with disaster analysis. 
Firstly, CGE as an equilibrium-oriented model requires a system to be in balance, while 
disturbance caused by a calamity can require a substantial recovery time before a (new) 
equilibrium is found. This means that the model in its standard formulation cannot 
handle modelling such circumstances. Next, the flexibility allowed by CGE concerning 
price adjustments to quantity restrictions may not always be applicable in a calamity. 
Because a substantial part of the productive capacity is gone, the catastrophe can be 
expected to cause a great deal of imbalances or disproportions in the economy’s 
supply-demand relations. It can endorse persistent situations of shortages of some 
products as well as over-proportional supplies of others, which can substantially expand 
the duration of the recovery period for an economy. In addition, when discussing the 
concepts of disaster, damage, and resilience (Chapters 2 and 3), the sheer scale of the 
disaster becomes a separate factor in itself. Then, as we pointed out, rigidities may play 
a significant role. Sometimes the markets are not allowed to clear because of 
government interference and imposition of price ceilings, free emergency aid or 
rationing of a wide range of products. Other restrictions for working of the market 
mechanisms can be caused by the chaos in the economy immediately after a major 
calamity, unavailability and imprecision of information, lacking means of payment, et 
cetera. Also, in places where some areas are hardly reachable, and where markets can 
essentially become strongly localised and disconnected, coming back to normal is a 
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 For example, Rose Oladosu and Liao (2007) distinguish five types of disequilibrium in their modeling: 
disequilibrium in the labour market through the Keynesian Closure Rule; disequilibrium in the trade 
markets through trade imbalances; disequilibria in the government accounts through deficit spending; 
disequilibria in goods markets through shortages of critical materials; and disequilibria through price 
rigidities. 
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challenge. Rose and Guha (2004, p.137), supporting this, state the following: “the 
typical CGE model, even based on short-run (vs. long-run) substitution elasticities, is 
far too flexible and is likely to greatly understate earthquake impacts […] Deliberate 
efforts must be made to incorporate real world rigidities as well as resiliencies.” We 
may infer from this that the authors, essentially, suggest that CGE framework used for 
major shock analysis, with its underlying assumptions of substitutability and 
(instantaneous) price adjustments, exaggerates the real abilities of economic systems to 
react and adapt in the face of disturbance, which would lead to overly optimistic 
estimations of disaster impacts in general. We should add that, in our view, rigidities 
and proportions should get a more prominent role in modelling disaster aftermath in 
modern economies. 
In choosing an appropriate approach, thus, one is confronted with trade-offs 
between the extent of the complexity and flexibility that the models are able to offer in 
situations where an economy is facing an entirely new set of circumstances. Here, 
decisions have to be taken in a non-standard way in the light of suddenly restricted or 
unavailable resources and disrupted connections within a system. Therefore, in our 
inquiry of the fundamental issues underlying a disaster event, our choice of a modelling 
framework is stipulated by the questions we want to answer. Namely, in light of the 
nature of a large-scale calamity, the specificity of the shock to be analysed, and the 
methodological challenge we are facing, we suggest that the Input-Output model, as a 
basic tool for inquiry, can be a suitable candidate for a framework. We believe that it 
possesses a lot of potential, worthwhile to explore. Input-output is unique in the sense 
that, it is one of the first models of sufficient range and usability to analyse issues such 
as policy change, technological change, international trade and natural resources (see 
Rose, 1995). There are a number of advantages that we see connected to the decision to 
take input-output as a basic framework. First of all, we are attempting to gain an 
overview of an entire economic network. Second, the recognised strength of the 
framework is its simplicity and transparency, which, in combination with the covered 
interconnectedness of an economy, gives a powerful argument in its favour.  
The insight provided by the input-output is nowadays also widely used and further 
developed by researchers and planners in such countries as the US and Japan, as well as 
in developing countries, where the neutrality of its formulation is preferred (Rose, 
1995). The issue of neutrality of model formulation can be interpreted in terms of 
modelling reconstruction programmes in the calamity aftermath, and whether these 
should be regulated and steered by the government or whether market-based solutions 
are preferred for the economy to restore its equilibrium. In fact every economy consists 
of a mixture of private and public sectors, which means that not all markets can be 
cleared automatically with the help of an ‘invisible hand’. This implies that government 
interference in case of emergency may be necessary; however, the degree of this 
involvement is a major point for discussion. Whereas American scholars, from a 
country where markets are more prominent, tend to opt for market-oriented solutions 
(and where CGE models are perhaps more appropriate), European scientists, where 
governments play a more significant role in the economies, tend to pay more attention 
to regulatory approaches. In the latter case, the choice of policy formulation, as offered 
by input-output, may be considered an advantage.  
Another strength of the Input-Output model is its excellent link to the empirical 
realm; data in the form of input-output tables are regularly collected and organised: this 
is one of the richest statistical databases in many countries around the world. Input-
Output allows for the concentration on different industrial as well as regional 
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aggregation levels and the studying of various effects, from local to global. Though in 
its standard formulation using input-output cannot satisfy the needs of the new type of 
economic disaster consequence analysis, its potential means that we can stretch the 
borders beyond conventional analysis and look for alternative solutions. In fact, one of 
the input-output fundamentals, which fits our needs to describe the ‘real’ economy, is its 
connection to the physical world, which we have to reflect on, with its disruptions and 
malfunctions, before taking on the commitment to model possible recovery trajectories.  
In this respect, we propose a more general position on modelling major disruptions 
in economic networks based on the Input-Output framework. Here, a procedure is 
necessary based on the division between the immediate disaster aftermath, the recovery 
planning and the analysis of possible precautionary measures. We hope that this 
generalised approach provides a connecting bridge between the theoretical foundation 
of the model and its empirical application for disaster analysis. We suggest returning to 
input-output fundamentals, trying to give more flexibility to what basically appears a 
rather rigid framework. We shall conclude this Chapter with a short summary, and 
continue with the description of an input-output framework in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter we discussed methods and models now being used in disaster 
consequence analysis for modern economies. We were particularly interested in the 
discussion of the methodologies for the study of economic inferences connected to 
major calamities. In this Chapter, we offered a selection of authors contributing to the 
field with studies on the economic impacts of disasters on contemporary societies. We 
signalled a missing convergence in the scientific disaster community concerning 
methodological issues of disaster analysis. This may delay the development of more 
integrated methods, for which we wish to plea. 
We divided the discussion of the literature in two parts, i.e. Dutch modelling 
exercises and international expertise. The reason is that the danger of floods in the 
Netherlands as a low-lying country triggered the need to conduct broad flood damage 
assessments. Historically, much knowledge was accumulated within the scope of 
physical damage evaluation and prediction, as the field was dominated by civil 
engineering advances and expertise. However, until recently, little was known about the 
economic repercussions of a major flooding of the country. Probably the first effort to 
arrive at an integrated assessment of damage was the so-called ‘standard method’ 
(Vrisou van Eck, Kok and Vrouwenvelder, 1999; and Vrisou van Eck and Kok, 2001), 
which was recently upgraded in one of the government reports “Flood Risks in the 
Netherlands” (see MTP, 2005b). However, the method does not have a profound 
indirect loss estimation module, and it presumably involves the double counting of 
losses. Two later reports from NEI and Tebodin (Briene et al., 2003; Van den Berg et 
al., 2000) include a better description of the indirect effects of a potential flooding, 
which is estimated based on the input-output multipliers, adjusted for substitution 
effects between and within the sectors. Furthermore, Eijgenraam (2005) suggests a 
model to support economic decision-making for the problem of investing in protective 
dike improvements. Here, the author takes into account the amount of direct and 
indirect effects of potential flooding, to provide the optimal level of protection, but the 
economic damage is borrowed from HIS, which is in turn based on the standard method. 
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All these works are characterised by micro- and meso-approaches, based on the 
calculations per dike ring. 
On the meso-macro level, the team of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam (Van 
Ast, Bouma and Francois, 2004) has developed what they refer to as the risk assessment 
approach, where attention is paid to the methodological side of the problem. 
Furthermore, the work of the Twente group resulted in a number of project reports and 
publications. Van der Veen et al. (2001) instigated the discussion on the societal and 
economic effects of large-scale calamities on the national level, stressing the importance 
of a theoretically sound approach. Delft Cluster reports then followed (Van der Veen 
and Logtmeijer, 2003; Van der Veen et al., 2003a,b), explicitly focusing on indirect 
economic damage methodology and mapping of important economic activities. Later, 
the methodological developments in the disaster analysis of disruption, recovery and 
policy were continued, offering the building blocks for a three-step procedure within an 
input-output framework (Bočkarjova, Steenge and Van der Veen, 2004b). Inferences in 
the economic hotspot determination and mapping can be found in Van der Veen and 
Logtmeijer (2005). However, the debate on the approach most suited to the Dutch 
situation and flooding disasters is open and further advances are being made. 
In the international arena, the topic of a methodology dealing with economic 
disaster consequence estimation remains a continuous subject for scientific debate. The 
international and national bodies involved in disaster protection and preparedness are 
sometimes the same ones providing broad guidelines or frameworks for broad damage 
estimation, although they rarely offer a model (see, for example, MAFF, 1999; BTRE, 
2001; ECLAC, 2003; Benson and Clay, 2004). Macro-models offered by IIASA 
(Freeman et al., 2004; Mechler, 2004 and 2006; Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler and Pflug, 
2005) are much more tangible and usable. However, these mostly deal with macro-
effects and risk financing in and for developing countries, which provides a different 
focus than the one we are studying in this thesis. 
Typically, in disaster economic modelling among academic scholars, one can see 
that opinions are divided on the use of models, which often leads to the discussion of 
the Input-Output approach vs. the CGE approach. Rose and colleagues, however, use 
both frameworks and offer extensive methodological accounts. For example, Rose and 
Benavides (1998) and Rose and Liao (2005) provide an input-output analysis of a 
lifeline breakdown and its effects on the disruption of production activities. At the same 
time, Rose (1995, 2004b), and Rose and Lim (2002) provide methodological insight 
into economic disaster modelling and challenges associated with this. Furthermore, 
Rose (2004a, 2006), Rose and Liao (2005) choose to concentrate on the issue of 
economic resilience in a disaster context and its quantification with the help of CGE 
modelling. Ultimately, Rose offers a legitimate claim that essentially disaster analysis is 
different from the ‘usual’ modelling based on equilibrium and a smaller scale of 
changes. In turn, for disaster modelling, regular models need to be adjusted to particular 
major shock requirements. 
In our overview of the literature on disaster modelling we note that there is a 
whole range of authors who favour the input-output approaches as a leading modelling 
framework. Apparently, input-output models offer a rich potential for disaster analysis, 
not all of which, however, has as yet been discovered. In this Chapter we illuminated a 
number of input-output based models for disaster analysis. The approach of Cochrane 
(1997a,b and 2004) and HAZUS (FEMA, 2001) are based on manipulating an input-
output table to account for disaster losses, after which balancing takes place by 
adjusting inventories, imports, exports and existing substitution capacity within sectors 
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to take over part of the lost production. Although this is an attractive module, the 
approach seems to be less transparent and is in a sense ad-hoc, where the opportunities 
for rebalancing are determined by the user. Cole and colleagues (Cole, 1998, 2004b; 
Cole, Pantoja and Razak, 1993) offer several works based on the input-output approach 
and SAMs, presenting the possibilities for analysis, by means of what they call an event 
accounting matrix, the EAM. The EAM, an innovative element that captures the essence 
of post-disaster disorder and later recovery planning, is a concept which has not yet 
reached its definitive shape, but which is an excellent departure point for further 
research. In his later studies, (Cole, 2003, 2004a) extends his modelling to an insurance 
accounting matrix approach, introducing protection investments as a ‘buffer’ for an 
economy to be used when disaster strikes.  
Furthermore, Santos and Haimes (2004) offer the so-called inoperability input-
output model for analysing the repercussions of a terrorist attack, although they do not 
include disequilibrium modelling. Finally, Okuyama, (2004) and Okuyama, Hewings 
and Sonis (2004) provide a time-adjusted input-output based sequential interindustry 
model, the SIM. The advancement of the model into the analysis of production 
chronology and recovery planning are worth noting, but the disequilibrium stage 
remains a problem. 
After analysing the models at hand, we finally returned to the discussion of our 
goal of choosing the framework to be used, as a basis for the adjustments to achieve the 
prototype of a disaster model. Ultimately, to do so we need a novel way of looking at 
the established modelling framework. As in the literature we reviewed, the main line of 
the debate concentrated on the two major models used in the field, i.e. the I-O and CGE 
approaches. The decisive confrontation of the two frameworks made us realise that 
CGE, with its range of valuable features, such as behavioural equations and attention to 
detail in the high-level analysis, as well as a great deal of flexibility, still remains 
unsatisfactory. As noticed by a number of researchers in disaster analysis, CGE loss 
estimates are often understating real losses, because they rely on a high degree of 
substitutability. This means, that more account should be given to post-calamity 
rigidities. Also, we think it is important to model disequilibrium first, before proceeding 
with recovery and reconstruction analysis. At the same time, input-output, with its 
transparency and simplicity in reflecting the complex relationships within an economic 
network, fits better to our needs of a basic modelling framework, able to provide 
answers to fundamental questions in disaster analysis. With its range of possibilities and 
neutrality of formulation, input-output offers a promising territory to be explored and 
exploited for the requirements of gaining inference in disaster phenomenon.  
Along the way, we established the importance of the meso-level, addressed by 
input-output types of model. It focuses on the interactions at this level, and has excellent 
potential also to address disruptions in these interactions. Simultaneously, we already 
touched upon the presence of certain rigidities, both of a technological and an 
institutional nature. These rigidities show up in certain model parameter configurations 
that are less flexible than others. These, later on, will be reflected in our views on 
disaster modelling. 
In the next Chapter we shall describe input-output in its standard formulation, and 
then proceed to the construction of our adjusted approach to model disaster 
consequences in Chapter 6. We shall start with its fundamentals and provide the 
necessary extensions to the model to shape it as a disaster analysis tool. 
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Chapter 5 
Input-Output Methodology 
_______________________________________ 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
So far we have addressed conceptual issues in the field of disaster analysis. We 
introduced the topic of disasters in modern societies and their economic consequences, 
discussed the fundamental concepts frequently used in this type of analysis, and 
reviewed the literature, highlighting selected works with the focus on gaining insight 
into the processes in an economic system, which appears to be under pressure when a 
disastrous event occurs.  
In the preceding Chapters, we prepared the stage for our methodological inference 
in modelling, and, in particular, selecting and building a model for the specific needs of 
a major shock analysis. We have based our insight into the nature of disaster on the idea 
of the circular flow in an economy. A number of features distinguish our approach, 
where disequilibrium and loss of connectivity play the main part. For the analysis of 
economic disaster consequences in modern industrialised economies, we selected the 
input-output framework (see the discussion of the literature in Chapter 4) as a basic 
point of departure for constructing our own modelling instrument. The transparency of 
an input-output framework and its rich potential to disclose relationships within an 
economic network of circular flows were the central features which determined our 
choice. 
Input-output analysis is a method of systematically quantifying the 
interrelationships between the various sectors of a complex economic system based on 
the notion of technology. It is a recognised tool to reflect the circularity of flows within 
an economy, which is central to our inquiry. Operationalisation is usually in terms of 
transactions between the constituent parties, such as business enterprises, consumers or 
consumer groups, public authorities and parties or agents abroad. These transactions are 
grouped into those dealing with the basic elements of an economy, such as (types of) 
production, distribution, transportation, consumption, et cetera. The interactions are 
represented as the entries in a square or rectangular matrix. The rows of the matrix 
register the sales of each production sector to other sectors or to consumers of the final 
product. The columns tell us about the purchases of each sector from other sectors or 
from the providers of the so-called primary inputs. Each number in a row is 
simultaneously a number in a column; each output is also an input into some production 
 104
process. The double-entry bookkeeping of the input-output table reveals the fabrics of 
an economy, connected by the flows of trade, ultimately linking each sector of the 
economy to all the others. 
An input-output table is constructed from the observed data for a particular 
geographically well-defined economic area. In practise, the economic system to which it 
is applied can be as large as a national or even the global economy, or as small as the 
economy of a metropolitan area or a single enterprise. The economic activity in this area 
consists of a number of segments or producing sectors. These can be industries in the 
usual sense, i.e., sectors of an economy according to a recognised classification scheme 
(like the international Standard Industry Classification, SIC), or even much smaller 
categories. The level of detail (or, vice versa, of aggregation) can vary according to the 
opportunities that the data allow or the requirements of the goals set. Experience has 
shown that work on input-output matrices construction involves ongoing discussions on 
the basic problems of classification, definition and treatment. 
The input-output model can be used for simulating the consequences of various 
forms of economic policy. Some models involve special types of economic control or 
optimisation. Many applications involve scenario analysis, running or testing the model 
under different assumptions regarding instruments considered relevant to the policy 
issues under discussion. The instrumental approach (Tinbergen , 1952, 1956) consists of 
specifying the targets (e.g. concerning the balance of payments, sectoral or regional 
employment, and so on) and then determining how to fine-tune the set of policy 
instruments to reach the targets. This involves the complicated task of establishing the 
time path (including lags) between the introduction of the instrument and its effect on 
the target.  
After the short introduction in Chapter 3, in this Chapter, we shall provide a 
further description of the standard input-output framework. We believe that in order to 
answer the fundamental questions in disaster analysis guarding our research, we should 
start from the basic elements underlying the construction of an input-output model, 
namely, the physical side of the model, its embodied interpretation of the real world, 
and its ‘accounting’ background. This has also been Leontief’s approach to model 
economies and to provide forecasts – building his conclusions on his view of economic 
theory, yet with a eye on the real events and processes taking place in the economy 
(Bederov and Kapkov, 2003). We shall conclude this Chapter by discussing the 
restrictions and challenges of the model in the light of our intended analysis, and by 
preparing the groundwork for the construction, and in essence, the extension, of the 
basic model in the next Chapter. 
 
5.2. DESCRIPTION OF AN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: THE INPUT-OUTPUT 
MODEL 
5.2.1. Some Background 
Input-Output has a long history. Its origin dates back to the Eighteenth century French 
authors, in particular the Physiocrats, who developed an early form of an input-output 
table, the so-called Tableau économique. This Tableau was based on the concept of 
circularity, the notion suggesting that social and economic systems can be described in 
terms of an uninterrupted and interconnected flow of goods and services from producer 
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to consumer, and back. Disruptions of the circular flow means that shortages arise or 
that production will be in excess of demands, with detrimental consequences for the 
economy. Later, many authors worked on various forms of input-output theory. We can 
mention the names of Marx, Walras, Cassel, Popov, Wald, and Von Neumann. 
However, in particular the Russian-American scholar Wassily Leontief provided an 
appropriate framework for empirical applications of input-output theory. During the 
1930s he published input-output tables for the American economy, which he interpreted 
as modern Tableaux économiques. Besides being a description of the economy, the 
main purpose was to investigate the impact of shifts in final (consumer and investment) 
demand and technological change on the American economy. The focus was in 
particular on the consequences of such change on major variables such as employment, 
import-export balances, and the price level. During the 1940s and 1950s, input-output 
became the core of modern national accounting, due to the work of scholars as Stone 
(1962), and others.    
In 1953, Leontief presented a dynamic version of the basic model (Leontief, 
1953). He accomplished this by modelling investments in production capacity along 
input-output lines. This meant that a new matrix, the so-called capital matrix, was 
incorporated in the model. The ith row of this new matrix represented the sales of 
industry i to the other sectors for enlarging productive capacity. The ith column, just as 
in the input-output matrix, registered the purchases of industry i needed for its capacity 
enlargement. Leontief’s approach led to a number of developments. First of all, it 
provided a basis for multi-sectoral work in growth and development economics. 
Furthermore, it was a significant stimulus for theoretical work on the mathematical 
properties of dynamic models. It also meant a new starting point for academic and 
national accounting work on the construction of empirical capital coefficients matrices.  
Regional applications of input-output analysis date back to the early 1950s (Isard, 
1951; Chenery, 1953; Moses, 1955). Later, after substantive standardisation, extensions 
into inter- and intra-regional analysis became available, as did applications in the supra-
national field for international comparison (Polenske, 1980). Further developments of 
the input-output model included the introduction of social accounting matrices (SAMs) 
in which the social and cultural aspects of economic change were recorded (we could 
find this approach in our literature review, namely, Cole, Pantoja and Razak, 1993; 
Cole, 1995 and 2004a,b). The new United Nations’ System of National accounts (UN, 
1968) was a revision and an update of the existing system of national accounts. Initially 
there were two variants of the model: quantity and price versions. At present there is a 
large body of literature on input-output theory and application, see e.g. Kurz, 
Dietzenbacher, and Lager (1998). The mathematical foundations were substantially 
developed over the years. At present, each input-output model basically consists of two 
forms. There is the primal or real model, which gives us the relations in the real sphere. 
The dual or price model gives the price implications. Extensions are now available in 
several areas. These include: Extensions of the basic model to deal with environmental 
pollution policies; Applications of input-output techniques to the structuring of 
demographic and social data, which were at the basis of the rise of socio-demographic 
models; Application of programming methods to data processing and model 
construction and solution. 
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5.2.2. The Basic Model 
The basic unit of the table is the transaction between its constituent parties (firms, 
sectors, industries, consumers, governmental agencies, and so on). The set of 
transactions consists of two parts, intermediate and final deliveries, where all entries are 
in value (money) terms. If a delivery is intermediate, it means that it is an input in some 
(other) production process and, hence, is processed further. A delivery is final if it is 
bought without any intention of further processing. Let us consider now the 
intermediate purchases of a sector j (i.e. the sales of all sectors to this sector j). As 
mentioned, in input-output analysis a column vector is used to represent these 
purchases. The elements of this vector then register both the origin and the magnitudes 
of sector’s j inputs. If we denote the observed (monetary) value of the flow from sector i 
to sector j by the symbol zij, we get the (column) vector: 
















nj
ij
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z
z
z
M
M
1
 [5.1] 
Returning to the input-output table, the rows of the zij’s record where the 
intermediate output of each sector end up. If there is no separately distinguished final 
demand, total output (xi) can be written as: 
inijiii zzzzx ......21 ++++=  [5.2] 
The set of all linear equations expressing the balances for each commodity being 
produced or used in the course of one (static version of the model) or several periods of 
time (dynamic version) completely describes the interdependence among the sectors of 
the given economy. Sector j’s demand for inputs from the other sectors during the year 
in this way will be related to the amount of goods produced by the same sector j over 
the same period. Applying this to the n sectors we obtain the mathematical structure of 
an input-output system, see Table 5.1 below. 
The fundamental law of input-output ‘accounting’ equilibrium ensures that the 
corresponding row and columns totals of an input-output table must be equal. That is, 
the following equality should hold: 
∑∑
==
=
nj
kj
ni
ik zz
...1...1
 [5.3] 
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Table 5.1 General form of an input-output table 
 
This logically leads to another equality, stating that the sums of all columns should 
equal the sums of all rows: 
∑∑∑∑∑
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  [5.4] 
The input-output transactions matrix in absolute terms (as above) can also be 
transformed into a matrix, which entries are expressed in terms of production (or 
technical) coefficients. If we denote technical coefficients as a’s, these are obtained by 
dividing the entry in each cell in monetary terms by the total sum of the respective 
column: 
j
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 [5.5] 
A matrix, which contains aij’s as its entries is conventionally denoted as A matrix 
and has dimension (n x n). This matrix is referred to as the matrix of technical input-
output coefficients, and accordingly represents the technical structure of the whole 
economic system. Thus, production coefficients show in the essence the production 
technology visible by columns, determined by the structure of purchases of each sector, 
which are in turn used as production inputs. On the other hand, row-wise we observe the 
sales structure of each industry as the row entries reveal sales of each sector’s products 
to other sectors. The transition from the coefficient form of the transactions matrix for 
its typical element aij is simple, and can be directly derived from the equation [5.5] as  
zij = aij xj. 
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In addition to the intermediate deliveries, we distinguish sales to purchasers whose 
decisions are external (or exogenous) to the (decisions of the) industrial (i.e. producing) 
sectors - for example, households, governmental agencies and foreign trade. The 
demands of these units – and hence the size of their purchases from the industrial 
sectors – are generally the outcome of considerations outside the domain of the 
producing units. Therefore, the demand of these external units is generally referred to as 
a final demand, basically being exogenously given. Denoting by fi the final demand for 
sector’s i production, we can add it to the existing intermediary output on the right hand 
side of equation [5.2] and obtain the total or gross output for sector i: 
iinijiii fzzzzx +++++= ......21  [5.6] 
We can now substitute the zij’s for the above derived production coefficients aij’s 
in equation [5.5]. This results in an expression for the total outputs in matrix notation, 
which is the basic relation of input-output analysis: 
ifxax ij
nj
iji ∀  +  = ∑
− ...1
   
 [5.7] 
or, in the notation of Chapter 3:   
fAxx +=  [3.1] 
where x and f, respectively, stand for the vectors of total output and final demand, and 
A for the matrix of input coefficients, all in the initial situation, before the shock. We 
distinguish n industries, so A is (n x n), while x and f are (n x 1). Also, we should note 
that the final demand category is usually subdivided into several categories, such as 
domestic final demand and foreign final demand. Domestic final demand again may 
consist of vectors of household consumption (C), government expenditures (G), 
investments (I) and other elements; foreign final demand is referred to as exports (E). 
Thus, total output in an economy adds up to the well-known equation: 
iiiiiji eigczx ++++= , [5.8] 
where iiii eigc and,,  are the column elements, respectively, of private consumption, 
government expenditures, investments and exports, which are also found in Table 5.2. 
Alternatively, being engaged in a production process, each sector not only has to pay for 
the inputs it obtains from all other sectors (including itself), but also has to pay for other 
types of inputs, such as labour (W) and capital (N). Together with certain other 
categories, such as imports (M), these form the ‘value-added’ part (V) of sector j. These 
items together are known as the ‘payments’ sector or primary cost categories. 
Incorporating them into a formula for total expenditures, we obtain: 
jjjijj mnwzx +++=  [5.9] 
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where, correspondingly, jjj mnw and,  represent the row elements of the primary 
factors, respectively, wages, capital and imports. We now can express the whole system 
in the following way as appears on Table 5.2 below: 
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Table 5.2. Expanded flow input-output table 
 
So, let us elaborate some more on the formulas [3.1] and [5.7]. We can 
straightforwardly transform to have x as a function of f. We obtain: 
fA)x(I =−  [5.10] 
or, 
fAIx 1−−= )(  [5.11] 
where matrix 1AI −− )(  is usually referred to as the Leontief inverse, or the multiplier 
matrix. Denoting its elements by the symbol αij, we thus can write the equations [5.5.] 
and [5.6.] as: 
ninjijiii ffffx αααα +++++= ......2211  [5.12] 
This shows in a direct way the dependence of gross output on the fi’s. In fact, 
looking at the αij’s in this context, we notice that we have 
j
i
ij f
x
∂
∂
=α . Verbally, the 
αij’s (or multipliers) represent the amount by which gross output would change given a 
unit change in final demand. This property can be utilised to obtain a simple model: 
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∆fAI∆x 1−−= )(  [5.13] 
In general, the multipliers of the famous 1AI −− )(  Leontief inverse account for the 
total effect of the exogenous impact (which is initiated by the change in final demand as 
discussed above).53  
It is also possible to find multiplier α.j for each sector j. In a general mathematical 
formula, this sectoral multiplier can be presented as a sum of all multipliers in the 
respective column j: 
∑
=
⋅
=
n
i
ijj
1
αα   [5.14] 
This sectoral multiplier can be used to see what the first-order and second-order sectoral 
effects are of an exogenous shift in final demand. The first-order effect of changed final 
demand for the product of sector j ( j.α ) represents in this context the increase of its 
demand for inputs to increase its output by the amount of the expanded demand for its 
products. The second-order effects ( k.α ) reflect the responses of other industries (as 
well as sector j itself, and thus it incorporates both inter-industry and intra-industry 
connections) to the increased final demand of sector j. The reason is that all other 
sectors will have to produce more of their products to supply sector j with the inputs 
necessary to produce the extra goods or services needed for the increased final 
consumption. 
As an aside, first- and second-order effects as described above cannot be directly 
translated to or compared with the direct and indirect effects that we defined in Chapter 
3. The reason is that as a result of a major disturbance (such as a disaster), part of 
production capacity, alongside the part of the final demand, is gone; thus, the system 
itself has shrunk. In this sense, a direct effect would include both exogenous changes of 
lost demand and lost production capacities; indirect effects would be determined as a 
reaction to that exogenous shock within the system. Here, multiplier effects will be 
interpreted as indirect effects.  Yet, the really important question to answer is whether 
multiplier analysis is appropriate is such a situation, or that alternative ways of 
exploring system’s response should be explored. We shall come back to this issue in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
To complete the model, we will add the labour market. We recall that we already 
have paid attention to labour as a special factor of production in the beginning of this 
Chapter. One reason we mentioned is that labour market effects play an essential role in 
disaster analysis, because disturbances in this markets are a prime origin of long-term 
delays in recovery and growth. Labour also is that part of the value-added rows of an 
input-output model that probably is most directly involved in the production processes. 
It is purely technologically determined, which is somewhat different in the case of all 
                                               
53
 In the literature devoted to input-output modelling the type of multipliers just described is being 
referred to as simple multipliers. These are distinguished from total multipliers, which are found via 
elements of the Leontief inverse of a model that is closed with respect to households. In this thesis only 
simple multipliers are considered following this notation computed for the open model (Miller and Blair, 
1985, p.102). 
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other categories. Depreciation and imports have different backgrounds being a) much 
more institutionally determined, and b) being more flexible in terms of the presence of 
substitutes. The other elements of the value-added rows, such as taxes and subsidies, 
are purely exogenously determined.54 For ease of exposition we shall treat labour as the 
single primary input factor in the production function. In the standard input-output 
formulation we then have:  
xl=L  [3.2] 
where l represents the vector of direct labour input coefficients and the scalar L total 
labour income. We shall follow, as mentioned, standard input-output methodology in 
imposing that the relation between A and l is technologically determined. In addition, 
we impose that all entries are in money values. This is most useful since money value 
representations increase the direct comparability across sectors, regions or time 
intervals.55 We thus work with physical units expressed in particular monetary terms; 
see Miller and Blair (1985, Ch.2). We also need a price equation. With equilibrium 
prices p and a wage rate w, standard we have:56 
lApp w+=  [3.3] 
We already mentioned the implied income equation: 
fpxl =w  [3.4] 
We also notice that the economy described by the above equations is in perfect internal 
balance. In fact, we meet here a perfect circular flow in the sense that commodities are 
simultaneously inputs and outputs of each production process, either directly or 
indirectly. Corresponding row and column sums are equal, reflecting the equality of 
supply and demand at the sectoral level.  This also is valid for the labour equation: the 
wages that are paid by the employers is spent on goods and services as represented in 
the commodity bundle f. 
 
5.3. A DIGRESSION INTO DYNAMIC INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS  
Scenario analysis is one of the strategies to explore long-run economic behaviour, 
where the term ’long-run‘ often is taken to imply that changes in technology may be 
part of the analysis. Another aspect is provided by changes in output volume. If capacity 
                                               
54
 Imports, on the other side, form an even more complicated post of the value added part, as it includes 
goods that are produced by other types of sector. One may see imports thus as a component that reflects 
the exceeding capacity of in-home industry, as sectors have to import those inputs that are not available 
on the domestic market, or which home producers are not able to produce in the necessary amounts. 
55
 We should recall that the total national product expressed in money terms is often taken as a proxy for 
national welfare. 
56
 In the case of money values, we encounter the alternative notation e = eA + l, where each element of e 
is equal to unity, and the wage rate fixed at unity. 
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constraints may form a problem, changes in output will have to be accompanied by 
expansion of the production volume. This usually means that the economy is confronted 
with the necessity of a substantial investment in capital goods. (We should note that 
investment aimed at expansion should be distinguished from replacement investment, 
which does not increase capacity). Modelling investment, however, asks for the 
introduction of a time dimension into the model. Leontief (1953) was the first scholar to 
explore an extension of the basic form [3.1] along this line. To this end, he introduced a 
so-called capital matrix B. The element bij of this matrix stands for the amount of capital 
stock of good i necessary to produce one unit of good j.  
The introduction of the necessity to produce capital goods meant that this type of 
production, previously a part of final demand f, now had to be accounted for explicitly. 
Below, we shall first briefly refer to Leontief’s original model. Hereafter we shall, also 
briefly, discuss the Duchin-Szyld model (1985), which addresses a number of 
shortcomings of Leontief’s original model. Leontief started with a closed form, given 
below. That is, there is no separate entry yet for exogenous final demand.57 We have, 
for a single time period:   
)( 1 tttt xxBxAx −+= +  [5.15] 
or,  
)(][ 11 ttt xxBAIx −−= +−  [5.16]  
where we immediately recognize that [5.16] is an extension of [5.11]. Solving for 1+tx , 
we find that future paths can be expressed in terms of properties of matrices A and B, 
their interaction, and the initial position of the economy. We also see that this model 
offers a most interesting approach to the stock-flow discussion presented earlier. Part of 
the total production tx  is flow, and is used up during one period. Another part of 
production (B) crystallises into stock magnitude and adds to capacity. The model offers 
a consistent way of dealing with these two dimensions. 
The above model, however, has a number of shortcomings in terms of stability 
issues. These are caused to a large extent by the specifics of the accelerator part (such as 
a requirement to re-invest all capital goods without sufficient flexibility to react to 
changed external circumstances (Leontief, 1953; Brody, 1970; Tsukui and Murakami, 
1970; Jorgenson, 1998; and Steenge and Thissen, 2005). To overcome such limitations, 
(Duchin and Szyld, 1985) proposed an alternative dynamic model. Their model requires 
an additional variable, i.e. explicitly focusing on a sector’s available productive 
capacity. In the model a sector invests in expanding its capital stock if and only both its 
output is growing and its capacity is fully utilized; if either condition is not met, 
expansion investment will not take place. So, the production of goods for investment 
purposes depends not only upon final demand but also the sectoral rates of capacity 
utilization. The model also allows for changes over time in the coefficients matrices, as 
indicated by the subscript t. The simplest version of this model, assuming a one-year 
time lag for all capital goods, can be written as: 
                                               
57
 We should remark that the mathematical properties of the closed dynamic model closely resemble those 
of the open model, see Brody, 1970.  
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tttttt foBxAx ++= ++ 11  [5.17] 
or 
ttttt foBxA-I =− ++ 11)(  [5.18] 
with  
];0[max 11 ttt cco * −= ++  [5.19] 
with 
11 ++ += ttt oc  c  [5.20] 
Here (dropping the time subscript): A, B, x, and f are as defined before, c stands 
for capacity, and o for desired addition to capacity. The vector *c 1+t , the desired capacity 
for period (t+1), is separately projected as a moving average of recent past rates of 
growth of output. The initial conditions include values for the vector c at t=0, and for 
the vectors c* and o at t=1. The full model includes additional equations representing 
factor inputs and a price equation, also with time-specific coefficients matrices. We 
again recognize, after rewriting, the basic form [5.11] in [5.18].  
The dynamic model described by the equations [5.18]-[5.20] and the 
corresponding price model (not discussed here) can be used to analyse scenarios based 
on alternative assumptions about the exogenous variables such as f, the technical 
coefficients, the rates of capacity utilization, and the interest rate (as modeled in the 
price equation). The model can be employed to calculate outputs and prices on a yearly 
basis, where changes in output will define investment at the sectoral level.   
Brody (1970) offers an interesting link between the flow dimension of the A 
matrix and the stock dimension of the B matrix. To that end, we define parameters tij 
where:  
ijijij tab =  [5.21] 
where i and j stand for, respectively, selling and receiving sectors. That is, capital 
investment stands in a technologically determined relation to the flow outputs as 
registered in matrix A. We may think here of depreciation allowances which, in this 
form, determine so-called ‘turnover time’. For us is relevant that this link allows a direct 
interpretation of the growth parameters in terms of the circular flow characterisation of 
the input-output model we discussed earlier.   
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5.4. CHALLENGES AND LONG-RUN ASPECTS 
Returning to what we outlined in the previous Chapters, disasters cause problems 
throughout the entire economic system, where the disturbed elements of the system 
trigger a separate chain of events, interconnected with other causal chains induced by 
subsequent actions and reactions. The input-output model has a number of limitations 
and challenges, which come to the fore in the analysis of disaster consequences. For 
example, in disaster analysis, changes in pre-disaster production levels will, through the 
fixed coefficients assumption, translate directly into a change in the sectoral demands 
for labour. A shift in these will translate into a shift in final demand, and so on. 
Subsequently, multiplier effects will enter with consequences felt throughout the 
economy. Clearly, without additional information it is problematic to analyse in which 
way the pre-disaster balanced economy will change. The main reason is the exceptional 
nature of the events studied. Input-output proportions established under ‘normal’ 
conditions in equilibrium will change, but in which way is difficult to anticipate, in 
particular because of the multitude of interacting multiplier effects; (small) shifts in 
intertemporal behaviour of economic agents in the immediate post-disaster period may 
completely upset traditionally expected patterns of outcomes. It is clear that further 
assumptions or, probably, hypotheses are required if we want to pursue our modelling 
effort along these lines. Below, we shall outline a number of input-output restrictions 
for disaster analysis in this Section. Let us recall the standard formulas in the previous 
Section, in particular:  
∆fAI∆x 1−−= )( . [5.13] 
which describes the relation between changes in input requirements, and changes in 
final demand stand. Very often, the analysis of changes in policy or economic structure 
begins from the model formulation like [5.11], where coefficients or multipliers are 
present. We noted in the previous Sections that final demand categories are viewed as 
being determined exogenously. The above formula thus allows us to assess the effect on 
the economy of a change in f. For example, we may study the effect of a change in the 
investment level due to a switch in spending, as a consequence of a natural disaster. 
Such changes in investments now are translated via the respective Leontief inverse 
1)( −− AI  into changes in outputs of the industrial sectors in the region. It is important to 
bear in mind here that the term ‘impact’ or step-wise analysis is used when the 
exogenous change is caused by one ’impacting agent’ (or a small number of such 
agents) and when the changes are expected to occur in the relatively short run (e.g. next 
period). This means that such an analysis suits well for a relatively simple small-scale, 
short-term economic shock examination when production coefficients are supposed 
(and assumed) to stay unchanged.  
Once we attempt to introduce a vast, large-scale heterogeneous shock, a number of 
basic input-output modelling assumptions may become questionable. The scale of the 
disaster plays the key role in determining the shape of the model. This is an aspect that 
seems to be less covered in the literature, in the sense that size usually is not treated as a 
separate factor. In concreto we may think here of small island economies being hit by a 
devastating hurricane, but also of devastating floods such as experienced by a heavily 
industrialized country like the Netherlands in 1953. In disaster research, this would 
mean that ‘equilibrium’ for a period of time has to be replaced by ‘disequilibrium’ and 
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‘connection by ‘disconnection’. Noteworthy is also that consequences of a large-scale 
event cannot be seen as a sum of consequences produced by a number of minor 
events58. As we discussed in Chapter 2, such a major calamity places the functioning of 
the whole economic system under pressure, while minor events have only marginal 
impacts. Soon it becomes clear that standard input-output exercises can no longer 
support such large-scale shock analysis. This stems, firstly, from the presence of 
rigidities triggering persistent disequilibrium on the markets in the face of disaster (see 
the discussion in Chapter 3); secondly, from the complexity of the economic 
consequence scenario(s); thirdly, from the time range while the economy is under 
effect; and fourthly, from the need for efficient resource reallocation in disaster 
aftermath.  
As noted in the discussion around the choice of model in the previous Chapter, 
disequilibrium and loss of connections within an economic system after a calamity are a 
common problem for disaster modelling. However, they are difficult to cope with 
conventional modelling tools, as normally models are based on balancing principles. A 
disaster, resulting in the breakage of existing ties within an economy and pushing it out 
of the established equilibrium for a significant period of time, is the first challenge we 
have to deal with in the construction of our own model. This implies that we have to 
think in novel ways about the current notions of equilibrium and disequilibrium. This 
raises the fundamental question on how to define and/or interpret an input-output 
model, which could perform sectoral studies of an economy under ‘extreme 
circumstances’. 
Next, there is the issue of the nature of the shock. Essentially, by the very 
definition of disaster (see Chapter 2), the shock is too substantial, and significantly 
outweighs the shocks modelled in other cases. Such a disturbance in a complex modern 
economy would cause a chain reaction, and most probably, undermine the assumed 
stability of the established flows, while in the studies of economy-wide effects of 
relatively minor impulses, it is assumed that the economic system under examination is 
robust, i.e. the basic structure stays stable. Heterogeneity of a shock will inevitably lead 
to the emergence of disproportions within the system, which will have to be 
’addressed’. The second challenge in our modelling is to deal with the emerging 
disequilibrium and look for new proportions within the system that would make it work 
again.  
Besides, when long-term effects and broader changes are examined within an 
economy following a severe adverse shock, we are basically dealing with projections 
and forecasting of an event with unknown consequences. Here we face a serious 
problem. As the period of projection increases in time (for example, modelling the 
longer term effects on a development trajectory) and the number of assumptions 
increases, the accuracy of a projection exercise tends to decrease. This is a consequence 
of a diminishing ability to accurately forecast the new final demands (i.e. the elements 
of f), and of changes in production structure (in fact, the elements of A). In the normal 
situation, a firm can sell part of its product to other manufacturers and part of it to final 
users. The relative proportions between these parts are the resultant of many factors, 
which, apart from economic ones, include political, sociological and historical elements. 
At the same time, a firm buys its inputs in specific proportions from other 
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 This statement was one of the conclusions of a three-day workshop on methodology on damage 
estimation held in 2003 in Delft, the Netherlands. For further reference, see Van der Veen, Vetere 
Arellano and Nordvik (2003, pp289-290). 
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manufacturers and employs the necessary amount of the primary inputs. The 
catastrophe, by its very nature, will destroy part of this economy-wide network. It is not 
obvious a-priori, what will happen if a firm is confronted with the fact that some (or 
most) of its customers or suppliers are lost, on a temporary basis, or perhaps forever. At 
the same time, new players can arrive or unexpected markets can emerge, possibly 
signalling new opportunities. At the national or sub-national level it is almost 
impossible to predict what will happen because issues are embedded in a much wider 
setting. Disasters, as one-time events, are very difficult, often even impossible to 
predict, and thereby assess the changes that they impose upon an economic system, as 
well as its pattern of reaction and recovery. Clearly, post-disaster economic policy needs 
to steer the distribution of the available goods in appropriate ways between various 
categories of buyers and suppliers. For instance, a policy choice in favour of relieving 
shortages in final demand may alleviate problems of the targeted groups, but at the same 
time may increase inter-industry imbalances. This shows that choices are not 
straightforward, and involve complex interrelations and interactions.  
The needs for clearly defined goals and well-communicated policy in the early 
disaster aftermath are triggered by the existence (and, in fact, strengthening) of the 
rigidities, which we discussed in Chapter 3. What these point at, is that an economic 
system under stress is severely damaged, the network of circular flow is disturbed, and 
little is known of what will happen next. It is due to the uncertainty that the markets are 
slow and have difficulty to find their clearance point. Looking for ways to find suitable 
policy directions forms the third challenge for our modelling exercise. The outlined 
challenges require us to take a different approach to fulfil the modelling needs of 
disaster analysis. We can conclude the following: to address the first challenge, the 
modelling of a disequilibrium situation, we need to find a way to account for the assets 
left after the outbreak of a calamity, while relaxing the balance assumption.  
The last challenge can be addressed by scenario analysis, often a formalised 
version of so-called ‘what if’ inferences. These have become an essential part of 
business decision-making, and are currently widely used in areas such as asset-liability 
and corporate risk management, and research and development over medium- and long-
term time frames (see Harris and Schwartz, 2002). This technique appears to be most 
suitable for studying events with a low frequency of occurrence, which nevertheless 
result in substantial, even irreversible, consequences (such as climate change, the 
depletion of fossil energy resources, pandemics or ageing), or for the analysis of large-
scale policies with major impact (like controlled emissions of CO2, policies aimed at 
sustainable development, economic integration and trade). New visions are suggested, 
among others, on scenario analysis done in various fields, for example CPB (2006), 
Duchin et al. (2002), Swart, Raskin and Robinson (2004), Van Genugten, Heijnen and 
Jager (2002). Although scenario analysis is often used in disaster (economic) analyses, 
it is sometimes not yet recognised as a formal tool. Here, the abundance of assumptions 
in cases where data are scarce and often incomplete, and where analysis is complicated 
by the presence of too many unknowns, often can be replaced by the analysis and 
comparison of various disaster situations under various circumstances. This way, policy 
analysis will not result in a straightforward answer; rather, scenario analysis offers 
distinct borders within which outcomes can be deemed reliable. The formulation and 
analysis of alternative scenarios incorporating documented, exogenous assumptions 
bound by internal consistency is a promising approach to shed light on feasible options 
for policy and action. Projections about changes in production coefficients, the pattern 
of demand as well as resource relocations (and, also, the impossibility thereof) during 
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the disaster aftermath and recovery can be featured in various combinations, tracing 
their impacts throughout the economy. Simulating various situations and events can 
reveal important impacts and help identify those ‘bottlenecks’, which can be avoided if 
policy measures are taken. Formulating scenarios may help illustrate the merits and 
potential of disaster analysis, in particular in the input-output setting, employing the 
structure and insight of the latter into the complex issues at various levels, from global 
to local, which input-output has to offer. Essentially, input-output with its strong 
technology tie can be well complimented by scenario approach. Scenario analysis offers 
more controlled flexibility without undermining the integrity and transparency of the 
basic model, while at the same time broadening its possibilities. Scenarios are also a 
prominent tool to structure our thinking on the identification and formulation of credible 
research questions and hypotheses, which are just as meaningful and ingenious. 
Particularly in the form of so-called turnpike trajectories (see Dorfman, Samuelson and 
Solow, 1958), optimal paths have been studied in the context of growth and 
development questions. Turnpikes describe the path an economy should ideally follow, 
given a clear objective (that is: the economic decision makers should know where they 
wish to be going), and given transparency of the constraints, see especially Tsukui and 
Murakami (1979). Also, for exploring further the role of scenarios within input-output 
context, dynamic input-output can be made use of; like the version described in Section 
5.3. 
 
5.5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter, we recapitulated the basic constructions behind the standard input-
output framework. Based on the input-output table, where the transactions between 
various actors on the economic scene are recorded, both on the production and 
consumption part, an input-output model can be formulated as expressing the 
dependence of the total output of goods on the final demand for these goods. The main 
line of thinking is that any increases or decreases in final consumption would cause 
ripple (multiplier) effects throughout all the sectors of production, in reaction to changes 
in demand. This is what is referred to as demand-driven model, where the multipliers 
matrix is referred to as the Leontief inverse.  
The main findings of this Chapter are on the implications of model constructions 
for disaster modelling. We showed that there are a number of features in a basic input-
output model, which are most important for our intended analysis. Essentially, the 
question is how far we can use the merits of input-output framework in economic 
disaster analysis and where adjustments are necessary to capture the reflection of a 
disaster phenomenon. We formulated a number of challenges to be addressed and 
overcome in our modelling Chapter, i.e. the reflection of disequilibrium; the emergence 
of disproportions; the choice of policy goal in the post-disaster modelling in the view of 
post-disaster rigidities. We suggest that the input-output approach can be supplemented 
by scenario analysis, opening a wide field of opportunities and hypothesis formulation 
for the situations where outcomes are unknown. With the established methodological 
background, we shall continue with the core of our investigation in the next Chapter, i.e. 
model building for the analysis of disaster consequences, recovery options and policy 
measures.  
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Appendix 5A  
Input-Output and Geography  
_______________________________________ 
 
5A.1. Compilation of Input-Output Tables 
Input-output tables are compiled in many countries around the globe. They are built by 
official statistical offices, specialised official or semi-official institutions such as 
national banks or universities, private companies or individual researchers. There exist 
several methods to build input-output tables, which all share a number of characteristics. 
There is a close connection to System of National Accounts, which guarantees internal 
consistency of the tables and consistency with the national totals on the macro level, 
such as gross or net national income or product. International organisations such as UN, 
OECD or Eurostat have played an important role in issuing guidelines for the national 
accounts. In 1968, the United Nations issued guidelines for a new overall framework, 
which still forms the basis for today’s system. This new system integrated the 
production data in two matrices, the make matrix and the use matrix. 
Several stages can be distinguished in the building process, where each of them 
requires specialised expert knowledge. The first stage consists of organising the data 
sources such as on individual firms, investments, wages, consumer behaviour, import 
and export. These data are incorporated into specific formats that provide the building 
blocks for the tables. The make-use system makes an explicit distinction between 
commodities and industries. The use matrix has a dimension (c x i), while the make 
matrix has a dimension (i x c). Thus, the make-use framework often is rectangular, 
distinguishing more commodities than industries. A big advantage of it is that industries 
characterised by multiple production now can be easily accommodated without a-priori 
dealing with complex allocation problems. A drawback is that the economic modeller 
now faces the task to build an input-output table on the basis of two matrices. Various 
methods have been developed to do this. Well-known are the methods based on the so-
called commodity technology assumption and the industry technology assumption. 
They generate tables of dimensions (c x c) and (i x i), respectively. If one opts for an (c 
x c) table (as we do), the technological interconnections are stressed, while opting for an 
(i x i) table stresses the institutional aspects.  
After the data have been incorporated in the make-use framework, the stage of 
balancing or integration begins. That is, the corresponding totals in the make and use 
tables must be corrected to give the same row or column totals. This is a labour-
intensive stage, because many sources of error, such as incorrect data or classifications, 
or complex ‘border cases’ must be addressed. A separate issue forms deciding on 
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appropriate definitions of commodities and industries. Both (c x c) and (i x i) methods 
have their own merits. Most important is that they are internally consistent, and 
consistent with the broader system of national accounts. 
In fact, as we mentioned above, input-output tables are compiled based on the very 
detailed data of individual economic agents, such as enterprises and households, which 
are then aggregated to the desired level (regional, national or even global). Due to this 
aggregation, in fact, the inherent geographical component of input-output tables 
becomes to some extent latent. Yet, in economic modelling, we are often faced with 
decisions and actions that have explicit geographical dimension. Current technological 
developments in the field of earth observation offer a solution to this issue. By means of 
so-called geographic information systems (GIS), the link with the real spatial format can 
be recovered, and geographically-related features may be brought into the up to now 
‘spaceless’ models. The routes of input-output tables in the micro-level data provide an 
excellent basis for infusing more geography into this modelling framework. We shall 
provide a short description of the GIS below. 
 
5A.2. Geographic Information Systems 
Recently, the so-called geographic information systems are gaining more prominence in 
various research fields, expanding the possibilities of models and methods by installing 
the link between the abstract theoretical world of models and real-life geographical 
component, which was not there before. We shall briefly introduce the geographic 
information systems, and reflect upon the opportunities it opens for achieving our 
modelling aims. 
A geographic information system is a computer-based system that enables 
capturing, storing, analysing and displaying various sorts of geo-referenced information, 
i.e., data that is identified according to its location (i.e., latitude, longitude, and perhaps 
elevation). Data capture is in fact identification of objects on the map, their absolute 
location on the surface and spatial relationships. The analysis part consists of the 
possibility to lay links and combine information via the geographical attribute. GIS thus 
enables integrating mapped variables, construction and analysis of new variables. GIS is 
also able to analyse spatial relationships and determine the adjacency between the 
objects (what is next to what), containment (what is enclosed by what) and proximity 
(how close or far is something to something else). Mapping data within GIS involves in 
fact a complex conversion of data from the satellite images into digital data that should 
be able to reproduce maps. Displaying data requires the ability to locate (analysed) 
thematic data back to a map. GIS technology is in fact enhancing the efficiency and 
analytical power of traditional cartography. Wall maps, interactive maps, animations 
and other graphical products that can be generated within GIS allow better visualisation, 
thus heightening the ability to extract and analyse information. Images retrieved from 
GIS are also a more effective tool for the communication of results, often conveying 
technicalities in a comprehensive manner also to non-scientists. GIS technology is 
therefore becoming an essential tool in the effort to gain more insight into various 
processes and events provided its capacity to explicitly include spatial dimension.  
In the GIS environment, it is possible, pointing at some location on a map (or 
screen), to retrieve information about it from offscreen files containing layers of 
attribute information. Each layer represents a particular theme or feature of the map. 
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Such systems may, for example, include information on such attributes as topographic 
features (like elevation, slope and orientation, et cetera), demographic attributes (age, 
gender, education level, et cetera), economic attributes (like type of economic activity 
by sector, number of production facilities per sector, number of employees, value added, 
et cetera), as well as others. This means that with a GIS one can link thematic attributes 
to location data, such as people to addresses and buildings to streets. Using ‘intelligent’ 
digital maps, one can then layer thematic information on top of one another to obtain 
better understanding of how complex reality works altogether within the same 
geographic area. Each layer, in fact, can be switched on or off, which is controlled by 
the end user of GIS. One chooses, which layers to combine based on the questions one 
needs to answer (US Environmental Systems research Institute, ESRI, 2002). For 
example, GIS can be utilised in numerous fields, such as agriculture for spatial analyses 
of agronomic data; in banking and commerce for gaining insight into sales, inventories, 
product logistics, customers’ profiles, purchasing habits, financial behaviour, and needs 
for additional products or services; in utility sector for modelling electrical, gas or water 
supply systems; in health care for the studies of epidemiology and mapping health care 
system; in insurance for risk visualisation, analysis and distribution; in transportation 
for infrastructure management, fleet, logistics and transit management; and many more. 
GIS also opens new possibilities in study and academic research: most of the problems 
facing the world toady, either of environmental, economic, political or social nature, 
exist in geographic context. GIS technology is therefore able to meet the most topical 
needs for the analysis of issues on today’s research agenda, and will undoubtedly 
become one of the most demanded research tools in academic circles. 
Being not an end in itself, a geographic information system is rather a means to 
integrate a variety of information and applications with a geographic component and 
create a single manageable system capable of reflecting the multi-layered reality. For 
example, we may first locate production facilities within a zip-code or a region, and 
then link each of them to the number of employees, output, or profits for the purposes of 
evaluating their importance in regional or national economy. Another example is the 
field of risk and emergency management, where GIS is already widely used as one of 
the critical tools of research. Here, for instance, response time of fire and rescue squads, 
victim evacuation or traffic congestion can be analysed, making an overlay of the 
location of residential and industrial areas, road system and the information containing 
road capacity. Combining all these data, it would be possible to pinpoint the exact 
locations of bottlenecks for rescue squads or evacuation streams, and seek for better 
solutions. Evidently, the backbone of GIS is good data; inaccurate data can result in 
inaccurate models and maps, skewing the outcomes of analyses and ultimately resulting 
in poor decisions. A number of institutes and research centres worldwide are putting 
effort into the advancement, collection, capture and processing of data. Among many, 
ESRI, USGS in the US; SPINLab (VU University of Amsterdam), Geolab (Technical 
University of Delft),59 and Geodan consultancy in the Netherlands can be mentioned.  
Summing up, the power of GIS is the ability to relate different information in a 
spatial context. GIS can be used, inter alia, for scientific investigations, resource 
management and development planning. Because this technology allows combining 
geo-referenced data from different sources, at a scale that was not possible before, it can 
                                               
59
  TU Delft has launched the Gomatics master programme in 2005, specialising in the combination of the 
science and thetechnology of three-dimensional measurement, visualisation and analysis of geo-
information. 
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reveal important new information and thus can improve the factual base used for 
decision-making. An active and broad market for GIS technology and its application 
nowadays facilitates the lowering of costs connected to data acquiring and processing. 
In addition, continual improvements in GIS hardware, software and data, are expected 
to lead to an even wider span of application of the technology throughout government, 
science, business and industry.  
GIS has excellent development and application potential for future research and 
practice, as new insights that can be gained within GIS environment, are providing the 
explicit link with the geography component that was often missing so far. Following US 
Geological Survey institute (USGS, 2006), environmental studies, geography, geology, 
planning, business marketing, social sciences and other disciplines will keep on 
benefiting from GIS tools and methods. Together with cartography, remote sensing, 
global positioning systems and geography, the GIS is evolving into a discipline with its 
own research base known as geographic information sciences. 
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Chapter 6 
Input Output Modelling of Big Disasters: the 
Proposed Approach 
______________________________________ 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 60 
In this chapter we shall focus on mathematical modelling of disruptions in the economic 
structure in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster. Thinking about large-scale 
disruptions is central in this Chapter. Input-Output, as the chosen framework, will act as 
a guide in our inquiry.  
The basic structure is again provided by a visualisation of an economy as a 
complex circular flow system with numerous interrelations between producers and 
consumers. Under the usual (pre-catastrophe) circumstances, it can be described in 
terms of a fine-tuned network of supply-demand relations, which determine quantities 
bought and sold. The disaster causes a sudden breakdown in this network; part of the 
system becomes dysfunctional, and the surviving parts need to adjust to the new 
circumstances.  
We shall start with a number of observations on the principles and backgrounds of 
disaster modelling in the input-output framework. An integrative model for disaster 
economic analysis will be introduced, accompanied by a numerical example. We shall 
put forth the building blocks focusing on the immediate post-disaster situation in terms 
of system imbalances and disproportions. Hereafter we shall discuss the recovery stage, 
followed by elements of a cost-benefit analysis of potential prevention policies. We 
should point out again that this is not a fully-fledged model yet. However, it will 
provide the methodological core of a new approach with ample development potential.  
                                               
60
 This Chapter is largely based on earlier studies of ours on the consequences of a hypothetical big flood 
in the densely populated and heavily industrialised Western part of the Netherlands (Bočkarjova et al., 
2004a,b; see also van der Veen and Logtmeijer, 2005), as well as the article by Steenge and Bočkarjova 
(2007). These studies in particular made us realize the crucial role of rigidities in thinking about large-
scale disasters.  
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6.2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM  
As we know, input-output modellers interpret a circular flow in a special way, which 
requires some words at this stage. To this end, we would like to refer to Figure 3.2. The 
model’s basic form, the standard, open input-output model, distinguishes two categories 
of destinations for commodities, i.e. intermediate demand by industries and final 
consumption. These two categories form the point of departure for our disaster analysis. 
Intermediate demand reflects the needs of each industry for products from other 
industries. Final demand consists of categories such as households’ consumption, 
business and government investments, exports and inventories. Correspondingly, also 
two categories of inputs are distinguished, intermediate and primary inputs. 
Intermediate and primary inputs taken together for a specific industry are interpreted as 
production functions. Primary inputs include expenditures on the so-called input factors 
like labour, depreciation, imports, and, to a certain extent, taxes and subsidies.   
We shall pay particular attention to one of the primary input categories, labour. 
Labour occupies a special place in disaster analysis, because it is different from the 
other input categories. For example, residential areas may be more severely affected –
with many victims- than the industrial or service quarters. Economically, this would 
mean that firms lose part of their markets, with many consequences. This also means 
that if the stricken quarters harbour a substantial part of the work force, required 
primary inputs are momentarily unavailable. Even if production facilities remain intact, 
this situation causes a mismatch between the unavailable primary production factor 
(labour) and the intermediate inputs. Vice versa, it also may be possible that the 
workers have withstood the shock relatively unharmed, while their work places are 
heavily affected. In that case, there is another sort of mismatch between the inputs: 
labour is sufficiently available, but it cannot be employed because of the displaced 
production facilities. At the same time, we may observe imbalances between the two 
demand destinations. As in the last case, while final demand is still in place (because 
people would survive and thus need to satisfy their demands), intermediate inputs are 
not available to produce the required goods and satisfy this demand. Unless spare 
labour is employed elsewhere in the economy, it will remain idle, or decide to move to 
the area where labour market offers more employment opportunities.  
In any case, we shall employ the fact that labour has properties, which make it 
different than the standard production facilities. In addition, there is another issue that 
we will address. Safeguarding full employment is one of the most important policy 
goals in modern economies. We shall address the question what this mans in terns of 
model choice when we are discussing the rigidities that we want to account for in our 
modelling effort.  
Because disasters by their very nature are complex events, we suggest a split into a 
number of stages. In fact, we propose to distinguish three steps. First of all, 
understanding the disequilibrium emerging in the immediate disaster aftermath is a 
‘must’. Although it seems like a justified step following from disaster logics, many 
conventional economic models fall short in depicting disequilibrium, as mostly they are 
based on balances and marginal shocks. Our modelling effort concentrates on the 
mismatch between intermediate and final demand categories in the disaster aftermath. 
Next, it is important to realise that an economy is not always able to achieve a 
new equilibrium position ’on its own‘ within reasonable time, given the scale of the 
shock that we are considering. A most recent example provides New Orleans 
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recovering after hurricane Katrina. One year after the disaster, the Brooking Institute 
refers to the situation in the area as ‘stagnant’ in both public and private spheres (Liu, 
Mabanta and Fellowes, 2006) and ‘making a slow comeback’ (Liu, 2006). Further, an 
uncertainty in terms of market behaviour is described (Liu, Fellowes and Mabanta 
2006, p.13). 
“To be fair, one year is not much time to turn around a city devastated by such 
storm. But, one year can be a long-time for the market […]. In short, much work 
is needed […] to boost market confidence in New Orleans and move the region’s 
economy affirmatively forward.”  
Moreover, the conditions in which the disaster may unfold can vary greatly, 
which means that there is actually no single recipe for recovery. It becomes clear that 
modelling disaster consequences implies a significant need for data about economic 
agent behaviour, the precise circumstances and the processes present in the disrupted 
system after a shock. Besides detailed data and information systems, ‘understanding’ 
and ‘analysis’ (see Petak, 2006) are especially asked for in disaster management. This 
already seems to suggest that multiple recovery paths should be analysed under various 
conditions and circumstances. This is also essential for policy-making in steering the 
economic recovery back to a situation of equilibrium.   
Knowing the options and possibilities in advance for an economy to recover 
should facilitate the structure of reconstruction and recovery in the disaster aftermath 
when decisions have to be taken fast and efficiently. Yet, the time pressure and public 
expectation that are experienced by officials together with limited information in 
calamity aftermath make decision-making extremely difficult. This means, that 
knowledge about vulnerability of an economy to large-scale shocks, its resilience 
potential to get back on track and the desirable recovery options, have to be prepared in 
advance.  
To provide a solution to the issues mentioned above, ex ante scenario analysis is 
indispensable. The formulation of scenarios with respective hypothesis and 
assumptions underlying each of them is one of the ways to address high uncertainty.  
Choices in favour of one aspect of recovery may restrict the possibilities elsewhere due 
to the limited availability of resources. In input-output terminology, stimulation of final 
demand consumption with all means may alleviate temporary needs, while this may 
imply a crowding out of domestic industry in the long run due to imports substitution 
(we touched upon this in Section 3.2.4). In the current study, we shall outline the 
possibilities for modelling a return to equilibrium, as well as the need to concentrate on 
a specific option, such as restoring the pre-disaster situation. In many respects, 
analysing the return to pre-catastrophe balances and proportions can be seen as a 
threshold for damage estimation. That is, this comparison can show where the economy 
could have been, had the disaster not happened. 
Finally, for the country to be prepared for a potential hazard, precautionary 
measures should be considered. We discuss this as the third stage in our modelling 
effort. Weighing economic costs to be made to implement a particular mitigation 
measure against the benefits to be gained in the future (often in the context of disaster 
preparedness) should underlie policy decisions where such analysis is appropriate. Here 
we also refer to the issue of expressing losses in monetary terms, which may well be 
applied to industrial loss, but is a much more intricate issue in cases of assessing human 
life or psychological damage. We shall attempt to gain insight into the economic 
performance of a society, concentrating on production capacity and the loss thereof. 
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Before proceeding, we would first will clarify a number of assumptions behind our 
approach. 
 
6.2.1. Assumptions 
Our approach in this Chapter will have a definite geographical basis. To include this 
aspect, we shall, for the moment, introduce some specific assumptions (which may be 
relaxed in later work). 
We shall assume, first, that all economic capacity is embodied only in the 
productive elements comprising the economic system. That is, in the activities involved 
in the production of goods and services, employing both labour and capital, and 
producing value-added. Often the concepts underpinning economic theory are neither 
tangible, nor directly measurable; terms like welfare or utility are good examples here. 
Featuring such concepts in quantitative models may bring in an unwanted degree of 
obscurity, and require ‘indirect’ operationalisation by means of proxies. Here, thus, we 
shall only deal with ‘tangible’ categories of productive activities. Input-output analysis 
addresses these activities traditionally in terms of so-called sectors or industries. A 
sector normally consists of a substantial number of ‘similar’ production establishments. 
Essentially, input-output modelling presumes that all firms within an industry have 
approximately the same production function, the industry production function. In 
practice, this function is some appropriate average of numerous individual (firm) 
production functions. To obtain the individual firm functions, one thus has to go back to 
the original data underlying an input-output table. Following this road means that it is 
data availability that ultimately determines the level of precision. (An appropriate 
definition that recognises the possible aggregation biases involved in defining a ‘sector’ 
may replace the present one in later work.) 
Second, we assume for the moment that individual plants are either completely 
gone or completely undamaged in the disaster aftermath. The simplified discreet 
division between either entirely lost or completely undamaged facilities in our case is a 
simplification, of course. In the real world, there exist many in-between options, like 
partly damaged buildings with various degrees of severity. This is the usual outcome of, 
for example, earthquakes or floods, when closer enquiries reveal a great number of 
partially destroyed buildings with detected deficiencies in construction as a result of 
ground motion or humidity. Detailed examinations and surveys then are necessary to 
bring real damages up to the surface and are important for direct loss estimations. 
Within the scope of our thesis, we shall also assume that direct loss estimation requires 
a ‘mere’ measurement,61 and is available to modellers to provide more inference into the 
indirect repercussions of direct losses throughout an economic network. This means that 
at this moment, we shall simply assume that the post-catastrophe economy consists of 
two parts, i.e. a part that has remained undamaged and is in principle able to continue 
production activities (unless restricted by inputs missing from the ‘lost’ areas), and a 
stricken part that is completely lost in terms of production capacity, temporarily or 
forever. A consequence of the second assumption is that if a sector or industry looses 
100γi percent of its capacity, it looses also 100γi percent of its employment 
                                               
61
 We have outlined the difference between measurement and inference in Chapter 3. 
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opportunities. We shall relax this assumption in Section 6.6, where we shall allow 
labour to decrease independently of sectoral capacity disturbance factors. 
Third, and perhaps most drastic, we assume that an undamaged production facility 
still has access to all its pre-disaster workers. This assumption avoids a further array of 
complex and interrelated effects. For example, if the factories would have survived 
without their work force, this would induce, on the one hand, extra demand for labour, 
and we would have to discuss transfer, re-schooling and re-training issues. On the other 
hand, production establishments without employees would be forced to stand still, 
which implies extra losses till the time labour has been re-supplied. At this stage, we 
decided to abstain from these issues. This allows us to focus exclusively on one 
particular type of mismatch, i.e. the mismatch between the ‘surviving’ establishments’ 
production capacities and households’ demand for consumption goods, i.e. the final 
demand categories. This choice also is motivated by what we conceive of as ‘rigidities’ 
in the modern, highly industrialized types of economies. The next paragraph will go into 
this.  
Fourth, experience has taught us that multiple rigidities exist in modern 
economies. In our contribution, we have considered rigidities in Chapter 3, thereby 
referring to conditions that prevent discrepancies of supply or demand to be solved 
relatively quickly by the market forces. One possibility may be the presence of 
inelasticities in the supply and demand factors. In our case, also the sheer size of the 
catastrophe, in combination with the low frequency of its occurrence, may provide 
another explanation. In particular, in a post-disaster situation, when the economy is out 
of equilibrium, rigidities will manifest themselves even more fierce. Time in itself also 
may be a cause of rigidities. Time is be necessary to restore broken economic links in 
case new suppliers, customers or markets are to be found; or time needed to ship the 
goods from abroad, also in the light of new scarcities of certain resources on the market 
relative to others; time for adjustments in technology, where input substitution is 
possible. However, production processes where substitution is less likely (for example, 
if they depend on a damaged or destroyed key sector), will cause ‘bottlenecks’, braking 
recovery efforts throughout the economic network. Also, there may be failures of the 
so-called lifelines infrastructure, be it roads, electricity or telecommunications. An 
inability to use these facilities by productive sectors and the population at large may be 
another contributing impeding factor. Other institutional factors may reveal the lack of 
information; pre-set contractual obligations, or government intervention in the form of a 
price ceiling or rationing for a set of basic products.   
 
6.3. THE CIRCULAR FLOW REVISITED 
We mentioned in Chapter 4 that it is advisable to adopt a modelling framework that is 
flexible enough to address specific issues in the wider setting of a country struggling 
with severe disruptions. This has led us, as explained earlier, via a number of steps, to 
select input-output as a basic framework. Further, in Chapter 5 we have discussed the 
standard formulation of this model and outlined its advantages and limitations. In this 
Chapter, we are going to adapt the input-output framework to fit the needs of major 
disruption modelling, thereby exploiting the model’s characteristics to our advantage. 
In the coming Sections, we shall follow an approach distinguishing three steps. 
We shall propose that such an approach offers a convenient point of departure for the 
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three tasks we have set in the beginning of this Chapter. The first issue is how to deal 
with the lost productive capacity in the immediate disaster aftermath. This stage aims at 
getting a proper perspective on the nature of the post-catastrophe disruption, which 
should result in a representation of a concise picture of the situation. Our second task is 
addressing the options for selecting a recovery path. During this stage, the economy has 
to decide in which way it wishes to rebuild and reconstruct its productive infrastructure. 
Many options exist, and it is not always clear which ones should be preferred. Specific 
problems in selecting a recovery path should be discussed. Finally, our task is to offer 
an outline of a cost benefit analysis (CBA) of selected precautionary measures, in line 
with our approach. In the last stage, ex-ante policy decisions should be linked to the 
planned for post-disaster sectoral and national performance.  
We shall devote this Section to the analysis of the first stage of our approach, 
namely gaining insight into the immediate post-calamity situation within an economic 
network. We recall the introduction of the Leontief model in Chapters 3 and 5 (see 
equations [3.1] through [3.4] and [5.1] through [5.14]). 
Despite its transparency, this model is not very clear in the way it deals with 
labour as a production factor. In the standard (open) interpretation, final demand is 
bought and consumed by households, which in turn provide the labour force that the 
economy needs. Labour, in this model, is in infinite supply. That is, any increase in 
demand for labour is met instantaneously. Similarly, any decrease in employment is 
met by the system without any problem: labour that becomes superfluous simply drops 
out of the system.62  
Clearly, the model also informs us about employment and employment 
opportunities (instead of ‘only’ about final consumption). To bring about this 
dimension more clearly, we shall reformulate the model. The reformulation also is 
aimed to better focus on the ‘rigidities’ that we referred to earlier. In particular, we 
mean here the relation between the labour inputs and final demand. One of the rigidities 
will be the interpretation of the final demand vector in terms of an aggregate real wage 
bundle of ‘prescribed’ proportions.      
In fact, we propose to present the above open model in a different way, i.e. by 
employing a representation employing the real wage. The real wage per worker is, by 
definition, equal to the consumption package that this worker can buy for his money 
wage. Because all workers have identical preferences and earn the same wage, we can 
denote this package by the symbol h. We then have: 






=
L
fh    [6.1] 
Recalling [3.2], this allows us to write the model ([3.1], [3.2]) as: 
xlfAxx 











+=
L
 [6.2] 
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 Evidently, the problem of superfluous labour will resurface in other parts of the economy such as 
unemployment schemes. These schemes, by assumption, do not influence the basic system as given by 
[3.1] and [3.2]. 
 129 
The above equation provides us with an alternative description of the 
interconnections in the economy. We distinguish two matrices; one representing the 
conventional fixed intermediate input structure, the other one the real wage part. A 
comment is needed clarifying the dimensions of the matrix H: 












≡ lfH
L
 [6.3] 
where the ‘h-part’ should be seen as (1/L)f, where f is the familiar (n x 1) consumption 
vector, multiplied by the scalar 1/L. Further, the row vector l has dimension 1 x n. This 
means that multiplication of the latter two terms yields the rank one matrix (1/L)fl of 
dimension n x n. Multiplied by the total output vector x, we obtain the vector Hx. The 
fact that all workers are identical implies that the proportions between the goods 
consumed within this matrix are the same across the sectors; however, the sectors will 
differ according to the relative weight of employed labour. The above equations thus 
provide us with an important link between labour and the intermediate inputs in the A 
matrix.   
Bringing the two new matrices together, we obtain a coefficients matrix, M, 
where 
[ ]HAM +≡  [6.4] 
We observe from the equality above that M is a strictly positive matrix having 
dominant eigenvalue equal to unity. The total output vector is the corresponding, 
strictly positive eigenvector x.63 We shall also make use of M, the corresponding matrix 
of transactions in absolute terms. It is particularly useful to have a division between 
both intermediate and final demand (i.e. consumption) parts per sector. Let xˆ  again 
denote the diagonal matrix with the sectoral outputs ix (i = 1,…,n) at its main diagonal. 
We now have:  
[ ] xHAM ˆ+≡  [6.5] 
xHxA ˆˆ +=  [6.6] 
FZ +=  [6.7] 
where  
xAZ ˆ≡
  [6.8] 
stands for the inter-industry deliveries of goods and services, and  
                                               
63
 Recall that we assumed that f is strictly positive. Recall further that in Chapter 3 we used the same 
symbol M for the coefficient matrix of a closed Leontief model. Because there is no confusion, we have 
adopted the same symbol here to denote the coefficient matrix of a more complex Leontief closed model. 
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xHF ˆ≡  [6.9] 
for the workers’ real wage.   
We shall employ matrix M for a better understanding of the physical disruptions 
in the disaster aftermath. We concentrate on the proportions between the primary and 
intermediate inputs, where disturbances in both categories will bring disequilibrium 
into the system. Namely, damaged factories will not be able to produce output; at the 
same time, lost labour will not be able to consume goods in the degree it previously did. 
Working with matrix M is an alternative to procedures such as adjusting coefficients 
matrices. In fact, what we envisage to do is not to feed the data on direct loss into the 
model the way it is often done, i.e. via a negative impulse on final demand, see inter 
alia Okuyama, Hewings and Sonis (2002), but rather to look at the influence of a shock 
on both intermediate and final consumption activities. This will represent a picture of 
the actual disruptions in an economic network in the situation immediately after a 
calamity. For this, we first will need the M matrix. Only when we are ready with 
picturing the actual physical disruptions, we will proceed with the analysis of the 
indirect repercussions of production flow interruptions. In fact, we may write, 
combining equations [6.2] and [6.4]. 
xM x =  [3.6] 
We note that equation [3.6] contains the same information as the set of equations 
[6.3] to [6.7], but now written as a closed Leontief model.64 We should observe that the 
model of [3.6] is different from the open model we started with. Solving for x now 
addresses a question about the proportions that are needed for a circular flow where x 
stands for the bundles of total outputs and total inputs. That is, the solution to [3.6] 
gives us in a transparent way the proportions that are required for an uninterrupted 
circular flow. We also should observe that this circular flow will be disrupted if the 
proportions in the workers’ real wage bundle would change – unless all industries adapt 
correspondingly, which is not to be expected. So, the ‘rigidity’ regarding the 
proportions of the consumption bundle now has found an interpretation in terms of not 
to be changed input proportions.  
x MM ˆ≡  [6.10] 
 
6.4. INTRODUCING A CATASTROPHE: MODELLING DISEQUILIBRIUM 
Below, we shall develop our argument starting from our knowledge of the location of 
lost capacity. Geographically differentiated knowledge of the pre-disaster situation 
often is available from various sources such as offered by today’s highly detailed GIS-
data bases (see Appendix 5A for more information on GIS). Nowadays many types of 
                                               
64
 See also Chapter 3 on the notion of a closed model. A different type of closed input-output model is 
discussed later on when deriving an alternative Basic equation for describing the surviving capacity after 
a calamity.  
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such geo-referenced information systems exist. Within a so-called geographic 
information system one may store, analyse and manage spatial data and associated 
attributes. In other words, these systems contain data that have an explicit spatial 
reference like a coordinate or zip code. Such systems may, for example, include 
information on topographic features (like elevation, slope and orientation), 
demographic attributes (such as age, gender, or education level), economic attributes 
(type of economic activity by sector, number of production facilities per sector, number 
of employees, value added, et cetera), as well as other information. The development of 
GIS made it possible to work with extremely accurate data essential to estimate lost 
production and consumption capacity in the immediate post-disaster situation. Detailed 
GIS that contains geo-referenced economic data is called economic GIS (see for 
example Huizinga, 2003), and provides an opportunity to develop modelling techniques 
that make use of this particular type of information.  
 
   
Figure 6.1. Location of Figure 6.2. Location of lost 
productive capacity  productive capacity in a 
in a pre-disaster economy post-disaster situation 
 
In our model, the extent of the shock caused by the disaster can be traced based to 
the information on the physical location of the individual establishments forming the 
sector; see also Bočkarjova, Steenge and Van der Veen (2007). We now shall use this 
knowledge to determine the post-disaster surviving productive capacity. We shall start 
with a small map schematically representing the economic infrastructure in a two-sector 
example, see Figure 6.1. The map depicts the location of each production site 
(establishment) in a fictive two-sector economy. Each dot represents an individual 
establishment, where the size of the dot varies according to the output value produced 
at each facility. The markings of the dots (black or grey) are indicative of the sector to 
which the plant belongs. Suppose now that a flood incapacitates a significant part of 
this country, as represented by the shaded area in Figure 6.2. 
As mentioned above, the data on the precise location can be obtained from an 
appropriate GIS database, which can also be coupled to the economic GIS with 
information on the economic variables per establishment per grid, like employment, 
value added, total value of production, et cetera. With this information, one can 
aggregate the data from each grid within the disaster area up to the level of detail of the 
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corresponding input-output table; for example, to the industry level in our case. 
Subsequently, this data on the incapacitated production value per sector can be related 
to the total production value per sector of the country to obtain the loss coefficient per 
sector. We shall introduce the parameter γi (0 ≤ γi ≤1) to indicate the fraction of 
production capacity lost in sector i. In matrix form, this yields: 










=
nγ
γ
L
MOM
L
0
01
Γ
 [6.11] 
We shall interpret this in the sense that, immediately after the shock, this 
particular sector is able to produce only 100(1 - γi) percent of its pre-disaster output 
provided the inputs required to maintain this production level are available in the right 
proportions. In matrix form we may express the surviving capacity as (I - Γ): 










−
−
=−
nγ
γ
10
01
)(
1
L
MOM
L
ΓI
 [6.12] 
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, we shall make one specific assumption to avoid a 
multitude of problems. That is, if sector i has lost 100γi percent of its capacity, we shall 
interpret this in the sense that also 100γi percent of its work force is lost or not 
available. This will result in an equation of the form: 
x Γ-I M t )(=  [6.13] 
where the new symbol t will be explained in the context of equation [6.18], below. 
Note, that equation [6.13] resembles equation [3.8] to a certain extent. A major 
advantage now is that a reduction in the sector’s labour input requirement directly 
translates into a corresponding reduction in final demand f as specified in [3.1]. We 
shall further assume that workers’ preferences have not changed. That is, proportions 
within the final demand basket remain the same. We may also note that in the case of 
no disruption, matrix Γ is a zero matrix, and ( )Γ-I  becomes the identity matrix; as a 
result of this, equation [6.13] reduces to equation [3.6].  
We shall now introduce γi and ( )iγ−1  into equation [6.10] with the aim to divide 
the initial pre-disaster economic system into two components. This will yield: 

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or 
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 [6.15] 
where we have separated the lost and spared parts of intermediate and final demand 
matrices. We now have the following expression, where the suffices refer, respectively, 
to the lost and spared parts of the economy: 
S L MMM +=  [6.16] 
Equation [6.16] now provides a clear insight in the economy immediately after a 
disaster. 
We now turn to S  M , which is of particular interest for us in modelling the 
disaster aftermath. It gives us the information on the production capacity that survived a 
calamity. This matrix can be written, following equation [6.15], as the sum of two 
matrices:  
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 [6.17] 
The representation of expression [6.17] is reminiscent of an input-output table 
like [6.7]. We observe that the first matrix on the right hand side of equation [6.17] 
looks like a matrix of intermediate inputs, while the second matrix gives information on 
the corresponding real wage.   
Clearly, the above gives a ‘bird’s eye view’ of the immediate post-disaster 
situation. Let us suppose now that the decision makers in the stricken area have access 
to this information. Given that, they immediately are confronted with the question how 
to proceed. If they have developed a set of appropriate scenarios, it is here that the 
rewards of having developed such a set will be seen. If there is no sense of where the 
economy should go now, an extremely confused situation will develop most likely. 
(This point will be addressed more fully later on). At the moment we shall assume that 
the decision has been made that the circular flow concept will form the basis for the 
reconstruction and recovery efforts. In that case, the next question is: which circular 
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flow? The question apparently needs separate attention because up to now we only have 
defined a circular flow in terms of a set of corresponding proportions. In addition, as 
we may recall, we have introduced the notion of the existence of certain rigidities. Two 
of these are the characteristics of the real wage bundle and the role of employment 
policy. Below we shall assume therefore that the economy, in its immediate post-
disaster period, focuses on restoring a circular flow given the presence of the signalled 
rigidities.  
As a first step to further explore the character of [6.17], let us add the elements of 
S M  row-wise, and adopt the symbol t = ti for the vector of row-wise summed totals. 
This leads to the following equation:  
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Equation [6.18] needs particular attention and will be discussed in the following 
Section. As we shall see, this expression ‘looks like’ an input-output system, but lacks 
the fundamental properties of an input-output system. However, it contains essential 
information for the economy on how to proceed. 
 
6.4.1. Discussion of the After-Shock Equation 
Although expression [6.18] may look like an input-output system in equilibrium, it is 
not. This is because it does not obey the fundamental input-output rules. We can see 
this immediately by calculating the implied input coefficients: dividing the elements of 
the ith column of the matrix on the left-hand side by the corresponding ti does not give 
us the correct pre-disaster intermediate input coefficients. We shall provide a simple 
numerical example in the next Section as an illustration of the argument. Apparently, in 
a very concise form, [6.18] expresses the disturbed proportions of the post-disaster 
situation when compared to the pre-disaster situation. 
Essentially, equation [6.18] is only an identity in economic terms. This stems 
from its construction; the total ‘quasi-outputs’, the elements of t, on the right-hand side 
of expression [6.18] have been obtained by simple row-wise addition of the newly 
implied ‘intermediate’ and ‘final’ demands, and does not reflect existing economic 
possibilities. In this context, it may be useful to devote a few additional words to the 
character of the imbalances in the economy as reflected in [6.18]. So, let us take a look 
at the relation between the ‘intermediate’ and ‘final’ demands within identity [6.18]. In 
fact, standard, the total product of any industry is the sum of the two destinations – 
intermediate demand for inter-industry production inputs, and the final demand for final 
consumption purposes. We observe that proportions within the columns of the 
‘intermediate part’ and within the ‘final’ demand vector have not changed. This is due 
to the fact that each column is multiplied by the same fraction )1( iγ− , representing 
remaining capacity. Suppose, however, that we actually would like to interpret the first 
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matrix on the left-hand-side as an intermediate input part in the input-output sense. It 
that case, the constructed ‘vector of final demands’ cannot be the corresponding final 
demand vector as the relationship between these two sets (of output destinations) is 
disturbed compared to the pre-disaster situation: the ti’s make no sense as sectoral totals 
as they are only mathematically obtained row sums. They cannot be interpreted as real 
industry output since the A-matrix coefficients cannot be recovered. Similarly, if we 
would like to interpret the other vector as a final demand vector in regular input-output 
sense, the intermediate input matrix would appear not to be the corresponding one, and 
again the ti’s would make no sense as totals. So, what we have here are, at best, pieces 
or elements of an input-output system, i.e. at best a part of a potential circular flow. The 
above notwithstanding, as we shall see, equation [6.18] gives extremely valuable 
information about the situation immediately after the disaster. In fact, it can be viewed 
as a very first effort at input-output accounting in the disaster’s aftermath.  
To express this, let us call expression [6.18] the Basic equation, thereby realizing 
that at the moment it is only an ‘artificial’ identity in a sense that it does not possess 
economic content yet, and thus cannot be interpreted in the standard input-output mode. 
In fact, the Basic equation is a mere snapshot of the immediate post-calamity 
disruptions and disorder in an economic system that used to be in balance, but is not 
anymore - and thus is (partially) inoperable. This system portrays disequilibrium in an 
input-output sense, having lost its internal consistency. This, in our view, forms stage 
one: the basis for systematic accounting for the actual physical damage brought about 
by a disaster. This means that at the moment we have a summary statement on what is 
left immediately after a catastrophe, and what is lost. This result is reflected in the type 
of ‘artificial’ accounts as [6.18].  
Equation [6.18] also can be seen as a measure of the economic vulnerability of the 
system, because it shows in which degree a calamity will affect it in terms of loss of 
capacity. So, we need a second step to extract information regarding the economic 
structure from this ‘artificial survey statement’ and guide the economy to the 
equilibrium. Here, economic resilience gets a chance to be realised, i.e. how far a 
system is able to adjust to new circumstances, using even more limited resources than 
in a business-as-usual situation, and return to equilibrium with least costs, and as soon 
as possible. The third stage of disaster inquiry is the analysis of precautionary 
measures, which are indicative of mitigation and adaptation processes in anticipation of 
a potential danger. These are directed both at the limitation of a hazard, and at the 
improvement of the system’s vitality, which concerns its resistance to major shocks, as 
well as its response capacity, resilience. Adjustments of an economic system in advance 
to a shock may result in changes in its structure, which means that both the pre-disaster 
equation, and the post-disaster identity (equations [3.1] through [3.8] and [6.1] through 
[6.18]) would change. This will ultimately affect the possible recovery paths as well as 
the final loss figures. In this way, one may compare the costs and benefits of various 
preventive measures, which is essentially a cost-benefit appraisal. 
As we have discussed in Chapter 3, resilience is a relatively new concept to 
economic analysis, and it not an easy concept to measure without the presence of an 
actual shock. Spare production capacity present at individual production 
establishments, the presence of contingency plans, the availability of information, the 
coordination of actions and the technical solutions to the (temporary or permanent) 
breaks, are all indicative of the order of disaster preparedness and extent of resilience 
present in the system. (Studies on the nature and conceptualisation of resilience 
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themselves should make another topic of a dissertation, as appears from the literature, 
which have proved time-intensive and lengthy projects.) 
Many options become open for an economy in the disaster aftermath, restricted, 
however, by the available resources within the system. One of the opportunities is, as 
history often has shown, that as a result of a major calamity, such as a war, and the vast 
disruption following it, some countries are accepting the challenge of renovation, 
thereby adopting new technologies, while others opt to recover old ones. One of the 
instances was the renewal of the capital base in Germany after World War II, as 
opposed to the UK, where this was not the case. By 1970’s it became apparent that 
renovation of capital stock had helped Germany to recover and to deliver a better 
economic performance, while British industry for a long time employed outdated 
machinery. 
Uncertainty and complexity of the issues at hand suggest that the entire multitude 
of recovery paths can hardly to be analysed without policy directions or preferences. 
This is one of the core points governing scenario analysis, when extreme uncertainty 
about future developments of (often) one-time events is endogenised. Policy preference 
would then allow making particular assumptions about the desirable paths that an 
economy may be directed to, thus making the study more feasible and probably more 
realistic than a mere abstract theoretical exercise. Provided viable assumptions, a 
number of scenarios can be constructed to study, for example, best and worst cases 
without outside intervention in the markets, as well as government-steered recovery. 
Essentially, this brings us to the next modelling step, recovery modelling, which, 
however, will be first preceded by a numerical example illustrating the Basic equation. 
 
6.4.2. The ‘Basic Equation’; an Example 
We shall illustrate the procedure described in the previous Section leading to the 
derivation of what we call the after-shock Basic equation by employing a numerical 
example of a two-sector two-commodity economy. (Later on, we shall also use a case 
study of a dike breach in the Netherlands to illustrate the use of our methodology on a 
more complicated example of a 38-sector input-output table).  
Let us turn to our example, where we represent a stylised economy consisting of 
two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. We start from the input coefficient matrix: 






=
450,0250,0
150,0250,0
A
 
We assume that the final demand vector is: 






=
450
150
f
 
This implies that the corresponding vector of total output is: 
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





=
1000
400
x  
The input-output system for our two-sector two-commodity economy results in the 
following expression in terms of coefficients: 






=





+











1000
400
450
150
1000
400
450,0250,0
150,0250,0
, 
or, alternatively in absolute value terms: 






=





+











1000
400
450
150
1
1
450100
150100
. 
Straightforwardly, we now also have the intermediate input-output matrix Z: 






=
450100
150100
Z  
Following the discussion in the previous Section, we explicitly distinguish only one 
primary factor, labour. Above, the corresponding labour input coefficients are given by: 
( )400,0500,0=l  
We observe that the value of total labour income, L, is 600, which equals the total value 
of final demand (150+450). The values of wages paid per sector are thus for agriculture 
400·0,5 = 200, and for manufacturing sector 1000·0,4 = 400. Provided knowledge of L 
and l, we can arrive at matrix F, representing the real wage part expressed as bundles of 
consumed goods (following the transformation as in [6.9]): 






=
300150
10050
F
 
To complete our transformation, we are constructing the matrix M as in [6.7] to have 
the representation of the pre-disaster economy in nominal money terms, divided into 
two matrices reflecting respectively the bundles of intermediate production demand and 
final consumption. 






+





=





=
300150
10050
450100
150100
750250
250150
M
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Let us assume now that a disaster hits, and destroys agriculture more heavily than 
manufacturing. For example, the ‘disaster parameters’, derived from the knowledge on 
the location of the destroyed activities and their production value, are 40,01 =γ  for 
agriculture and 20,02 =γ  for manufacturing. So, similarly as in [6.15] we may write: 
























+





+











+





























+





+











+





=
300
100
450
150
8,0
300
100
450
150
2,0
150
50
100
100
6,0
150
50
100
100
4,0M
 
Reassembling terms of the above M matrix, and separating the survived part, we 
obtain the following identity for the matrix describing the surviving capacity, consisting 
of intermediate and final demand categories: 




















+



















=
300
100
8,0
150
50
6,0
450
150
8,0
100
100
6,0SM  
or: 






=





+





=
600150
20090
24090
8030
36060
12060
SM  
So, we have illustrated how the productive capacity can be split into two parts in a 
consistent way within an input-output framework, based on the knowledge of physical 
disruptions. The part of the system that survived the disaster now can be written in the 
form of the post-disaster Basic equation [6.18], as: 
Intermediate Final Demand Total Output 
Input Active Active Active 






=





+











750
290
330
110
1
1
36060
12060
 [6.19] 
Looking at [6.19] we can make a number of observations. First, we immediately 
notice that the agricultural sector has become significantly smaller compared to 
manufacturing. In fact, the whole system has shrunk, but not proportionally. Our second 
observation is that the internal relations are disturbed between the intermediate and final 
demand, which raises the question whether the available intermediate inputs would be 
enough to produce goods for the required final demand. Next, ‘the vector of the total 
output’ on the right hand side of the identity has been obtained by adding up the 
elements row wise, but as we know, this is by pure construction; there is no economic 
content. Essentially, it is questionable whether the survived intermediate part is able to 
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satisfy final demand as presented in [6.19], and whether the amount of produced goods 
would add up to the induced total as it stands in [6.19].  
Equation [6.19] also points to the fact that many things are uncertain. Some of 
these are not difficult to see. It is a big question, for example, whether the structure of 
final demand would remain the same, or would tend to change, say, in favour of 
agricultural products as the basic needs in nutrition should be satisfied first in a situation 
of limited resources. A further big question is, alternatively, whether the need for 
manufactured goods would be a dominating factor in view of the reconstruction. In the 
next Section we shall discuss further recovery challenges and possibilities. Ultimately, it 
is important to know which options are available, to compare them, and to see which 
ones are desirable.  
 
6.5. THE ROLE OF PROPORTIONS IN RECOVERY PLANNING  
At this point we need to ‘take stock’, and reflect for a moment on the structure the 
disaster has left behind – as presented in [6.18]. The spared area now faces the task to 
reassemble these parts, and to rebuild the system based on what is left. Below we shall 
present a procedure on how to recombine what is left with a specific goal in mind. This 
goal is, as we already mentioned it, to construct or, better perhaps, to reconstruct an 
economy based on the circular flow notion. At the same time, we shall recognize the 
existence of, in particular, two types of rigidities. One is connected to the role of 
technology. The other one concerns the most important role of employment goals in our 
industrialized societies; to which final households’ demand vector with its established 
proportions is directly connected. We shall start with a graphical exposition, first based 
on Dorfman, Solow and Samuelson (DOSSO, 1958). Hereafter we shall present a 
method of our own.    
The first graphical representation, Figure 6.3, is adopted from DOSSO (ibid). First 
we shall show how the equilibrium embodied in the equations ([3.1], [3.2]) can be 
depicted graphically. To this end, let us again consider a two-sector economy in familiar 
notation. We have the real system: 






=





+











2
1
2
1
2
1
2221
1211
x
x
f
f
x
x
aa
aa
 [6.20] 
and the accompanying labour equation: 
Lxlxl =+ 2211     [6.21] 
We rewrite to obtain three equations: 





=+
=+
=
L x l  xl
fx) - a (  x-a
f x- ax) -a(
 
2211
2222121
1212111
)3(
1)2(
1)1(
 [6.22] 
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Figure 6.3. Graphical representation of the total output of an open input-output 
system. 
 
For given values of f, say f, we may represent system [6.22] graphically as in 
Figure 6.3, where the numbers representing the lines correspond to the equations as 
given above. Let x = (x1, x2) represent the solution to [6.22], graphically represented by 
point E0. The lines (1), (2) and (3) intersecting at point E0 represent the equations of the 
system [6.22]. 
 
 
6.5.1. Modelling Recovery: A Different Representation 
It is not well known that we can depict the same input-output system in an alternative 
way. Let E0 again denote the vector of total outputs x.65 Let furthermore 
0
OQ  stand for 
the vector of total intermediate inputs Ax, and 
0
OF  for the vector f. We now have, in 
vector notation (see Figure 6.4), 00 and OFOQ representing the intermediate and final 
demand vectors, and 
0
OE the vector of total output. We can also write: 
000
OFOQOE +=  [6.23] 
 
                                               
65
 Note that Figures 6.4 through 6.10 are drawn on a scale different from Figure 6.3.  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
x1 x1 
x2 
x2 
E0 
O 
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Figure 6.4. Output as addition of intermediate and final demand vectors in an 
input-output system. 
 
That is, our equilibrium now is represented in terms of vector addition, with the points 
Q0 and F0 on either side of the ray OE0. We should observe the angles Q0OE0 and 
E0OF0, in Figure 6.4 denoted by the symbols ε and φ, respectively. They embody our 
knowledge of the production technologies as given by the columns of matrix A.  
Let us assume now that a disturbance of the internal circular flow is takes place. 
To explore its effects, we shall start with a homogeneous disturbance or shock. Figure 
6.5 depicts, also in vector addition format, an ‘imploded’ economy in point E1 that has 
maintained the same proportions as our initial economy in point E0. We now define the 
shock in terms of the following proportional decline, where the superfix ‘1’ refers to the 
post-disaster situation: 
10
1
0
1
0
1
<=== λ
OF
OF
OQ
OQ
OE
OE
 [6.24] 
That is, total outputs, intermediate inputs and final demand have decreased in the same 
proportions. Here, again, it holds true that the new vector of total outputs 
1
OE
 equals 
the sum of the new intermediate demands, 
1
OQ , and final demand, 1OF : 
111
OFOQOE +=  [6.25] 
We observe that in this case the angles Q0OE0 and E0OF0 also are equal to ε and φ, as 
introduced earlier.   
x1 
x2 
ε ϕ 
O 
Q0 
E0 
F0 
x1 
x2 
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Figure 6.5. A homogeneous shock in an input-output system. 
 
Now, let us consider the impact of a big disaster, with characteristically non-
homogeneously disturbed internal proportions. We then return to the Basic equation 
[6.18] that we have derived in Section 6.4. Let us now denote, for our two-sector 
economy, the point E2 as corresponding to the vector t, obtained via row-wise addition 
as described earlier (see Section 6.4.1). We reflect it on Figure 6.6 below.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. A heterogeneous shock in an input-output system. 
 
x
x2 
O 
E2 
E0 
x1 
x2 
ε ϕ 
O 
Q0 
E0 
F0 
E1 
F1 
Q1 
x1 
x2 
 143 
Earlier we have observed that the vector of ‘quasi final demand’, f~ , in our Basic 
equation [6.18] is proportional to f in equation [3.1]. However, as we have seen, for the 
point E2 to be interpreted as the total output vector of a system producing a net output 
equal or proportional to f, it should lie on the ray OE0. Because it does not (due to our 
assumption of the non-homogeneous shock), we can be sure that the bundle of goods f~  
cannot be produced by the post-disaster economy in a circular flow configuration. This 
thus means that the vector addition  
222
OEOFOQ =+  [6.26] 
cannot be interpreted as an input-output system. Figure 6.7 is representative of the 
situation. Note that we have a new angle Q2OE0 that we denote as δ, with δ ≠ ε. At the 
same time, the angle φ is unchanged relatively to the pre-disaster ray OE0, signalling 
that vector f~  is proportional to f. So, because the proportions between final 
consumption and intermediate inputs are distorted, we can say that the economic 
structure described by the point E2 is not a balanced system, and has to look for a new 
equilibrium. This is precisely what the Basic equation [6.18] tells us. However, it is a 
most useful starting point for finding a real working system that is ‘embedded’ in the 
equation [6.18] - in fact, we are allowed to speak of an ‘extraction’ process.  
 
 
Figure 6.7. Graphical representation of the Basic equation. 
 
The recovery process requires a vision of where the economy is to go. Without a 
clear idea where post-disaster recovery efforts should be directed at, a ‘laissez-faire’ 
recovery will not necessarily result in a socially acceptable outcome. In case the 
decision is taken to centrally steer the recovery, the government should have a 
particular goal in mind with a corresponding set of strategies for the post-disaster 
reconstruction period. Essentially, the task ahead for the country is to agree on such 
x1 
x2 
δ ϕ 
O 
Q2 
E2 
E0 
F2 
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balances, and to devise a transition path to reach them. Our approach now will be to 
‘use’ equation [6.18] to arrive at internally consistent balances. Clearly, many 
possibilities exist here. We already mentioned that the country may wish to ‘use the 
occasion’ to diversify or modernise its production facilities. Alternatively, it may also 
opt for integrating its economy better in existing national or international cooperation 
schemes or, rather, for becoming less dependent on particular sources or connections by 
investing in selected sectors. Here the post-disaster Basic equation can be most helpful 
for structuring the recovery decisions and determining the desired internal and external 
balances for a particular direction.  
Some authors pointed at a path that leads to restoration of the pre-catastrophe 
proportions. To quote Tobin, for example, (1999, p.15): “For instance, many relief 
programmes strive to return communities to the status quo ante, indeed, a common 
refrain from victims and politicians alike following a disaster is ‘to get back to 
normal’.” He adds (ibid), “… to understand recovery, attention must be focused on: 1) 
re-accumulation of capital and physical infrastructure; 2) policies and programmes of 
government agencies, private organisations, and businesses among others; 3) resource 
distribution.”  
The above also leads to accompanying notions of what actually has been lost in 
the disaster, and the type of costs the post-catastrophe country faces. Many possibilities 
exist here, evidently. We shall concentrate on one particular option, i.e. the case where 
one wishes to define the total cost of the disaster as the costs made to return to the 
position where the economy would have been if the disaster had not happened; where 
the initial position (before the catastrophe) acts as a basic reference point. A similar 
view can be found in (Bram, Orr and Rapaport, 2002), where the effects of the 9-11 
attacks are studied on the development of employment in New York city via comparing 
factual trends with counterfactual inference in the trend had there been no attack. Such a 
look at the definition of disaster-imposed costs, in fact, means that these costs will 
depend on the speed of an economic system to return to the pre-disaster track.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Defining the recovery strategy. 
x1 
x2 
δ ϕ 
O 
Q2 
E2 
E0 
F2 
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This implies, in turn, that the goals chosen, and, consequently, the recovery path 
followed, will affect the total figure of disaster losses. In this sense, to keep the costs as 
low as possible, one needs to select a ‘fastest’, i.e. a most ‘effective’ recovery strategy. 
This resembles the turnpike idea, to which we shall return later in this Section. 
First, we shall pay attention to one option especially. That is, as mentioned, we 
shall suppose that the post-disaster economy wishes to return to its pre-disaster 
proportions as depicted by the ray OE0 in Figure 6.8. The consequence of this choice is 
that total inputs and final demand should be proportional to total inputs and final 
demand as required by the economy in point E0. 
Starting from E2, how could we ‘move’ to E0? First of all, we may notice from 
Figure 6.8, that E2 can be reproduced as the summation of the vectors 
22
and OFOQ . 
Furthermore, we know that the intermediate inputs are ‘out of proportion’ relative to the 
pre-disaster situation (as the angle δ is different from the initial angle ε), and that the 
relative magnitudes are not the correct ones. This means that to arrive at some new 
equilibrium on the ray OE0, we need to ‘correct’ only the proportions of intermediate 
consumption. If reaching this goal has succeeded, and our new intermediate input 
demand has the same relative proportions as OQ0 (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5), then the 
summation of the vectors of intermediate and final consumption should result in a total 
output on the desired ray OE0. We shall review two manners how this can be achieved.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.9. The recovery strategy: an extreme case of returning to pre-disaster 
proportions 
 
First, consider a solution as illustrated in Figure 6.9. In the post-disaster situation 
good 2 is present in relative abundance compared to good 1, i.e., it is in excess supply 
(in other words, essentially, good 1 is a bottleneck to recovery as it is relatively scarce). 
Given the proportion requirement for the production of goods dictated by the prevailing 
technologies, a part of the total amount of good 2 becomes ‘idle’ and has to ‘drop out’ 
x1 
x2 
δ ϕ 
E* 
O 
Q2 
Q0 E2 
E0 
F0 
F2 
F* 
Q* 
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of the system (i.e., the intermediate product mix will shift from OQ2 to OQ*). Several 
options are open regarding this quantity of good 2. For example, it possibly may be sold 
to agents outside the intermediate modelling context as part of exports; yet, in the short 
run, when inter alia institutional rigidities prevail (as we discussed in Chapter 3), this is 
unlikely. After the catastrophe, communication channels may be out of order, roads may 
be blocked or displaced, information is incomplete, and financial resources are limited. 
So, for the immediate disaster aftermath, we shall assume that the availability of all 
resources is fixed, and that good 2 cannot be used for alternative purposes; so, it 
becomes a loss. This means that the economy will start growing again from the point 
E*, where the circular flow is restored. Yet, we should notice, that this is an extreme 
contraction, which requires final consumption to reduce for a while to the level of OF* 
(see Figure 6.9). 
 
 
Figure 6.10. The recovery strategy: ‘correction’ of proportions in intermediate 
transactions 
 
There is yet another option for restoring pre-disaster proportions (see Figure 6.10). 
We may start from the final demand requirement that we have obtained from our 
immediate post-disaster accounts, the Basic equation [6.18]. The government may 
decide to aim at favouring the final consumption at the highest possible level, i.e. at the 
level of OF2. Given this goal, a solution to the associated input-output equation will 
provide the corresponding total output and the intermediate input requirements (we need 
make sure that the ‘right’ technologies are used). Following this procedure, we shall end 
up with the vector of intermediate inputs OQ** (on the OQ0 ray, see Figure 6.10), 
where the post-disaster circular flow, and thus equilibrium, will be restored as given by 
the point E**. The question here is: are there enough production capacities to satisfy 
this final demand? Possibly, this road can be followed when resource mobility is again 
possible, and extra capacities in the needy sectors can be acquired ‘in exchange’ for 
production from the less affected sectors. 
x1 
x2 
ε ϕ 
E2 
E** 
O 
Q2 
Q0 
E0 
F0 
F2 
Q** 
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6.5.2. Initial Position and Recovery; an Example 
Now let us return to our stylised example. In Section 6.4.2 we have derived the post-
disaster basic equation [6.19] for the case of a 2x2 stylised example. We shall repeat it 
here as a starting point for our recovery analysis:  






=





+











750
290
330
110
1
1
36060
12060
 [6.19] 
In the immediate disaster aftermath, all we have is this identity [6.19]; we have 
pointed out that although in a basic equation such as [6.19] we have a representation of 
the survived part of an economy, there is yet no balance. To illustrate that, we rewrite 
the identity in the form of the ‘induced’ input-output equation, obtained by dividing the 
column elements by the corresponding row totals: 






=





+











750
290
330
110
750
290
480,0207,0
160,0207,0
 
It becomes clear that the technologies are not the ‘correct’ ones; the production 
coefficients have changed. Thus, the Basic equation presupposes technologies different 
from those present ‘in reality’. We now shall rewrite the equation in terms of the 
‘correct’ (pre-disaster) input coefficients. We obtain: 






=





+











750
290
330
110
800
240
450,0250,0
150,0250,0
 
The above equation, however, is an ‘impossible’ input-output system. The output 
vector on the left hand side of the equation above is not equal to the total obtained from 
the Basic equation, on its right hand side. Moreover, we directly observe that this 
economy cannot provide the real wage bundle for its workers. Calculation suggests that 
an economy which produces total outputs of 240 units of agricultural goods and 800 of 
manufacturing goods only can produce a net output bundle of 60 units of food and 380 
of manufacturing, as given by the following input-output equation:  






=





+











800
240
380
60
800
240
450,0250,0
150,0250,0
 
The explanation is straightforward; provided no technological change is present 
or possible, we are faced with a disproportion between the intermediate inputs part and 
final demand (which in our case is the workers’ real wage). So, does it actually 
represent an operable circular flow? Clearly, policy-makers must decide on finding a 
strategy for reaching the OE0 ray. Several options are open. Let us mention two 
straightforward ones. 
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First, let us start with an illustration of a possible transition to the E0 path based 
on Figure 6.9. As we mentioned before, this is a rather extreme case. Let’s take again a 
look at the proportions. The initial pre-calamity total output proportions of the OE0 ray 
(see Section 6.4.2) are 400:1000=0,4; and the proportions of final demand OF0 are 
150:450=0,333. In the post-disaster system described by the last equation above, total 
output proportions are 240:800=0,3; and final demand proportions are 60:380=158. 
From this, we can derive that, comparing to the pre-disaster ‘trend’, good 2 now is 
present in relative abundance to good 1. So, ‘correcting’ the final demand and total 
output proportions in the system above, we arrive at the following input-output system: 






=





+











600
240
270
90
600
240
450,0250,0
150,0250,0
 [6.27a] 
The equation [6.20a] above represents an operable circular flow, in the sense that 
we may interpret it in terms of ‘good’ balances and proportions. We may observe, that 
such a system with a total output of (240, 600) is able to produce final demand in the 
required proportions at the level of (90, 270). This is clearly lower than the economy’s 
potential described by the post-disaster equation [6.19], which also corresponds to the 
situation E* in Figure 6.9 as we described in the previous Section. This means that an 
‘additional’ (indirect) loss of 200 units (which is obtained as a difference (290+750)-
(240+600)) should be accounted for, mounting to the total loss of 560 units at this point 
in time, which is 40% of the initial production capacity. This is, in fact a proportional 
implosion of an economy provided the level of a maximum disruption coefficient 
(recall that we assumed 40,01 =γ  and 20,02 =γ ).  
We have also considered another possibility for recovery, namely, that we start 
from the Basic equation (such as [6.19]), and try to obtain the desired proportions, 
following the procedure corresponding to Figure 6.10. In fact, if we look at the Basic 
equation, we see that final demand proportions correspond to those in the pre-disaster 
situation. What is ‘wrong’ with a system like [6.19], is the proportions between the total 
output. So, to ‘correct’ those, we would need the combination of (290, 725) instead of 
(290, 750), which we have in [6.19]. This means, that then we have a system like: 






=





+

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
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

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450,0250,0
150,0250,0
 [6.27b] 
The system [6.20b] also has ‘good’ proportions, just as system [6.27a]. Yet, the 
difference is that in the situation described by equation [6.27b], the corresponding 
interindustry transactions matrix would look like: 






32273
10773
. 
To clarify, the respective inter-industry transactions matrix for equation [6.20a] would 
coincide with the one in the Basic equation [6.19]. Comparing the two matrices, we can 
see that in the latter case, where we kept final demand at its maximum requirement 
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level (110, 330), we would need a situation, where sector 1 would need some extra 
production capacity that is directly available in the immediate disaster aftermath. This 
means, that the latter solution would not be possible at the moment when rigidities 
manifest themselves; this is rather a solution to be pursued when resource re-allocation 
is possible.66 The total loss incurred by a disaster to the production capacity of a 
country in this case (and at this stage) will be 27,5%. 
Besides the issue of obtaining the ‘right’ proportions and looking for a new 
equilibrium, we observe, naturally, that once the economy has reached the (desired) 
OE0 ray, it still faces the problem of having to develop a growth program (e.g., such as 
to reach its pre-disaster position at E0, and possibly to expand beyond). In terms of our 
model this means e.g. that part of final demand in [3.1] now must be set aside for 
capital construction to facilitate expansion. This, however, is the domain of dynamic 
Leontief theory, and will not be pursued here (see Section 5.3, Chapter 5 for the basic 
description of a dynamic model). Also, we may observe a connection with standard 
turnpike theory.67 Regarding this, we should remark that application would not be 
straightforward, present insight in the properties of the dynamic versions of the 
Leontief model (especially regarding the role of stability issues) is still not sufficiently 
developed.68  
Finally, we hope to have shown the importance of being prepared in the sense of 
having available a set of scenarios for the post-disaster period. As we have seen, there 
exist many ways for an economy to react. Most important in our notion of recovery is 
the notion of proportions and balances, which should be sought in a structured manner. 
 
6.6. THE BASIC EQUATION: AN ALTERNATIVE DERIVATION  
As we have discussed earlier in Chapter 6, because a substantial part of productive 
capacity is gone, the catastrophe may be expected to generate a multitude of imbalances 
or disproportions in the economy’s supply-demand relations. Below we shall return to 
some of these, and try to systematize the post-disaster imbalances in a way alternative to 
what we have presented in Section 6.4. Our goal remains the same, i.e. to determine the 
nature and origin of disaster implied disruptions in its immediate aftermath. This 
alternative approach also makes use of precise knowledge of the geographical 
dimension involved.  
Below we shall again concentrate on the concept of a circular flow as providing 
the underlying fundamental structure for research on catastrophes. As before, we shall 
discuss the circular flow in terms of a set of inputs, which matches, given certain 
technologically determined parameters, a set of outputs which subsequently becomes a 
                                               
66
 Yet, in a situation like above, where we have tacitly assumed that the desired quantities of both goods 
could be sold or bought at the appropriate markets, we directly face the limits of our model, which 
basically is ‘inward-looking’. To address questions like these sell or buy decisions, a more extended 
model is needed that incorporates relations with the outside world.  
67
 Turnpike theory is based on the idea that optimality in growth paths in many cases depends on a 
‘closeness’ to certain special growth or development trajectories, such as von Neumann’s balanced or 
proportional growth path. See e.g. Tsukui and Murakami (1972). 
68
 For a recent contribution and an explanation of certain instability problems, see Steenge and Thissen 
(2005). 
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set of inputs in the next round. This notion provides part of the necessary background 
for terms like ‘imbalances’ or ‘disproportions’. The next question then, clearly, is: in 
relation to precisely which aspect (or aspects) of a circular flow do we use these terms?  
Evidently, the notion of circularity, in the somewhat sketchy form as given above, 
needs precision. In fact, we need some kind of ‘anchor’ to proceed sensibly. In our case, 
this anchor is provided by the notion of the consumption bundle f as introduced in 
Chapter 3. This bundle is the exogenously determined and fixed set of consumption 
goods bought and consumed by each consumer. Because of the one-to-one relation 
between consumers and workers that we have imposed, this bundle also stands for the 
real wage. As signalled earlier above, many recovery paths exist. However we will 
select one where the pre-disaster composition of final demand will provide the required 
anchor. In terms of our model, this means that given f, we directly know which total 
output vector x is involved; the level of f determines the level of x. A different 
composition of f implies a different x. However, we shall concentrate on the case of a 
final demand vector of with the mentioned characteristics.   
In Sections 6.3-6.5, we introduced the disaster-adapted presentation of the basic 
model ([3.1], [3.2]), employing the notion of the real wage bundle. However, there is a 
alternative way of thinking about the transition from the pre-disaster to the post-disaster 
situation. We have, by assumption, discarded any possible changes in f following the 
catastrophe. So, this source of possible adaptation is excluded. Similarly, we have 
assumed that in the immediate post-disaster period, the adoption of alternative 
technologies (which possibly may be more ‘appropriate’ under the new circumstances 
than the ones in place) also is precluded. We thus can view the economy in terms of a 
set of interrelated fixed technologies.  
Here we reach an important point: once the consumption vector is known (relative 
or absolute), we also know the proportions in which the other activities should be 
combined. This has a direct consequence: suppose all activities except one satisfy these 
proportions. If the one activity that does ‘not fit’ has a lower output than ‘prescribed’ by 
the required proportions, it immediately becomes the production bottleneck, and 
effectively determines the scale in which the entire economy can operate. This is an 
immediate consequence of the limitational character of the Leontief production 
processes (i.e. there are no substitutes available).    
This recalls the opinion voiced by Schlesinger and Zeuthen, as referred to in 
Chapter 1. Economists tend to focus too much on equilibrium situations with supply-
demand equalities. Much of reality, however, is concerned with a different question, i.e. 
which activities are in oversupply and which in undersupply, and how does that 
influence prices? So, we are faced with this particular question, against the background 
of a very specific and well-defined output task, i.e. finding a path that corresponds to the 
production of workers’ consumption in the proportion of f.  
In this context, a different type of multi-sector model seems worthwhile to 
explore. First of all, we now are thinking of a closed model. Open input-output models 
are characterised by the fact that the primary factors form a different category in the 
sense that their provision usually is not part of the analysis. Correspondingly, if they are 
in excess supply, their removal from the system does not cause any problem. In a closed 
model, our (single) primary factor, i.e. labour, is treated as an input into a process that 
generates labour power. As we shall see, in this reformulated model availability issues 
(of goods and commodities) can be interpreted and discussed in a way reminiscent of 
Von Neumann’s economic system (Von Neumann, 1945/46).  
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Here we aim to describe the situation right after the shock when the economy has 
not yet adapted to the new situation. As in Chapter 6, we shall start from the standard 
open model. We recall equations [3.1] and [3.2] from the earlier formulation: 
fAxx +=  [3.1] 
lx=L  [3.2] 
We can rearrange the above equations as a closed input-output system, including 
intermediate inputs and the previously primary production factor, labour. Labour now 
explicitly is modelled as an input: 
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or 
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Where again 
f h 





≡
L
1
 [6.1] 
Introducing matrix M
(
 (note that by construction it is different from matrix M 
introduced in equation [6.4], Section 6.3.): 
M
(
 ≡ 






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

0l
hA
 [6.29] 
and the column vector q of production intensities where:  
q ≡ 






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

L
x
 [6.30] 
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we obtain  
q  q M =
(
 [6.31] 
That is, we have moved from a formulation in terms of an open Leontief model to a 
formulation in terms of a closed Leontief model, including an equation for the 
previously primary factor, labour. Consequently, the dimensions of the system matrix 
now have become (n+1) x (n+1). We should observe that this model is different from 
the standard closed model as discussed in, e.g., Pasinetti (1977). In that model, the fixed 
coefficients assumption applies to all industries, including households. In [6.29], 
however, this assumption only applies to the sub-matrices A and l. If the consumption 
preferences as registered in f change (for example, when we discuss the possibilities for 
a cost-benefit analysis in Section 3.8), also x and L change correspondingly to new 
values x~  and L~ , and we will have a new column vector h~  which replaces h in the 
matrix on the left hand side of [6.28a]. We see that the eigenvector equation [6.31] 
describes an economy in perfect equilibrium: M
(
 is a matrix with dominant eigenvalue 
equal to one with q as the corresponding (positive) eigenvector. The left hand side of 
equation [6.31] stands for the totality of inputs, and the right hand side for the totality of 
outputs. Equation [6.31] thus expresses the economy’s self-reproducing property with 
sectoral capacities at level q.    
Equation [6.31] will be our alternative starting point for investigating the 
consequences of a big disruption. The equation can be used to provide an answer to 
questions like: Is there a post-disaster output level such that the economy can self-
reproduce? And if so: How do we find that level? In situations where the economy’s 
production intensities do not have the right proportions (i.e. those prescribed by the 
dominant eigenvector of matrix M
( ), we will need a new guiding equation, based on 
[6.31], to point the way to go. That will be an alternative view of the Basic equation, to 
be discussed below.       
It is useful now to continue with indicators that express how much capacity is still 
available after the calamity (e.g., in our example, a flood) when compared with the pre-
disaster situation. To this end, we introduce (n+1) parameters γi (0 ≤ γi ≤ 1) which 
indicate the fraction of the production capacity of industry i that is lost after the 
flooding.69 Let C be the vector of the remaining sectoral capacities. We then have:  
q )Γ-(I  C (=  [6.32] 
where  
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(
  Γ  [6.33] 
                                               
69
 Here labour is commodity n+1.  
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Clearly, if we assume that [6.31] represents a pre-flood situation, Γ(  is the (n+1) 
dimensional zero matrix. If Γ
(
 is not the zero matrix, we have, correspondingly, 
qΓqΓ - (I M ((( ≠) , unless q  qΓ γ=(  with 0 < γ ≤ 1. In the latter case, the economy is 
shrinking proportionally and replicates at 
 ) - (1 100 γ  percent of its earlier level. If the 
diagonal elements of matrix Γ
(
 are not equal to such γ, qΓ - (I )(  is not an eigenvector of 
matrix M
(
, and the economy cannot replicate in the same proportions.  
To continue, let us consider how the input side of [6.31] has changed after the 
flood. With capacities changed, the available inputs are given by: 
t  qΓ - (I M ((( =)  [6.34] 
where t
(
 is the (column) vector of the row sums of the left hand side (extended with the 
term tn+1 total for the labour equation compared to equation [6.18]). Let us consider 
equation [6.34] in more detail:   
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We observe again that although [6.35] may look like an input-output system in 
equilibrium, it clearly is not; it just provides a survey of possible inputs into a post-
disaster ‘next round’.70 Apparently, in a very concise form, this equation expresses the 
disturbed proportions between inputs and outputs in the post-flood situation.71 In fact, in 
terms of form and purpose, equation [6.35] is similar to equation [6.18]. That is why we 
have decided to assign to both the name Basic equation, distinguishing between what 
we call the basic formulation (equation [6.18]), and an alternative design (equation 
[6.35]). Other possibilities to derive a similar sort of equations exist as well, based on 
the specified assumptions behind the transformations. The Basic equation, thereby, is an 
artificial construction only to be used as an initial stepping stone. Immediately below we 
shall observe the link that now has been made with Von Neumann growth theory.72  
For situations where 0 < γ1 = … = γ n+1 = γ < 1, we have a proportionally shrunken 
economy as we may observe in equation [6.36].73 
                                               
70
 Just as in the case of interpreting equation [6.17], we see this corroborated by calculating the implied 
input coefficients: dividing the elements of the ith column of the matrix on the left-hand side by ti does not 
reproduce the correct pre-disaster intermediate input coefficients.   
71
 We again observe that proportions within the columns of the ‘intermediate part’ and within the ‘final 
demand’ vector have not changed. This is due to the fact that each column i is multiplied by the same 
fraction (1-γi).   
72
 Recall also equation [3.8] here, where we have the same interpretation. 
73
 The same observation has been made by Cochrane, 1997a, p.2.  
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This also corroborates with our findings during a numerical example exercise in 
Section 6.5.2, where we found a proportional ‘implosion’ of an economic system to the 
level of the most disturbed sector. 
 
6.6.1. Comparison of the Basic and the Alternative Designs for a Basic Equation 
Let us now look again at the basic equation [6.35] which is an alternative to the Basic 
equation [6.18]. We need to rearrange equation [6.35] to be able to compare the two 
formulations. First, we rewrite to:  
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Further rewriting gives:  
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Because by definition ijjij zxa = , and ii fLh = , equation [6.38] can be readily reduced 
to the form: 
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 [6.39] 
The transformation of the new basic equation [6.35] into equation [6.39] 
resembles the basic equation [6.18], yet one may also notice a difference. We shall 
reproduce equation [6.18] for ease of comparison: 
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Comparison of the two Basic equations [6.39] and [6.18] yields interesting 
conclusions. Essentially, both basic equations reflect the situation immediately after a 
calamity, yet each in a slightly different manner. In the basic formulation [6.18], each of 
the sectoral final demands fj was premultiplied by the composite factor ∑ −
i
i )1( γ , 
which reflects the assumption of proportional labour force loss relative to sectoral 
production capacity. The difference is, first of all, that in the new post-disaster equation 
[6.39], final demand is multiplied by the loss factor 1+nγ , which reflects the decrease in 
demand according to the number of people lost due to a disaster. At the same time, in 
the alternative post-disaster equation [6.39], labour inputs per sector (in the (n+1)th 
equation) are reduced according to the technology requirements, i.e. the respective iγ  
factors. 
The difference between the reduction of final demand and the labour input leads to 
the conclusion that the interpretation of basic equation [6.39] deviates slightly from 
[6.18]. Our alternative design for the derivation of the Basic equation, extending matrix 
Γ
(
 with an additional 1+nγ  parameter for the loss of human victims, the choice of 
expression for physical terms, and the formulation of the input-output system as a 
closed system including the labour equation, as described in this Section, has led to the 
formulation of equation [6.39]. While consumers are also workforce, in equation [6.39] 
a discrepancy in the post-disaster situation between the people who need to be fed 
(expressed in the need to satisfy consumption needs in the new vector of post-
catastrophe final demand) and the people employed as labour force in production 
(expressed in the wages paid to workers, and thus the capability to produce goods and 
services in the disrupted economy) becomes explicitly apparent. Finally, we should 
remark that it remains a matter of choice which model formulation will be chosen.  
In our goal to return to the pre-disaster proportions within an economic system, we 
may turn to the Von Neumann model that we have briefly introduced in Chapter 1. The 
reason is that final demand and labour supply are fixed, and determine the scope of 
production. In other words, when we endogenise both f and L, as we did in developing 
our alternative Basic equation in Section 6.6, this results in a closed input-output 
system; our goal of reproducing the pre-calamity proportions points in the direction of 
Von Neumann types of models. 
 
6.7. THE VON NEUMANN-LEONTIEF APPROACH  
Below we shall briefly discuss Von Neumann’s model for expanding and contracting 
economies. We shall see that the model addresses a different problem than Leontief’s 
model. Von Neumann rather focuses on the right proportions and prices in the light of a 
specific goal. The model nonetheless shares a number of basic properties with 
Leontief’s such as the description of productive activities in terms of production 
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functions expressed in terms of input and output coefficients. Differences with Leontief 
are that unlike Leontief’s industries, Von Neumann’s industries are characterized by 
joint production, i.e. each industry can produce more than one product. Furthermore, the 
matrices of input and output coefficients are rectangular, i.e. the number of commodities 
need not be equal to the number of activities. Finally, the model focuses on one 
particular type of growth. The balanced or proportional type of growth is characterized 
by the fact that the industries grow at the same rate, say 5 percent per year. This implies 
the possibility of industries that produce more output than it can sell to the other 
industries. This ‘extra’ output is a waste, and may pose questions of free disposal.   
As mentioned, a most important difference is the difference in focus. Von 
Neumann’s model focuses on the selection of commodities and activities in the light of 
an overall, macro-economic objective. This is quite unlike Leontief’s model where these 
choices already have been made. So, Von Neumann describes a selection process in the 
light of a particular question. This question is a deceptively simple one: Which selection 
of goods and activities should be made so that all activities in the set minimally grow at 
the same rate, which are the corresponding inter-sectoral input and output proportions, 
and which prices do obtain? The model also tells us which commodities are 
overproduced, and which activities are inefficient in the sense that output values do not 
cover input values. The question may be simple; the proof of the basic theorem is 
extremely complicated and involved an entirely new type of fixed point theorem (in 
later version, the proof was much simplified, see e.g. Kemeny, Morgenstern and 
Thompson, 1956). The model also tells us which commodities are overproduced, and 
which activities are inefficient in the sense that output values do not cover input values.   
Proportions under balanced growth (or contraction!) stay the same over time. Von 
Neumann also imposed a number of conditions to guarantee economic interpretability. 
Most interestingly, the model specification includes the first explicit reference in input-
output history to duality between the real output and price version of the same model. 
(That is, the internal relations in the ‘real’ sphere imply corresponding internal relations 
in the associated price model and vice versa).  
Let us now briefly introduce the model itself: A be the (m,n) matrix of input 
coefficients, and B the corresponding (m,n) matrix of output coefficients.74 Let 
furthermore x indicate the total output vector, and α - the uniform rate of balanced 
growth. Finally, let the notations > and < stand for the concepts ‘greater than’ and ‘less 
than’, with at least one equality, respectively.  
An equilibrium solution to the model is formed by vectors x and y and numbers α 
and β that satisfy the following five axioms:75  
xAxB α≥  [6.40] 
That is, we are looking for an output vector x such that all industries grow with the 
rate α while at least one industry grows at exactly that rate. 
ApBp β≤  [6.41] 
                                               
74
 This output matrix B should not be confused with the capital matrix in Leontief dynamic model of 
Section 5.3. 
75
 Here we follow the approach in Kemeny, Morgenstern and Thompson (1956). 
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This property is the competitiveness condition; no industry can make a profit.  
0)(  x  AB p =− α  [6.42] 
This is the free disposal assumption. If a commodity is oversupplied, its price is 
zero, and there are no additional problems of elimination.  
0)(  x  AB p =− β  [6.43] 
That is, inefficient (i.e. loss making) processes are not used. Finally, 
0  yBp >  [6.44] 
This axiom requires that the total value of all produced goods is positive. Von 
Neumann imposed, as an alternative to the last axiom, the so-called indecomposability 
condition. It implies that the economy cannot be decomposed in independent sub-
systems. 
0>+ B A  [6.45] 
The axiom [6.45] implies that the economy cannot be decomposed in independent 
sub-systems.76 Although in many cases satisfying these axioms will imply α = β, 
equality of α and β in general case require additional axioms, see Kemeny, Morgenstern 
and Thompson (1956). 
The Leontief closed model can be viewed as special case of Von Neumann’s 
model. If m = n, and if B = I, the Von Neumann model coincides with Leontief’s 
model.77 We have: 
xAx α=  [6.46] 
So, if processes are combined in these exact proportions, we have balanced growth 
or decline. If α > 1, we have economic growth. 
App β=  [6.47] 
Prices precisely cover the interest rate. Equilibrium implies: 
0)(  x  AI p =− α  [6.48] 
                                               
76
 See further Steenge en Konijn (1992) on the role of this axiom in relation to the phenomenon of joint 
production 
77
 We should add that Leontief explicitly opted for certain simplifications such as considering only one-
commodity activities. Many of these simplifications have been introduced to avoid a host of problems in 
empirically implementing the model.   
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and 
0)(  x  AI p =− β  [6.49] 
The total produced value is positive: 
0 x pxIp >=  [6.50] 
and finally: 
0  IA >+  [6.51] 
i.e., A is indecomposable. In this case, we have straightforwardly α = β. If α = β = 1, 
we have the closed model of Section 6.6. Both models are closed in the sense that there 
is no special category of primary inputs or resources. The system propagates without 
additional inputs ‘from outside’.  
 
6.8. ELEMENTS OF A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
In this Section we shall outline what may become an underlying principle of 
performing a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of preventive measures taken in the pre-
disaster period within an input-output framework. This may help us compare the costs 
associated with the implementation of preventive measures with the loss figures of an 
expected disaster in the a-priori analysis setting. Avoidance or decrease of losses 
compared to the benchmark situation would then count as benefits associated with the 
measure at hand. Carrying out a CBA requires a well-defined threshold for the 
comparison of alternative scenarios to the benchmark, or what is sometimes referred to 
as the ‘doing nothing’ option (see, for example, MAFF, 2000, p.19, for the discussion 
of this issue). 
Our model, by construction, allows us to investigate the consequences of large-
scale adversities at the level of the national economy. Besides, one of the crucial 
features of our approach is that the model also is able to determine losses emerging at 
the micro level. This is due particularly to the development of modern GIS 
technologies, which make it possible to bring together and link the geographical and 
economic data, to be used in the input-output framework. The advantage of this 
construction is that it allows us to model changes within an economic system (either 
before, after or during a major shock), independent of the level at which they emerge, 
be it the sector, the region or the individual establishment. 
The possibility for performing a CBA in our input-output framework finds its 
origin in the type of scenario analysis, to which we have briefly referred to in the 
previous Section. For a CBA this is an indispensable tool to use in the analyses of the 
options for policy and action in disaster preparedness, and to select the ones that are 
most desirable, effective or optimal for a decision-maker in a particular policy setting. 
In this Section, we shall consider three options as an illustration of which measures may 
be taken to limit the consequences of a possible major calamity. We shall provide what 
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can be seen as an outline for the way in which a CBA can be constructed in the 
framework of our model. 
We shall first consider one of the simplest options of protection against a flood. 
Suppose that the expected disaster extensiveness can be limited due to the installation 
of some additional flood barriers, like artificial dikes or levees, as indicatively reflected 
by the reduced shaded area in Figure 6.11 when compared to Figure 6.2. In that case, 
we might observe that this action would have saved two production facilities. As a 
result of this we may expect that the recovery process from this reduced flood might be 
speedier as fewer connections within an economy are disturbed, and achieving a new 
status-quo thus would be facilitated. 
Another possibility that can be analytically considered is the installation of 
additional prevention mechanisms around specific production facilities that may be of 
critical or of strategic importance for the entire economic network (see Figure 6.12). 
For example, it may be an important area where so-called ‘critical’ sector activities are 
clustered (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4), the loss of which would imply over-
proportional upwards or downwards effects throughout the system. Suppose now, that 
part of the plants that now could have been lost, if no action is taken, would have been 
saved by a targeted protection effort. 
 
    
Figure 6.11. A smaller- Figure 6.12. Different Figure 6.13. Reduced  
scale disaster after effect of a disaster vulnerability to a  
the imposition of after the targeted  disaster after spatial 
an additional flood protection of selected redistribution of  
protection barrier production facilities economic activities 
 
The two options for protection policy as described above are essentially directed 
at structural engineering solutions to keep water outside designated areas. An 
alternative to such policies would be a provision of incentives for economic agents, 
which are specifically directed at spatial rearrangements; see Figure 6.13, where two 
production facilities (D and E) are moved from the disaster area, and now are located in 
the safe area, while the extent of an expected flood remains the same as in the original 
situation on Figure 6.2. For example, a public campaign in the flood-prone areas 
making inhabitants and businesses aware of existing flood risks, may lead in the 
medium and long term to changes in decisions connected to the choices of locations 
D 
E 
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that economic agents make. We may expect that as a result of such a campaign, choices 
concerning residence and business locations may shift in favour of more protected or 
geographically safer areas. Such changes, if they take place, would mean a spatial 
reallocation of assets between various regions within a country (as a side effect of this 
option, some agents may also consider locations abroad that would lead to an 
undesirable outflow of economic activity). Another type of incentives that may trigger 
shifts in location preferences may be the creation of favourable tax conditions in 
relatively safe areas (using e.g., principles of off-shore zones). Prohibition to build new 
property in the disaster-prone areas or a decision of the authorities not to guarantee 
protection from disasters and subsequent losses to the new-comers (for example, the 
latter is the case in the dune zones in the Netherlands, see e.g Commissie Poelmann, 
2005), are among possible indirect measures aimed at restricting the growth and 
accumulation of economic and other valuable assets in the endangered zones. 
With respect to the possible policies aiming at spatial rearrangements,78 we have 
to note that it is important that each incentive is carefully reviewed in conjunction with 
an array of related factors in a broad context. These can be socio-demographic and 
psychological factors (where such aspects as ‘trust in government’ and the creation of 
credible expectations may play an important role), real estate markets and international 
competitiveness, et cetera. This additional information is indispensable in the process 
of the construction of credible scenarios. 
Analysis of the imposition of possible protection measures, evidently, involves a 
trade-off. Considerations whether or not to undertake investments in additional 
protection have to be weighed against lower direct and indirect post-disaster costs for 
the entire economy, as well as the distribution of costs on the micro- and meso-levels. 
Mathematically, prevention measures undertaken in the pre-disaster situation, as 
determined in our model described in the previous Sections, would have a number of 
implications. Engineering solutions, as imposition of additional protective barriers for 
the first two cases (depicted on Figures 6.11 and 6.12), would first of all affect pre-
disaster consumption (as represented by vector f and matrix F in equations [6.1]-[6.9]), 
as for example part of public spending would be invested in the construction of flood 
defences, which in a sense remain ‘idle’ until the event of a flood. At the same time, the 
second implication for our model would be a decrease in the γi’s, as in equations [6.11] 
to [6.18], as part of the production facilities would appear unharmed relative to the 
initial situation of ‘doing nothing’ (Figures 6.11 and 6.12, compared to Figure 6.2).  
A different type of implications for our CBA analysis may be involved for the 
case of adaptive change in spatial activity distribution. Here, a broader range of pre-
disaster effects throughout the economy is to be expected. It may affect almost every 
element of an input-output system already in the pre-disaster situation. On the one 
hand, for example, due to spatial movements of production activities and labour, the 
labour input vector l may change (in particular if multi-regional tables are available); 
also, due to regional differences, in commodities such as property or utilities, also 
(regional) consumption patterns as given in f may change. Such changes would 
influence in turn the construction of the M matrix in equations [6.4], and the 
construction of the M matrix in equations [6.5] through [6.7]. Major restructuring 
within an economy may also trigger shifts in production functions, which would affect 
the A matrix. All of these possible or expected changes in the pre-disaster situation, as 
                                               
78
 In the context of concepts defined in Chapter 2, we would refer to these as an example of an adaptation 
strategy. 
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an economy adapts to a potential hazard, can be analysed as taking place separately or 
together in various combinations on the basis of scenario work. A calamity, which 
would now cause less damage to the ‘renewed’ economy, would result in lower values 
for the relevant loss ratios, the γi’s in equations [6.11] through [6.18], and ultimately in 
a different picture for total disaster costs. A new basic equation (of the type [6.18] or 
[6.39]) underpinned by the accompanying changes before and after a disaster can then 
be derived and analysed, also with respect to prospective recovery patterns.  
 
 
Figure 6.14. Graphical illustration of the effects of adaptive strategies on disaster 
impacts. 
 
If we apply a two-commodity diagram, CBA can be illustrated as follows. In fact, 
the essence of such an exercise is to compare the effects (consequences in terms of 
economic loss in our case) of a shock in the initial situation to the effect of the same 
shock (which may effectively have a different extent) in the situation where pre-disaster 
adaptation and mitigation have taken place. This means that we may assume that as a 
result of mitigation measures taken, and adaptive processes taking place, the situation 
can be schematically depicted as in Figure 6.14. Due to improved resistance and 
resilience, the extent of the same shock as in our initial scenario is different in the 
adapted and additionally protected economy, the distortion can now be reflected as 
point 2E~  in the immediate disaster aftermath instead of 1E  in the baseline scenario. 
The benefits can be defined as the changes in losses in the improved situation (i.e., 
difference between 0E  and 2E~ , and in bridging this gap) compared to the losses made 
in the initial situation (i.e., the difference between 0E  and 1E , and bridging that gap).79 
The costs made for the implementation and subsequent restructuring of the economy in 
the ex-ante situation have then to be weighed against the expected benefits. (We have to 
make a not here that cost-benefit analysis has developed its own particular set of 
                                               
79
 We follow the definition of loss that we have established in the framework of our model earlier in this 
Chapter, Section 6.5. 
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concepts and measures. Bridging the differences between concepts of CBA and multi-
sectoral analysis will be a necessary next step.) 
One of the ways to improve resistance and resilience is to apply the developed 
GIS techniques in risk and emergency management (see also Appendix 5A). GIS 
techniques, with the extensive background database, can be applied in disaster 
management for analysing historical events and their consequences for specific 
locations, strategic planning as well as assisting in tactical planning on the spot in the 
immediate disaster aftermath. Prompt mobilisation, analysis and visualisation of data 
within GIS can also help gaining insight into the potential repercussions of future 
calamities to support policy and action and forming an integrative approach, for 
example together with economic and hydrological or seismic modelling (see Chen, 
Blong and Jacobson, 2003). This can be done based on a palette of scenarios for 
possible events, where analysis of emergency response and mitigation priorities can be 
performed visualising potential outcomes and bottlenecks, thus pointing to the areas 
where disaster preparedness should be improved. Finally, in the immediate disaster 
aftermath, GIS will prove indispensable for providing information for planning and 
coordination of recovery efforts, thus addressing an array of rigidities, contributing to 
the speedy restoration of broken links or the establishment of new links. This means 
that a GIS, with its entire set of techniques and data, is an important aspect in the field 
of disaster studies to be addressed and integrated better in the future, as one of the 
means to significantly improve system preparedness and response. 
 
6.9. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter we have proposed an input-output based methodology for discussing 
sudden shifts in the economic structure as a result of a major shock. Our study has 
explored the possibilities the methodology may offer. Input-output, despite its 
limitations, seems an excellent choice if, for whichever reason, the stricken economy is 
confronted with rigidities, be they of a technological or an institutional nature. In this 
contribution we have focused on one particular aspect of a catastrophe, namely its size 
in relation to the country or region that is affected. The consequences of the catastrophe 
have been interpreted in terms of a disruption of existing connections within an 
economic network. This is an aspect that input-output analysis, with its characteristic 
focus on connections and interrelations, seems to have been neglected largely.  
In this Chapter we have focused on the model’s properties in terms of rigidities. 
As we pointed out, the term may need additional attention. The Leontief model often is 
associated with rigidities. They have almost exclusively a technological interpretation. 
That is, only particular types of activities are possible or allowed for technological 
reasons. That is, substitutes are impossible, or very difficult to realise. However, there 
are additional rigidities, rather of a social or institutional nature that intensify the extent 
of technological rigidities in the immediate disaster aftermath. One of these is what 
may be called the full employment ‘imperative’. That is, employment targets are seen 
as one of the most important properties of an economy, and policies should be directed 
at that. Employment will invariably be affected after a disaster. It is true, of course, that 
in the disaster’s aftermath many new jobs are created such as in the emergency sphere 
in medicine, waste collection, and, general, restoration. However, these are mostly 
temporary and ‘exceptional’. In terms of regular jobs associated with the traditional 
occupations, there often will be a substantial problem. 
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We have employed the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and adaptability 
(discussed in Chapter 2) as helpful means for structuring our thinking about the 
disaster, the recovery thereafter, and over-all preparedness. Analytically we have 
distinguished three stages. These are: first, the immediate disaster aftermath, where the 
system’s vulnerability plays a major role; second, the recovery and reconstruction 
processes where resilience is most important; and third, pre-disaster precautionary 
strategies aiming at preparation for a potential shock. Here we meet the concepts of 
adaptability and mitigation. 
Regarding the first stage, we have put forward what we view as the ‘Basic 
equation’ [6.18]. This equation offers a detailed survey of the imbalances that exist 
immediately after a disaster. To be precise, we actually defined the notion of 
‘imbalances’ in terms of this equation. The Basic equation also offers a structured 
insight in the choices the economy has to make (which is pointed out by a number of 
authors, inter alia, Gilbert, 2002). Naturally, a great many paths can be followed after 
the direction (such as restoring the pre-catastrophe situation) has been determined. But 
even such a central goal is only one of many the economy may wish to consider. Our 
approach makes use of the possibilities that GIS and other spatial information systems 
offer in obtaining a detailed insight in the geographical dimensions of the catastrophe.  
During the second stage, recovery possibilities can be examined, where scenario 
analysis is considered to guide the way in the uncertain world of post-disaster analysis. 
For steering the recovery, it is important to possess a set of feasible scenarios and select 
desirable ones in advance. Insights into the vulnerability and revival capacity of an 
economic system are essential for policy advice, which forms the core of the third 
stage. Here, precautionary measures can be analysed, possibly weighted and evaluated 
in terms of their gains (often, expressed in terms of lower or avoided losses) against 
costs made to implement those measures.  
We have also pointed out that ‘costs’ should be defined against the background of 
the adopted recovery scenario. A good insight in where the economy wants to be at the 
end of the recovery stage, and how it plans to achieve it, are essential here. Here again 
the term ‘rigidity’ comes to mind. We should –again– think of generally shared 
opinions such as the importance of employment and maintaining established 
consumption packages, all finding their meaning in terms of the circular flow concept.    
Further, we present an alternative derivation of a Basic equation for the 
description of survived capacity in a post-disaster economy. In this case, we essentially 
focus on one type of imbalances, namely a disruption in the relation between the net 
product an economy can produce and the remuneration of the labour force. After a 
major disaster, there will be a mismatch between net product and the demands made by 
labour. To this end, we leave the traditional open model and have focused on a special 
closed model including a labour equation explicitly, in which the relevant imbalances 
can be traced more directly. In this alternative formulation, households’ consumption is 
treated as an input. This approach provides an alternative to the formulation [6.18] 
discussed above, where we have used the labour equation as an interim tool to account 
for final demand loss.  
In the alternative formulation of the Basic equation [6.39], we in fact ended up 
with a type of hybrid Leontief-Von Neumann model. This way, our recovery planning 
exercise receives a new interpretation. Essentially, because Von Neumann growth 
model stresses the importance of observing proportionality in an economic system, this 
also becomes our leading principle in recovery path selection. Namely, this setting 
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makes us follow such a direction, which returns the disturbed economy to its pre-
disaster proportions (both in terms of intermediate input requirements and final 
demand). In this manner, all the resources that are physically in place over the needed 
proportions are considered in excess, and hence as being ‘superfluous’. Moreover, if it 
is not possible to dispose of them on foreign markets, they will become idle, and in this 
setting will be seen as a loss. At the same time, those resources that are available only in 
limited amounts act as bottlenecks for putting the system back on track, at which 
recovery efforts should be directed in the first instance to ensure fast reconstruction. 
Possible extensions of the model are in several areas. Applications in inter- and 
multi-regional analysis easily come to mind. There are many more possibilities than 
have been addressed in terms of the model. The use of GIS data and coupling an 
economic model with GIS techniques also offers ample opportunities for extending 
empirical work in the field of disaster analysis. Besides, featuring a synthesis of theory 
and practice, the model may be a good candidate for use in policy analysis and advice. 
For example, post-disaster policy will be needed to accompany market mechanisms in 
steering the circulation and distribution of the resources in appropriate ways between 
the various agent categories. In this context, we propose that vulnerable countries 
should develop a portfolio of post-disaster relief and reconstruction policies. It is here 
that more specialised models such as the dynamic models of Section 5.3 in Chapter 5 
may find their place. 
In this thesis, we have focused exclusively on imbalances in the absolute sphere. 
Further attention, in any case, should be devoted to questions concerning the 
circumstances under which price mechanisms can guide the economy in its path to a 
’normal‘ equilibrium situation. Because standard input-output theory only provides 
sustaining prices in the equilibrium situation, we will need here an accompanying 
theory of prices to support the post-shock choices. Underlying any such theory must be 
insight in what markets can perform in the situation at hand, and what the role of 
government should be. Another issue is the role of the infrastructural systems like 
transportation, utility services and communications. We have not addressed this point 
explicitly in this Chapter. This is because we tacitly have assumed that disturbed links 
between firms in affected and non-affected areas can be replaced without undue cost by 
new or extended links between firms in the non-affected area. However, in establishing 
these connections, new types of transportation and transaction costs will arise, which 
must be accounted for in later modelling efforts. Similar observations are valid 
regarding the time aspects involved to properly distinguish between static and dynamic 
issues. Thus, in a number of steps, we have moved from the Basic equation introduced 
in an open Leontief model, to a Basic equation defined in a closed model. We started 
with some diagrams in ‘DOSSO-style’, and later on moved to a set of figures closer to 
the Von Neumann-Leontief set of closed models. This provided an introduction to the 
interpretation of a catastrophic event in highly developed countries in terms of 
contracting Von Neumann-Leontief logics. 
A concluding remark is here at place. The suggested model, of Von Neumann-
Leontief type, where ultimately the system is forced to shrink triggered by the level of 
the most hit sector, is clearly an extreme. In this formulation, where rigidities take the 
central place, and no substitution (in fact, no resilience) is possible, we arrive at a 
‘radical’ conclusion that every input and every sector is critical. This means, that our 
proposed model provides a maximum estimate of economic loss. Here, the indirect 
effects, which are triggered by the direct ones are at their highest. This implies that 
every improvement in the level of the system’s resilience will yield a lower total 
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damage figure. For modelling and analysis of such options, a different set of 
assumptions, and, possibly, a different procedure will be necessary (after the 
construction of the Basic equation) to arrive at a new state of equilibrium. The aim of 
our ‘modelling exercise’ was to provide a clear and consistent framework for the 
analysis of a major disturbance in a modern, highly interconnected economy. Further 
improvements and extensions of the current framework together with fine-tuned 
scenarios, are left for the future research agenda. Also, the linearity assumption 
underlying the model belongs to the set of issues that needs further inquiry. For 
example, the proposed Basic equation will not always result in a linear implosion of the 
system; an assumption of ‘perfect flexibility’ would turn the Basic equation into an 
actual equilibrium, thus implying a structural break (caused by a heterogeneous shock).  
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Part Three  
Analysis 
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Chapter 7  
Model Illustration: a Hypothetical Flooding in 
Randstad (the Netherlands) 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION  
Currently, several sources exist which contribute to the increase in probability of 
flooding in the Netherlands. The ones attributed to climate change are: increased 
precipitation; melting of snow caps in the Alps, triggering the occurrence of extremes in 
peak flows; and the sea level rise. Others are the gradually subsiding ground level in the 
West of the country and an observed change in the bottom pattern of the North Sea, 
which might affect the wave patterns that reach the shores of the Netherlands. Altered 
wave patterns might in turn produce unexpected pressure on the dunes that protect the 
coast from inundation by seawater. This implies, that more pressure is put on the entire 
water management system in the Netherlands to adapt to changing circumstances, where 
modelling and analysis of economic vulnerabilities deem indispensable. 
We shall take the case of a hypothetical (yet possible) major flooding in the 
Netherlands as a reference case in our research. In the preceding Chapters we have 
provided a basis for analytical approach towards modelling economic consequences of 
large-scale disturbances in modern economies. In the current Chapter, we shall apply 
this model to an illustrative case study of a simulated flooding in the central part of the 
Netherlands to set the agenda for a debate around changing attitudes in the Dutch water 
and flood management in the next Chapter with our model as a possible tool for 
decision-making support.  
The main objective of this illustrative case study is to analyse the consequences of 
a relatively severe inundation in the Netherlands, and to show how the developed input-
output methodology for disaster analysis can be used to perform such an exercise. To do 
this, we shall fist describe the data connected to this case study and link it to the needs 
of our modelling approach. Next, we shall perform the calculations for losses incurred 
in the economic network as a result of interruptions of the circular flow. We shall select 
a return to initial proportions as a basis scenario for our recovery stage. Further, we 
shall compare the obtained results with the earlier study of ours where ad-hoc 
methodology for loss estimation was used. We shall close with summary and 
discussion. 
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7.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE AND THE DATA 80 
In this Section, we shall present the hypothetical case study that we shall use as an 
example to illustrate the economic model that we have developed (Chapter 6) for 
studying effects of disruptions in the circular flow as a result of a massive calamity in a 
modern economy. Challenges presented by data availability as well as data 
compatibility will be discussed here. But before that, we shall devote a few words on 
the specificity of situation in the Netherlands in the domain of flood protection.  
 
7.2.1. Dike Rings in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands takes a special place in the spectrum of countries provided its efforts in 
the field of flood protection. Because of its location, in the course of time the country 
has developed a particular sort of landscape. The part of the country vulnerable to 
flooding from sea or rivers is subdivided into a number of so-called dike-ring areas. 
Each dike-ring area is surrounded by a ring of natural or manmade water defences, such 
as dikes, dunes, concrete structures or high grounds. There are 99 of such dike-ring 
areas in the country, including the ones along the Meuse. Figure 7.1 below resembles 
only those dike rings that were originally included in the Flood Defence Act (1996); 
later, in 2005 also dike rings along the river Meuse with standards for dike overtopping 
once in 500 years were added to the Act. 
A dike-ring area consists of one or more polders or low-lying areas. In the 
Western coastal area, the standard for the exceedance probability is most stringent (once 
per 10.000 years), followed by the Southern and Northern coastal areas (once per 4.000 
years). Several of the smaller dike-ring areas (in terms of population and economic 
significance) are faced with exceedance probabilities in the neighbourhood of once per 
150 or 200 years (in Limburg). The reason for having differences in standards for 
different areas was the observed variation in population and capital densities in the 
different parts of the Netherlands. All these standards are laid down in the Flood 
Defence Act (1996). Estimated maximum loss per dike ring varies greatly, ranging from 
160 million euro in the island of Terschelling to 300 billion euro in Central Holland, 
dike ring 14 (MTP, 2005c, p.8).81  
In the coming Sections, we shall provide a study of economic loss based on the 
specifications of a particular (hypothetical) flood in central Holland (dike ring number 
14). It is one of the largest dike-ring areas, comprising the densely populated Western 
part of the Netherlands and covers important parts of the provinces of Noord-Holland, 
Zuid-Holland, and Utrecht, and includes several major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
The Hague, Leiden, Haarlem, Gouda). 
 
                                               
80
 We are highly indebted to Christiaan Logtmeijer for data collection and computational assistance 
during the early stages of this research, as well as to the Delft Cluster “Risk due to Flooding” programme 
team for provision of the data and close cooperation. 
81
 The estimated loss figures above are provided as an indication for relative economic importance of 
various dike rings as given in MTP report (2005c). Possible argumentation on methodological issues 
around the estimations and models of economic damage is given in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
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Figure 7.1. Safety Standards per Dike Ring in the Netherlands  
(source: MTP, 2005d, p.13) 
 
 
7.2.2. The Case 
For our application exercise, we shall use the example of a dam break in the province of 
South Holland in the Netherlands, dike ring 14, which should serve a fruitful 
playground for modelling the consequences of vast economic disruption. This case 
study was initiated within the Delft Cluster theme “Consequences of Flooding”, project 
“Risk due to Flooding”, where a hypothetical dike breach near Rotterdam was 
simulated, with a massive flooding of major parts of the Randstad area as its 
consequence. Randstad is the biggest urbanized area surrounding the so-called Green 
Hart in the Netherlands and a conurbation in Europe, lying in four provinces and 
including three major Dutch cities.  
The location of a river dike breach near Rotterdam (along Hollandse IJssel or the 
Nieuw Maas) was selected as the one expectedly leading to a most disastrous flood 
(Asselman and Heynert, 2003, p.11). The reason is that supply of water at this location 
in the river Rhine is large; as are the differences between the water levels during the 
periods of high and low discharge. Also, the elevation of land behind the dike in this 
area reaches at places more than 6 meters below the sea level. Finally, because of the 
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absence of floodplains near Rotterdam, water can flow through the gaps in the dikes 
even when water levels at the river drop to a very low level.  
The flooding of the southeastern Randstad area, following the simulation 
developed by Delft Hydraulics (ibid), would occur very rapidly, i.e. within 5 hours. It 
would take 5 days more before the entire area of about 50.000 ha becomes inundated. 
The output of the hydrological model thus comprises a map with water depths for the 
case of flood caused by a dike breach near Rotterdam (see Figure 7.2 below, where the 
arrow shows the point of the breach). Orange colour provides the borders of the dike 
ring; blue colours indicate the depth of the flood water (the darker the colour, the higher 
the depth of the flood, reaching 5 to 6m in its extreme). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Maximum water depths computed for the hypothetical case study of 
a dike breach near Rotterdam 
 (source: Asselman and Heynert, 2003, p.15) 
 
Some facts below from the Delft Cluster research team will illustrate the extent of 
this hypothetical simulated flooding. Because of the large volume of water stored in the 
flooded area (1,37x109 m3), it would expectedly take 160 days to pump all water out 
(ibid, p.15), causing substantial environmental contamination of the area (Stuyt et al., 
2003) and over 70.000 expected victims (Asselman and Jonkman, 2003). Van der Veen 
et al. (2003b) provided the estimation of expected economic losses within the Delft 
Cluster project, which were calculated based on a rudimentary input-output type of 
model. The indication of economic damages was mounting up to 5 to 10% loss of value 
added in productive sectors depending on the recovery scenario (we shall discuss these 
figures in Section 7.3.2). In the current Chapter we shall provide the estimations of 
economic losses associated with the interruptions in circular flow with the help of our 
newly developed input-output model. Because we shall use flooding data based on the 
same initial conditions as in the Delft Cluster study of 2003, it will also enable us to 
compare the two economic loss estimations.  
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Every time a researcher has to apply a theoretical model to a case study, two major 
challenges are faced. The first is that data availability is not always guaranteed; it is 
important that systematically collected, reliable data is available on the spot. At the 
same time, another challenge concerns data compatibility. Even if reliable data is there, 
it not always fits the requirements of the theoretically developed model. Often, 
additional calculations, data from other sources and / or proxies are needed to bridge the 
gap and keep the model operational for practical purposes. Also in the case of Delft 
Cluster study, some limitations were encountered, which we shall discuss in the next 
Section. 
 
7.2.3. The Data 
Economic data 
The basic economic data requirement of our theoretical model to carry out the analysis 
of economic repercussions of large-scale disruptions is the availability of an input-
output transactions table as a basis to model the disturbed relations in an economy. In 
fact, bi-regional tables for every province of the Netherlands for the year 1997 compiled 
at the University of Groningen became available for us in the framework of Delft 
Cluster inquiry. The bi-regional structure of the input-output tables provides us the 
information about the transactions within a province of the Netherlands, and between 
the respective province and the rest of the economy, for all 12 provinces. The 
transactions table was constructed according to a semi-survey method (Eding and 
Stelder, 1995), in which survey methods were combined with technical methods to 
construct the transactions table in the time-period between 1992 and 1997 (see also 
Appendix 5A to Chapter 5). Some may claim that the data in the tables may be out of 
date; however literature (Eding and Stelder, 1995) suggests that the main characteristics 
of the economic structure in the ‘business as usual’ time remain the same. This makes it 
possible for us to assume that most relationships within the Dutch economy remain 
stable these days as well. 
Our case study takes place in the province of South Holland; this means that we 
shall use the respective input-output transactions table for the province of South Holland 
and the rest of the country. However, our model for analysing major disruptions in an 
economy as it stands now is developed in a single region input-output context. This 
means that we would have to ‘reduce’ the bi-regional transaction table to a single 
region. This can easily be performed by row-wise and column-wise summations of 
transactions in two locations by respective industries. For example, we would sum the 
purchases of the agricultural sector in South Holland82 and in the rest of the country to 
obtain a single column of expenditure for the agricultural sector on the country level. 
The same procedure for the sales of each industry would be followed to obtain a row of 
sectoral revenues on the country level. Note also that these input-output data are in 
guilders, so to adjust for euro prices, one needs to divide each entry by 2,2 (see 
Appendix 7B). 
                                               
82
 In fact, we could have taken any bi-regional input-output table for the Netherlands when we had 
decided to reduce it to a single region table. Theoretically, it should have given us in the end the same 
input-output table. 
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While after some manipulation our input-output table for the country became 
useable, it still did not possess any reference to the location, which we need to reflect 
the spatial dimension of the flood. In the process of development of our model, we 
realised that without a geographic link, understanding and modelling of economic 
impacts of major calamities and their repercussions throughout an economy cannot be 
complete. Thus, the challenge that we face also in the empirical study is to combine the 
output of the hydrological model provided by Delft Hydraulics (as described above) 
with the input-output table in such a way that it fits the needs of the economic model 
that we have presented in Chapter 6. The literature on earthquake hazard modelling 
(French, 1998) suggests the use of a conceptual framework, which links physical 
damage to economic functions using the spatial relation both have in common. 
Translating this to the case of a large-scale flood, this means that we can make a 
conceptual model depicted in Figure 7.3. Today, we have geographic information 
systems at hand that represent this spatial relationship (GIS, discussed in Appendix 5A 
to Chapter 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Conceptual model for GIS-analysis (French, 1998) 
 
French (ibid, p.51) further claims: “The spatial analysis techniques available in a 
GIS provide a mechanism for linking the formerly separate physical and economic 
modelling efforts.” To bring in this connecting innovative element that was not 
available before, we need to look for a data set, which would resemble an explicit link 
between the spatial characteristics of both the hydrological and the economic model. 
For these purposes, we could utilise a set of economic data that is used in the HIS-
SSM83 damage model. We shall recall that it is based on the so-called standard method, 
see our discussion of economic damage modelling in Chapter 4 and (Vrisou van Eck 
and Kok, 2001). This is a dataset, which is generated by Dun and Bradstreet Marketeer 
and Prospector (D&B). It contains information on the location, size (number of 
employees) and the sort of economic activity (per 4 digit SIC code) of any place in the 
Netherlands for the year 2002. We have to notice here, that to be able to use the micro-
level D&B data, it needs to be reclassified according to the SBI coding, which is used in 
the Dutch input-output transactions tables. This is done by using a reclassification 
schemes to transform SIC data into SBI data; the schemes are available from Statistics 
Netherlands (see www.cbs.nl). See Appendix 7A for the description of both schemes. 
The spatial element in the D&B dataset is thus a six-digit zip code. Besides, we 
have a dataset of all zip codes in the Netherlands with their geographical X and Y 
coordinates. This makes it possible for us to geo-reference economic data, i.e., to link 
specific economic data to a geographical position, and thus connect the information on 
the location of economic activity and the map of the hypothesised flooding. Ultimately, 
                                               
83
 HIS-SSM is the policy support Module for Victim and Damage estimation within the Dutch High 
Water Information System (in Dutch: Hoogwater Informatiesysteeem – Schade- en Slachtoffer module). 
Other policy-support modules are the Flooding Module and Evacuation Module. The operational part of 
HIS consists of Monitoring and Registration. For more information, see www.hisinfo.nl. 
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this results in a database in which we have, per zip code, data on economic activities 
categorised by the type of activity and size of activity in terms of number of employees.  
GIS and Data Transformations 
To manipulate and fit all the data into one fully consistent base, one needs special GIS 
software, Arcview84. We could download both the output of the hydrological model 
with the map of the simulated flooded area (see Figure 7.4) and the D&B data on 
economic activity into a GIS environment. It is a system in which we can visualize 
(with the help of a map) any kind of data that has a geo-reference, in its geographical 
context. Furthermore we can select and analyse the data within this setting for specific 
analytical purposes.  
Figure 7.4 shows the operational implementation of the conceptual model of 
Figure 7.3. It shows how a link can be made between data on a micro-level and data on 
a more aggregated level. Each row entry in the table to the right contains a 
disaggregated micro-level economic data with a 6-digit zip code. The zip code file can 
be called a cornerstone of our analysis, and contains the centres (with X and Y 
coordinates) of every zip code in the Netherlands. The description of the zip code is 
given in column two of the table, and the X and Y coordinates are given in respectively 
column 3 and 4. Column 5 represents the number of employees and in columns 6 and 7 
the description of economic activity can be found. The blue dots on the map to the left 
represent the centres of zip codes, which is also the source of the geo-reference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Example of the link between spatial and economic data 
Schematically, in the chart below (Figure 7.5) the overview of our data and 
manipulations therewith are depicted as a visualisation of Figure 4 above. On top of the 
flowchart we find the four datasets, which are used in this study. Below these, in 
rectangles the operations we apply to the data are represented: one is a join between two 
datasets, and another is an overlay between two spatial entities. 
                                               
84
 For more information on Arcview, as well as other GIS and mapping software, consult designers’ 
website at http://www.esri.com/software/arcview/index.html.  
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Figure 7.5. Flowchart of data and data manipulations. 
 
With the GIS software, we can make an overlay of multiple layers of geo-
referenced information to select the zip codes, which are affected by the flood. This 
overlay operation is in fact the combination of the output of the hydrological model (in 
the form of the map, see Figure 7.2) and the economic D&B data. Since we have 
different types of geo-referenced information, putting the hydrological model (the shape 
of the end-result of the flood-simulation) ‘on top’ of the economic micro-data will select 
the companies and factories that will be directly affected by the simulated flood. This in 
turn will provide us information on the precise nature and size of economic disruption, 
namely with the number of employees per economic activity per zip code that are 
affected by the flood. 
Here we might face two problems, however. One of them has to do with temporal 
discrepancies between the two data sets we dispose of. We have mentioned above that 
the input-output tables we have at hand are dated to the year 1997, while the D&B 
dataset on economic activity with a zip code attribute dates to 2002. With regard to that, 
Eding and Stelder (1995) conclude that input-output data can still be valuable for 
analysis, as soon as economic structure remains constant in the industrialised countries 
for years during ‘business-as-usual’ periods. 
Another problem that surfaces is the fact that we have only employment data per 
economic activity per zip code (from the D&B data set), while we are aiming at 
analysing disruptions in the circular flow that affect productive output and value-added. 
In fact, here we are talking about estimating the extent of disruption per sector of 
activity, which we can only make via employment loss, and then connect it to our input-
output model where we use disruption coefficients to analyse economy-wide effects. 
Yet, this does not seem to hinder the quality of our analysis, as the literature points to 
other examples, where production capacity loss was approximated by employment 
losses (see French, 1998). Because more detailed data (e.g., on production volumes, 
value added or wages) is not currently available, we should consider employment as an 
Zipcode file Employment per site
Join , based on
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Hydrological
model
overlay
Number of hit
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Aggregation from micro data to meso level
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acceptable proxy for the estimation of production loss for our illustrative case study. To 
apply this approach, we have to assume that output per sector (that is known to us from 
the input-output table) is proportional to the number of employees (which is available 
from the D&B data set), which is also confirmed in the literature (see Rose and 
Benavides, 1998). This implies that we can calculate sectoral loss coefficients, γi’s (see 
also Chapter 6, Section 6.4), in the following manner: 
)(
)(
totali
affectedi
i N
N
=γ  [7.1] 
where )(affectediN  is the number of employees affected by the flood in sector i, which we 
obtain from the geo-referenced overlay of the hydrological and economic data; and 
)(totaliN  is the total number of employees for sector i before the flood obtained from the 
D&B data set. The sectoral γi’s are found in Appendix 7A. 
This transformation will complete the link between the two economic data sets 
and finalise the transition from hydrological map with defined borders of the simulated 
flooding to the zip code file with geographical coordinates, which is linked to the D&B 
data set on economic activity and employment, and ultimately to the input-output table 
that we use in our economic consequence modelling. In the following Sections, we shall 
describe the calculations that we shall perform for the above mentioned case study with 
the help of the newly developed input-output disaster model, and compare its results 
with our earlier attempts to estimate economic loss (see Van der Veen et al., 2003b). 
 
7.3. APPLICATION OF THE DESIGNED INPUT-OUTPUT DISASTER 
ANALYSIS MODEL 
In the previous Section we have described our case study in the framework of the Delft 
Cluster project “Risks due to Flooding”, and the data that were available for us to 
perform application studies within the project. We have outlined that a number of 
problems were encountered, such as accessibility to data, applicability of data and 
compatibility of data coming from different sources. We had to apply specified 
assumptions (see the previous Sections) to assemble the data in such a way that it 
became useable for our modelling purposes. In the end, we succeeded to obtain 
approximated coefficients for the loss of production capacity per economic activity 
sector (γi’s) based on the hydrological map of flooding in central Holland. In this 
Section, we shall continue with the calculations for the hypothetically simulated dike 
breach case near Rotterdam and its possible consequences for the Dutch economy. 
Our developed model for analysing the effects of major disturbances in modern 
economies is essentially input-output based (as described in Chapter 6). We recall, that 
the input-output model in its standard formulation has undergone some adjustments to 
be able to account for disproportions and disequilibrium that are observed in the direct 
disaster aftermath. Further development is given to the recovery options that essentially 
require clearly stated strategies. Finally, a type of CBA analysis is possible to be 
performed with the proposed model to study the effectiveness of pre-selected preventive 
measures and disaster preparedness. The model is essentially split in three stages 
(disequilibrium, recovery and a CBA of a-priori adaptation), where latter two stages are 
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suggested to be carried out with the help of scenario analysis instead of prediction (a 
brief background for scenario analysis is given in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. 
In this case study, we shall effectively look at the first two stages (applying the 
basic design, see Chapter 6, Section 6.3), which will keep our analysis comparable to 
our earlier results of economic loss estimation based on the preliminary approach (Van 
der Veen et al., 2003a). Further elaborations in the direction of studying and 
constructing credible scenarios for a cost-benefit analysis in the preparedness stages are 
advised to be left for later inquiries. This means that for now we shall mostly 
concentrate on the reconstruction of the disequilibrium stage and sorting out the course 
for recovery planning. 
The input that we need in order to be able to perform damage assessment with the 
help of our proposed input-output model is first of all, an input-output table, and, 
second, industry disruption coefficients. We have both of them at our disposal, and we 
believe each component needs some additional attention. In Chapter 5 we have 
described a basic input-output model, starting from the description of an input-output 
table. It is apparent that on the expenditure side, an input-output table should contain 
outlays of productive sectors for intermediate inputs (representing their technologies) as 
a part of the inter-industry transaction matrix, and expenditures on the primary inputs. 
Alternatively, on the income side, an input-output table should represent sales of 
productive sectors as rows of the inter-industry matrix, and final demand categories. In 
general, the construction and presence of an inter-industry matrix is rather 
straightforward; mostly, differences appear in which primary sectors and final demand 
categories are present. The input-output tables for the Netherlands dated 1997 contain 
four categories on the part of primary inputs that can be described as imports, taxes, 
wages and profits. The important category for our inquiry is ‘wages’ which we shall use 
in the input-output model transformation into the disequilibrium stage of disaster 
aftermath. Essentially, because here our primary inputs consist of four elements (as 
opposed to the 2x2 example in Chapter 6 where we have assumed the presence of a 
single primary input, i.e. labour) it suggests that, following the logic of our proposed 
model, only that part of final demand can be lost that is not consumed from the lost 
wages. This, in fact, provides some justification to the fact that disruption coefficients, 
γi’s, which we can use in our case, are based on the loss of employees rather than output 
(see Section 7.2.2). Also, because the link between the geo-referenced employment data 
set of D&B (as we also described above) and the input-output table is made through 
coefficients of lost labour force, the discrepancy in time between the two data sets 
should not be a problem. Essentially, finding the sectoral coefficients of lost productive 
capacity via the sectoral proportions of lost employment may be seen as one of possible 
proxies; another would be conventional loss of output; while other researchers might 
find value added loss as a justifiable option.  
 
7.3.1. The Basic Equation: Transformations of the Input-Output Table 
The first stage of our model results in what we call the ‘Basic equation’. Let us describe 
the calculations and transformations that the input-output table had to undergo to arrive 
at this equation. For reference, the initial input-output table is given in Appendix 7B. 
In the course of our exercise, we shall follow the same order as outlined in 
Chapter 6, Sections 6.3 to 6.5 describing the basic design of our input-output model. 
Essentially we start with the calculations of the M matrix, which consists of two 
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matrices, F and Z. While the latter can directly be obtained as an inter-industry 
transactions matrix from the input-output table, the former requires more attention. We 
recall the definition of the F matrix, which is in fact a final demand vector dispersed 
through all sectors as consumption bundles that workers buy proportional to their 
income. By construction, the F matrix has the same proportions across its columns 
reflecting identical preferences of all labourers; only between the columns proportions 
are different according to the wages earned, or in other words, the number of workers 
employed in the sector (see also equation [6.3]). Each column, thus, shows in which 
way wages are spent on various consumption goods. This means that we need to know 
the proportions in which final goods are consumed, and the values of wages paid (and 
consequently, earned) per sector to arrive at the F matrix. Wages paid to the employees 
are obtained from the input-output table (see Appendix 7B) as a part of primary 
production factors, alongside with imports, taxes and profits. Final demand proportions 
can be easily calculated by dividing each sectoral demand by the total value of 
consumption demand. The multiplication of the vertical final demand proportions vector 
(nx1) by the horizontal vector of wages (1xn) yields the matrix which we have defined 
as the worker’s real wage matrix F (to be found in Appendix 7C). (Note, however, that 
the row totals of the F matrix do not coincide with the final demand vector from our 
input-output table, because the former represent only that portion of final demand that is 
consumed from labour income.) 
Adding together matrices Z and F brings us the matrix M, to which a special role 
is attributed in our modelling. We should again refer, respectively, to the equations 
[6.8], [6.9] and [6.10]. Matrix M, which reflects inter-industry transactions in both 
intermediate and final goods, enables us to connect physical losses brought by a 
calamity to both sides of economic construct, i.e., production and consumption. 
Provided the knowledge of location and the extent of disturbance, we can split the pre-
disaster M matrix into two parts, representing the lost and spared parts of the economy. 
This provides the advantage of being able to directly trace the damage ‘as it occurs’. We 
do this with the help of sectoral loss coefficients, the γi’s (see equation [7.1], Section 
7.2.3).85  
The next step is to split the M matrix into two matrices reflecting the immediate 
post-disaster situation (see equation [6.16]). In fact, we are mostly interested in the 
recapitulation of the spared part, which will go on with recovery. To have the accounts 
of what is left, the MS matrix (see equations [6.16] and [6.17] in Chapter 6), we in fact 
need to multiply the columns of the M matrix by the respective sectoral factors of 
surviving capacity (1-γi), as given in Appendix 7A. Finally, we have to separate the final 
demand part and assemble it again as a vector to give the table the corresponding input-
output format. Via column-wise addition, we obtain the vector t and arrive at what the 
Basic equation (i.e., equation [6.18]). What we have now obtained should rather be 
called the ‘basic disequilibrium input-output table’. This has been reproduced in 
Appendix 7D. We should mention that in this situation, final demand has shrunken 
proportionally,86 all disproportions thus stem from the new total output. Total 
production loss at this stage is recorded at 2.68%. 
                                               
85
 Above we have also discussed how we were able to obtain these coefficients for our case study. 
Namely, we utilised the knowledge about the loss of employed personnel by location and productive 
sector as a result of the simulated vast flooding in the West of the Netherlands. 
86
 This can also be observed by looking at equation [6.17], where each row element f.j is multiplied by the 
same fraction of survived capacity (1-γi). 
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We recall that a Basic equation (in fact, a table as in Appendix 7D) is ‘merely’ an 
accounting table that reflects what is left in the economic network directly after a 
distress. This is not yet a balanced system, at least not in the sense of its pre-disaster 
proportions. We may only observe here factual remaining capacity of the system in 
‘translated’ from the initial physical damages as a result of a hazard. On the one hand, 
because the Basic equation shows the potential of the system, it does not necessarily 
mean that the system is able to produce this amount of total output provided new 
intermediate and final demands. On the other hand, even if a system is able to produce 
this new output, it will be able to utilise all of the resources to its advantage available in 
disproportion only if it possesses a high level of resilience. Unfortunately, practice has 
shown that systems under attack are not able to react fast and efficiently and thus are not 
flexible enough to adjust instantaneously to new circumstances. In fact, provided the 
chaos and uncertainty in the immediate calamity aftermath, some of the resources may 
appear to be superfluous as the system attempts to achieve its pre-disaster proportions. 
We have chosen to focus on this trajectory as one of the possibilities for recovery, 
discussed in Chapter 6. For our current exercise this means that final output proportions 
should be restored according to the pre-disaster ones, i.e., the t vector should become a 
‘sensible’ vector xnew. We have adopted for this vector an output vector having the 
proportions of the pre-disaster total output vector. However, the elements of our ‘xnew 
vector’ reflect the 5,10% loss as discussed earlier (the last but one column of Appendix 
7D). The last column in Appendix 7D presents the differences (in fact, the ‘superfluous’ 
production). We thus may observe that if we transform vector t into the vector xnew 
following pre-disaster proportions, it would lead to a much higher, almost double, figure 
for the immediate production loss, namely 5,10%. This is due to the fact that, under the 
assumption of proportionality, the most hit sector plays a role of a bottleneck to all other 
(less damaged) sectors.  
Furthermore, if we assume that in fact many rigidities are present, either of 
technological or of institutional character (discussed in Chapter 3), we may wish to 
calculate the effects of what can be seen as a ‘worst case’ scenario regarding immediate 
loss. If we think in terms of the loss factors, the γi’s, then the biggest disruption can be 
incurred if all sectors are damaged to the extent of the sector with the highest loss factor 
γi. In this ‘worst case’ scenario, the immediate output loss would be 6.03%. If we again 
assume that output should return to its pre-calamity proportions, total production loss 
would mount to 10,3%, which is in fact a proportional shrink of the whole system by 
the extent of the most hit sector.87  
The ‘forced’ implosion of the system to the 10,3% level is observed due to the 
rigid assumption of extreme interdependency between all the sectors, for which every 
input is critical. This also shows the maximum amount of damage to be sustained by an 
economic system if this strict proportionality (without a possibility for substitution) is 
observed. In fact, the difference between the direct sectoral damages, γi’s, and the γmax 
determine the extent of highest indirect damage.  
It is important to mention here that in this exercise we have not applied a further 
multiplier analysis in its conventional input-output sense. Essentially, because we are 
dealing with the extreme situation of a very large shock, we involve the Basic Equation 
for the evaluation of initial damage in the framework of Von Neumann-Leontief type of 
model as we just described in the previous paragraph. In this case, multiplier analysis 
becomes unnecessary at the stage where we account for major disequilibrium and 
                                               
87
 We have described this case in the Section 6.6 (equation [6.36]). 
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sudden disproportionality in the entire economic system, with establishment of a new 
balanced network as a next step. At later stages, when the economy is back in balance 
(in term of its internal proportions), interindustry multipliers will make sense again and 
impact effects of a growing economy can be traced. Yet, at this moment we leave the 
design and analysis of possible reconstruction and development scenarios to further 
research, because this typically requires separate attention by itself. In particular, effort 
should then be directed at testing the sensitivity of the model to a change of 
assumptions. 
 
7.3.2. Comparison and Interpretation of Results 
In this Chapter, we decided not only to show the applicability of our developed input-
output model to a practical exercise, but also to compare the obtained results with the 
ones from our initial Delft Cluster study (see below). There is no need to introduce the 
data for our earlier study, as now we are using just the same case of dike breach in 
central Holland. Yet, to be able to carry out a comparison between the two models, it is 
necessary to describe briefly our initial model setting. 
The model was developed for the purpose of studying economic effects of a large-
scale flooding in the Netherlands based on the case study we have presented in Section 
7.2. It essentially consisted of two steps, which are the imposition of the initial shock 
and recovery thereafter (see Van der Veen et al., 2003a; Bočkarjova, Steenge and Van 
der Veen, 2007). We then formulated what we called three scenarios, where in the first 
one we have performed standard input-output exercises; in the second and third ones we 
have attempted to manipulate the inter-industry matrix, respectively accounting for a 
more flexible and more restricted economic infrastructure. While during the standard 
exercise we were imposing the shock and recovery impulses via final demand and 
computing multiplier effects, it was rather carried out as a baseline scenario than a study 
of effects. This is due to the very fact that input-output in the way we used it in this 
case, is meant for impact analysis, not a major shock analysis. The second scenario 
presented a model, where losses in domestic goods were instantaneously substituted by 
imported goods so that production in the survived areas could go on. The third scenario 
(on the contrary), a ‘bottleneck’ scenario, reflected a decrease in both intermediate and 
final demands. Maximum loss fractions, γi’s, were used there to account for 
intermediate production losses, while the impulse on the final demand was introduced to 
account for consumption decrease. 
For the comparison between our two models, only two formulations of the earlier 
version would suit, namely, the standard exercise and the restricted scenario. We shall 
compare the imposition of the initial shock in the earlier version of the model to the 
modelling of disequilibrium and return to balance in our current exercise (following the 
procedure described in the previous Section).  
Following our newly proposed approach, the initial loss observed directly in the 
disaster aftermath (i.e., the result of the Basic equation) for the case of dike breach near 
Rotterdam would result in a 2,68% loss of production on the country level. Yet, if we 
consider that a system first needs to come to a balance from which recovery can proceed 
(which we achieve by imposing the pre-disaster proportions to the total output), then we 
obtain a 5,1% loss of output. The difference reflects that additional losses appear either 
due to technological feasibility to adjust, or due to the fact that, provided required 
proportions, some goods become superfluous. At the same time, if we compare these 
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figures to the results of the standard input-output impact analysis from our earlier study, 
we could see 5,6% loss of production in terms of total output (we retrieve this number 
from our earlier study, see Van der Veen et al., 2003b, Appendix 2). The reason for a 
higher outcome in this case may lie in the fact that in the latter instance, multiplier 
analysis was performed, where inter-industry multipliers were taken into account. As 
we mentioned above, currently we question the meaningfulness of multiplier analysis in 
disaster analysis at the initial stage where immediate disruptions and imbalances 
resemble themselves. We suggest that multiplier analysis is applied in later stages where 
the system has achieved its structure and is on the way of recovery. This means, that 
essentially the loss of 5,1% of production capacity obtained from our newly developed 
disaster input-output model marks the very beginning of the process where the 
economic system is trying to find the way it would follow in its reconstruction and 
recovery efforts. Possibly, more losses can be associated with it, so the ‘new’ estimate 
of 5,1% production loss and the ‘old’ estimate of 5,6% can be seen as converging. 
For the case of bottleneck calculations, where a maximum disruption factor was 
applied in both Delft Cluster and current exercises, we have higher loss numbers 
compared to the calculations just presented in the paragraph above. Our new model 
suggests that the minimal production losses in the bottleneck scenario are 6,07%, and 
may amount up to 10,3% in case we assume the return to the pre-disaster proportions. 
At the same time, our earlier exercise witnesses 7,8% output loss. In fact, we may 
recognise that the loss figures just provided according to both models are of comparable 
dimension. In the Delft Cluster study, a bottleneck scenario was considered as an 
absolute maximum for our calculations. Our new results show an even higher number of 
output losses, which is in fact a proportional decrease of the entire system by the factor 
of highest sectoral loss (the one of the sector 39 ‘Other goods and services’). We 
suggest that this number is taken as an ultimate minimum, which, yet, does not reflect 
any resilient response that should certainly deflate this initial loss figure.  
Once again, in this illustrative exercise, we have abstained from the analysis of 
recovery paths and adjustment strategies. Research into the resilience of economies to 
natural disasters (see inter alia Cole, 2004; Dalziell and McManus, 2004; Rose and 
Liao, 2005) has shown that a system’s ability to respond to the distress in a flexible 
manner results in much lower final loss figures, which take into account also 
reconstruction and recovery periods. With this preliminary study, we have shown that 
our developed input-output based disaster analysis model can be used for the purposes 
of practice-based exercises, and provides a guiding illustration for their implementation. 
It should also be mentioned that the level of precision and internal consistency of model 
applications to case studies depends on the availability of data and compatibility 
between data when numerous sources and data sets are used. 
 
7.4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter, we have taken a case study from our earlier work as a basis for an 
illustrative exercise to show if and how our developed input-output model will be 
operable. The case study, actually, stemmed from a hydrological model of a 
hypothetical dike breach near Rotterdam, resulting in a vast inundation in central 
Holland. Using additional economic data on employment per zip code, and connecting it 
to the map of the flooding in the contemporary GIS setting, we were able to retrieve 
employment loss coefficients per sector to be used as proxies for production capacity 
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loss fed in our input-output disaster analysis model. During the exercise, we have learnt 
that the available data required additional corrections before it could be used, and 
making connections between various data sets required additional assumptions.  
We may see that case study work opens up a different side of modelling, which 
now includes real life events, experiences and data. Because of the issues of data 
availability, accessibility and compatibility, researchers are forced to find ways of 
dealing with these problems, and thus often look for operationalisations of theoretical 
concepts, which can then be traced back to empirical data. When an empirical 
(re)interpretation of scientific constructs is not found, proxies become a way out to find 
an approximation of a concept among the existing statistical data. Yet, the search for 
empirically available data should not result in undermining the conceptual framework 
behind the theoretical model. 
In our reality-driven exercise, we were aiming at showing that our proposed input-
output disaster analysis model (introduced in Chapter 6 of this thesis) can be used for 
empirical purposes. In this hypothetical case study, we have provided a numerical 
exercise of losses caused by the interruptions of circular flow within a single economic 
system, as well as offered one of the options for return to the required internal balances, 
which conforms to the idea of ‘right’ proportions in the system. As an initial step of 
looking at modelling recovery and post-disaster development, we have assumed that 
returning to the pre-disaster pattern of production can be seen as a background scenario 
for other alternatives. We found that the immediate loss of output in the disequilibrium 
situation, which we obtain by means of our basic equation, constitutes a mere 2,7%, 
while correcting for proportions in total output would bring our estimation up to 5,1%, 
which does not differ much form the standard input-output exercise of introducing an 
impulse, that would yield 5,6% loss. A bottleneck scenario also results in the figures 
that are of the comparable magnitude as in our previous study. The current estimates are 
found to vary between 6,07% and 10,3% loss of output on the country level, while our 
earlier study has resulted in 7,8% loss for the initial disruption. 
Because we have performed the calculations only for the immediate post-disaster 
stage, excluding for the time being recovery options and pre-disaster preparedness (both 
of which are touched upon in Chapter 6), we also question the use and meaning of a 
multiplier analysis exercise at this stage. The reason is that we see large-scale shocks as 
conceptually different from what conventional models often are analysing, i.e. minor or 
incremental changes that are somewhat ‘commonplace’. We claim, with the help of this 
study, that major shocks require a different way of thinking and thus also a special 
treatment in modelling terms. Our suggested model offers in this sense one of the ways 
in which major disturbances in modern economies can be analysed. 
In the next Chapter we shall describe some of the trends in current Dutch water 
and flood management, and would like to point out the place that our suggested 
modelling framework may take in the light of recent developments. 
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Appendix 7A  
Sector classification and disruption factors 
No Sector (SBI classification) Ni(total) Ni(affected) 100γi  
1 Agriculture and forestry 87908 7803 8,88 
2 Fishery 3588 4 0,11 
3 Mining industry 2005 0 0,00 
4 Food (agricultural) 27874 1444 5,18 
5 Food (other) 58154 2170 3,73 
6 Beverages and tobacco industry 27221 1798 6,61 
7 Textiles 13188 195 1,48 
8 Clothes 18181 292 1,61 
9 Leather, shoes and other leather products 4821 101 2,10 
10 Wood- and furniture industry (excl. metals) 44386 1250 2,82 
11 Paper industry 17697 261 1,47 
12 Graphic industry, publishing 100915 5641 5,59 
13 Oil industry 142483 91 0,06 
14 Chemical industry 97208 2790 2,87 
15 Construction materials 40275 1972 4,90 
16&17 Metal industry and production of machinery 221227 5941 2,69 
18 Electrotechnical industry 65329 736 1,13 
19 Transport 53475 429 0,80 
20 Instruments and optical industries 42264 2166 5,12 
21 Utilities 63199 3183 5,04 
22 Construction industry 517209 33310 6,44 
23 Retail and wholesale trade 1060458 76103 7,18 
24 HoReCa 180699 16658 9,22 
25 Reparation of durable goods 23830 939 3,94 
26 Sea and air transport 31161 1309 4,20 
27 Other transport 682884 13111 1,92 
28 Communication-industry 67259 850 1,26 
29 Banks 673587 20053 2,98 
30 Insurance 88372 7471 8,45 
31 Exploitation of real estate 235964 8942 3,79 
32 Business services 101423970 515217 0,51 
33 National government and social security 18115 506 2,79 
34 Regional government and semi-governmental 
institutions 680 3 0,44 
35 Education  147782 7669 5,19 
36 Health care and veterinary 203338 13344 6,56 
37 Culture, sport and recreation 62803 2597 4,14 
38 Other services 438243 33968 7,75 
39 Other goods and services 790734 81510 10,31 
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Appendix 7B  
Input-output table for the Netherlands (1997) 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 4600 0 6 18439 2092 33 22 4 2 19 9 
2 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 33 1 260 66 101 13 9 0 0 15 128 
4 37 0 0 2762 1376 4 0 0 57 0 0 
5 7404 2 2 379 4062 245 16 0 0 0 64 
6 0 0 0 0 44 165 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 6 0 1 0 1 355 77 0 21 7 
8 0 0 2 2 7 1 12 120 0 1 1 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 74 19 0 
10 52 4 0 10 21 16 0 0 0 307 48 
11 24 0 8 262 579 273 36 2 7 32 735 
12 4 0 12 159 336 228 19 9 4 35 49 
13 173 68 21 8 48 11 11 3 2 23 12 
14 258 5 34 131 448 165 295 8 62 214 188 
15 78 0 0 28 95 157 0 0 0 10 7 
16&17 853 0 237 199 263 176 77 34 17 66 86 
18 6 0 47 11 26 11 3 2 0 16 19 
19 9 31 13 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
20 12 0 1 10 13 8 4 4 5 3 9 
21 1652 0 81 205 551 91 86 11 13 76 141 
22 405 7 70 49 115 35 27 2 3 96 66 
23 422 3 55 47 144 57 40 16 9 80 109 
24 14 1 6 27 61 29 19 11 5 22 23 
25 135 1 18 44 88 16 13 1 4 15 8 
26 0 0 17 2 6 3 1 1 1 4 8 
27 1 56 306 21 32 16 0 2 0 9 1 
28 201 7 58 45 100 27 25 10 10 34 36 
29 216 0 2 25 28 5 11 4 2 7 5 
30 196 16 6 10 17 6 4 2 3 13 14 
31 1 0 2 48 154 26 33 43 6 92 21 
32 1006 29 277 775 1401 772 278 92 45 341 418 
33 9 3 8 11 16 10 5 2 1 5 3 
34 16 3 7 21 36 15 23 5 3 5 8 
35 28 0 7 20 32 25 8 0 0 8 19 
36 386 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 2 0 2 12 23 15 0 0 0 1 1 
38 47 4 105 102 198 119 122 29 12 48 56 
39 5 2 18 34 62 39 12 5 0 13 19 
  
                      
Imports 2319 87 2335 2175 15079 2638 2138 919 349 2523 2897 
Taxes 2181 31 153 1633 3154 426 183 75 72 608 445 
Wages 3461 203 944 2695 5432 1472 1424 494 305 2065 1823 
Profits 15900 440 11800 1155 4017 2666 473 236 26 849 1301 
  
                      
Total 42148 1010 16919 31623 40267 10015 5785 2226 1101 7695 8786 
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Input-Output table (continued) 
Sectors 12 13 14 15 16&17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 6 6 62 12 29 9 12 6 85 53 62 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 334 1160 255 71 4 0 2 6821 195 34 
4 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
5 0 0 256 0 1 1 1 2 0 26 32 
6 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 91 
7 1 1 19 0 7 5 10 4 0 13 178 
8 6 3 29 2 31 3 11 7 0 0 204 
9 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 9 
10 5 0 101 129 53 14 54 53 0 1492 198 
11 225 8 431 55 82 76 14 38 20 31 533 
12 3914 32 288 25 210 92 68 44 18 77 2161 
13 18 1005 1415 54 137 98 40 15 71 222 88 
14 157 49 6623 195 617 373 472 180 83 1158 347 
15 2 3 105 461 64 38 42 12 0 4731 153 
16&17 102 106 583 145 7469 631 1191 208 265 4461 557 
18 11 18 99 21 416 1197 1002 62 190 666 251 
19 4 4 14 2 163 6 1729 12 2 68 77 
20 16 14 53 8 88 82 90 126 53 92 293 
21 122 83 986 271 945 249 129 85 1780 176 1283 
22 110 55 321 85 352 101 55 26 48 18584 545 
23 61 90 347 95 401 117 74 41 62 399 3698 
24 54 31 191 25 203 119 67 28 13 36 765 
25 37 7 52 31 61 44 33 19 47 630 1050 
26 23 5 36 7 30 23 17 6 2 15 345 
27 135 48 105 9 95 53 43 9 3 243 492 
28 331 40 206 34 224 137 60 38 158 180 1804 
29 21 2 43 11 51 16 15 4 25 169 1004 
30 19 3 33 11 62 10 20 7 2 86 492 
31 120 82 189 119 265 62 98 53 0 520 3372 
32 1298 698 2580 539 2201 1217 813 264 202 2663 5561 
33 17 7 32 3 22 19 15 4 1 34 106 
34 129 34 82 10 63 37 33 32 529 56 217 
35 67 74 206 22 105 147 37 9 32 28 136 
36 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 17 3 0 0 
37 150 7 29 1 17 14 6 0 3 4 158 
38 164 149 573 99 383 289 133 48 152 295 729 
39 44 17 111 23 85 43 20 9 34 143 705 
  
                      
Imports 3801 13144 16513 1977 13902 6551 6707 1072 3092 9854 9137 
Taxes 448 335 2960 715 3441 1657 1762 271 1086 4950 2067 
Wages 5791 923 9796 2210 14215 7349 4172 1570 3368 21760 38221 
Profits 2716 1838 6017 1246 4950 3204 1233 669 5854 5533 27428 
  
                      
Total 20126 19255 52729 8907 51515 24089 20279 5053 24104 79643 104602 
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Input-Output table (continued) 
Sectors 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
1 136 11 52 79 7 13 6 75 6 5 128 
2 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 49 
4 898 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 8 
5 1255 0 57 0 1 0 0 0 0 113 62 
6 854 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 34 
7 15 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 26 10 12 
8 12 6 8 23 0 0 0 0 6 1 3 
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 41 0 4 3 106 28 12 19 
11 12 11 13 31 26 20 8 6 78 42 28 
12 215 150 53 183 126 340 142 9 2930 409 226 
13 25 19 331 352 28 14 15 8 73 141 102 
14 34 57 13 39 7 12 5 46 194 132 67 
15 0 10 0 2 0 0 0 109 0 28 53 
16&17 9 142 56 368 97 80 61 83 193 335 196 
18 19 42 84 60 88 79 30 181 75 523 109 
19 0 241 125 192 3 9 5 0 9 755 11 
20 12 41 31 48 13 29 20 43 101 32 95 
21 555 177 39 439 47 161 88 73 265 234 361 
22 183 65 152 844 1053 390 211 3114 207 1367 1876 
23 51 89 115 319 55 166 113 467 440 253 128 
24 378 106 39 139 46 151 128 6 928 315 119 
25 61 193 14 954 20 176 144 0 671 70 56 
26 0 0 801 42 47 20 9 0 22 36 6 
27 12 33 575 1734 78 112 72 1 122 369 136 
28 129 86 152 436 155 1598 218 74 776 516 264 
29 44 19 24 43 0 186 811 0 117 295 438 
30 189 105 19 150 1 68 3846 194 228 64 23 
31 623 388 8 350 131 399 92 154 1156 364 390 
32 1058 530 282 1674 365 1354 496 837 6609 1876 593 
33 21 10 1 14 7 4 125 9 47 662 78 
34 72 9 12 136 61 67 31 284 129 52 235 
35 36 11 0 25 6 11 12 23 78 190 97 
36 0 0 7 20 2 0 68 0 0 190 85 
37 2 0 14 26 0 115 48 0 485 328 208 
38 178 144 79 577 315 239 186 101 406 1269 742 
39 86 26 10 34 23 24 4 27 182 0 0 
  
                      
Imports 1240 3396 6304 1833 471 380 1615 137 1485 2626 650 
Taxes 1120 1124 124 1884 631 804 448 2806 1280 2621 1709 
Wages 4582 3445 3114 14676 6205 9397 5111 2126 24495 19511 12673 
Profits 5762 3051 2732 8271 5384 9958 1404 51593 15580 930 1294 
  
                      
Total 19924 13738 15514 36038 15499 26380 15576 62692 59427 36768 23363 
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Input-Output table (continued) 
Sectors 35 36 37 38 39  Final demand  Total 
1 1 69 48 65 38   16231  42538 
2 0 10 2 9 0   933  1010 
3 0 0 0 3 0   7352  16919 
4 4 230 62 213 111   25718  31629 
5 4 263 168 223 244   24749  39632 
6 3 20 217 37 138   8304  10015 
7 8 22 10 8 4   5031  5856 
8 0 11 2 22 0   1690  2226 
9 0 0 0 0 1   987  1101 
10 7 0 6 53 97   4762  7695 
11 27 51 15 43 1   4958  8840 
12 407 171 93 257 3   6671  20169 
13 60 27 60 103 0   14892  19792 
14 51 437 33 387 30   39277  52883 
15 8 8 10 15 0   2678  8907 
16&17 57 38 8 97 10   31959  51515 
18 53 48 70 54 19   18852  24460 
19 0 8 0 29 0   16686  20212 
20 29 129 21 53 19   3378  5078 
21 345 427 298 721 0   10831  24076 
22 450 239 189 315 0   47831  79643 
23 61 97 54 97 3   99364  108239 
24 38 139 198 160 0   15284  19924 
25 52 49 57 111 0   8757  13739 
26 2 5 7 7 0   13958  15514 
27 55 59 53 143 0   30805  36038 
28 155 349 591 314 0   5920  15499 
29 4 0 51 34 0   22344  26076 
30 27 51 38 90 0   9452  15576 
31 97 369 154 848 0   51864  62692 
32 526 757 1071 1568 0   16361  59427 
33 0 42 50 39 2   35324  36768 
34 1354 83 246 119 0   19110  23364 
35 107 115 38 251 0   26869  28879 
36 132 728 10 74 0   37132  38856 
37 56 41 1192 70 54   9889  12973 
38 565 1188 378 1008 0   24452  35682 
39 1 32 10 53 0   2  1957 
  
                
  
Imports 319 1822 326 1273 489   132635  276210 
Taxes 854 1587 717 1511 694   118158  166724 
Wages 20604 18857 3997 20748 0   1009  300243 
Profits 2356 11087 2423 4457 0   6518  232351 
  
                
  
Total 28879 39665 12973 35682 1957  978975  2000927 
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Appendix 7C  
The matrix F 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 78 5 21 61 122 33 32 11 7 47 41 130 21 221 
2 4 0 1 3 7 2 2 1 0 3 2 7 1 13 
3 35 2 10 27 55 15 15 5 3 21 19 59 9 100 
4 124 7 34 96 194 53 51 18 11 74 65 207 33 350 
5 119 7 32 93 187 51 49 17 10 71 63 199 32 336 
6 40 2 11 31 63 17 16 6 4 24 21 67 11 113 
7 24 1 7 19 38 10 10 3 2 14 13 40 6 68 
8 8 0 2 6 13 3 3 1 1 5 4 14 2 23 
9 5 0 1 4 7 2 2 1 0 3 2 8 1 13 
10 23 1 6 18 36 10 9 3 2 14 12 38 6 65 
11 24 1 6 19 37 10 10 3 2 14 13 40 6 67 
12 32 2 9 25 50 14 13 5 3 19 17 54 9 91 
13 72 4 20 56 112 30 29 10 6 43 38 120 19 202 
14 189 11 51 147 296 80 78 27 17 113 99 316 50 534 
15 13 1 4 10 20 5 5 2 1 8 7 22 3 36 
16&17 153 9 42 120 241 65 63 22 14 92 81 257 41 434 
18 91 5 25 70 142 39 37 13 8 54 48 151 24 256 
19 80 5 22 62 126 34 33 11 7 48 42 134 21 227 
20 16 1 4 13 25 7 7 2 1 10 9 27 4 46 
21 52 3 14 41 82 22 21 7 5 31 27 87 14 147 
22 230 13 63 179 361 98 95 33 20 137 121 384 61 650 
23 477 28 130 372 749 203 196 68 42 285 251 798 127 1351 
24 73 4 20 57 115 31 30 10 6 44 39 123 20 208 
25 42 2 11 33 66 18 17 6 4 25 22 70 11 119 
26 67 4 18 52 105 29 28 10 6 40 35 112 18 190 
27 148 9 40 115 232 63 61 21 13 88 78 248 39 419 
28 28 2 8 22 45 12 12 4 3 17 15 48 8 80 
29 107 6 29 84 168 46 44 15 9 64 57 180 29 304 
30 45 3 12 35 71 19 19 6 4 27 24 76 12 128 
31 249 15 68 194 391 106 102 36 22 149 131 417 66 705 
32 79 5 21 61 123 33 32 11 7 47 41 131 21 222 
33 170 10 46 132 266 72 70 24 15 101 89 284 45 480 
34 92 5 25 71 144 39 38 13 8 55 48 154 24 260 
35 129 8 35 100 203 55 53 18 11 77 68 216 34 365 
36 178 10 49 139 280 76 73 25 16 106 94 298 48 505 
37 47 3 13 37 75 20 20 7 4 28 25 79 13 134 
38 117 7 32 91 184 50 48 17 10 70 62 196 31 332 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The matrix F (continued) 
Sectors 15 16&17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
1 50 320 166 94 35 76 490 861 103 78 70 331 140 
2 3 18 10 5 2 4 28 49 6 4 4 19 8 
3 23 145 75 43 16 34 222 390 47 35 32 150 63 
4 79 507 262 149 56 120 777 1364 164 123 111 524 221 
5 76 488 252 143 54 116 747 1313 157 118 107 504 213 
6 25 164 85 48 18 39 251 440 53 40 36 169 72 
7 15 99 51 29 11 24 152 267 32 24 22 102 43 
8 5 33 17 10 4 8 51 90 11 8 7 34 15 
9 3 19 10 6 2 5 30 52 6 5 4 20 8 
10 15 94 49 28 10 22 144 253 30 23 21 97 41 
11 15 98 51 29 11 23 150 263 32 24 21 101 43 
12 20 132 68 39 15 31 201 354 42 32 29 136 57 
13 46 294 152 86 32 70 450 790 95 71 64 303 128 
14 120 775 401 227 86 184 1186 2083 250 188 170 800 338 
15 8 53 27 16 6 13 81 142 17 13 12 55 23 
16&17 98 630 326 185 70 149 965 1695 203 153 138 651 275 
18 58 372 192 109 41 88 569 1000 120 90 81 384 162 
19 51 329 170 97 36 78 504 885 106 80 72 340 144 
20 10 67 34 20 7 16 102 179 21 16 15 69 29 
21 33 214 110 63 24 51 327 574 69 52 47 221 93 
22 147 943 488 277 104 224 1444 2537 304 229 207 974 412 
23 305 1960 1013 575 216 464 3000 5270 632 475 429 2024 856 
24 47 301 156 88 33 71 461 811 97 73 66 311 132 
25 27 173 89 51 19 41 264 464 56 42 38 178 75 
26 43 275 142 81 30 65 421 740 89 67 60 284 120 
27 94 608 314 178 67 144 930 1634 196 147 133 627 265 
28 18 117 60 34 13 28 179 314 38 28 26 121 51 
29 69 441 228 129 49 104 675 1185 142 107 97 455 192 
30 29 186 96 55 21 44 285 501 60 45 41 192 81 
31 159 1023 529 300 113 242 1566 2751 330 248 224 1056 447 
32 50 323 167 95 36 76 494 868 104 78 71 333 141 
33 108 697 360 204 77 165 1067 1873 225 169 153 719 304 
34 59 377 195 111 42 89 577 1014 122 91 83 389 165 
35 82 530 274 156 59 126 811 1425 171 128 116 547 231 
36 114 732 379 215 81 174 1121 1969 236 178 160 756 320 
37 30 195 101 57 22 46 299 524 63 47 43 201 85 
38 75 482 249 142 53 114 738 1297 155 117 106 498 211 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The matrix F (continued) 
Sectors 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39  
Final demand 
consumed by 
labour 
1 212 115 48 552 439 285 464 425 90 467 0 
  
6740 
2 12 7 3 32 25 16 27 24 5 27 0 
  
387 
3 96 52 22 250 199 129 210 192 41 212 0 
  
3053 
4 335 182 76 874 696 452 735 673 143 740 0 
  
10679 
5 323 176 73 841 670 435 708 648 137 713 0 
  
10277 
6 108 59 24 282 225 146 237 217 46 239 0 
  
3448 
7 66 36 15 171 136 88 144 132 28 145 0 
  
2089 
8 22 12 5 57 46 30 48 44 9 49 0 
  
702 
9 13 7 3 34 27 17 28 26 5 28 0 
  
410 
10 62 34 14 162 129 84 136 125 26 137 0 
  
1977 
11 65 35 15 169 134 87 142 130 27 143 0 
  
2059 
12 87 47 20 227 181 117 191 175 37 192 0 
  
2770 
13 194 106 44 506 403 262 426 390 83 429 0 
  
6183 
14 512 279 116 1335 1063 691 1123 1028 218 1131 0 
  
16309 
15 35 19 8 91 73 47 77 70 15 77 0 
  
1112 
16&17 417 227 94 1086 865 562 914 836 177 920 0 
  
13270 
18 246 134 56 641 510 332 539 493 105 543 0 
  
7828 
19 218 118 49 567 452 293 477 437 93 480 0 
  
6929 
20 44 24 10 115 91 59 97 88 19 97 0 
  
1403 
21 141 77 32 368 293 190 310 283 60 312 0 
  
4497 
22 624 339 141 1626 1295 841 1368 1252 265 1377 0 
  
19860 
23 1296 705 293 3377 2690 1747 2841 2600 551 2861 0 
  
41258 
24 199 108 45 520 414 269 437 400 85 440 0 
  
6346 
25 114 62 26 298 237 154 250 229 49 252 0 
  
3636 
26 182 99 41 474 378 245 399 365 77 402 0 
  
5796 
27 402 218 91 1047 834 542 881 806 171 887 0 
  
12791 
28 77 42 17 201 160 104 169 155 33 170 0 
  
2458 
29 291 158 66 759 605 393 639 585 124 643 0 
  
9278 
30 123 67 28 321 256 166 270 247 52 272 0 
  
3925 
31 676 368 153 1763 1404 912 1483 1357 288 1493 0 
  
21535 
32 213 116 48 556 443 288 468 428 91 471 0 
  
6793 
33 461 251 104 1201 956 621 1010 924 196 1017 0 
  
14667 
34 249 136 56 650 517 336 546 500 106 550 0 
  
7935 
35 350 191 79 913 727 473 768 703 149 774 0 
  
11157 
36 484 263 110 1262 1005 653 1062 972 206 1069 0 
  
15418 
37 129 70 29 336 268 174 283 259 55 285 0 
  
4106 
38 319 173 72 831 662 430 699 640 136 704 0 
  
10153 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
1 
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Appendix 7D  
The Basic equation 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 4192 0 6 17484 2014 31 22 4 2 18 9 6 
2 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 30 1 260 63 97 12 9 0 0 15 126 1 
4 34 0 0 2619 1325 4 0 0 56 0 0 0 
5 6747 2 2 359 3910 229 16 0 0 0 63 0 
6 0 0 0 0 42 154 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 6 0 1 0 1 350 76 0 20 7 1 
8 0 0 2 2 7 1 12 118 0 1 1 6 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 72 18 0 0 
10 47 4 0 9 20 15 0 0 0 298 47 5 
11 22 0 8 248 557 255 35 2 7 31 724 212 
12 4 0 12 151 323 213 19 9 4 34 48 3695 
13 158 68 21 8 46 10 11 3 2 22 12 17 
14 235 5 34 124 431 154 291 8 61 208 185 148 
15 71 0 0 27 91 147 0 0 0 10 7 2 
16&17 777 0 237 189 253 164 76 33 17 64 85 96 
18 5 0 47 10 25 10 3 2 0 16 19 10 
19 8 31 13 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 
20 11 0 1 9 13 7 4 4 5 3 9 15 
21 1505 0 81 194 530 85 85 11 13 74 139 115 
22 369 7 70 46 111 33 27 2 3 93 65 104 
23 385 3 55 45 139 53 39 16 9 78 107 58 
24 13 1 6 26 59 27 19 11 5 21 23 51 
25 123 1 18 42 85 15 13 1 4 15 8 35 
26 0 0 17 2 6 3 1 1 1 4 8 22 
27 1 56 306 20 31 15 0 2 0 9 1 127 
28 183 7 58 43 96 25 25 10 10 33 35 312 
29 197 0 2 24 27 5 11 4 2 7 5 20 
30 179 16 6 9 16 6 4 2 3 13 14 18 
31 1 0 2 46 148 24 33 42 6 89 21 113 
32 917 29 277 735 1349 721 274 91 44 331 412 1225 
33 8 3 8 10 15 9 5 2 1 5 3 16 
34 15 3 7 20 35 14 23 5 3 5 8 122 
35 26 0 7 19 31 23 8 0 0 8 19 63 
36 352 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 2 0 2 11 22 14 0 0 0 1 1 142 
38 43 4 105 97 191 111 120 29 12 47 55 155 
39 5 2 18 32 60 36 12 5 0 13 19 42 
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The Basic equation (continued) 
Sectors 13 14 15 16&17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 6 60 11 28 9 12 6 81 50 58 123 11 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 
3 334 1127 242 69 4 0 2 6477 182 32 0 0 
4 0 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 815 0 
5 0 249 0 1 1 1 2 0 24 30 1139 0 
6 0 32 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 84 775 0 
7 1 18 0 7 5 10 4 0 12 165 14 0 
8 3 28 2 30 3 11 7 0 0 189 11 6 
9 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 8 0 1 
10 0 98 123 52 14 54 50 0 1396 184 0 0 
11 8 419 52 80 75 14 36 19 29 495 11 11 
12 32 280 24 204 91 67 42 17 72 2006 195 144 
13 1004 1374 51 133 97 40 14 67 208 82 23 18 
14 49 6433 185 600 369 468 171 79 1083 322 31 55 
15 3 102 438 62 38 42 11 0 4426 142 0 10 
16&17 106 566 138 7268 624 1181 197 252 4174 517 8 136 
18 18 96 20 405 1184 994 59 180 623 233 17 40 
19 4 14 2 159 6 1715 11 2 64 71 0 232 
20 14 51 8 86 81 89 120 50 86 272 11 39 
21 83 958 258 920 246 128 81 1690 165 1191 504 170 
22 55 312 81 343 100 55 25 46 17387 506 166 62 
23 90 337 90 390 116 73 39 59 373 3433 46 85 
24 31 186 24 198 118 66 27 12 34 710 343 102 
25 7 51 29 59 44 33 18 45 589 975 55 185 
26 5 35 7 29 23 17 6 2 14 320 0 0 
27 48 102 9 92 52 43 9 3 227 457 11 32 
28 40 200 32 218 135 60 36 150 168 1675 117 83 
29 2 42 10 50 16 15 4 24 158 932 40 18 
30 3 32 10 60 10 20 7 2 80 457 172 101 
31 82 184 113 258 61 97 50 0 487 3130 566 373 
32 698 2506 513 2142 1203 806 250 192 2491 5162 960 509 
33 7 31 3 21 19 15 4 1 32 98 19 10 
34 34 80 10 61 37 33 30 502 52 201 65 9 
35 74 200 21 102 145 37 9 30 26 126 33 11 
36 0 0 0 1 0 0 16 3 0 0 0 0 
37 7 28 1 17 14 6 0 3 4 147 2 0 
38 149 557 94 373 286 132 46 144 276 677 162 138 
39 17 108 22 83 43 20 9 32 134 654 78 25 
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The Basic equation (continued) 
Sectors 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
1 50 77 7 13 5 72 6 5 127 1 64 46 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 2 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 49 0 0 0 
4 61 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 8 4 215 59 
5 55 0 1 0 0 0 0 110 62 4 246 161 
6 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 34 3 19 208 
7 1 0 0 0 1 0 26 10 12 8 21 10 
8 8 23 0 0 0 0 6 1 3 0 10 2 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 40 0 4 3 102 28 12 19 7 0 6 
11 12 30 26 19 7 6 78 41 28 26 48 14 
12 51 179 124 330 130 9 2915 397 225 386 160 89 
13 317 345 28 14 14 8 73 137 102 57 25 58 
14 12 38 7 12 5 44 193 129 67 48 408 32 
15 0 2 0 0 0 105 0 27 53 8 7 10 
16&17 54 361 96 78 56 80 192 326 195 54 36 8 
18 80 59 87 77 27 174 75 509 109 50 45 67 
19 120 188 3 9 5 0 9 734 11 0 7 0 
20 30 47 13 28 18 41 100 31 95 27 121 20 
21 37 431 46 156 81 70 264 227 359 327 399 286 
22 146 828 1040 378 193 2996 206 1329 1868 427 223 181 
23 110 313 54 161 103 449 438 246 127 58 91 52 
24 37 136 45 147 117 6 923 307 118 36 130 190 
25 13 936 20 171 132 0 668 68 56 49 46 55 
26 767 41 46 19 8 0 22 35 6 2 5 7 
27 551 1701 77 109 66 1 121 359 135 52 55 51 
28 146 428 153 1550 200 71 772 502 263 147 326 567 
29 23 42 0 180 742 0 116 287 436 4 0 49 
30 18 147 1 66 3521 187 227 62 23 26 48 36 
31 8 343 129 387 84 148 1150 353 388 92 345 148 
32 270 1642 360 1314 454 805 6575 1823 590 499 707 1027 
33 1 14 7 4 114 9 47 644 78 0 39 48 
34 11 133 60 65 28 273 128 51 234 1284 78 236 
35 0 25 6 11 11 22 78 184 97 101 107 36 
36 7 20 2 0 62 0 0 185 85 125 680 10 
37 13 26 0 112 44 0 483 319 207 53 38 1143 
38 76 566 311 232 170 97 404 1234 739 536 1110 362 
39 10 33 23 23 4 26 181 0 0 1 30 10 
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The Basic equation (continued) 
Sectors 38 39  Residual final demand TOTAL  
Proportional 
total output 
Redundant 
output 
1 60 34  15936  40744  40370  374 
2 8 0  916  987  959  28 
3 3 0  7218  16364  16057  307 
4 196 100  25250  30827  30017  810 
5 206 219  24299  38136  37613  523 
6 34 124  8153  9735  9505  230 
7 7 4  4939  5737  5558  179 
8 20 0  1660  2171  2113  58 
9 0 1  969  1080  1045  35 
10 49 87  4675  7447  7303  144 
11 40 1  4867  8593  8390  203 
12 237 3  6550  19471  19141  330 
13 95 0  14621  19380  18784  597 
14 357 27  38562  51670  50188  1482 
15 14 0  2629  8483  8453  30 
16&17 89 9  31377  50169  48890  1279 
18 50 17  18508  23951  23214  737 
19 27 0  16382  19834  19182  652 
20 49 17  3316  4943  4819  123 
21 665 0  10634  23207  22849  357 
22 291 0  46960  77131  75585  1546 
23 89 3  97555  105967  102724  3244 
24 148 0  15006  19456  18909  547 
25 102 0  8598  13361  13039  322 
26 6 0  13704  15190  14723  467 
27 132 0  30244  35305  34202  1104 
28 290 0  5812  14978  14709  269 
29 31 0  21938  25461  24747  714 
30 83 0  9279  14962  14782  180 
31 782 0  50919  61203  59498  1705 
32 1446 0  16063  57415  56399  1016 
33 36 2  34680  36068  34895  1174 
34 110 0  18762  22826  22174  653 
35 232 0  26380  28307  27408  899 
36 68 0  36456  38072  36876  1196 
37 65 48  9709  12681  12312  369 
38 930 0  24006  34772  33864  908 
39 49 0  2  1857  1857  0 
      
 
    
Total      997943  973151   
Loss      -2,68%  -5,10%   
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Appendix 7E 
An Example of Data Coupling in GIS 
 
 
A short example of how the above flowchart and use of data is applied in practice may 
clarify the way we deal with our data. Let’s take a simplified input-output table for a 
small economy. This economy consists of two sectors: A and B. Besides this we have 
data on imports and on other final demand. We start with the following data (Table 
7E.1): 
 
To 
From 
A B Housholds Other final 
Demand 
Gross 
output 
A 20 45 30 5 100 
B 40 15 30 65 150 
Households 20 60 10 10 100 
Imports 20 30 30 0 80 
Gross outlay 100 150 100 80 430 
Table 7E.1. Example of a transactions table 
 
Suppose, in addition, we also have a database that contains data on the location 
and on the intensity (number of workers) of economic activities. In this environment we 
can perform operations that allow us to deal with the spatial character of the data. One 
of the first operations we can implement with a GIS is to give thematic data exact geo-
location. In our example, this is done by linking the thematic data on economic 
activities to a geo-referenced database using zip codes (in this small example, we keep 
the X and Y coordinate fields empty; of course, in the real GIS environment they are 
filled in).  
Suppose that from our overlay operation, we find that the areas containing zip 
code “9977 AB” and zip code “9978 ZK” are flooded (we have lightly shaded them in 
Table 7E.2). This would mean that these activities would seize to function for some 
time. The database is supposed to contain all information on all activities; this means 
that now we can make estimates of the impacts of a disruption on each sector. In our 
example this means that we can summarize this impact in the following table. 
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X Y Zipcode SIC-code SBI-code 
Z value 
(number of 
workers) 
1   9976 KJ 8844 8 9 
2   9976 KJ 8845 8 3 
3   9977 AB 8849 8 0 
4   9977 AB 8850 8 2 
5   9978 XZ 6670 6 10 
6   9978 XZ 6671 6 5 
7   9978 ZK 6675 6 4 
Table 7E.2. Example of how a GIS-database might looks like 
 
The end result of this operation is an estimate of the effect of a natural disaster on 
the economy. This fraction of lost employment will be used to model the impact of the 
shock on the economy (Table 7E.3).  
 
SBI-code 
(sector) 
Number of 
workers affected 
Number of workers 
in the affected area 
Fraction Percentage 
capacity loss  
8 = A 2 14 2/14 14% 
6 = B 4 19 4/19 21% 
Table 7E.3. Calculation of loss of output 
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Chapter 8 
Water and Flood Management in the 
Netherlands: Shifts in Policy and Modelling 
_______________________________________ 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION88 
One of the most rewarding cases to consider in conjunction with our methodology to 
analyse the consequences of major disruptions in modern economies is the issue of 
flooding and flood management in the Netherlands. In the European spectrum of 
countries, the Netherlands occupies a special place. For centuries, water management in 
the Netherlands was subject to smart solutions in the engineering sphere – constructing 
complex system of dikes, drainage systems and artificial canals,89 which resulted in a 
highly-developed country with high potential, partially occupying the land conquered 
from water. It is due to this amazing fight against nature that the Dutch have become 
world-renowned experts in water management, dike and levee construction.  
For the Netherlands as a low-lying country, a major flooding can be highly 
destructive, if not catastrophic. This is a consequence of the country’s location on the 
coast of the North Sea, with almost half of its territory below sea level. As it is in the 
downstream of three biggest rivers in Europe, the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt, the 
Netherlands face a constant danger both from the rivers and the sea. Being under 
pressure of the uncertain dynamics of possible climate change, there are the 
implications to deal with, i.e., the rising sea level and increasing extreme fluctuations in 
peak flows, which are increasingly acknowledged by various experts (inter alia, MNP, 
2005). It is important that flood protection is recognised as a crucial policy issue. Recent 
findings of a predicted increase of extreme precipitation events and a gradually 
subsiding ground level in the Western (coastal) parts of the country further intensify 
this. Learning to live with risks, and adapting accordingly, means that we have to look 
far ahead when making today’s choices. 
                                               
88
 This Chapter is largely inspired by a paper Bočkarjova, Steenge and Hoekstra (to appear 2007) 
“Management of Catastrophes: A Paradigm Shift in Thinking about Flood Risk” In: Folmer and Reinhard 
(Eds.) "Water Problems and Water Policies in the Netherlands". 
89
 Currently primary and secondary dikes are protecting the country where each has its own role. Primary 
dikes are the ones built along the coast and along the main rivers. Secondary dikes are limiting the 
artificial water reservoirs and canals. By pumping excessive water back to the rivers and the sea, the 
water level in these artificial storages can be regulated. 
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In this Chapter, specific aspects of recent thinking about the consequences of big 
floods are discussed. Economic development and population growth in the Netherlands 
in the past decades, together with changing natural conditions caused by climate change, 
trigger shifts in the approach towards water management and threats of a major flood. It 
appears that the risk of such floods occurring has steadily increased in the past decades, 
which implies that traditional, technology-based approaches (such as raising the dikes) 
can no longer be seen as a single remedy. This means that more integrative approaches 
are asked for, and thus become central to our discussion in this Chapter. 
The Chapter focuses on policy options in cases where, due to a catastrophic flood, 
part of the existing economic networks fails for a considerable period and many supply-
demand relations are disrupted. The economy suddenly has to decide on how its now 
restricted resources should be allocated. Following our modelling logic, set forth in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, we choose an approach which offers a suitable instrument for 
analysing alternative policies which (re)direct the circulation of available resources 
between various categories of sources (‘suppliers’) and destinations (‘buyers’) in an 
intelligent way. In fact, the case of potential major flooding in the Netherlands should 
be considered with due care, where mixed mechanisms of public policy and private 
response must take place. This is important in particular due to the recent developments 
in water and flood management in the Netherlands, which point to newly emerging 
underlying principles in public policy, namely in the direction of shifting the balances 
between the public and private domains in favour of a more involved model of sharing 
responsibility. From this, it becomes clear that the problem then becomes a matter of 
complex interactions between private and public interest. For this purpose, our input-
output model for disaster analysis (see Chapter 6) can provide sufficient flexibility to 
address policy issues for a country facing a potential threat of a major flooding, 
covering both ex ante adaptive measures and measures structuring recovery in the 
immediate disaster aftermath. 
This Chapter is arranged as follows. First, we start with a brief historical 
retrospect, leading up to contemporary water and flood governance structures with the 
changing demarcation between individual and state responsibility. Next, we will provide 
some insight into the current Dutch policy dynamics that seem to resemble self-
reinforcing mechanisms. We shall draw attention to the critical position at the moment 
for choosing the time horizon and taking decisions for future development trajectories; 
some main lines will become clear, but by and large, the debate is just beginning. 
Finally, we will show that our methodology for modelling economic aspects of major 
disturbances can be used as a tool for addressing current issues in Dutch policy-making 
while fitting into the European trend of giving more attention to flood protection issues. 
 
8.2. THE NETHERLANDS: FROM FIGHTING AGAINST WATER TO LIVING 
WITH WATER 
The Netherlands makes a suitable case of reference in our study of major disasters in the 
developed countries. With the population density four times EU average (480 
inhabitants per km2 in the Netherlands against 117 in the EU-25, 200390), the country 
                                               
90
 Source: Eurostat (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/). For comparison, population density in Germany 
is 230 inhabitants per km2, in Latvia – 37. 
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has an extensive industrial network, which can be adversely affected as result of a 
disturbance. In this Section, we shall address the Dutch ‘philosophy’ with regard to 
water management. Here, the trend of seeing the water as an enemy seems to give way 
to a major change in thinking, i.e. an approach based on the principle of living together 
with water. This means that different ways of thinking on flood protection and the entire 
water management in the country become necessary. We shall first provide some 
historical background, and then turn to the recent developments in Dutch policy-
making, illustrating the shift in thinking on water management and flood protection. 
 
8.2.1. Short Overview of Flooding Disaster History in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has witnessed a number of water-related disasters in its history. Many 
people still remember the terrifying flood of 1953, which however was not the first 
disaster that the country has ever witnessed. Major calamities are recorded from as early 
as 83891: the first floods (838 and 1014), St. Elizabeth’s floods (1404 and 1421), all 
Saints flood (1570), Christmas flood (1717) and the Zuiderzee flood (1916). One of the 
more recent experiences, although it did not lead to a devastating calamity, is the near-
flood event of 1995 when 200.000 people were evacuated because a polder along the 
river Rhine was in danger of being inundated. 
One can consider the Zuiderzee flood as a warning coming before the major 
disaster of 1953, signalling the existence at that time of weak points in the coastal 
protection belt. As a response to the 1916 flood, the construction of the so-called 
‘Afsluitdijk’ was initiated, which cut off the ‘Zuiderzee’, which then became an interior 
lake, the ‘IJsselmeer’. This was combined with other large infrastructural works such as 
the elevation of two new polders, ‘Wieringermeer’ and ‘Noordoostpolder’, which added 
new farmers’ land and connected several islands to the mainland. In later years, two 
more polders were added, carved out of the IJsselmeer, ‘Oostelijk Flevoland’ and 
‘Zuidelijk Flevoland’, which combined different functions, providing room for new 
towns, farming, nature and recreation. 
However, the Afsluitdijk, connecting the provinces of North Holland and 
Friesland, could not prevent the disaster of 1 February 1953, when the provinces of 
South Holland and Zealand were thoroughly flooded. Apart from the poor condition of 
the many dikes in the Delta area, the flood was largely due to an unfortunate 
combination of climatic circumstances. Starting 30 January 1953, during the period of 
high tide, a strong depression had formed to the North-West of the Netherlands, moving 
towards the country. The hurricane that emerged in that depression area intensified the 
high tide, existing at that time, and caused the collapse of the weakened protective dikes 
in the early morning of 1 February. The highest recorded water level was reached: 4,55 
metres above NAP (Normal Amsterdam Water Level). A further second flood during 1 
February worsened the situation, claiming more lives, as the dikes were breached, 
giving the water every opportunity to further inundate the low land.  
The consequences of the flood were terrifying. 1.835 people died as a direct 
consequence of the flood, about 40 more people died afterwards. 200.000 cows, horses, 
pigs, and other cattle died in the water and almost 200.000 hectares of land were 
flooded. The contamination by the salty water meant that the once fertile soil was 
                                               
91
 Source: Delta Works online (www.deltawerken.com) 
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unusable for many years. 3.000 houses and 300 farms were destroyed and another 
40.000 houses and 3000 farms damaged. 72.000 people had to leave their houses and 
were evacuated to other areas. Only by the end of 1953, the area was officially declared 
dry again. 
This enormous flood triggered the emergence of the ‘Delta Plan’, a combined 
strategy of a) building higher dikes, and b) developing the entire delta area. The resulted 
execution of Delta works – the impressive construction of an open dam consisting of a 
system of 62 massive sluices, cutting off the major outlets to the sea (with the exception 
of the Scheldt, motivated by the interests of Antwerp harbour), was concluded in 1997 
with the building of the movable storm surge ‘Maeslant Barrier’ near Rotterdam, which 
can close off the New Waterway when water levels rise to a threatening level. All these 
works were carried out as the country’s immense investment in the protection against 
future floods. However, currently – half a century after the last disaster –the 
Netherlands is facing new challenges. 
 
8.2.2. Marking the Shift from Probability to Risk Management  
From the short overview of the flood history of the country in the previous Section, we 
note that the policy of guaranteeing public safety in the Netherlands by raising and 
strengthening the dikes in combination with land claim policies has an extensive record. 
It reached its culmination in the Delta Plan, after the 1953 flood.92 The decisions made 
in that context fixed Dutch policy for the next 50 years. The political pressure in the 
aftermath of the 1953 tragedy was triggered by public belief and expectations that the 
government will provide protection against flooding in the future. Due to the technical 
infeasibility at the time to conduct a detailed study of economic vulnerability, as well as 
the inability to anticipate the extent of growth that the country would witness in the 
coming decades, the ‘Wise Men’ of the Delta Commission concentrated on solutions 
targeting the probability of flood to be reduced to close to zero. This has resulted only in 
a partial safety standard differentiation according to the relative economic importance of 
the areas in the design of the Plan. The main focus was to ensure safety under the motto 
“never again such a flood”. The Delta Commission asked Van Dantzig, a well-known 
statistician, to address the problem of calculating the optimal investment strategy in 
flood protection. He developed a general formula for the optimal size of flood 
protection measures, the dikes, in a dynamic context, where investments at regular 
intervals are required. His formula gives a fixed exceedance probability93 after each 
investment in the relevant safety structure. The method is still in use in the cost-benefit 
analysis of flood-protection measures today. 
The high standards applied in flood defence constructions thereafter (like water 
overtopping a dike once in 10.000 years in the utmost for the most vulnerable areas in 
the Western part of the country) created a general feeling of security, and reinforced the 
expectation that public authorities can always guarantee safety, both of which reflected 
a near absolute faith in the physical, geographical and climatological foundations of the 
underlying (model) calculations. This permitted an accelerating socio-economic 
                                               
92
 The first comprehensive study of the Delta Plan was presented by Maris (1954), Tinbergen (1954) and 
Zeegers (1954), and discussed the engineering, economic, and social aspects of the plan.   
93
 The term exceedance probability refers to the chance that water level exceeds the top of the dike, 
resulting in overflow and breaking of the dike and thus flooding of the land behind the dike.  
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development behind the dike system in the subsequent decades. The protected areas 
rapidly changed into a highly urbanized economy, claiming a significant role in the 
‘global village’ of international commercial and social networks. The fact that human 
and economic interests behind the dikes became higher and higher slowly created a 
problem in itself. What was not sufficiently realised at the time, was that the protective 
system and what that system is protecting are bound together in a seemingly endless 
feedback system with ever increasing stakes and potential damage. Thus, policy mainly 
focusing at managing the probability of flooding meant that less attention was paid to 
measures controlling and reducing the consequences of a potential flooding. This 
resulted in a situation when the risk of a flood, defined as the product of the probability 
of a flood and the expected loss in case of a flood, was addressed one-sidedly by 
looking only at the first term of the risk equation, which is not sufficient for reaching a 
long-term solution. 
At the same time, it gradually became apparent that the state can not completely 
control natural variability or changes therein – which means that extreme situations will 
always remain possible. The fact that flooding frequency standards during the past fifty 
years did not change and that economic expansion behind the dikes was exponential 
actually increased expected risks (RIVM, 2004). That is, although the probability of 
flooding is relatively low at present, potential damage is enormous. Against this 
background, there is a developing insight that the current strategy cannot be sustained 
ad infinitum, and that new solutions have to be found (see e.g. Commissie Waterbeheer 
21e Eeuw, 2000).  
A corresponding development in this context is the growing importance of system 
risk analysis (see e.g., OECD, 2003; Dalziell and McManus, 2004). Characteristic for 
the system approach is that it considers a system in its entirety, which, as opposed to 
partial analysis approaches, is considered to be ‘bigger than the sum of its constituents’. 
For us it is interesting to consider that part of system analysis that studies the effects of 
positive and negative feedbacks (Hoekstra, 2005). In this context, a positive feedback is 
the mechanism that favours the reinforcement of the initial impulse; a negative 
feedback, on the contrary, suppresses the impulse. This means that negative feedback 
mechanisms are necessary for a system to stabilise itself. This approach, applied to 
water and flood risk management in the Netherlands can imply that in particular 
negative feedback mechanisms are of crucial importance to be built in, to ensure that the 
country is able to deal with a hazard without incurring extensive damages, and be 
flexible enough to adjust to the new circumstances. In this way, negative feedback 
resembles features that come very close to the ideas of resilience and adaptability that 
we discussed in Chapter 2. We put forth that adapting in advance to potential 
adversities, thereby decreasing vulnerability and improving the resilient response 
capacity of a system, improves the systems’ persistence in the face of a disaster. If 
system risks pose a threat to the stability of a social system in its entirety, then relevant 
questions for the Netherlands are the following: Which combination of technical, 
economic, financial, legal and administrative policies and/or measures can contribute to 
improved risk control, and in particular to decreasing the economic and social 
vulnerability to flooding? New insights inter alia into the economics of a calamity in the 
context of a modern developed economy are then also required.94 
                                               
94
 Here we shall not discuss related developments such as the establishment of modern systems for data 
storage and retrieval in water monitoring. However, we should mention the recently developed High-
water Information System in the Netherlands (MTP, 2005a). This system is designed to monitor flood 
defences, to present inundation calculations and loss calculation as a decision-making support tool for 
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A number of elements in the process of growing awareness in the Netherlands can 
be detected. One of the first issues which has been realised is that risk analysis is not 
(only) about the probability of a certain water level of the rivers or sea to reach some 
critical value as it used to be, but also about the probability that a particular link in the 
entire line of defence construction succumbs (TAW, 2000; Vrijling, 2001). That is, one 
should be looking for possible dike failure mechanisms,95 stability of dike closing 
mechanisms (like sluices) and, more generally, for the weakest links in the entire 
protective system. The real probability of a flood is therefore equal to the probability of 
the water reaching a particular level in conjunction with other failure processes. 
Today the country has reached the conclusion that it has gradually ended up in a 
self-reinforcing state with potentially catastrophic consequences. The conclusion has 
emerged that not only decreasing the probability of a flooding should be considered, but 
also (and specifically) the possible consequences of a flood. According to the recent 
RIVM report “Dutch dikes and risk hikes, a thematic policy evaluation of risks of 
flooding in the Netherlands” (RIVM, 2004), at present the Netherlands is not adequately 
protected against the threat of flooding, both from the sea and the rivers. The following 
quote clarifies the statement (ibid, p.12): “Dams in the Netherlands have never been 
stronger. […] Yet the risks of causalities and economic damage have become much 
greater [since 1953].” The new question in this respect has become: How to balance 
lowering the probability of a flood and lowering the potential damage. This means an 
entirely different conceptual basis, reflecting the shift in Dutch thinking and policy-
making about protection strategies, which may be referred to as a shift in paradigm (see 
Bočkarjova, Steenge and Hoekstra, 2007). The concept of risk is being re-discovered, 
and this nowadays becomes the key to understanding the future direction of water 
policy in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the report signals a discrepancy between the 
legal standards regarding dike height and socio-economic growth in the past decades. 
The main conclusion of the RIVM study is (2004, p.13): “The current safety policy does 
not create the conditions for the Netherlands that would lead to the safe and suitable for 
habitation country as it has been provided by the determination of the safety standards 
of 1960. […] The safety standards are no longer cost effective with regard to the spatial 
distribution of the economic assets. […] Economic values and the lives of people are 
less protected than it has been provided in 1960”. The report claims that it is not about 
the dikes, i.e. the technological response to the threat of flood. What is required are 
spatial solutions as the dynamics of economic asset accumulation as well as human 
settlements have been overlooked for decades by the former generation of planners. 
These are the standards for future developments in the economy, not the standards of 
today which can be viewed as a threshold for the drawing up and the implementation of 
current protection paths. 
The second study to be mentioned in conjunction with the marked shift in policy 
perspective is “Flood Risks and Safety in the Netherlands” (MTP, 2005d), a study 
initiated by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. It focuses 
on safety within the Dutch system of interconnected polders (we shall return to this 
issue in the next Section). This presented a series of calculations based on an adapted 
                                                                                                                                          
officials in charge. Several stakeholder organisations are involved, with a central role for the Dutch 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management.  
95
 Nine dike failure mechanisms are distinguished (RIVM, 2004 p.110): overtopping; instability through 
infiltration and erosion after overtopping; piping; heave; macro-instability at land side; macro-instability 
at river side; micro-instability; instability of dike cover; and sliding off at riverside. 
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framework in which not only dike overtopping was accounted for, but also several other 
causes for dike breaching (see footnote 95 as well as Section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4 for the 
description of modelling methods). 
One can see from the description of reports above that the noted awareness causes 
a gradual shift in thinking about water policy, with increasing attention being paid to the 
possible effects of flooding and to measures to prepare the country for the new (and 
changing) circumstances. In this context, new ideas such as ‘room for water’ or ‘room 
for the river’ fit in extremely well (Silva, Klijn and Dijkman, 2001), as well as new 
views on concepts like vulnerability and resilience (discussed in Chapter 2). Also, the 
idea of minimizing system risks within system approach, which we briefly mentioned 
earlier in this Section, fits in well. The new concepts in contemporary Dutch water 
management ‘room for water’ and ‘room for river’ (also sometimes referred to as 
‘letting the river be the river’ in Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola, 2003) refer to the 
proposed approach of giving more space to natural water flows instead of building 
water defences and thus making the water flow in modified ways. In particular, the 
‘room for river’ approach suggests that, with the aim of managing floods and 
improvement of overall environmental conditions, river cross sections are widened by 
situating the dikes further away from the river, or by lowering the river forelands. It is 
also possible that in some cases retention areas are assigned for controlled flooding in 
case of extreme water levels to avoid uncontrolled dike breaches or overtopping. This is 
expected to result in lower flood levels; for example, by the year 2015 the river Rhine 
should be able to safely discharge 16.000 m3/s, and by the end of the century 18.000 
m3/s (with a current capacity of 14.000 m3/s).96 Implying a new kind of approach to 
flood management, ‘room for water’ requires new spatial planning and consequently 
also new ways of decision-making. This essentially has to do with the selection of the 
locations where more room would be given to the natural flow of the rivers and where 
arrangements would be made with people affected by the new approach. Because the 
population is actively involved in the decision making processes, practice has proven 
that communication on the part of the government and local authorities, on the purposes 
of the new measures, plays an essential role in achieving societal consensus (RIVM, 
2003, p.14). 
Other reports, “National Spatial Strategy” (MHSPE et al., 2004) and “Peaks in the 
Delta” (MEA, 2004), were published by the government, marking the further change in 
thinking about water. In addition to the new strategy of protection against floods, being 
implemented, a new spatial planning is under way involving many more interested 
parties, which can ultimately change the pattern of future human activity distribution. 
This presumes integration between spatial planning, economic development and water 
management, as the ‘room for water’ strategy means the creation of detention areas 
available for controlled inundation in case it becomes necessary to control exceptional 
water flows. Such an approach will evidently demand a revision of spatial patterns for 
land use, and can cause adjustments resulting in changing economic (infra-)structure in 
the long run. A number of studies have been initiated to support anticipated new 
directions in water policy and management in the Netherlands (such as an ongoing 
research in the field of climate change, in particular the ‘Climate Changes Spatial 
                                               
96
 For more information, see the website of the project “Room for the River”, www.ruimtevoorderivier.nl. 
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Planning’ research project covering five main themes: climate scenario’s, mitigation, 
adaptation, integration and communication can be mentioned).97 
However, the arguments outlined in this Section only provide a snapshot of wider 
public, political and academic discussions going on in the Netherlands. A shift in 
attitude to flood protection from a static, probability-oriented approach to a more 
integrative risk management can be seen (see also Bouma, Francois and Troch, 2005). 
Still, it is to be expected that it will take some time before the new approach becomes an 
accepted ‘business-as-usual’ practice. At the moment, studies of multiple flooding 
effects, their interdependence and repercussions through time, have to be conducted 
before specific policy decisions are taken and measures are implemented which can 
have a massive influence on the future development paths of the country.  
 
8.2.3. Risk Management Approach 
Observing recent developments on the issue of flood protection in the Netherlands, we 
note the revival of the concept of risk in flood management. Risk is the product of the 
probability of flooding, and its consequences (i.e. the costs inflicted). If we denote the 
flooding probability by the symbol P, and the expected effect (i.e. the potential 
economic consequences) by E, the risk R can be defined as R = P × E. Acknowledging 
the fact that the full flood risk is the sum of different flood scenarios, it is more precise 
to write: R = Σi (Pi × Ei) , where i = 1 to n denotes the number of flood scenarios. For 
many years, public policy was aimed at lowering P as much as possible. 
Simultaneously, however, as we mentioned in the previous Section, the country 
experienced a period of rapid growth, which meant that E, the potential flood effects, in 
the risk formula became larger and larger. This has lead to the situation where, at the 
moment, the Netherlands is confronted with the exceptionally low probability of a flood 
(by age-old philosophy) and potentially extremely high consequences. In order to bridge 
this discrepancy in the coming decades, the risk approach must be translated into a 
policy aiming at decreasing overall risk. This is evidently a formidable task, because it 
not only requires insight in the ‘risk equation’ and its dynamics, but also in the 
relationship between the two terms comprising risk. This clearly is the place where the 
water management specialist and the social scientist meet.  
The discussion in the previous Section, as we have seen, clearly signals what one 
may call a ‘paradigm shift’ in water and flood management in the Netherlands. That is, 
a shift from focusing on the probability of a flooding to thinking in terms of risk of a 
flooding, which opens a much broader setting for problem analysis and policy decision-
making. The essence of the ‘old’ thinking in this sense is keeping the probability of 
flooding constant in conformity with the accepted standards (for example, those laid 
down in the law). The ‘new’ thinking takes into account the risk connected to the event 
of a flood, which means a balanced attention to both flooding probabilities and effects. 
A further step in this direction would focus the attention of politicians and decision-
makers at managing in particular the potential effect of a flooding, because flooding 
probabilities in the Netherlands are already very low. The background here is that the 
accumulation of assets and the accelerated urbanisation in the flood-prone areas of the 
Netherlands dictate ‘new rules of the game’. The probabilities of a flood set out in the 
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 See the website of the project ‘Climate Changes Spatial Planning’ for more information: 
www.klimaatvoorruimte.nl. 
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National Flood Defence Act (1996) are actually miniscule, especially in comparison 
with the standards imposed around the globe, averaging once per 100 years. This means 
that to some people, further efforts at a reduction of flood probabilities in the 
Netherlands may make little sense. Therefore, management of the effects of a flood 
becomes indispensable as a main direction for future policy developments. 
The recent discussions about the need to reconsider current flood risk policy 
reactivate the issue of equality in protection levels. The question is whether everyone, 
wherever (s)he lives, has a right to the same protection level, or that protection levels 
should be a function of population and capital densities per dike ring. In the former case 
the safety level in each dike-ring area should be of the same order of magnitude. In the 
latter case (reflecting the current situation) one is in fact forced to accept different safety 
levels in different polders. With the state financing water safety, as is the case now, 
probably no difference would be observed. However, if the state opts for a 
responsibility-sharing model, involving more participation on the part of the public in 
water management decision-making, as shared financial responsibility, the final choice 
of staying in a higher risk area would be up to the people living there. Also, because of 
differences in economic growth rates, currently existing demographic and economic 
differences can become more prominent in the medium and long run. In fact, the very 
principle of thinking about floods in terms of risk implies also that in future the ultimate 
decision about the acceptable level of risk should be made by society at large. That is, 
flood protection should no longer be a sole matter of engineering, but rather be decided 
in public debate and compromise. This requires that many parties become involved in 
the negotiating and decision-making processes in the future. 
Bouwer and Vellinga (2007, pp481-482) contribute to this discussion, arguing in a 
similar manner: “The Dutch policy with regard to the safety levels and the protection 
against floods needs to be reconsidered. More than before, the potential impact of a 
flood needs to be the starting point for decisions. […] The idea that the land has to be 
protected at all costs could also become an issue for debate and safety levels in some 
area could be lowered.” This means that it is increasingly realised that, apart from 
looking at probabilities connected to a flood event, also potential consequences have to 
be taken into account, which in turn leads to reconsideration of protection standards and 
rules. We should add that increasingly, analyses of the social, environmental and 
economic costs and benefits are required to determine the most cost-effective measures 
which would correspond to the accepted level of risk connected with a major flooding 
event. Options to be considered include increasing dike heights, but also providing more 
room for the rivers, compartmentalising existing dike rings, creating emergency 
inundation (retention) areas, adjustments in building methods, rearranging spatial 
patterns of living and economic activity in the long run, et cetera. One of the 
implications for the developing shift in perspective is that it is increasingly more 
important to properly account for the economic consequences of any particular decision, 
as the country (now) has to weigh investments in extra safety against the costs of a 
possible flooding. This means that on the economic side, cost benefit analysis will be a 
central element, combined with willingness to pay studies to explore the opportunities 
for alternative solutions that would in turn lead to the emergence of a more sustainable 
and risk-aware society.  
An important issue in the ongoing debate is the responsibility issue. Up to now the 
Dutch government has had full responsibility for all of the water-related risks, at least as 
perceived by the public. The question is if this can continue in the future. One aspect is 
that no government can guarantee perfect safety from natural hazard; residual risks will 
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always remain. Recently, in the Netherlands the question appears how to cover this 
residual risk. Public or private initiatives, as well as mixed solutions will have to be 
found. In the light of this discussion, one notes an intensification of the debate on 
private insurance against flooding both in academic and public circles (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.4), as well as research conducted at the Institute for Environmental Studies 
(IVM) at the Free University of Amsterdam, inter alia Botzen and Van den Bergh 
(2006a,b).98 We shall elaborate this issue in the next Section. 
Addressing this issue immediately touches upon the (future) scope of governance, 
which brings entirely new elements into the discussion. For example, Ahrens and 
Rudolph (2006), point to the interdependence between governance structure and a 
country’s susceptibility to hazards, and risk reduction, where accountability, 
participation, predictability and transparency play an important role. In any case, the 
role of the Dutch Water Boards, the age-old public bodies governing water safety on the 
local level, can be reconsidered as well (see also Kuks, 2004). Water Boards in the 
Netherlands are fulfilling three tasks: i) water control, including protection against 
flooding by means of dunes, dykes and canals; ii) water management including both 
water quantity and quality; and iii) management of inland waterways and roads (see 
Unie van Waterschappen, 2004). Recent reports point out the potential for an increasing 
importance of Water Boards to sustain flood risk management in the future. For 
example, the report of the Advising Committee on the Financing of Primary Flood 
Defences (Vellinga et al., 2006), Dutch Water Boards are suggested to have higher 
financial capacity in the long run compared to the current model of financing stemming 
from the national budget to guarantee sufficient investments in the improvement of dike 
rings. There are three main reasons underlying this conclusion. First, Water Boards in 
the Netherlands already have a long history of successful water management and self-
financing. Second, they are independent of state, and therefore are not subject to 
political changes or compromise. Finally, because of the expected increase in 
investments in primary defences (among others, connected to the pressured put by the 
climate change, as well as underinvestment in the last decades), higher tax burden has to 
be put on the public; yet it appears that people would rather accept water board tax 
increase than a national tax increase, which should ensure the solvency of the Water 
Boards in the longer term. The next Section will follow up on the topic of the 
reshuffling of the balance between public and private domains. 
 
8.2.4. The Emergence of New Public - Private Balances  
For a long time, responsibility for flood protection in the Netherlands has rested solely 
with the government. However, as pointed out, recently one notes a shift in opinion 
towards more interactive decision making, involving more parties. Lately, the 
government has started to express its views on a more deregulated mode of dealing with 
flood risks. The National Policy Agreement on Water (2003) puts forth that issues 
concerning protection from and reaction to calamities should be addressed at the level 
where they appear. This principle, in practice, should mean that individuals, 
municipalities and provinces should show more initiative in taking care of their own 
safety without relying solely on the protection provided by the national government. 
This is supported by the views proposing a shift of the current mode of government 
                                               
98
 More information can be found on the IVM website www.vu.nl/ivm. 
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responsibility to a model of shared responsibility (Wouters, 2000a,b). Here, in the 
context of the transition in Dutch water management from ‘keeping water behind the 
dikes’ to ‘living with water’99, people have to learn how to deal with risks connected to 
flooding, as well as taking more responsibility. Among others, this can be seen as 
adjustments in building modes and standards, location choices for residential and 
business areas, and cooperation between various actors within society.  
This is a remarkable development, marking another shift in the approach to flood 
risk. Up to now, flood prevention has been often seen as a public good. The observed 
shift signals a change in the non-excludability characteristic of a public good. That is, 
the producer of the good (the national government) may (gradually) introduce a policy 
of excluding particular parties from consuming this, for example, as it is the case with 
the introduction of the so-called ‘unprotected areas’ or areas located outside the dikes 
(in Dutch, ‘buitendijkse gebieden’), see MTP (2002, 2005b). To clarify, in contrast to 
the protection standards for dike rings defined by the Flood Defence Act (1996), 
‘unprotected areas’ are not incorporated in the Act, and are in fact those areas found just 
before or on the protective dam or dike. In the province of Flevoland, the ports of Urk, 
Lelystad, Almere and Zeewolde fall under the defined ‘outside-the-dike areas’; on the 
coast, 13 such areas are identified, among others the famous places of Vlissingen, 
Scheveningen (near the Hague), Katwijk, Noordwijk, Zandvoort and Friesian islands in 
the Wadden Sea. Here, an attempt is made to prevent future development that runs the 
risk of erosion during storm surges (MTP, 2002). Yet there is no clarity about the 
protection level that the government can offer to the existing infrastructure and people 
living in these outside-the-dike areas. A special commission, the Poelmann 
Commission, was appointed to advise the Undersecretary of the Dutch Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management on the further development, protection 
level and responsibility for protection in the areas located outside the dikes. Its report 
(Commissie Poelmann, 2005) revealed that protection and development of these areas 
should be closely considered as a specific case in flood protection.100 We therefore 
observe here a tendency to growing institutional diversity, attributing more direct 
influence and responsibility to the parties involved.101  
Insurance 
One of the points, which reappears in our discussion of public-private balances, 
concerns the issue of insurance against flood. We have put forth the main line of the 
discussion on this issue in Chapter 3, outlining its basic principles as well as the 
problems related to insuring low –probability – high consequence events. In the case of 
the Netherlands, this has its own implications, as apparently the issue of flood event 
insurance is problematic on the part of insurers, as well as on the part of the population, 
                                               
99
 See also the website of the promoted policy of “the Netherlands lives with water” 
www.nederlandleeftmetwater.nl. 
100
 For more information concerning ‘unprotected areas’ (‘buitendijkse gebieden’), see the websites of the 
online Knowlegde Centre “External Safety” http://www.externe-veiligheid.nl and STOWA (Dutch 
abbreviation for Stichting Toegepast Onderzoek Waterbeheer - Foundation for Applied Research on 
Water Management) http://www.stowa.nl/. 
101
 This may be interpreted in terms of a Williamson alignment (re)arrangement in which governance 
structure and product (or transaction) are aligned in such a way that total transaction costs are minimized 
(Williamson, 2000). Transaction costs, then, are interpreted in a broad sense, including information, 
bargaining and monitoring costs.   
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both individuals and businesses. On the part of the insurers, at the moment private 
insurance against flooding is not available in this country. This has historical grounds, 
going back to the flood of 1953. After this disaster, insurers basically refrained from 
selling policies covering flood damage, arguing that flood risk is an ‘uninsurable 
catastrophic risk’ (see Kok, 2004 and 2005). However, recently the issue of private 
insurance is increasingly addressed. Herein lies a fundamental problem, however. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, insurance is based on diversification and generally covers 
events with a known frequency distribution. However, a disaster, and especially a 
flooding in the Netherlands, is typically characterized by (uncertain) low frequency and 
very high cost. Large numbers of people inhabiting polders, as well as the relevant 
property, if affected, would lead to substantial, dependent claims. Covering claims 
associated with such a disaster requires access to substantial sources of capital.  
At the same time, on the part of the public, insurance does not seem appropriate. 
The point is that thus far, government always used to give aid to the victims of natural 
disasters based on the solidarity principle, which required a re-interpretation for each 
particular case (see the Decision and the Law on Compensation of Damage in Case of 
Disasters and Serious Accidents, both 1998). This means that in fact government 
practices provide a disincentive for private agents to engage in insurance. Also, those 
individuals, who expect that the government will at least partially cover private 
damages incurred in case of flooding, do not see any reason to buy an insurance policy. 
Other issues may possibly also play a role in individual decision-making. 
Kunreuther (1997, pp2-5) draws on the literature on decision-making processes with 
respect to low probability – high consequence events and discusses the issue of 
individual protection in the hazard-prone areas. He notes the following reasons for 
behaviour to avoid taking measures in such cases: ignoring the event (it will not happen 
to me); budget constraints; myopia (connected to personal risk perception, as well as 
valuation of costs and benefits); and reliance on state disaster assistance. We may 
certainly notice that myopia plays a part in the case of flood insurance in the 
Netherlands. We also refer to Heems and Kothuis (2006), who explain the lack of 
consciousness in Dutch society concerning flood risks by the following factors apart 
from the perceived general feeling of safety: lack of experience connected to a flooding 
event; not considering water as a source of danger; lack of information and facts 
distributed to the public concerning current risks; and, finally, the collective character of 
flood protection, which in fact can be seen as leading to the free rider problem when this 
concerns taking measures. As a result, the current situation in the Netherlands, 
according to the authors, can be described as a ‘bungee jumper’ effect, when people 
inhabiting polders consider it safe to live with the permanent danger of flooding behind 
the dikes, the strength of which they deem reliable. As a starting point to unfold this 
problem, Heems and Kothuis suggest that proper risk communication takes place. 
The above discussion regarding the considerations of insurers and the public in 
general in the Netherlands suggests that it is of crucial importance that agents on the 
insurance market have appropriate incentives. An eventual transition to the principle of 
shared responsibility in the Netherlands and emergence of a market for private 
insurance will demand a clear determination of roles with a corresponding set of rights 
and responsibilities for each participant.  
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The Role of Government 
Another issue from the overlap of public-private domains concerns the role of 
government in steering economic development, which we also briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4. All around the world, economies are to a certain extent 
regulated by the governments. For us it is of interest to consider the specificity of 
developments in the Dutch situation and the role of government in economic policy-
making in the aftermath of a disaster. In the light of the shifts between the private and 
public domains in the Netherlands concerning flood protection, one of the scenarios that 
we can assume for future developments is that ‘under normal circumstances’ the 
government is willing to delegate part of its responsibility with regard to flood control 
and water management in the country to the public. At the same time, the government 
can choose to remain a stabilising factor and a source of ‘last resort’ in emergency 
situations and consciously assume the responsibility for steering post-disaster recovery 
of society. One of the aspects in the efforts for putting the country back on track is the 
economic side of the calamity. 
Looking from an economic perspective, if a part of a country is hit, which hosts 
important production facilities, that part of the established economic network is lost. 
That is, the system suddenly loses constituent parts and cannot keep on working as 
before. A number of producers economy-wide lose their customers, others lose 
suppliers, and consumers are not able to obtain the desired consumption goods, causing 
an avalanche effect throughout the economy. In addition, various production sectors 
may suffer damage to a different extent, which implies asymmetry of effects (as we 
discussed in Chapter 6 in developing our model). This can create imbalances between 
the various sectors within the economy, leading to supply and demand shortages on 
various markets. Imbalances can not always be automatically restored; probably 
sometimes governments choose to assume responsibility and either temporarily 
introduce more regulation in the markets experiencing severe problems or provide 
appropriate incentives to various agents with the aim of facilitating post-disaster 
recovery. This means that, most probably, economic policy is required to assist the 
markets in clearing. To be ready for emergency situations, the government thus needs to 
know its options, and above all needs to have insight in how the economy may respond 
to various stimuli under the circumstances that go beyond the scope of ‘business-as-
usual’ practices. In the next Section, we shall discuss how economic modelling can be 
applied. 
Furthermore, there is clearly a time horizon issue for proactive policy formation 
for the risk-averse policymaker. An example of such a policy would be the protection of 
a particular area, or a deliberate spatial redistribution of activities (in order to make 
most disaster-prone areas less densely occupied by industry and inhabitants) as a loss 
avoidance strategy for a potential calamity. In comparison to the ‘do-nothing’ case 
(MAFF, 1999), these assets would be protected, and thus the costs of loosing them 
would be avoided if a flooding breaks out. Evidently, these are examples of long-term 
policy measures. This brings us to the point that in fact short- and medium-term 
approaches should be conceptually distinguished from the long-term perspective. When 
talking about long- and very long-term policy, often Hicksian sustainability concepts 
enter, in the sense that the choices of future generations should not be compromised for 
the sake of choices of current generation (see also Brundtland Report, UN, 1987). This 
implies that we have to think of ways to enhance the robustness and resilience of the 
systems in question on the long term in preparing for a calamity, or in steering recovery 
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when responding to a disturbance. This implies a different set of concepts and variables 
in taking today’s decisions than when policy-makers aim at the short-term horizon. 
Also, when considering the cost-benefit analysis of pre-disaster measures, outcomes of 
analyses may vary due to different ways of discounting costs and benefits over time. 
This also involves the inter-temporal preferences of actors involved in the decision-
making process.  
All this has implications not only for preventive strategies as described above, but 
also for recovery planning. We can think of ex-post government policies helping the 
economy and businesses in particular to cope with the extreme situations in future in the 
event of a flood (or any other major disorder). For example, the government should 
probably be alert to a situation where, in addition to the country suffering direct and 
indirect losses (for the discussion of these concepts, consult Chapter 3) incurred by a 
calamity, long-term losses associated with the crowding out of domestic production by 
imports can take place. This may be the case if domestic producers as well as consumers 
outside the affected area temporary switch to foreign products to substitute missing 
local goods. If this turns into a permanent trend, goods, which before the calamity were 
produced domestically and now are imported, are in fact lost to foreign countries (which 
is in line with our definition of damage, see Chapter 3). To avoid this situation, policies 
directed at the encouraging of uninterrupted production processes in the country may be 
pursued.  
This means that the possibilities to steer the recovery have to be designed in 
advance. These contingency plans should form an integral part of the high water 
protection strategy, as in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophe it should be clear for 
the decision-makers which options there are and which of them should be preferred 
depending on the prevailing circumstances. One should realise that in such extreme 
situations action has to be taken straight away, and the consequences of this action will 
have an impact on the later development stages. Therefore, recovery and reconstruction 
have to be immediately directed at the trajectory of the ‘most desired outcome’.  
In fact, in the course of this Chapter, we effectively took a broader view of disaster 
management than just analysing the aftermath of the event, with policy alternatives for 
steering the recovery. We suggest that several decisions concerning preparedness and 
directed at efforts to create conditions for resilient systems have to be taken; action and 
reaction in the wake of a disaster are critical both in operational and strategic decisions 
for the long-run development trajectories. The rising awareness of the increasing 
dangers in the flood-prone areas in the Netherlands creates a broader platform for public 
debate than before, and offers the possibility for new ideas and concepts to surface. For 
the Dutch government it is even more important to realise which consequences a large-
scale flood may have, not only for the area, which may be effected, but also for the 
entire economy.  
 
8.3. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter, we discussed recent developments in Dutch water management and 
policy, signalling a paradigm change in thinking about flood threats. We saw that for 
centuries both sea and rivers have continuously been a source of danger. The Delta Plan, 
which came into being after the disastrous 1953 flood, has for decades set the stage for 
flood protection in the Netherlands. This was based on the concept of very strong 
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primary defences, organized to withstand extreme water levels. For the highly 
developed and populated central part of the Netherlands, this amounted to a chance of a 
flood up to once per 10.000 years.  
We saw that this permitted a spectacular economic growth in the provinces below 
sea level, which ultimately made the country a world player on many markets. 
However, the discrepancy between the infinitesimal dike overtopping probability, and 
the alarmingly increasing expected losses resulting in a high and ever growing risk of 
flooding, demand a different type of approach. It means that the country has to prepare 
itself for future challenges connected to the rising risk, in this context finding a balance 
between expected probability and potential losses, and growth and development 
agendas.  
These recent changes in the view on water management in the Netherlands have 
led to a change of approach from one based on probability, to one based on risk 
assessment. Risk, in turn, is the concept including the interaction between the 
probability of an event to happen (like a major flooding) with the costs that this event 
may bring about. In other words, risk is the product of probability and the effects of the 
expected calamity. Adopting a risk management approach in fact requires a framework 
that takes the economic side of a disaster explicitly into account. At the same time, there 
is a need for the assessment of the potential economic damage that a flood may cause. If 
taken on board, this new initiative may in the long run lead to direct implications, in the 
first place for spatial planning, accompanied by a further chain of reactions throughout 
various facets of contemporary society.  
Current developments in Dutch water management, as depicted in this Chapter, 
lead to other questions. One of these is whether everyone has the same right for 
protection from flooding – which is not the case right now. In fact, there is a 
discrepancy between safety standards as fixed by Dutch law and the actual situation as it 
has developed. Here, probably, the country faces the task to re-distribute safety in a 
reasonable and acceptable way. This relates to other issues. At the moment the Dutch 
government bears the responsibility for protection against threats posed by the water, 
either coming from the sea or from the rivers. In the coming decade this however may 
evolve into practices that are different from current ones in many respects. For example, 
if people want to live or work in specific areas, they also may have to bear a part of the 
involved responsibilities related to flood protection. This, evidently, can take several 
forms, all of which have to addressed.  
A wealth of issues surrounds the spatial dimension. Firstly, many of the issues on 
today’s agenda are a consequence of how Dutch spatial structure has developed. The 
country is basically a patchwork of interconnected polders, which each has different 
characteristics such as population, economic value, and different safety standards. This 
means that probability calculations should be based on the much more complex concept 
of systemic risk where a number of dike rings should be seen as an interdependent 
system. Another issue concerns the present distribution of activities. A major issue is 
whether or not the Western part of the country can remain as prominent in Dutch 
society as it is now. Systematic factors do not look favourable: sea level rise, subsiding 
ground level, increased precipitation and the expectation of more extreme peak river 
discharges. The Netherlands has to decide how it will develop in the next decades. 
Should it keep its core economic activities located in the areas directly behind the dikes, 
or should it adopt a policy of spreading these activities to the higher areas in the Eastern 
and Southern parts of the country? Further research will be needed for this.  
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Given the increasing complexity in which modern societies like the Netherlands 
are operating, it is nearly impossible to solve water management and (large-scale) 
flooding problems without embedding them in the broader context of economic 
development as was the case in earlier times. The seamless interaction between various 
networks offers rich grounds for debate, which we believe will improve our vision on 
the water and flood protection problems in future. In this Chapter, we attempted to 
connect flood protection policy evolution in the Netherlands to economic modelling as a 
possible means to analyse selected issues, in particular paying attention to the ‘effect 
constituent’ of the risk concept. In this context, we state that the economic dimension of 
disaster consequences is an essential part in understanding, explaining and steering 
contemporary economies in the direction of the desired development trajectories. In the 
framework of this thesis (Chapter 6), we developed and presented a methodology that 
gives insight into the concepts of economic vulnerability and resilience, as well as 
adaptability and mitigation, which are becoming recognised as topical issues in Dutch 
water and flood management at the moment.  
The division of our analysis in three steps in our proposed input-output model 
allows tracing particular events and their effects at each stage, and modelling their 
repercussions throughout the entire economic system. Dividing a complex disaster 
phenomenon into three comprehensive stages, 1) accounting for survived production 
capacity; 2) convergence to (new) equilibrium and managing recovery; and 3) the 
analysis of effectiveness of proactive measures, is considered to comply with the needs 
for flood loss analysis and decision-making support at times when significant shifts in 
water governance are taking place in the Netherlands. We suggest that scenario analysis 
provides significant advantages, opening up multiple opportunities for analysis and 
action. We hope to have shown that this three-stage approach, analysing the economic 
consequences of large-scale disturbances, has the potential to mature into a fully-
fledged tool for supporting decision-making on a national, as well as on international 
levels.102  
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 We may also notice that international cooperation is gaining prominence in the last decade marking a 
trend towards paying more attention to flood protection issues. Mitchell (2003, p.568) points out: “In 
Europe, concern about flooding has grown rapidly in recent years and has resulted in significant public 
policy responses by transnational organisations as well as national ones.” Mitchell distinguishes a number 
of driving forces behind these developments embedded in a dominant consumer-oriented economy, which 
in fact contribute to the increased risks of flooding. Among others, he is mentioning such factors as the 
movement of exporting industry to waterside locations; the phenomenon of North to South industrial 
migration; shift towards transportation infrastructure, watershed protection and water supply, nature 
conservation, and recreation as more important floodplain land uses than traditionally dominant 
agriculture; landscapes and ecosystems that become extensively modified by humans; growing 
urbanisation, and others. Mitchell notices that these processes are in particular characteristic of Europe, 
and are even more intensified by the decreasing willingness of European nations to tolerate floods, 
imposing high flood-protection standards, probably pioneered by the Netherlands which seems to become 
a ‘zero-risk’ society (see also Tol et al., 2003, p.579). This all together requires an integrated solution, 
which is sought to be found in cooperation between the European countries. 
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Chapter 9 
Concluding Remarks and  
Issues for Future Research 
_______________________________________ 
 
9.1. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
In this thesis, we studied the economic aspects of major disasters in the context of 
developed modern countries. Our research was inspired by earlier empirical research 
into the consequences of a big flood in the coastal areas of the Netherlands. We 
observed that the area of disaster studies was very diverse, but also that certain elements 
seemed to be lacking or underdeveloped. Our study focused on one such area.  
We had to refrain from many aspects, such as environmental, ecological, social 
and political impacts, or human victims. The study focused on two particular aspects of 
a disaster, its scale and the structure of the stricken economy. Thereby, we focused 
solely on highly developed economies. The international literature clearly pointed to the 
need for separate attention for the issues we raise. Various stakeholders need to gain 
further knowledge of disastrous events and their repercussions throughout modern 
societies. At the same time, expertise in this area is not really extensive. The analysis of 
major shocks is conceptually different from that of relatively minor shocks. Also 
alternatives, such as viewing a big disaster as a kind of aggregate of a number of ‘small’ 
disturbances, were not convincing. Here, the scale of the event, which seriously 
undermines the ability of a system to operate, plays a leading role. We had to conclude 
that research of this kind is still relatively new; attempting to gain additional insight into 
the processes behind disaster events in modern economies has only recently become a 
separate theme of research. Essentially, this has yet to gain a more definitive shape as a 
specific field of study.  
Current attempts at studying calamity consequences are very diversified, by 
country, type of (natural) hazard, modelling type or purpose; we discussed these issues 
in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. This raised another issue, namely that a set of 
commonly accepted concepts used in disaster research and their definitions are still 
missing. In our study, we decided to start by addressing the core concepts in disaster 
analysis. We started with the notions of a disaster and a catastrophe - which are 
identified as severe shocks, generating widespread disturbance in terms of physical 
damages and loss of connectivity within an economic network. Although catastrophes 
are seen as ‘major disasters’, within the scope of this thesis we treat them as equal in 
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terms of scale, as opposed to the minor or incremental changes conventionally 
addressed in economic literature. 
As stated, the inspiration for our research was the situation in the Netherlands 
where the dynamics of the danger of a flood are changing. One of the most important 
aspects of a disaster is the disruption it brings about. Clearly, a big disaster will bring 
about big disruption. It appears that the impact a disaster can have strongly depends on 
the nature of the country or region. For example, it depends on whether the economy is 
developed or still developing. Also, it depends to a large extent on whether or not the 
country has prepared itself for a possible catastrophe. Essentially, these aspects of 
disaster analysis can be described by notions such as vulnerability, resilience and 
adaptability (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion). These concepts have recently 
become topics of particular interest and wide debate in scholarly research. We have to 
stress that these notions (i.e. vulnerability, resilience and adaptability) were ‘borrowed’ 
from other social and natural disciplines. This meant that they also had to be given a 
context-specific interpretation when used in disaster analysis. In this thesis, we have 
attempted to present a survey of the literature by authors with an economic background, 
as well as authors from the natural and social sciences. In this manner, we interpret 
economic vulnerability (to hazard) in terms of a measure to incur damage. Economic 
resilience (of a system) is then the ability of the system to cope with a disturbance, 
adjusting to the new circumstances and conditions and maintaining its vital functions. 
Adaptability, in turn, is seen as the ability of the system to prepare for potential hazards, 
thereby aiming at decreasing its vulnerability and improving its resilience capacity. In 
connection with sustainability notions (broadly interpreted), adaptability and resilience-
theory applications could yield their best potential – thereby obtaining a certain 
normative content. 
Consequently, because of the disruptions incurred, the affected economy faces 
costs. Here we should not think of costs in terms of a single number. Disasters, 
imposing serious disturbances into business-as-usual practices, everyday routines and 
established relationships, are too complex to reduce their impact to a single figure. 
Clearly, many types of costs are involved, such as loss of human lives and productive 
capacity, objects of cultural and historical value, environmental contamination, 
psychological trauma, and so on. In this study, we focused on the economic costs in 
terms of lost – in fact, unrealised – production capacity. 
The measurement of costs is a major issue. Costs incurred as a result of a calamity 
can be broadly sub-divided into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ costs. However, there are 
differences in opinion among researchers concerning the definition and interpretation of 
these terms (we concentrated on these issues in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis). In this 
study we considered losses resulting from a direct ‘contact’ between the hazard and the 
assets as ‘direct’, including loss of associated business flow. On the other hand, losses 
resulting ‘elsewhere’ as a consequence of loss of connectivity within an economic 
system, are referred to as ‘indirect’. We also pointed out that the typology itself of the 
costs connected to a calamity requires special attention.  
First of all, there is the difference between measurement and inference. What we 
mean is that the estimation of direct costs, such as hazard-induced damages, requires a 
different approach than the estimation of indirect cost. In particular, physical damage 
has a specific spatial dimension and known scope, which facilitates measurement. At 
the same time, direct and indirect losses, connected to the interruptions of circular flow, 
are much more difficult to trace and are not only a matter of measurement, but rather of 
inference. Furthermore, indirect costs often reveal themselves far beyond the affected 
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region, and can in fact become visible hundreds of kilometres away from the hazard-
affected area. This meant that in order to gain insight into the nature of such losses 
within a larger entity (like a whole country) we need a suitable modelling tool that is 
capable of capturing the interrelationships (or a sudden lack of them) within an entire 
system.  
Secondly, we pointed out the importance of introducing a spatial element in the 
analysis. Disasters have a definite geographic dimension, so location enters into the 
equation. As mentioned in the above, indirect losses can manifest themselves over large 
distances and even in other countries. That is, the spatial extent – and how we define it - 
of cost estimation will affect the final outcome.  
Thirdly, the temporal dimension is important. Here, we can distinguish between 
immediate or very short-term effects, medium-term, and long-term impacts. 
Immediately after a calamity, only direct damage is visible; one only starts to realise 
somewhat later that there are also disturbed economic relationships and links. If damage 
assessment is restricted to this stage, only a limited amount of costs can be identified. In 
the short-term and the middle term, distracted linkages in an economy gain effect, and 
economy-wide indirect effects become apparent. Non-produced goods, absent suppliers 
and customers, closed factories and shops, broken roads and communications are the 
signs of indirect impacts, in the affected area, and outside it. Before all actors find their 
place in the new situation and the system comes to a new balance, many costs categories 
will be observed. Taking the recovery stage into account will provide another estimate 
of total disaster costs. In the longer-term perspective, we can look at the disastrous event 
as pushing a region or an entire country away from its long-term development path. We 
define the total costs of a calamity as the difference between the potential that the 
economy could have realised without the disaster, and the actual development up to the 
point where the post-disaster track meets the potential one. Here, the time horizon 
depends on the ability of an economy to return to normalcy. Some economies can catch 
up with their original path within a couple of years; for others it can take a decade or 
more. If a disaster has been a severe one, and a system is not able to return to its 
development track at all, this theoretically raises the costs of a catastrophe to infinity.  
Our fourth observation with regard to cost assessment concerns the choice of 
framework. Depending on the selected objective, a number of perspectives to costs can 
be considered. In the context of an economic disaster, theoretical financial and 
economic cost perspectives are available. Here it is important, in order to avoid 
confusion, and to apply the concepts consistently according to the chosen perspective.  
Finally, the distinction between stock and flow measures of losses should be 
made. Again, depending on the type of loss, stock or flow concepts can be applied; for 
example, it is more appropriate to measure property damages as a loss of stock, while it 
is more appropriate to measure business interruption in terms of losses of flows. To 
keep the appraisal consistent, as pointed out in the literature, it is essential to measure 
each loss category either in terms of lost stock, or in terms of lost flow, but not both. In 
Chapter 5, we pointed out that the Leontief model, in particular in its dynamic versions, 
offers interesting possibilities for an integrated view on this. 
The discussion, involving stock and flow measures, brings us to another point. If 
existing relations within an economic network become disturbed or destroyed, the 
capacity to generate a surplus is also affected. Here we focus on the disruption of 
relations within an economy and its effect on the surplus producing capacity. To 
describe the interrelations (and also the loss of them) within an economic system, we 
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employed the notion of a circular flow. The notion of circularity is based on the idea 
that a commodity within an economy can appear simultaneously as an input in one 
activity and as an output of another. This provides interdependence between producers 
and consumers. This way, we can visualize an economy as an interconnected system of 
multiple buyers and suppliers operating on various markets. To also formally express 
this interdependence between the various groups and categories of agents in the 
economy, we decided to adopt the framework that multi-sector models provide. The 
term ‘sector’ has a broad meaning in this context. It can mean groups such of producers 
or consumers, but also stand for separate industries such as various types of agriculture, 
heavy or light industries, services, et cetera. In particular, we looked at the capacity of a 
country to generate a surplus or net product. If we picture the pre-disaster situation in 
terms of circular flow, the situation is balanced in the sense that buyers and sellers 
coordinated their respective decisions. If this circular flow is disturbed, imbalances and 
disproportions arise. Consequently, we chose to study the impact of a disaster through 
the notion of imbalances caused by disruptions in the interconnected network, which 
form the economy. Major disturbances, as we portray them, break up connecting lines 
between sellers and buyers, and also between factory or work place and the individual 
worker; the establishment can be gone, or the worker can have been incapacitated, 
resulting in a loss of employment.  
Having adopted a multi-sector model, the question arises: which one? Today’s 
models are to a large extent based on the idea of ‘balances’, not ‘imbalances’. Actually, 
during the literature review and conference discussions, we gradually realized that we 
had to return to basic philosophies underlying multi-sector research to be able to apply 
them to ‘disequilibrium’ modelling. That is, we had to go back to the 1920s and 1930s, 
to authors like Walras, Cassel, Wald, Von Neumann and the early work of Leontief. We 
referred to Schlesinger (see Chacko, 1976), who pointed out that economic theory 
should not only explain nonnegative prices and the quantities produced from scarce 
resources, but also which goods are scarce and which are ‘not scarce’ or ‘free’. Also, a 
theory should be able to explain which of the existing productive activities are not used 
at all. To be able to address these types of questions, we had to go back to the views of 
John Von Neumann. 
Von Neumann addressed a very particular question about economic growth. He 
showed that economies, which are able to support a circular flow, possess a so-called 
proportional or balanced growth, a situation where all sectors grow at the same rate. 
This unique growth path obtained a special normative status much later, in work 
concerning optimal growth after World War II. This approach also provided information 
on goods which are actually consumed as inputs and produced as outputs, and in which 
quantities. It also provided information on the overproduced (i.e. ‘free’) goods, and the 
activities and technologies that are used or not used. Later work by others produced 
special algorithms to actually calculate this growth rate, the accompanying financial 
parameters, and the corresponding outputs and prices. Von Neumann’s model was 
‘closed’ in the sense that no outside resources were required to maintain the circular 
flow. This meant adopting a perhaps somewhat forced concept of activity-producing 
labour while absorbing consumption goods in fixed proportions. In addition, disposing 
of oversupplied commodities was no problem. Leontief, only a few years later, 
published a Tableau Economique of the United States. This Tableau also was closed for 
consumption, without, however, considering labour as an activity like all the others. 
Only later, the so-called open input-output model became available for impact analysis 
in the form of multiplier analysis. However, the Leontief models are somewhat less 
 221 
flexible in addressing issues of relative abundance and shortage. This is the reason the 
Von Neumann formulation was adopted as providing the basic outlook. For us, it was 
important that we now could say more straightforwardly what is overproduced and what 
is unused as a consequence of the emerging imbalances in the disaster aftermath.  
Essentially, the question a disaster-researcher faces is how to model a post-disaster 
economy. In fact, one can formulate the problem as follows: Where are we? And where 
do we want to go from here? Also: How can interrupted activities be restored? Where 
should the means for assistance be directed to in the first difficult moments? Clearly, in 
such situations, we have an extreme scarcity of resources at certain points; decisions on 
resource allocations are critical and have to be based on factual information. In other 
words, in order to make ‘optimal’ decisions, we initially have to know what is available 
and what is not. Furthermore, we should also have an idea about in which direction we 
want to go. So, there are two things we want to know: firstly, what is the state of affairs 
immediately after the event? What is damaged, lost, or destroyed? What is left 
untouched and remains functioning? What can be used, and what appears to be of no 
use locally, regionally, or nationally? And secondly, what is the strategy to be followed 
for recovery? This means that before we get to reconstruction and recovery modelling, 
we need some sort of accounting for those assets and resources that survived the disaster 
and remained intact. Getting to know where we stand, immediately after an outbreak, 
and how far we are from what can be called ‘business-as usual’, requires a study of its 
own. It was a revelation to realise that existing literature does not cover this step as part 
of disaster model building. Yet, we consider this ‘accounting’ stage a highly important 
element in thinking about major calamities and their consequences in modern complex 
economies, where the scale of the disturbance is a determinate factor. So, firstly, we 
decided to focus on the immediate after-catastrophe situation where part of an economy 
is destroyed, thereby sometimes introducing heroic assumptions regarding the surviving 
elements.  
Naturally, there are many different opinions on how an economy can develop after 
a major shock. What should we aim at? A proper goal might be restoration of the pre-
catastrophe situation. We can assume that, before the calamity, markets were in 
equilibrium, where consumers were buying goods and services based on their 
preferences, maximising their utilities, and producers were producing the necessary 
amounts of those goods and services based on profit maximisation principles and 
applying the ‘best’ technology. Because that equilibrium was not just coincidence, but 
rather the result of consumer- and producer-optimising behaviour, this would indeed be 
a proper goal for where the economy should be (again) after the recovery stage. 
Alternatively, it can also be seen as providing a convenient threshold scenario to 
compare with other recovery paths. 
Modern economies are characterized by many types of rigidities. These can be of 
a technological nature, as stressed by Von Neumann and Leontief. However, they also 
can be of an institutional, cultural or behavioural nature. In our work, we focused on 
such rigidities in the form of engrained views on the composition of the final 
consumption basket, and on the role of full employment. That is, after the disaster, 
consumption and employment issues basically dominate the agenda. We modelled this 
in terms of a policy to restore ‘some’ kind of economic circular flow where labour’s real 
wage (i.e. its consumption bundle) is paid for by labour’s input into the productive 
sectors. In our basic model design, described in Chapter 6, Sections 6.3 to 6.5, we 
derive what is called the Basic equation under the assumption that labour losses are 
proportional to the losses of sectoral capacities after a disaster. As a result, we arrived at 
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the description of the post-disaster surviving production capacity, with maintained 
proportions between the sectoral intermediate and primary inputs, but with distorted 
proportions (i.e. relative to the proportions observed in the pre-catastrophe circular 
flow) between the sectors and intermediate and final consumption demand. This clearly 
is a first approximation, because in reality labour often is more ‘flexible’, which 
provides opportunities for fine-tuning at the sectoral level. We addressed this possibility 
in Section 6.6 of Chapter 6. There, we derived an alternative Basic post-disaster 
equation based on the assumption of disproportional losses between the labour force and 
sectoral production capacities. In this instance, we also arrive at the different post-
disaster capacity description. Focusing on the all-important role of the consumption-
jobs relation, in this way we arrived at what basically is an ‘upside-down’ input-output 
system: in cases of a relative abundance of labour, the intermediate input part, i.e. the 
technological infrastructure, now essentially becomes the scarce resource!  
In modelling recovery, we focused on a strategy directed at a speedy growth after 
a calamity, which would in the medium and long run ensure the creation of new work 
places. Furthermore, expanded production to satisfy final demand will generate more 
labour income, which in turn will ensure the stability and self-sufficiency of the system 
in longer term perspective. We thus assumed a policy decision to return to the pre-
calamity proportions. Starting from the basic post-disaster equation, we are then able to 
identify, with the help of Von Neumann theory, which sectors are the ‘bottlenecks’ for 
the recovery. Essentially, this means that because some of the sectors are struck badly, 
they act as a limiting factor for the entire economy. This means that other sectors, with a 
greater post-disaster productive capacity, in any case in the short run will produce goods 
in abundance relative to what is necessary both for intermediate and final consumption, 
thereby becoming largely superfluous.  
 
9.2. DISCUSSION OF MODEL IMPLICATIONS 
We attempted to develop an integrated approach that is transparent, methodologically 
correct, and empirically applicable for serving as a reliable tool for policy analysis and 
advice. We also provided a connection to a more integrative water management 
approach in the Netherlands. In Chapter 8 of this thesis we discussed which tools our 
model can offer for the analysis of flood threats in the Netherlands as well as for 
decision-making and action in a broader international context. Our adapted input-output 
framework, introduced in Chapter 6, can be used for exploring scenarios for adaptive 
policy regarding the threat of flooding.  
In Chapter 8 we put sharply that in the Netherlands, where economic and flood 
protection networks are overlapping, water management policies cannot be considered 
separately from the long-term development of the country as a whole. The analysis that 
we presented can ultimately result in proposals concerning adjustments in the current 
political economy of the country as a whole. It may be necessary to prepare a set of 
well-based and thoroughly studied options to guarantee long-run sustainability under 
conditions of increasing risk of climate change, particularly in its interaction with dense 
socio-economic, administrative and political network-based interests. Besides, it may be 
that changes introduced in present policies (with a certain legacy of ‘technocratic’, path 
dependent polices), only mark the beginning of bigger shifts such as those addressed in 
Chapter 8. Thus, water management and flood protection policies cannot be viewed 
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separately from the national long-term development path. Essentially, this asks for the 
co-evolvement of modern economic thinking and current policy-making. 
We suggest that the proposed economic model can serve as a tool that lends itself 
to a three-fold set of targets in current water and flood management in the Netherlands: 
a) establishment of an integrated way of thinking about large-scale catastrophes; b) 
improvement of the economic methodology for disaster analysis; and c) introduction of 
new thinking about policy implications of disaster analysis. 
The first step to this three-fold approach is to get a proper perspective on the 
nature of the post-catastrophe disruptions. To this end, it is necessary to go back first to 
the pre-disaster equilibrium notions as modelled by circular flow based schemes. 
Against this background, we reviewed the interconnections within and between the 
various sectors of the economy, disturbed as they are by the hazard. This resulted in the 
so-called Basic equation, which is derived based on adapted input-output accounting 
(see equation [6.18], and equations [6.35] and [6.39] in Chapter 6). Using the equations 
for labour and total output, we were able to establish in a systematic manner which part 
of intermediate as well as final demand ‘drops out’ of the circular flow system as a 
result of the calamity. The Basic equation, in fact, provides a reflection on the situation 
in the entire economy in the form of a systematic ‘inventarisation’ of the remaining 
production capacity. However, it is not yet a representation of an operable economic 
system because it only reflects disrupted internal proportions. 
The second stage consists of addressing post-disaster imbalances. During this 
stage, the Basic equation becomes our point of departure for an investigation of the 
options open to an economy when entering the post-disaster recovery. Many policy 
tracks are open, and in Chapter 6 we illustrated one of them, i.e. a return to the pre-
disaster proportions.  
During the third stage, a special type of cost-benefit analysis can be employed, 
based on the geographic dimension of the catastrophe. As a result, our model enables us 
to estimate the macro-economic effects of particular ex ante preventive measures on 
production facilities or residential areas lost or saved per formulated scenario. Knowing 
the spatial distribution of economic activities, we can assume that if the country, or parts 
thereof, were better protected, the consequences of a calamity at the national level 
would be less massive. This provides us with a possibility to analyse multiple pre-
disaster conditions, policy measures and recovery paths, and to contrast these with the 
total expected costs of a catastrophe. Thus, comparing the outcomes to the related costs, 
preferred scenarios can be singled out.  
 
9.3. KEY CONTRIBUTIONS 
Let us briefly recapitulate our research goal and questions. Above all, we hope that the 
answers provided to the research questions, formulated in Chapter 1, added to our 
knowledge in the field of disasters studies. Our goal was to develop an integrated 
approach for the economic analysis of disasters in modern, highly developed 
economies. The reviewed literature has shown that systematic thinking, incorporating 
important elements of analysis, such as disaster preparedness, reflection of imbalances 
and recovery thereafter, has not yet fully developed, while detecting a need for such a 
tool in policy-making.  
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We can conclude that five specific contributions of this thesis can be recognised. 
Firstly, we have introduced the conceptualisation of the notions of a ‘disaster’ and a 
‘catastrophe’, as well as the notions essential in disaster analysis, such as ‘economic 
vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’, and other related notions. These are found in Chapters 2 
and 3. Secondly, we have illuminated the potential of the input-output types of model, 
applied to the studies of structural breaks (Chapters 4 and 5). Thirdly, we have proposed 
a novel methodological advancement in the development of an adjusted input-output 
based model. This can become a flexible instrument for the structured analysis of the 
processes inside an economic system, focusing on policy as well as on action, in which 
three phases can be distinguished: 1) the immediate disaster consequences 
(vulnerability); 2) the economic reconstruction and recovery in the disaster aftermath 
(resilience); and 3) policy instruments and measures for advance preparation to a 
potential hazard (mitigation and adaptation), as found in Chapter 6. Fourthly, we 
provided an improved theoretical foundation for the adjusted input-output disaster 
model. This now has ample potential for further development (such as exploring the 
opportunities for linking with other approaches like CGE), and empirical application 
(fitting it to more practical needs and exploiting various sources of data). Last, but not 
least, we offered the exploration of the Dutch case of water and flood management, 
which provided the established methodological framework in the context of emerging 
risk approaches. This is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
In conclusion, we would like to stress once again that the approach to major 
disaster modelling offered in this thesis has been proposed as one of the possibilities to 
look at the processes behind a major calamity in modern societies. Clearly, we do not 
exclude that other modelling practices will be developed in this field. Nevertheless, we 
would like to emphasise that in developing this approach, we started from basic 
questions, initiating a study into the fundamental issues guiding disaster-modelling 
philosophy. Starting from the idea of circularity and circular flow within an economic 
system, we arrived at a comprehensive input-output logic for describing disastrous 
events in complex economic systems. We suggest that, having developed this approach, 
we built a solid foundation for further elaboration and construction of more complicated 
modelling tools to gain further insight into the complex interrelations of severe 
disturbances in contemporary economies. 
 
9.4. LIMITATIONS AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a number of issues that are likely to be included in the future research agenda 
of disaster events in modern economies. First of all, we addressed the importance of 
further integration between the many themes that must be addressed in disaster analysis. 
This also requires increased cooperation between the disciplines or sub-disciplines 
guarding the building blocks thereof. Arriving at an integrative approach would clearly 
require a further focus on inter- and sub-disciplinary work. 
Also, as we have seen, disasters have a definite geographic dimension. Therefore, 
location gets involved in a fundamental way. Here undoubtedly many new applications 
are awaiting us. There is also the temporal dimension. We pointed out that these aspects 
require additional sets of definitions and concepts. In our study, we also put forward that 
it is most important that there are at least some insights into the type of post-disaster 
economy to be aimed at. Here we encounter an entirely new set of questions facing the 
economic modeller. In model terms, this requires attention for different types of 
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multipliers, including, in fact, the whole gamut of semi-legal to completely illegal 
activities one often finds in the wake of a disaster – not addressed in this study. 
Mathematical programming techniques can also become important, whereby many 
accepted truths, such as the famous non-substitution theorem (Samuelson, 1951), may 
have to be re-invented.  
As we have seen, the input-output table plays a dominant role in our type of 
research. However, in future research, we may run into complex issues of adjustments 
of the table. For example, we may be forced to transfer parts of the disaster-related 
expenditures from the final demand column or columns to the appropriate column in the 
transactions table. This will directly influence our insights into the technological input 
requirements. It will also influence the estimations of the value-added part because what 
used to be accounted for as consumption now becomes part of intermediate demand, 
including the complicating presence of tax-subsidy and other price-affecting rules and 
regulations.  
Finally, it may be worthwhile to reflect on some specific connections with other 
economic sub-fields. International competitiveness and attractiveness of a country for 
businesses are, according to the insights of the New Economic Geography (NEG), 
heavily influenced by a specific set of factors. Nowadays the thought of filling the gap 
of ‘spacelessness’ of much of modern neoclassical economic theory is gaining impetus 
(see, for example Fujita and Thisse, 2002; as well as Stelder, 2005; Capello, 2007). We 
can apply NEG insights to see how spatial economic activity may be reshuffled after a 
major disturbance - like a vast flooding in the Netherlands. NEG proposes a distinction 
between regions characterised as ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’. This view is inspired by 
spatial effects, imperfect competition on the markets in different spatially distributed 
areas, and the transportation costs. At some point, the ‘centre’ becomes the area where 
concentration effects, which affect production as well as consumption, will take place. 
At that moment, increasing returns to scale production effects take over, thereby 
creating an amalgam of centripetal and centrifugal forces that attract more and more 
businesses and labour to the area. Depending on the scale of analysis, central and 
peripheral regions can be distinguished within a country (like the industrialised West in 
the Netherlands versus the East and the North), but also within a larger unit, like 
Europe, where the ‘Blue Banana’ often is taken to represent the agglomerated ‘centre’ 
(see Hospers and Steenge, 2002; Hospers, 2003).  
In this light, our analysis can be given another twist. NEG actually offers an 
explanation of accumulation and agglomeration effects, though it does not explain why 
‘centres’ are found at the locations where they developed. We can now suggest 
additional mechanisms for steering the way certain possibilities emerge for regions to 
gain the central position and how they can be realised. In this context, we have to 
consider if, after a disaster hits such a ‘central’ region, it will recover and maintain its 
position, or if the conditions will favour some now peripheral regions to gain more 
importance; will other agglomerations take over from the flooded ‘centre’? These are 
crucial questions to be answered. 
At the same time, a look at the map of Europe suggests that the Netherlands is a 
relatively small country, and the close proximity of the Ruhr-Rhine agglomeration can 
make a difference in this type of logic. Economic actors (businesses and possibly 
consumers), instead of moving their activities within the Netherlands, thereby in the end 
forming new ‘centres’, can also seriously consider the advantages of shifting their 
attention and locations to alternative ’saddle points’. Neighbouring Germany, France, 
Belgium and the UK are countries offering existing ‘clustering’ possibilities. 
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Links to modern Political Economy can also be considered. A significant change 
in policy will incur costs. Often these are fixed costs, associated with investments 
necessary for a change to take place, and produced in the short run, i.e. directly before 
and at the start of the change. These costs are not necessarily always expressed in 
monetary terms. One can think, for example, of efforts and means invested in basic 
research into the issue, bringing the issue to the top of the political agenda, as well as 
costs connected to implementation of the new policy or project. At least a part of these 
costs will become sunk costs, which are project-related and irrevocable. However, the 
benefits of the new approach are often monitored as a discounted flow of future 
benefits, usually in terms of lower operational costs. This means, that there is then a 
temporal gap between incurring the costs and reaping the benefits. This discrepancy can 
make politicians, who are elected for the office for a limited period of time, averse of 
taking decisions on significant changes in policy, because that would only increase 
costs, without benefits in the short run. Such a stalemate situation can lead to rigidity of 
policy, or, as it is sometimes referred to, ’path dependence’. This is argued inter alia in 
Pierson (2000, 2004), Woerdman (2004) and others.103 We can apply this argument here 
with regard to the pre-disaster preventive policies. It usually takes time and possibly a 
real disaster for the policy-makers to ‘invent’ a new approach to protection. In this 
sense, the situation in the Netherlands with respect to high water protection policy 
appears to reveal similar ‘path dependent’ characteristics.  
We saw in Chapter 8 that established current practices in flood protection policy in 
the Netherlands, namely the construction of a highly complex system of dykes, led to 
the emergence of very intense and steady perceptions in society on flood protection. 
Practiced for decades, this way of dealing with water has seemingly become customary, 
and by definition not subject to change. Further investigation into the matter probably 
would identify a certain rigidity of the dominating policy, i.e. a serious case of path 
dependency. Being ‘locked in’ for decades, new, more integrative approaches in 
thinking about floods are only slowly emerging (as discussed in Section 8.3 of Chapter 
8), and will need much time to mature into a real shift in action. A study of Van der 
Brugge, Rotmans and Loorbach (2004) points to a changing water management regime 
towards a more participatory style. Still the government has to supervise the emergence 
of conditions that will guarantee long run sustainability under circumstances of 
increasing climate pressures and expected socio-economic developments in the 
Netherlands. Gaining further insights into the political economy of decision-making 
applied to the case of Dutch water and flood management can also be a fruitful ground 
for further investigation. 
 
INSTEAD OF AN EPILOGUE 
In the context of hazard management, we also come across the concept of the ‘risk 
society’ emerging in the era of post-modernity, as introduced by Beck (1992) and 
Giddens (1990, 1999). We have briefly touched upon it in Chapter 1. We may see 
several shared elements between the principles underlying our approach, and the ones 
guiding the existence of the risk society, although the latter concentrate on the risks 
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 Although path dependency of political processes and policy formation is commonly explained by the 
existence of increasing returns in the political processes, it can be also argued that the rigidity is triggered 
by the so-called ‘sunk cost fallacy’.  
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generated by and within post-modern societies, abstracting in a sense from pre-
industrial hazards. In fact, one of the basic sources of increasing risk in modern societies 
nowadays is the ongoing accumulation of wealth, which inevitably becomes subject to 
various hazards. In our discussion of the Dutch situation in the highly developed and 
densely populated polders, we have also pointed to this phenomenon. In fact, natural 
hazards, when intertwined with human-induced systems with better welfare positions, 
also obtain higher devastating potential. In this sense, we must agree that any disaster is 
a result of the techno-economic development itself, as asserted by Beck (idem). 
Furthermore, risks in modern societies have acquired a new quality when repercussions 
occurring in the aftermath of a calamity are no longer tied to their place of origin. 
Namely, increasing complexity (and specialisation) triggers what Beck (1992, p.22) 
refers to as “the unknown and unintended consequences”, which seem to be akin in 
nature to the indirect effects that we are discussing. In fact, those effects that go beyond 
the directly damaged assets and property, as pointed out in Chapter 3, are subject to 
such interpretation in addition to ‘simple measurement’. Besides, in the theory of risk 
society, because of interconnectedness within modern systems, perceptions of personal 
risks seem to change, while the danger of group risk or even risks with global 
consequences is growing in potential. To this end, we suggest that an analysis of major 
calamities should be carried out in the context of an integrated approach, and the 
consequences of these should not be seen as a single discipline phenomenon, but as a 
complex event tied to a manifold of contexts and possessing a multiplicity of facets. 
This also means that an inquiry into such incidents requires an ability to have a broad 
overview of processes guarding the disaster, and thus asks for an appropriate scale of 
analysis. Finally, the content of risk concept in the risk society is directly connected to 
action, or, rather, pro-action. This is a consequence of the time component of risk and 
the anticipation of future threats, by means of which ‘not-yet-risk’ events become real 
today (which we touched upon in the light of the time span for decision-making in 
Chapter 8). This implies, in turn, that risk societies can be characterised by an explicit 
orientation towards prevention. In this sense, we need to anticipate the unexpected today 
(as put forward by Jones, 1997), and take action to prevent catastrophic consequences. 
Here, the future, and not the past, has the power to determine the present. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting  
_______________________________________ 
 
Deze dissertatie behandelt het thema van een grote ramp in een hoog ontwikkeld land. 
We kunnen daarbij denken aan een grote overstromingsramp in het Nederland van het 
begin van de eenentwintigste eeuw, maar ook aan een aardbevingsramp in Japan of in 
het Amerikaanse Californië. De vraag wanneer een ramp (of catastrofe, we zullen beide 
termen afwisselend gebruiken) ‘groot’ is, is een subjectieve, wij zullen slechts een 
aanduiding geven. Essentieel is dat de catastrofe het functioneren, direct of indirect, van 
aanzienlijke delen van de samenleving onmogelijk maakt, en het voor langere tijd zeer 
moeilijk maakt om op dezelfde, of vergelijkbare, voet voort te gaan. De nadruk in dit 
proefschrift ligt op de economische aspecten van een dergelijke ramp. Dergelijk 
onderzoek is veelal ingegeven door de wens om een goede methodiek te hebben om de 
schade te bepalen. Indien beschikbaar kan deze op haar beurt weer dienen als een 
vertrekpunt voor allerlei preventieve maatregelen (hoofdstuk 1).  
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de kernconcepten van het huidige catastrofenonderzoek 
besproken. We gaan in op de verschillende definities van een ramp, en komen tot een 
eigen definitie. Ook gaan we in op het ‘schaaleffect’, d.w.z. de rol die de omvang van 
de ramp speelt in verhouding tot aard en omvang van het getroffen gebied. De 
begrippen weerstandsvermogen (resilience) en aanpassingsvermogen (adaptability) 
komen ter sprake als aspecten van de economische veerkracht (coping capacity), 
evenals verschillende kwetsbaarheidbegrippen (vulnerability). Deze begrippen spelen 
alle een rol bij het omgaan met de dreiging van grote rampen in de context van wat 
volgens sommige onderzoekers een risicomaatschappij (risk society) is geworden. (Naar 
dit begrip wordt ook gerefereerd in het laatste hoofdstuk).  
In hoofdstuk 3 gaan we in op de gevolgen van catastrofes. Het onderzoek hiernaar 
vond zijn feitelijke start in empirisch onderzoek naar de gevolgen van een grote 
overstroming in het westelijk deel van ons land. Het ging daarbij om een veronderstelde 
dijkdoorbraak bij Rotterdam die grote delen van de provincie Zuid-Holland onder water 
zette. Aan ons was de taak om een calculatie uit te voeren naar de economische 
gevolgen van een dergelijke catastrofe. Bij de opzet werden wij allereerst 
geconfronteerd met de vraag wát wij precies wilden uitrekenen. Een grote ramp heeft 
vele aspecten, die allemaal bijzondere aandacht kunnen eisen. Al vrij spoedig echter 
bleek dat er op het heel specifieke terrein waarop wij ons begeven hadden (een ramp 
van een dergelijk kaliber), nauwelijks literatuur beschikbaar was. Dat wil zeggen, er 
was vrijwel geen literatuur naar de gevolgen van een grote tot zeer grote ramp in een 
moderne, geïndustrialiseerde, en sterk verstedelijkte omgeving.  
Niettemin, redelijk veel onderzoek is al beschikbaar naar de gevolgen van 
catastrofes, zij het op kleinere schaal. Bij een vooronderzoek bleek echter al vrij snel dat 
er geen eenduidigheid bestaat over wat precies zou moeten worden verstaan onder 
termen als schade en kosten, en, bijgevolg, de gevolgen van een ramp. De huidige 
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situatie wordt gekenmerkt door een grote mate van verschillen van inzicht. Dit uit zich 
in een veelheid aan begrippen, concepten en terminologie. Verder is er een veelheid aan 
invalshoeken voor calculaties rond ontstane schade, inclusief de 
verzekeringsproblematiek. Gaandeweg gaf dit vorm aan een van de grootste uitdagingen 
van ons onderzoek, n.l. om een samenhangend beeld te verkrijgen, in ons geval van een 
‘grote’ overstroming.  
  
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt ook een aantal punten betreffende de afbakening van de ramp in 
ruimte en tijd. Bij het bepalen van de gevolgen van een ramp is het van groot belang om 
een duidelijke begrenzing te hebben. Ook hier weer blijkt dat te maken keuzes veelal 
subjectief van aard zijn. Er zijn in ieder geval verschillende stadia te onderscheiden. 
Allereerst is daar de directe, post-catastrofe periode. Deze is veelal gekenmerkt door 
vaak onoverzichtelijke en ongestructureerde informatieverzorging, en het eerste opgang 
komen van noodhulp en opruimingswerkzaamheden. Na enige tijd zullen de meeste 
slachtoffers geborgen zijn, en bepaalde transport- en informatiekanalen deels weer 
beschikbaar zijn. Dat betekent echter nog lang niet dat de onderbroken economische 
bedrijvigheid ook weer op gang kan komen.  
Een kernonderscheid hier is dat tussen directe en indirecte schade. Onmiddellijk 
na een catastrofe is het duidelijk dat er zeer veel directe, ‘fysieke’ schade is. 
Woongebieden zijn getroffen en huizen zijn beschadigd of onbewoonbaar geworden. 
Hetzelfde geldt voor bedrijfsgebouwen of soms hele bedrijfsterreinen. Ook hier is veel 
zichtbare, directe schade. Bovenal is er het verlies aan menselijk leven, en er kunnen 
veel gewonden of zieken zijn. Verder is er het verlies aan dierlijk leven, al dan niet deel 
uitmakend van menselijke productieactiviteiten zoals agrarische bedrijven. Hiernaast is 
er de indirecte schade. Indien een bepaalde fabriek verloren is gegaan, betekent dat in 
ieder geval twee dingen: 1) een bedrijf dat leverde aan deze fabriek heeft zijn afnemer 
verloren, en 2) een bedrijf dat de producten van de betrokken fabriek afnam, wordt niet 
toegeleverd. Dit zijn voorbeelden van indirecte schade. De schade is echter groter omdat 
de gedupeerde toeleverancier en afnemer op hun beurt weer hun afspraken en contracten 
binnen het economische netwerk niet of slechts deels kunnen nakomen. Er ontstaat dus 
een golfbeweging door de economie die zijn invloed op alle sectoren kan hebben. Deze 
indirecte effecten kunnen een orde van grootte hebben die minstens vergelijkbaar is met 
de directe effecten. Er is wel één groot verschil: om de indirecte effecten te kunnen 
bepalen, is een model nodig. En dat vereist een visie op het functioneren van een 
economie.  
 
In deze studie willen we dus inzicht krijgen in de indirecte gevolgen van een grote 
ramp, en daarmee ook een interpretatiekader voor de directe gevolgen. Dit betekent dat 
we de beschikking moeten hebben over een model dat de voor ons doel belangrijke 
eigenschappen van een economie ordent en interpreteert. In deze dissertatie zullen we 
de getroffen economie interpreteren in termen van een netwerk bestaande uit 
producenten en consumenten, verbonden in een veelheid aan betrekkingen. Het netwerk 
bezit daarbij een bepaalde kern die regionaal of nationaal bepaald kan zijn, en die 
ingebed is in weer grotere, internationale netwerken.  
Het probleem is dat we eigenlijk niet geïnteresseerd zijn in het economische 
netwerk zelf, maar in de onderbreking, of het falen, ervan. Door de ramp kunnen delen 
van het netwerk niet meer, of nog slechts ten dele, functioneren. Ons doel is nu het 
interpreteren van de schade veroorzaakt door de ramp, en de daarmee verbonden kosten, 
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in termen van schade aan het netwerk. Dat wil zeggen, we zullen trachten aard en 
omvang van de schade uit te drukken in termen van de eigenschappen van het netwerk. 
We zullen hierbij weer gebruik maken van het onderscheid tussen directe en indirecte 
gevolgen. De directe gevolgen bestaan uit het ‘fysieke’ deel van de schade, zoals 
beschadigde of verloren gegane bebouwing en infrastructuur. De indirecte gevolgen 
betreffen dan de uitwerking hiervan op de rest van het netwerk zoals productieverlies 
‘elders’, et cetera. We zullen nu eerst kort ingaan op de achtergrond van het te 
modelleren netwerk, en daarna op de gemaakte modelkeuze.   
Hoofdstuk 4 plaatst ons werk in de context van modellen en modelexercities zoals 
die momenteel circuleren. We gaan in op studies die als de ‘Nederlandse School’ gezien 
kunnen worden. Er blijkt een veelheid aan studies te zijn, variërend over de gehele 
breedte van micro- naar macro-economisch georiënteerd onderzoek. Deels hebben deze 
ook betrekking op een andere omgang met de waterproblematiek, zoals in de recente 
besluitvorming rond ‘ruimte voor water’ (zie ook hoofdstuk 8). We bespreken ook werk 
uit de internationale literatuur waarin de problematiek van de modelkeuze ook naar 
voren komt. Tevens gaan we in op vraagstukken rond de afbakening van taken voor de 
overheid en voor de markt, mede in het licht van de modelkeuze. Inzichten rond de 
flexibiliteit van een economie blijken hierbij een significante rol te spelen.      
Economische modellen (waaronder alle door ons te hanteren modellen) hebben 
vaak een ingebouwd evenwichtsbegrip. Voor de economie als geheel vindt dit veelal 
zijn representatie in het concept van de economische kringloop als basisstructuur voor 
het hierboven aangeduide netwerkidee. De kringloop behoort tot de oudste en meest 
fundamentele concepten van de economische wetenschap. Het betreft hier het inzicht 
dat productie en consumptie samenhangen via markten voor productiefactoren (zoals 
arbeid), intermediaire en eindproducten, waarbij de productie van een bepaalde eenheid, 
hetzij het individuele bedrijf of een hele sector, de input produceert voor andere 
eenheden, hetzij direct, hetzij indirect. Het kringloopidee geldt ook voor ‘de 
consument’, die in ruil voor eindproducten zijn diensten aanbiedt. 
Een economisch netwerk kan op vele wijzen worden vormgegeven en 
gemodelleerd. Wij hebben gekozen voor een visie gebaseerd op de onderlinge 
betrekkingen tussen producenten (het ‘bedrijfsleven’), en consumenten (de zogeheten 
finale gebruikers) waarbij gezinshuishoudingen in de regel de grootste fractie vormen. 
(De term ‘finaal’ betekent hier dat de betreffende leveringen niet weer een input zijn in 
productieprocessen van de beschouwde economie). Op hun beurt leveren de gezinnen 
echter wel weer de noodzakelijke arbeid voor de bedrijven, waarmee een gesloten 
kringloop ontstaat. We zullen de productiekant van de economie nu beschouwen in 
termen van industrieën of sectoren, d.w.z. bedrijven geaggregeerd rond 
gemeenschappelijke kenmerken zoals soortgelijke producten of vergelijkbare 
productieprocessen. Ons analyseniveau is daarbij het meso-niveau van bedrijfstakken, 
waarbij opgemerkt moet worden dat de definitie van een bedrijfstak zeer flexibel 
bepaald kan worden, afhankelijk van het precieze doel van de studie. Deze optiek 
betekent wel dat we afgezien hebben van enerzijds een micro-economische optiek, 
waarbij de individuele producenten of consumenten centraal staan, en van anderzijds 
een geaggregeerde, macro-economische optiek. De reden hiervoor is dat een keuze voor 
het meso-niveau veel directer de relaties legt met het centraal staande concept van een 
economisch netwerk. (Niettemin, onze uiteindelijk gekozen methode is flexibel genoeg 
om zeer gedetailleerde geografisch georiënteerde (GIS) data te kunnen incorporeren, zie 
de hoofdstukken 5 en 7).  
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Het meso-niveau wordt vaak geassocieerd met de familie van multisectorale 
modellen. Wij hebben dit overgenomen, waarbij de term ‘multisectoraal’ ruim wordt 
geïnterpreteerd, d.w.z. zij omvat ook participanten die tot de finale-vraagcategorieën 
worden gerekend zoals, naast huishoudens, ook overheidsbestedingen, 
capaciteitsvergrotende bedrijfsinvesteringen en exporten. Hiernaast bestaan er 
verschillende typen multisectorale modellen, waarvan elk type weer andere 
eigenschappen beklemtoont. Ze hebben echter alle gemeen dat hun kerngrootheden 
bestaan uit aggregaten op meso-niveau. De modeltypen zelf variëren naar de mate 
waarin ‘rigiditeiten’ of ‘stabiliteiten’ aanwezig worden verondersteld tussen deze 
aggregaten. Productiefuncties vormen een voorbeeld van een rigiditeit in een 
multisectorale context. In termen van de hierna te behandelen modellen b.v. betekent dit 
dat de elementen van bepaalde matrixkolommen geïnterpreteerd worden als 
inputfactoren in een productiefunctie. Bij de hierna kort te bespreken limitationele of 
Leontief productiefuncties houdt dat in dat een vaste verhouding wordt gepostuleerd 
tussen bepaalde elementen in de matrixkolom. Dat wil zeggen, de inputfactoren worden 
gebruikt in een onderlinge verhouding die niet afhankelijk is van schaalgrootte of 
compositie van andere modelgrootheden. Het is een nog altijd punt van discussie of b.v. 
ook afzet- en verkooppatronen een dergelijke vast patroon vertonen. Indien men van 
mening is dat dat wel zo is, dan is dat een additionele ‘rigiditeit’. Naast rigiditeiten in de 
sfeer van productiefuncties, zullen wij ook de aanwezigheid van andere, meer 
institutioneel bepaalde rigiditeiten veronderstellen. Het gaat dan b.v. om constante of 
redelijke constante patronen in bepaald consumptiegedrag en in het beleid ten aanzien 
van werkgelegenheid. We geven nu een kort overzicht van de wijze waarop 
economische netwerken worden gemodelleerd. Het vertrekpunt vormt de notie van een 
industrie of sector.  
 
Industrieën zijn b.v. verschillende typen landbouw, lichte en zware industrie en vele 
typen diensten. Stel we gaan uit van een industrie genaamd ‘consumentenelectronica’. 
Statistische bureaus verzamelen per gebied (zoals een land of een regio daarbinnen) 
informatie over alle bedrijven die gerekend worden tot een bepaalde sector (zoals de 
consumentenelectronica). Vervolgens wordt, volgens bepaalde, internationaal 
afgesproken uitgangspunten, voor alle bedrijven in deze sector de informatie 
geaggregeerd naar ‘input’, de aankoop van bedrijven in andere sectoren, en naar 
‘output’, de leveringen aan bedrijven in andere sectoren. Indien we deze informatie 
ordenen in een kruistabel, dan resulteert dat, per sector, in een kolom van inputs en een 
rij van outputs. Als dit voor alle industrieën gebeurt, heeft men de beschikking gekregen 
over een zogeheten input-output tabel. Daarmee heeft men dan een overzicht van de 
onderlinge leveringen in de gehele economie in een bepaald jaar. De tabel is volledig als 
zij opgesteld is inclusief kolommen die de zogeheten finale leveringen aan gezinnen en 
overheid, de investeringen van bedrijven en de export weergeven. Corresponderend 
hiermee bevat een volledige tabel ook rijen waarin de lonen en salarissen, de 
afschrijvingen, importen en de belastingen en subsidies zijn weergegeven. De tabel 
weerspiegelt een evenwicht in de zin dat de totalen van overeenkomstige rijen en 
kolommen gelijk zijn.  
Men maakt de stap naar een input-output model als men verder aanneemt dat 
bepaalde onderlinge verhoudingen (redelijk) constant zijn over een aantal jaren, de 
hierboven al genoemde rigiditeiten (hoofdstukken 3 en 5). Heeft men deze 
gelocaliseerd, dan heeft men een uitgangsbasis verkregen om de effecten van 
veranderingen in bepaalde grootheden door te rekenen. In alle typen input-output model 
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staan de sectorale inputs (de kolommen in de input-output coëfficiënten matrix) 
centraal. Zij worden geïnterpreteerd in termen van een zogeheten limitationele of 
Leontief productiefunctie, waarin de verhoudingen tussen de input categorieën 
onafhankelijk zijn van omvang en aard van de finale vraag. Deze aanname geeft de 
noodzakelijke stabiliteit aan de coëfficiëntenmatrices, en maakt het mogelijk om de 
consequenties van wijzigingen in de finale vraag met behulp van scenario’s door te 
rekenen. Er is nog een ander punt hier van belang. Als gezegd, er bestaan nauwelijks 
modellen die gebouwd zijn rond het verbreken van onderlinge betrekkingen. De kern 
van een ramp zoals wij die wilden modelleren is juist het verbreken van de interne 
relaties. Dit betekent dat wij terug moesten gaan naar de onderliggende basisideeën. In 
ultieme zin is een input-output model niets anders dan een op een bepaalde manier 
geordende verzameling productiefuncties gekenmerkt door constante verhoudingen. Op 
deze eigenschap met name is een beroep gedaan bij het modelleren van de gevolgen van 
een ramp.     
 
Centraal verder is het onderscheid tussen endogene variabelen (waarvan de waarde door 
het model wordt bepaald), en exogene variabelen (waarvan de waarde door factoren 
buiten het model wordt bepaald). In een open input-output model worden de waarden 
van de finale bestedingen als exogeen genomen. Dit opent de mogelijkheden tot het 
bepalen van de impact van b.v. Keynesiaans vraagstimulerend beleid in termen van de 
vereiste productieverhoging in bepaalde sectoren, en de daarmee verbonden 
werkgelegenheid. Het model biedt hierbij tevens de mogelijkheid tot het bepalen van 
prijseffecten. In gesloten input-output modellen worden de onderlinge verhoudingen 
tussen alle sectoren (in overeenstemming met een bepaald evenwichtsbegrip – waarover 
later meer) endogeen bepaald, waarbij vaak slechts de niveaus exogeen zijn.  
Het input-output model is eveneens gebaseerd op het gegeven van de economische 
kringloop als weergave van het netwerkidee. Voor ons is van belang dat in open 
Leontief modellen de kringloop wordt gekenmerkt door vastliggende verhoudingen 
tussen de sectorale productieniveaus, gegeven de exogeen bepaalde finale vraag. Voor 
gesloten modellen ligt dit anders, zie hieronder.  
Het input-output model is een multisectoraal model. Er zijn echter meerdere typen 
multisectorale modellen, elk met een eigen theoretische grondslag. De modellen van 
Leontief zijn waarschijnlijk het meest bekend, maar er zijn een aantal andere. Ook 
bestaan er binnen de op Leontief georiënteerde groep van modellen weer verschillende 
subtypen. Een alternatief is het model van Von Neumann. In de opzet hebben beide 
modeltypen veel gemeen. De basis b.v. is de productiefunctie, die op een 
gestandaardiseerde manier input en output van een bepaald proces weergeeft. Bij 
Leontief handelt het dan om productieprocessen die één enkel product of output 
produceren, waarbij tevens geldt dat elk product slechts op één karakteristieke manier 
geproduceerd kan worden. Bij Von Neumann kunnen dat meerdere outputs tegelijk zijn, 
terwijl tevens Leontiefs één op één betrekking ontbreekt. Hiertegenover staat dat 
Leontiefs model empirisch van zeer grote betekenis is. Er bestaat zeer veel empirisch 
materiaal waarbij opgemerkt moet worden dat ook de Nationale Rekeningen een input-
output kern bezitten (al heeft die ook eigenschappen die aan Von Neumann herinneren). 
We wilden een model dat in principe op elk gewenst aggregatieniveau kan 
opereren. Dat wil zeggen, een model waarin door aggregatie van kleinere eenheden, 
grotere eenheden tot stand kunnen komen; uiteraard wel met behoud van de onderlinge 
betrekkingen. De moderne systemen voor de compilatie van input-output tabellen laten, 
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desgewenst, een grote mate van ruimtelijke disaggregatie toe. Dat wil zeggen, het is met 
een grote mate van betrouwbaarheid mogelijk om een ruimtelijke component toe te 
voegen aan de gebezigde productieparameters. De huidige geografische 
informatiesystemen (GIS) kunnen hierbij de noodzakelijke additionele informatie 
verstrekken. Dit is van groot belang bij het vaststellen van de omvang van een eventuele 
ramp voor wat betreft verlorengegane economische capaciteit. Het is momenteel b.v. 
mogelijk om met een grote mate van precisie de ontstane toestand ‘op de grond’ na een 
grote dijkdoorbraak weer te geven aan de hand van gedetailleerd kaartenmateriaal. De 
kaarten zijn gebaseerd op de kenmerkende eigenschappen van het land, zoals 
hoogteverschillen, fysieke barrières in zowel de stedelijke als de landelijke gebieden, 
enz., informatie die gecombineerd kan worden met gedetailleerde economische data (de 
hoofdstukken 5 en 7).  
 
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 5 wordt het basis Leontief model geïntroduceerd. Hoofdstuk 3 
doet dit in relatie tot het kringloopbegrip zoals dat in het basismodel zijn weerslag heeft 
gevonden. Geïntroduceerd worden de kernvergelijkingen [3.1] en [3.2]. Vergelijking 
[3.1] beschrijft de totale productie (x) als de som van intermediaire leveringen (Ax) en 
finale vraag (f); een grafische interpretatie is gegeven in hoofdstuk 6 in context van 
homogene en niet-homogene schokken. De hiermee corresponderende 
werkgelegenheid, uitgesplitst over de industrieën, wordt gegeven door [3.2]. Het model 
beschrijft het intermediaire verbruik en de totale productie als een functie van de 
samenstelling en omvang van de finale vraag f. Het model is veel gebruikt bij empirisch 
onderzoek om de impact van veranderingen ∆f op het intermediaire verbruik (A∆x) en 
de totale productie (∆x) te berekenen.  
In hoofdstuk 6 bespreken we de modellering van de impact van de catastrofe. We 
gaan daarbij uit van een evenwichtssituatie vlak voor de catastrofe, gemodelleerd 
volgens Leontief. Dat wil zeggen, alle interne verhoudingen binnen de economie 
stemmen overeen met een bepaalde, gegeven finale vraag. De situatie kort na de 
catastrofe wordt in eerste instantie gemodelleerd in termen van gewijzigde sectorale 
productiecapaciteiten. Een deel van de bedrijven zal niet meer kunnen functioneren. Dat 
betekent dat voor de getroffen sectoren de bestaande outputniveaus naar beneden 
moeten worden bijgesteld. In ons model wordt uitgegaan van een capaciteitsverlies van 
100γi procent voor een willekeurige sector i. Op dezelfde manier zal de bestaande 
werkgelegenheid eveneens naar beneden moeten worden bijgesteld. Omdat de γi’s per 
industrie zullen verschillen, zullen in de onmiddellijke post-catastrofe periode de nog 
bestaande capaciteiten naar verwachting niet meer de interne verhoudingen bezitten die 
nodig zijn om aan de vraag te voldoen van diegenen die na de ramp nog een werkplek 
bezitten. Deze post-catastrofe situatie van interne disproporties wordt modelmatig 
weergegeven door de zogeheten ‘Basic equation’, vergelijking [6.18]. Deze vergelijking 
‘lijkt op’ een basis input-output vergelijking van het type [3.1]. Zij is het echter niet, 
omdat de geïmpliceerde input coëfficiënten geen bestaande technologieën voorstellen.  
De Basic equation vormt het vertrekpunt voor de analyse van post-catastrofe 
hersteltrajecten. Vanuit dit vertrekpunt kunnen, vanzelfsprekend, vele trajecten worden 
ingezet. Op dit punt zal het getroffen land zich moeten realiseren wélk hersteltraject zij 
precies wil inzetten. Vanwege mogelijke onoverzichtelijkheid en disorganisatie tijdens 
de onmiddellijke post-catastrofe periode is het daarbij van groot belang dat het land 
reeds een portfolio bezit van eventueel beschikbare scenario’s. Het is verder van groot 
belang dat er politieke overeenstemming bestaat over de richting waarin de 
reconstructie wordt gezocht. In termen van ons model betekent dat dat de getroffen 
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economie enig inzicht moet hebben in de gewenste interne sectorale verhoudingen. We 
hebben gezien dat in de precatastrofe situatie de interne verhoudingen een functie waren 
van de finale vraag. Hier nu doemen twee problemen op, n.l. 1) is het in de nieuw 
ontstane situatie nog steeds zo dat samenstelling en omvang van de finale vraag nog 
altijd richtinggevend zijn? en 2) indien zo, zijn de gewenste proporties nog wel 
realistisch?  
 
Bij de verdere discussie zijn wij uitgegaan van het gegeven dat het getroffen gebied 
kiest voor een ‘strategie’ om zo spoedig mogelijk weer een levensvatbare economie te 
hebben. Wij hebben die gedefinieerd in termen van een kringloop gebaseerd op intern 
consistente productie-elementen. Uitgaande van een scenariokeuze gebaseerd op een 
bepaalde finale-vraagcompositie dient zich ook hier weer een keuze aan. Indien de 
economie er voor zou kiezen om de finale vraag te wijzigen, b.v. als antwoord op de 
gewijzigde productiemogelijkheden, dan verandert daarmee ook het patroon van 
vereiste sectorale capaciteiten. De zo gewenste interne afstemming tussen 
mogelijkheden en gewenste netto productie kan in een dergelijke configuratie misschien 
gerealiseerd worden. Waarschijnlijk is dit echter niet, en moet er gericht gestuurd 
worden om de juiste proportionaliteiten te bewerkstelligen. De situatie wordt voor 
enkele gevallen grafisch weergegeven in de figuren van hoofdstuk 6 en later wiskundig 
in termen van het Von Neumann model, ditmaal in termen van een economische 
contractie. We ontmoeten ook hier weer een keuzeprobleem, waarbij we uit de vele 
mogelijkheden er één hebben gekozen, n.l. het herstel van de status quo ante. Dat wil 
zeggen, we hebben gekozen voor een finale-vraagcompositie van dezelfde 
samenstelling als voor de ramp. Hiermee ligt het model vast en kunnen eventuele 
berekeningen uitgevoerd worden.  
In onze modelexercitie hebben we ons (louter) gericht op die activiteiten die 
gericht waren op het herstellen van de rol van het economische netwerk. Dat betekende 
dat we allerlei uiterst belangrijke activiteiten rond opruiming en herstel enkel 
meegenomen hebben voorzover die een rol spellen bij de gerichte reconstructie.  
Modelmatig wordt, in hoofdstuk 6, het (open) model geherformuleerd in termen 
van het reële loon (real wage). Dit is mogelijk omdat het loon per sector, betaald in een 
monetaire eenheid, onmiddellijk door de werknemers wordt omgezet in de fysieke 
aankoop van een consumptiegoederenbundel. Omdat alle werknemers geacht worden 
dezelfde preferenties te bezitten én hetzelfde loon ontvangen, kan aan elke industrie een 
reëel loon worden toegerekend evenredig aan de werkgelegenheid die de sector biedt. 
Wiskundig betekent dit dat we een nieuwe input coëfficiënten matrix krijgen, M, die de 
som is van matrix A en van een nieuwe matrix, H, die het reële loon weergeeft. Het 
model krijgt hierbij de wiskundige vorm van een gesloten Leontief model, reeds 
geïntroduceerd in [3.6]. In de secties 6.6 en 6.7 wordt aangetoond dat dit model ook 
geïnterpreteerd kan worden als een speciaal geval van Von Neumann’s befaamde 
groeimodel.  
Bij deze interpretatie is de samenstelling van de finale vraag van belang. Indien 
deze in de volgende perioden niet verandert, en als ook de technologieën niet 
veranderen, verandert er qua verhoudingen niets in de economie. In dat geval kan het 
open Leontief model ook geïnterpreteerd worden als een gesloten (Leontief) model. 
Echter, een dergelijk Leontief model is ook te zien als een Von Neumann groeimodel 
met speciale ‘Leontief’ kenmerken (n.l. enkelvoudige productie en geen alternatieve 
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productieprocessen per goed). Dit bijzondere model is ons uiteindelijke model 
geworden omdat het op een directe manier contractieverschijnselen modelleert.  
 
Hoofdstuk 7 bespreekt eerder empirisch onderzoek naar een grote overstromingsramp in 
het hoogontwikkelde westelijk deel van Nederland. Het bestaande watermanagement 
systeem wordt in het kort besproken in termen van dijkringen en veiligheidsmaatstaven. 
Dit is de omgeving waarin de hypothetische case van een dijkdoorbraak bij Rotterdam 
is geplaatst. De gekozen methodologie van het onderzoek is gebaseerd op een GIS 
analyseapparaat gecombineerd met een data transformatiesysteem. Informatie met 
betrekking tot werkgelegenheid wordt ‘vertaald’ in een vorm die een band legt met 
input-output data. We hebben de rekenexercitie herhaald tegen de achtergrond van ons 
nieuw ontwikkelde Leontief-Von Neumann model. We bediscussiëren de verschillende 
aggregatiemethodieken die ter beschikking staan, en gaan in op de methodologische 
achtergrond van alternatieve uitkomsten.      
 
Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft een aantal aspecten van de actuele situatie in ons land. Het blijkt 
dat een paradigmawijziging langzamerhand zichtbaar wordt. De aloude wijsheid om het 
water als de belangrijkste vijand te zien, een wijsheid die teruggaat op een eeuwenoude 
traditie, verliest geleidelijk aan haar macht. Het huidige systeem van bescherming tegen 
het water gaat terug op het Delta Plan, opgesteld na de vernietigende vloed van 1953. 
De calculaties rond het Deltaplan gebaseerd op het werk van Van Dantzig waren gericht 
op het minimaliseren van overstromingskansen in een dynamische context van gerichte 
investeringen. Hier vinden we de aanzetten tot een wijziging in de grondhouding door 
een nieuw type risico management. Dit is een reactie op de grote vlucht die de 
Nederlandse economie heeft genomen gedurende de laatste decennia. Die betekende dat 
datgene wat beschermd werd door het dijkenstelsel een steeds hogere economische 
waarde kreeg, de variabele E in de formule R = P x E. Hierbij staat R voor het 
economische risico dat wordt gelopen en P voor de waarschijnlijkheid op een 
overstroming. De variabele P heeft momenteel wel zijn laagste niveau bereikt. Echter, 
de waarde van E stijgt voortdurend door de (nog altijd) exponentiële ontwikkeling. Dit 
betekent dat het risico, het product van P en E, voortdurend stijgt. Dit vraagt om nieuw 
beleid bij een aantal fundamentele kwesties. 
 
In het laatste hoofdstuk sluiten we af, en zien we vooruit. We hebben nogmaals het 
belang beklemtoond van een zo veel mogelijk uniforme methodologie bij onderzoek 
naar catastrofes. We hopen dat ons onderzoek daartoe een bijdrage kan leveren. Een 
aantal punten dient, uiteraard, nader te worden bekeken in andere contexten. Onze focus 
op de economische kringloop en de interpretatie van een ramp in termen van een 
verstoring van die kringloop vormt een dergelijk punt. Ook het belang dat we toegekend 
hebben aan bepaalde rigiditeiten in de economische en sociaal-maatschappelijke 
structuur van een land vraagt om nader onderzoek, evenals de verdere uitwerking van 
het kostenbegrip, nu gelieerd aan de verstoorde kringloop. Van groot belang lijkt ons 
het ontwikkelen van een aantal scenario’s voor de onmiddellijke post-catastrofe periode. 
Deze scenario’s zouden dan, idealiter, moeten worden opgesteld in de context van 
nationale besluitvorming rond thema’s ten aanzien waarvan duidelijke keuzes moeten 
worden gemaakt. Moderne inzichten rond risico management en de risk society zullen 
hier een centrale rol spelen.  
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Tenslotte, we hebben aangegeven dat we ook veel punten niet of niet uitvoerig 
hebben kunnen behandelen. Wellicht het meest belangrijke punt daarbij is dat onze 
methodologie, ontwikkeld in de Leontief-Von Neumann traditie, zeker nadere toetsing 
vereist, waarbij een dergelijke toetsing ook meteen een toets is voor de flexibiliteit van 
het input-output raamwerk. Kernpunt hier zal in ieder geval zijn onderzoek naar de 
aanwezigheid en de aard van rigiditeiten –van welke aard dan ook- in de moderne, 
multisectorale wereld. 
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